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
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ARTICLES

AN INQUIRY INTO PERSONHOOD*

MARY T. CLARK

THERE IS NO BELIEF CIRCULATING TODAY of ideas having come full-blown from the head of Zeus, least of all the idea of person. This concept has had a long evolution. This does not mean that nothing distinctive of human being was recognized until the term "person" was philosophically clarified. Recognition of human traits appeared in literature long before the word "person" was commonly used to denote an individual human being. It took the form of referring (implicitly or explicitly) to certain human characteristics, such as rationality, or to aspects shared with other entities, such as individuality. The possessor of such characteristics was generally denoted by words other than our now familiar term, "person."

I

The Hebrew Scriptures reveal that for the Hebrews the physical body was fundamental. In thinking of human existence they did not isolate mental processes from sense reactions and bodily feelings. The word "heart" was often used instead of a personal pronoun. In Judges 19, "Comfort thy heart with a morsel of bread" means "Give yourself comfort." In Exodus 33:14, "My face will go with thee," means "I will go with thee." The word *ruah*, or spirit, denoting breath or wind, referred to anyone who by physical energy and mental alertness was full of life. In many cases the word "heart" was used to bring together the feelings, motives, intentions, and other

* Presidential Address to the Metaphysical Society of America, Villanova University, March 13, 1992.

aspects of an individual as a whole. The word "heart" referred to psychic activity, not merely to a physical organ.¹

In later biblical times certain aspects of the prophets² and the people are highlighted. In the community of Israel the personal "I" is important. The prophet articulates insight into God's wishes, and individuals respond or do not. We are shown the human being as a moral agent, and behavior as internally molded. The prophet's pleading is for something of great value, the very selves of the listeners. The choice is between the fountain of living water and broken cisterns that can hold no water—a human fulfillment or a self-dissolution. There needs to be an understanding of disaster and a response from within. Jeremiah gives this warning: "And you, O desolate one, what do you mean that you dress in scarlet, that you deck yourself with ornaments of gold, that you enlarge your eyes with paint: in vain you beautify yourself."³ The Hebrews knew that God was not concerned with appearances but with the heart, their metaphor for person.

II

Homer, a prephilosophical Greek thinker, described many activities which we today call personal. In the *Iliad*, thinking and feeling and deciding are attributed to the human being. Moreover, many words such as *thymos*, *menos*, *etor*, *ker*, *kradie*, *phen/phenes*, and *nous*, which denote functions, are used to personify the agent.⁴ The ability of these words to substitute for one another provides for David B. Claus⁵ the clue that they have a unity of meaning like "the individual agent" which is not derived from some identification with some bodily organ or process. Thus Claus rejects the widely

¹ See Hans Walter Wolff, *Anthropology of the Old Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974).

² See Timothy Polk, *The Prophetic Persona: Jeremiah and the Language of the Self* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1984). Cf. S. J. L. Croft, *The Identity of the Individual in the Psalms* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987).

³ *Jeremiah* 4:30, as quoted in Polk, *The Prophetic Persona*, 46.

⁴ A. W. H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 22. Cf. R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge: University Press, 1954).

⁵ David B. Claus, *Toward the Soul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 7. Cf. Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of Mind* (New York: Harper, 1950).

held view of Bruno Snell that the Homeric characters are fragmented, with a man amounting to a mere aggregate of functions, open to the play of circumstances and the deeds of the gods. Claus calls into question the old view that primitive man did not act like a rational agent but was a field for the play of psychological and divine forces.

Only later, between Homer and the fifth century B.C., did the terms "body" and "soul" evolve so that Homer's eschatological *psyche* began to designate the soul as a whole; and the word *soma* was gradually used for the living body instead of a corpse. Although the holistic use of *psyche* may not have resulted completely from sixth century Pythagoreanism, the latter stimulated a new use of *psyche*.⁶ The Pythagorean teaching of the significance of number as a principle of knowledge, of cosmic order, and of harmony in human life (private and public) relates to an intellectual and moral aspect of the human soul, today called self-transcendence. Pythagoreans emphasize a right relation between soul and body and between human beings, that is, friendship. The implication of a judgment followed by transmigration accented individual responsibility while it failed to appreciate the intimate relation of body and soul.

John Burnet is surely not right in concluding that *psyche* or "self" came into being only with Socrates.⁷ Previous philosophers had widened *psyche* from the Homeric life-force into an intellectual and moral agent. Heraclitus spoke of the "dry soul as wisest and best."⁸ Moreover, the medical tradition indicated an intimacy between soul and body by recommending soul therapy to cure the body, and health guides to improve the soul.⁹

III

Plato combined the Homeric view of the *psyche* as an animating function with the fifth century view of *psyche* as the seat of thought,

⁶ Claus, *Toward the Soul*, 13-26.

⁷ John Burnet, "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul," in his *Essays and Addresses* (London: Chatto and Windus 1929), 140.

⁸ Heraclitus, frag. 118 Diels (trans. K. Freeman). See also, "It is hard to fight against impulse; whatever it wishes, it buys at the expense of soul"; frag. 85 Diels.

⁹ Claus, *Toward the Soul*, 153-5.

desire, and will, and with the Pythagorean view of its capacity for transcendence. This comprehensive Platonic view appears in the early dialogues, especially in the *Apology* and *Crito*. In the *Alcibiades* the soul is presented as merely spiritual and cognitive without relationship to body. In the *Phaedo*, however, the cognitive function is not isolated from the animating function. The unity of the individual is made apparent in the *Crito*, with the unification of the moral and the animating soul;¹⁰ in the *Laches*, with the unification of morality and knowledge;¹¹ and in the *Laws*, with the subordination of life-functions to thought and feeling.¹²

Plato's philosophical approach to personhood is best shown in the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus*, where the *psyche* is directly created by the Demiurge upon the model of the Good for union with body. Plato does not make the sharp distinction, which begins with Aristotle and which is found in later Platonism, between *Nous* and *Psyche*; nor is the Platonic attitude here toward bodies as hostile as sometimes stated. For Plato, even the gods have bodies. Human souls will eventually return to star-bodies. On earth they had a mission of introducing rational order to make the temporal world the best possible likeness of the divine. The *Republic* is an effort to create the community that can achieve this. Thus Plato, like some of his predecessors, recognizes as aspects of human beings not only self-consciousness and responsibility (myth of Er), but relatedness and friendship, as the basis of justice (*Symposium* and *Republic*). Recall also the myth of Protagoras where the gift of friendship comes from Zeus.

Above all in the *Phaedrus* Plato recognizes as distinctive of human beings the power over their own being through choice.¹³ Speaking of the return to the world of Forms, he refers to a self-determination, deciding not merely about an action but about oneself. Souls must decide whom they want to be by choosing a special god to imitate. In that choice the soul takes on a special character. Then the choices in the cycle of incarnations are made by souls who have increased their own uniqueness. Plato here distinguishes be-

¹⁰ The really important thing is not to live but to live well; *Crito* 48b.

¹¹ *Laches* 185e.

¹² *Laws* 896e-897b.

¹³ See C. L. Griswold, *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.)

tween what one is and who one is. In the myth of the charioteer he shows the soul's interiority absorbed in moral conflict. The natural desire for the good is there, but only a persuasive knowledge can unify the soul and insure its self-possession so that it can engage in friendship in the light of true beauty. Reason guides feeling and blind desires. Only reason knows what is good for the whole man. The person is bettered by following right reason which is not opposed to the good of the individual human being.

IV

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle mentions important aspects of personhood.¹⁴ He analyzes human nature in all its powers in *De anima*. It is clear to Aristotle that the human soul and body are essential to what we call the human person. In the *Categories*, the individual is described as a numerical unity; it is without parts and yet is a numerical part of a species. Although itself indivisible, this logical individual is part of a higher reality. In the *Metaphysics*, however, Aristotle denies that genera and species really exist. Therefore, only individuals exist: substances or accidents. Individual substances are never part of anything else. The name "substance" is given to nonaccidental individuals to signify their independent existence, their agency, their support of accidents. Accidents and actions are intrinsic to substances. The notion of substance as static is a non-Aristotelian notion, a notion that derives from Locke and his modern successors. James Felt has shown in an extended study that Aristotle conceives substances as dynamic and interrelated.¹⁵ Becoming, as analyzed by Aristotle, is intrinsic development. In the *Metaphysics* he states that "pure form" is

¹⁴ *Nicomachean Ethics* 78a-b, 1112a18-1113a16, 1100a10-1101a21.

¹⁵ James Felt, "Whitehead's Misconception of 'Substance' in Aristotle," in *Process Studies*, 14 (Winter 1985): 224-336. See also *Physics* 202b6-8: "It is not absurd that the actualization of one thing should be in another. Teaching is the activity of a person who can teach, yet the operation is performed on some patient"; and *Metaphysics* 1075a16-23: "The world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are all connected." Cf. Reto L. Fetz, *Whiteheade: Prozess Denken und Substanz-metaphysik* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1981). Three chapters of this are translated by James Felt, *Process Studies*, 19.1, 19.3, 20.1.

primary substance;¹⁶ in its own way it is an individual. He also calls the form of a natural object a "this."¹⁷ The form designates capacity and remains the same through changing matter.¹⁸ Natural objects are also substances. The name "substance" is loosely applied to matter as a potential object, as well as to artifacts. Forms themselves are not subject to substantial change. The individuation of the human being's soul-form does not eliminate its essential nature which all human beings share, but adds a relationship to matter indistinctly quantified which individuates it. Pure forms are different as forms. All substances are individual,¹⁹ although not all individuals are substances. Such entities were called things or beings, but no ontological actuality called "being" has, for Aristotle, an actualizing role.²⁰ Human substances are given by Aristotle many personal characteristics: aspiration, deliberation, free choice, virtue, friendship. Some say that he identifies the human being with mind, such as at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*; but it can be said that if you accept the Arabic interpretation of *De anima* 3.5, he has removed from the human being the individual intellect for which one receives the name "person."

V

Plotinus, unlike the classical Greek thinkers, indicates that the differences among human beings are spiritual. He investigates the metaphysical foundation of such differences by exploring the transcendent. His equivalent words for the term "person" are *autos* or *hemeis* or *anthropos*. Among the triad of the One, the *Nous*, the All-Soul, he places the Platonic forms in the *Nous*. For Plato, we know, such forms are universal, albeit concrete ones. Plotinus, however, says the following:

No, there can not be the same forming principle for different individuals, and one man will not serve as model for several men differing

¹⁶ *Metaphysics* 1029b-1030b, 1037a, 1041a.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1037a25-26, 1037a28-30.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1039b24-26, 1070a22ff.

¹⁹ Cf. S. R. Dickerson, *Comparison of Aristotle and Strawson on the Concept of a Person* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms), 1980, 1-161.

²⁰ *Metaphysics* 1040b21-40, 1028a21-44. See also Thomas Aquinas, *On Separate Substances* 8.44: "For the existence of a thing is neither its form nor its matter" (my translation).

from each other not only by reason of their matter but with a vast number of special differences of form. Men are not related to their form as portraits of Socrates are to their original, but their different structures must result from different forming principles.²¹

It is clear that Plotinus considers this uniqueness a value. The higher part of the human soul remains in the intelligible realm but it truly belongs to a unique human being. Transcending oneself by identifying with one's higher self as an intelligence open to truth is characteristic only of human beings meant for eventual union with the One. The union occurs through *eros* for the Infinite Good freely consented to. This union is open to all, and those who fail to attain it should not blame their heredity or environment. On this point A. H. Armstrong notes the following:

Socrates as a person in his metaphysical reality would only begin to appear and be fully operative when he began to make something of what his country and city and period and parents and bodily nature had given him, to use his circumstances as material for free and responsible moral decisions and to find in them the way back to self-realization and self-transcendence.²²

Without using the term *prosopon* (his substantive equivalent is *psyche* or "this soul"), Plotinus retains aspects of personhood of which Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics were aware, and adds a special relationship of the human soul to the Transcendent. He expresses amazement at the great dignity, which so many ignore, of human souls. Plotinus speaks of the historical human being which includes the body.²³ The self is not without its vegetative, sensitive, intellectual levels, and it must choose with which level to identify. By its dominant way of life the soul makes itself to be alive on one of these levels. One should not become so preoccupied with organizing the sensible world that one fails to look within and discover one's *Nous*. Only on the level of *Nous* one can become aware of the Good.²⁴ By returning to one's highest level one identifies with transcendent *Nous* and is enabled to experience the Good to whom one is dynamically related. One then becomes totally oneself and as an individual

²¹ *Enneads* 5.7.1., in Plotinus, *Enneads*, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

²² A. H. Armstrong, "Form, Individual, and Person in Plotinus," *Dionysius* 1 (1977): 49-69.

²³ *Enneads* 4.3.27, 4.8.18, 4.7.1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.6.5.

person can act in the world as provident for all of reality. This universal mission takes precedence over concern merely for one's own body.

VI

A number of scholars attribute to the theological tradition the sharpening of the distinction between person and nature, although that tradition never separated them. Although the word *prosopon* was probably used by Panaetius²⁵ in the second century B.C. in his work *On Duties*, which led Cicero to distinguish between human nature and the individual human being in *De officiis*, this word did not then become strictly philosophical as it did with inquiries into the Incarnation of Christ (one divine person acting through two natures) and into the Trinity (three divine persons in one being).

This philosophical investigation of the person-reality leading to a general concept of person is a paradigm case for the historical reality of Christian philosophy. Etienne Gilson says that he would "call Christian, every philosophy which, although keeping the two orders formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason."²⁶

Divine Revelation stimulates interest in special topics such as God and man and their relationship. Christian philosophy is a stage of knowledge between faith in God and the vision of God, namely, a stage of faith plus an understanding achieved by reason. As noted, the Greeks promoted a philosophical understanding of many aspects of personhood. Gilson remarks that "because they never denied the reality of the individual, the Greeks opened the way for the Christian recognition of the eminent worth of the person; not only did they not prevent it or even simply retard it, they did a great deal to forward its success."²⁷ They did not, however, directly ask, What does it mean to be a person? Thus Gilson thinks that Chris-

²⁵ See Cornelia J. de Vogel, "The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought," in *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 20-60.

²⁶ Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Scribners, 1940), 37.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 189.

tian thinkers were the first to explore explicitly the reality of personhood.

In agreement with Gilson today is John D. Zizioulas, a Greek Orthodox bishop and theologian who claims that a theology of personhood directly prepared the way for a philosophical understanding of personhood.²⁸ He argues that the term *prosopon* had no ontological content in the Greek classical world. It referred to a mask, something added to one's being, or it referred to the eyes.²⁹ Thus an ontological content to the term *prosopon* in the Greek tradition was given through the effort to express one's understanding of faith in a triune God. To say that God is Father, Son, and Spirit, without ceasing to be one God, is to say that each is the same Being/Substance (*ousia*). The Greek Fathers used the word *hypostasis* (a term that meant a concrete existent like Aristotle's first, as distinct from second, substance) to assert that each of the Three really existed. In using their word *hypostasis*, which was equivalent to *ousia*, the Greek Fathers, according to Zizioulas, provided ontological content to the word *prosopon*, the Greek equivalent for *persona*. *Prosopon*, like *persona*, was associated with mask, and the Greeks considered it a word that was too weak to stand for the subject "I." They resisted using it for fear that it would signify God in three roles and so lead to Sabellianism. This concern about Sabellianism, that is, considering the divine Three as modes or faces of one substance, led to making the word *prosopon* and the word *persona* ontological terms in theology rather than theatrical or cultic terms. The Latin fourth century theologians did not share the Greek fear in using *persona*, for they were aware not only of its use by Hippolytus and Tertullian in discussing the Trinity, but of its use in grammar to denote various speaking voices, its Roman legal use to denote those who could bring their claims to court, and its everyday use in the Latin world to denote a human being. They did not want *persona*, however, when referred to the Trinity, to denote incommunicable substance. Pierre Hadot reports that already a fourth-century Latin grammarian said that "person is a rational substance."³⁰

²⁸ John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion* (New York: St. Vladimir's Press, 1985).

²⁹ H. Stephanus, *Thesaurus Graeca Linguae*, vol. 6, col. 2048.

³⁰ Pierre Hadot, "De Tertullien à Boèce," in *Problèmes de la personne* (Paris: Mouton, 1973), 123-34.

From the fourth century on, *prosopon* and *hypostasis* became interchangeable, as can be seen especially in the Council of Chalcedon. In their liturgy the Greek Orthodox theologians continued to prefer *hypostasis*, understood as the total subject. The Latin theologians, however, recognized that in using the term *persona* in a Trinitarian context as meaning a distinct possessor of one divine substance, the distinction of divine persons had to have a different origin from that of human persons who are substantially different. In studying Scripture the Church Fathers realized that what distinguished the Three was paternity, filiation, and procession—all divine without temporal priority. The divine persons are primordial. Divine being is therefore personal being—being common to Three: one divine unity, each of the Three distinguished by its proper relation to the others, relations that are internal to the Divine Being, not accidental.

The Greek Fathers taught that by grace, or the gift of love (*agape*) communicated by the Holy Spirit, human persons are deified and called to communion in Trinitarian life. In patristic thought, both Eastern and Western, the human person is better understood from above than from below. The human person, according to Genesis, is an image and likeness of God. The term “image” meant that man could receive God; a person is *capax Dei*. The term “likeness” had to do with the love expressed through interpersonal relations. Through love the human person is, as it were, like God in being creative of others by actions that are loving and promotive. Such likeness can remain undeveloped or be lost. Thus, patristic theologians made a contribution to the evolution of our understanding of personhood by their sustained reflection on persons, divine and human, as distinct possessors of intellectual and loving being.

VII

Augustine of Hippo is a fourth-century Western Church Father who attempts to clarify the use of the word “person” to denote Father, Son, and Spirit. He was unhappy in speaking of three persons in God when the word “person” ordinarily denoted a substance. In that vein he declares that “person” said of God is an absolute name

referring directly to the divine being.³¹ He searches for some special reason that the Three in God are persons. "Person," he says, "is a general name to such an extent that one uses it in speaking of men, although there is such a difference between God and men."³² What the word "person" ordinarily denoted (an intellectual substance) was common to the Three. Although Augustine does not explicitly identify person with the relative in God, he says that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinguished by relative opposition.³³ In his *Commentary on John's Gospel*, he says, concerning the number three, "Only in their relation to each other do they suggest number, not in their essential existence."³⁴ In the thirteenth century Aquinas will bring together "substance" from the Aristotelian tradition and "relation" from the Augustinian tradition to speak of the divine persons as "subsistent relations": infinite being as interpersonal because self-communicative. He will do this through his metaphysical analysis of being-as-act, and therefore dynamically active and relational.

As to the human person, Augustine highlighted important aspects such as interiority, memory as self-presence, openness to transcendence, the distinction of person from nature.³⁵ In his later writings he says firmly that the human being is simultaneously soul and body³⁶ (a union without confusion), living in time that is linear rather than cyclical.³⁷ Free choice, he says, is natural to the will which accompanies reason for the sake of attaining the true Good. Its reality insures that human destiny is not equal to fate. To reach one's destiny, a long dialogue between the human and divine will ensues, as shown in the *Confessions*. When the true Good is definitively chosen, the will is stabilized in the Good, dynamically taking

³¹ "Non enim aliud est deo esse, aliud personam esse sed omnino ideam. Nam si esse ad se dicitur, persona vera relative. . . . Ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad filium vel spiritum; sicut ad se dicitur deus et magnus et bonus it iustus et si quid aliud huiusmodi"; *De trinitate* 7.6.11. Cf. 5.6.7, 5.8.9, 8.1.1.

³² *Ibid.*, 7.4.7.

³³ *Ibid.*, 5.5.6, 5.9.12, 5.14.15.

³⁴ Augustine, *Commentary on St. John's Gospel*, tr. 39.4.

³⁵ "Aliquid singulare atque individuum personas natura," that is, person versus nature (in common); *De trinitate* 7.6.11.

³⁶ Augustine, *Letter* 137, 3.11.

³⁷ Augustine's *City of God* provides a theology of history, implying linear time.

delight in it. He calls this condition of the will its true freedom (*libertas*).³⁸ Free choice, available for evil or good, is a necessary condition for reaching freedom (*libertas*). The choice of a good here and now takes place in accord with the will's reality as a desire for happiness. This desire is the human person's vocation to the truth and goodness which characterize infinite being.

VIII

In the sixth century Boethius gave the first explicit philosophical answer to the question, What is a person? The answer for which he is famous is, A person is an individual substance of rational nature. He had available to him the philosophical and the patristic traditions. His reading of Aristotle's logical treatises and Porphyry's *Isagoge* led him to an in-depth study of individuality and the individual.³⁹ In his commentaries the term "individual" is not restricted to a human being, as indeed it should not be, but he often uses proper names, taking the human being as a paradigmatic case. In his commentary on Porphyry he makes the individual the result of accidents. Later, in his commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, he identifies an individual with substance, noting that individuality is manifested by accidents. The specific nature is common to all members of a species; singularity is incommunicable to all, proper to one. The individual ontologically precedes accidents.⁴⁰

His definition of person appears within a theological treatise on Christ as being one Person possessing two natures, divine and human. He studied the human person before discussing the Person of Christ.⁴¹ Finally, in *Theological Treatises* 1, 2, and 5, he considers Persons in the Trinity. Whereas in *Treatise* 5 his terminology in

³⁸ See my *Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom* (New York: Desclée, 1959).

³⁹ See Jorge Gracia, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984). See also Jorge Gracia, *Individuality* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

⁴⁰ See Maurice Nédoncelle, "Les variations de Boèce sur la Personne," *Revue des sciences religieuses* 29 (1955): 201-38.

⁴¹ Boethius, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, chap. 3.

reference to the Trinity is confused (he speaks of one essence and three substances), in *Treatise* 1 and 2 he admits that plurality in God is not ordinary otherness. He uses the word "person" to denote otherness and follows Augustine in making "opposed relationships" distinctive of the three divine persons. Coming to the discussion as a logician, Boethius nevertheless recognizes that divinity is beyond the terrestrial logic of including attributes in a substance, and that God is beyond the categories. Number in the Trinity comes from relative attribution while the substance maintains its unity. The divine relations are eternal, for the Father was always Father, and so forth.

IX

In the twelfth century, William of St. Thierry, a Cistercian, wrote an article against Abelard's use of nonpersonal categories in writing on the Trinity.⁴² Reflecting on the words of Genesis that man and woman were made to the image of God, William argues to the existence of human responsibility as the ability to respond to a "thou." He concludes that this existential intentionality, or call to be an image of God, indicates an intersubjective personal structure. The paradigm of such intersubjectivity is the mutual reciprocity of Persons in the Trinity. He then defines the human person as an intellectual subsistent having spiritual existence, an existence that gives human beings a power to relate to the totality of being. Yet as an embodied spirit the human person is limited and numerically differentiated. This individuation is a source of separation and affects the potentiality for intersubjectivity. As embodied spirits, human persons are objectifiable and can all too readily be viewed as only objects. The community possible between persons can be jeopardized by objectification.

⁴² William of St. Thierry, *Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum ad Gaudfridum Carnotensem et Bernardum*. T. M. Tomasic summarizes Abelard's objections in this way: "One merely creates problems that do not really exist by attempting to separate the absoluticity of the Persons from their relational situation"; T. M. Tomasic, *William of Saint-Thierry Against Peter Abelard: A Dispute on the Meaning of Being a Person*, *Analecta Cisterciensia* 1-2 (1972): 66. "Relationship in the Trinity, in a perfect Community, cannot be anything but the Essence of God, that is, a perfect unity of intersubjectivity" (p. 69).

In the same twelfth century Richard of St. Victor criticized the Boethian definition of person as not being a good definition of a divine person. He offered another definition: "an incommunicable existence of a divine nature."⁴³ For Aquinas, however, *Ipsum Esse* is the divine nature. Aquinas later proceeds to justify Boethius's definition by placing "individual" within the more extended notion of "distinctiveness." He then focuses on the way persons in God can be distinguished. Although a general definition of person can be formulated, person as applied is an analogical notion. For Aquinas, the ontology of human personhood requires a reference to a unique act of existence from which issue nature, individuality, the complete subsistence, active self-presence, and self-communication.

X

Thomas Aquinas had at his disposal an even richer philosophical and theological tradition than Boethius. He knew how the word "person" was used in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation and was aware of various philosophical definitions. Divine Revelation sparked his interest in finding a definition of person applicable to God, to angels, and to human beings. Man experiences his own individuality, and himself as an individual.⁴⁴ Aquinas speaks of this as "incommunicability." This is a negative term for a positive feature of being the ultimate principle of attribution, and being ontologically self-possessive—the ground of what we call personal responsibility.⁴⁵ Aquinas experienced in himself and others the power to universalize and to choose freely, indicating some degree of immateriality.

At an early age, in his work *On Being and Essence*, Aquinas argues for existence as really distinct from a finite essence. The

⁴³ Richard of St. Victor, as quoted in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (hereafter, "ST") I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4. For person as analogical see ST I, q. 29, a. 4, ad 4; I, q. 29, a. 3.

⁴⁴ "For substance is individualized by itself; whereas accidents are individualized by the subject; ST I, q. 29, a. 1. Cf. ST I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4.

⁴⁵ "In a more perfect and special way, the particular and the individual are found in rational substances which have dominion over their own actions. . . . Therefore, also individuals of rational nature have a special name among other substances; and this name is *person*"; ST I, q. 29, a. 1.

essence or nature limits the existence which actuates it. Therefore, personal existence is the source not only of the essence but of the "individualness" of a human person to whom it gives ontological unity, since it is as existents that things differ from one another. This personal existence, grounding as it does, incommunicability, Aquinas calls "subsistence." He calls a person a distinct subsistent of an intellectual nature.⁴⁶

The divine persons, Aquinas says, are subsistent relations; angels are unique forms; human persons are body-spirit structures. God's very being is to be related as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each one a subsistent relation, a person.⁴⁷ These relations are really distinguished among the divine persons⁴⁸ but as subsistent relations they are only conceptually distinct from the divine being. In a human person nature is a constituent, but personhood is neither a part of nor an addition to the human being. The human person receives all its reality from a unique act of existence which both specifies and individuates through the potential principles it actuates. Aquinas speaks of this role of existence in a key text:

What I mean by *esse* is the most perfect of all, and this is apparent from the fact that actuality is always more perfect than potentiality. Notice that no form at all is considered as actual unless some existence is understood as present, for humanity . . . can be viewed as existing within the potentiality of matter or within an agent's power or even within an intellect, but it is made to be actually existing only by having existence [*esse*]. So obviously, this existence [*esse*] is the actuality of all acts and therefore the perfection of all perfections. Neither may we think that this existence [*esse*] has anything added to it so that this "something added" would be more formal than it and would determine it as act determines potentiality . . . ; it cannot happen that what is added to existence is anything extraneous to it, because there is nothing that can be extraneous to existence [*esse*] except, obviously, non-being, but then non-being can be neither form nor matter; and therefore existence [*esse*] is determined by something other, not as potentiality is determined by act, but rather as act is determined by

⁴⁶ This definition arises from assembling Thomas's answers to objections to Boethius's definition being applied to God. Cf. *ST* I, q. 29, a. 1, c. and ad 1; I, q. 29, a. 4. Cf. I, q. 3, a. 5; and Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia Dei*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 17.

⁴⁷ *ST* I, q. 40, a. 2, c. and ad 1, 2, and 3.

⁴⁸ The word "person" "signifies relation directly and essence indirectly"; *ST* I, q. 28, a. 3. "Not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of an hypostasis; while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation"; *ST* I, q. 29, a. 4.

potentiality . . . ; in this way this existence [*esse*] differs from that existence [*esse*], for it is the existence of this or that nature.⁴⁹

Evidently the human essence does not limit the existence it receives to a wholly material mode of action, since knowing, choosing, and loving extend beyond the sensible. The human person includes a rational form or soul, an indistinctly determined material principle, an individuating principle, and subsistence, that is, a kind of existence which confers independent reality with powers of acting materially and spiritually.

In saying that "person" refers to that which is most perfect in the whole of nature, Aquinas links this perfection to existence that is rational and relational.⁵⁰ By rationality knowledge is not confined to sense data. The basic knowing experience is of something, of a thing, of a being; and the judgment that something exists is the first opening to being in an unlimited way. One experiences an *élan* toward being as true and as good, often awakened in the experience of beauty. Through this "intentional being" in mind and will a person is enriched and enabled to share more perfection with others. In finite being as act there is a dynamic polarity of receiving and giving. The openness to being through self-transcendence, far from removing a person from the natural world, increases relations with all beings, both personal and impersonal. Aquinas notes that "the soul of man is in a way all things by sense and intellect; and thereby, those realities that have knowledge in a way approach to a likeness to God in whom all things preexist, as Dionysius says."⁵¹ Knowledge, by increasing one's intentional or cognitional existence, adds to the perfection of intelligent beings without altering the objectivity of what is known. Moreover, it is the nature of every actuality to communicate itself as far as possible. Through the self-communication which occurs through action, and which brings a communion of minds and hearts when the action is what John Macmurray calls "communal action," the personal agent participates more profoundly

⁴⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *On the Power of God*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9, in *An Aquinas Reader*, trans. Mary T. Clark (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988), 85-6.

⁵⁰ *ST* I, q. 19, a. 2; I, q. 29, a. 3; I-II, q. 6, a. 2, ad 2; Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1. Cf. Norris Clarke, "To Be is to be Self-Communicative," *Theology Digest* 33 (Winter 1986): 441-54; and Mary T. Clark, "The Human Person and God," *Downside Review* 84 (1966): 15-30.

⁵¹ *ST* I, q. 80, a. 1.

in being and looks out upon the world from the personal centers of others.

XI

In the ancient world, according to the available literature, there was an awareness of the distinctive rationality of a human being, sometimes of its unity, often of its relational aspect. Various thinkers highlighted one aspect or another, often identifying the self with one, such as rationality. In some current literature there is a tendency to equate observable aspects or actions with personal reality, often involving disputes as to what is the most significant or equivalent aspect. In this way the wholeness of the person is eclipsed. While the ancients tended to highlight the soul, the current tendency is to highlight consciousness or the body which, of course, entails temporality; therefore, some want to replace nature with history. A human person, however, is present whenever a human essence (human soul and matter) is actuated by an *actus essendi*, even when aspects associated with mature persons are not immediately observable.⁵²

In the past and in the present human beings were and are recognized to be individuals. The ancients saw this as a sign of inferiority. Why did the fact of Athenian democracy not promote greater appreciation of the individual? For Plato the universal was more real than the individual: he even viewed individuals as accidental parts of a substantial state, saying in the *Laws* that "all must be common to all, even eyes, ears, and hands."⁵³ As for Aristotle, the individual seems to be for the sake of the species. Although Aristotle recognizes important personal aspects in the *Ethics*, yet in the *De anima* the human being can seem almost entirely

⁵² "What is necessary and sufficient to be a human person is to be a whole bodily individual which—unless he or she ceases to be, which can happen to anyone—will remain the same individual while developing continuously into a grown man or woman. Now, whatever, remaining the same individual will develop into a paradigmatic instance of a substantial kind already is an actual instance of that kind"; Germain Grisez, "When Do People Begin?" *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 63 (1989): 27-47

⁵³ *Laws* 739c.

impersonal if one accepts the Arabic interpretation of the intellect as common to all thinkers. Aristotle does say that the first actuality of any organism is the soul which disposes the organism to be what it is from the very beginning;⁵⁴ but for him is this an intellectual soul? On the other hand, with Pythagoras the individual is not subordinate to the state if he has the duty of directing his own destiny toward a transcendent reality. Boethius had the benefit of both the philosophical and the patristic traditions. He knew that the term "person" must serve to distinguish one individual from another, so a person could not be identified with rationality only. He learned not to identify the individual with accidental features. He knew that the word "person" had to include the whole human reality, that "hypostasis" denoted individual subsistence. He said the following: "It is evident that the word 'person' has for substrate 'nature' and that 'person' cannot be attributed outside a nature."⁵⁵ He saw that although rationality is knowable through common properties, and individuality observable through singular accidents, both derive from a concrete substance.

Until the medieval period any being, including a human one, was seen as equivalent to its concrete essence, inclusive of accidents. We noted that Thomas Aquinas derived the value of realities from a distinct metaphysical principle which actuates all essences, namely, the act of to-be (*esse*) caused by subsistent *esse*, which simultaneously produces the potential essence. Without a real distinction between essence and existence, that which is knowable through a concept and that which is knowable through judgment, it is difficult to see how things could ever begin or cease to be. Yet they do begin and cease; and nonexistent essences are valueless. It is fruitful, therefore, to inquire into the connection between person, and being which both individuates and unifies. In this connection is grounded the value of every human person, which has both a human and divine source,⁵⁶ an irreplaceable temporal vocation, and a destiny beyond death by reason of its spiritual *esse*.

⁵⁴ *De anima* 412a19-22, 414a18; *Metaphysics* 1040a35.

⁵⁵ Boethius, *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, chap. 3.

⁵⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* III, chap. 66; *On the Power of God*, q. 3, a. 7. In these places Aquinas discusses the concurrence of divine causality with finite causality; the first cause acts in all causing of *esse*.

Whereas biologists speak of human beings rather than of persons, a philosophical analysis shows that the term "person" is not simply a subjective value-term. It refers directly to all human beings as valuable because of their greater participation in being as manifested in mature persons through self-presence, self-determination, and self-communication. In a sense, the way to approach an understanding of the ontological content of unlimited being is to explore the being called personal.

In Thomas Aquinas's view, a human person is more perfect than the whole of nature. He did not simply attribute this perfection to a human person. Factually, a human person is a greater revelation of unlimited existence or unlimited perfection (the only possible source of finite existents) than other realities are. Awareness of the contingent existence of the human composite can, on reflection, make one aware that existence is received from infinite personal being, relating one to personal being at its greatest intensity, having all human perfections without their limitations. Adequate self-awareness would then include an awareness of this relationship and one's relation to all others through participation in existence. Moreover, in the personal experience of knowing and choosing, with their unlimited pursuit of truth and goodness, infinite personal being is obscurely present, that is, nonobjectively. This is because the unlimited Good is a lure in every choice. This unobjective experience of the enabling condition for human knowledge and freedom is an experience of God—one not always raised, however, to thematic knowledge.

Thus an inquiry into personhood does not proceed by abstraction but by penetrating into the metaphysical structure of the human person whose proper activities are unintelligible apart from their orientation to being as true and good. We become aware of Being through beings by the exercise of perception and judgment; of its causality through the contingency of beings; of its spiritual dynamism through a study of human beings who are windows into the nature of Being as total act, actively communicating being (in the Trinity as self-communication, in the universe by creating finite beings). Infinite Being is the apex of life and knowledge, of freedom and love.

The dignity and value of all human beings derives ultimately from their individual creation and their destiny to return to their divine source. This dignity can be recognized by their greater metaphysical likeness to that source as active self-presences and

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self-communicators. John Rist holds that Plotinus, among the ancients, was close to recognizing the intrinsic value of all human beings: Plotinus says, "Although the One is present to those who look, it is only a very small minority who look."⁵⁷ Rist remarks:

We are quite near the view that all "persons" have intrinsic value, from which could flow a doctrine of intrinsic rights; but despite his doctrine of the self, his novel version of the theory of man as a "divine spark" with its special relationship between the soul and the One, Plotinus still holds to the ancient position that insists that value and rights must be claimed by mature human beings. If we neglect virtue, we neglect our value; and if we neglect our value, we lose it.⁵⁸

If persons are made persons by human existence they never lose their value. Consider how the connection between person and being is the basis for an affinity with all persons and all things. If a unique act of spiritual existence makes one a person in his or her own right, so it is with other persons. To be personal is to live and act with awareness and concern for the ethical claims of others. As Levinas says, what we encounter in the face of another "is the infinity of his transcendence,"⁵⁹ "an immediate presentation of self,"⁶⁰ "an appeal for responsibility."⁶¹ What appears, the face of the other, has the form of law. "Thou shalt not commit murder" is written on the face of the other.⁶² "That the face of the other conveys the idea of the Infinite"⁶³ is the pivotal point of Levinas's ethical metaphysics. It is also true that the human knower as open to all being is the only one who can act on being's behalf, providing for the interests of animals and of physical nature.

The distinctive personal activities of knowing and loving and choosing, which point to a spiritual existence (*esse*) activating and unifying the human organism, do not eliminate the temporal or historical conditions of humanness nor diminish the importance of a person's sensitive and physiological actions, or the value of the

⁵⁷ John Rist, *Plotinus and the Value of the Human Person* (unpublished lecture), 7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁹ Edith Wyschogrod, *Emmanuel Levinas* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 86. Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et Infini* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).

⁶⁰ Wyschogrod, *Emmanuel Levinas*, 87.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, 88.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 89.

body. Intellectual activity, for the most part, originates in sensible knowledge. (Aquinas's theory of knowledge entailed "man in the world" long before Heidegger articulated the phrase.) All too easily the expression "self-transcendence" can give the impression that to be a person one must live the life of a spirit. What actually happens is that as a body-spirit complex, the person, shares the spirit's existence and goals with bodily powers. The human soul as subsistent is the form of the matter organized into a human body. The soul-spirit does not come to be except in union with matter. The basic experience of reality is made possible by body. Even for the self-communication proper to spirit, the body is necessary. Through bodily action we express personal thoughts, desires, decisions, feelings—verbally and nonverbally. Only through bodily actions does the architect, the artist, the musician produce his works. Only through the body is the world made a more human one in the carrying out of spiritual choices made by persons. Insofar as one's material environment and one's space-time situation are certain "determinations," a person's freedom is necessarily limited by bodily existence, as is obvious in the case of the physically disabled and economically deprived. On the other hand, some of the richest human experiences which develop a human person come through bodily activities in the enjoyment of art, play, music, food, and emotional love. In promoting humanness they are spiritually enriching. If the body can impede personal growth, it can also enhance the personal existence it shares.

It might be more helpful to speak of metaphysical self-identity rather than self-transcendence as an ideal for human persons. In the metaphysical order self-identity is fidelity to a unified personal structure, both given and affirmed. It is achieved through self-determination: determining the whole self to be a reality, not letting any level of life alienate itself from the human reality. A person who so acts fulfils his or her needs, but also acts out of love that is generous and creative. Thus the expression, "become what you are," paradoxical as it may seem, describes the challenge of being a human person. It marks the radical difference between personal and impersonal realities. The latter, unfree, are determined in being and action. The former, free, can say yes or no to human life, to being a person.

The quality of interaction with things and persons reveals the values attracting a person and the kind of self being chosen.

Spontaneous choices show the self because of the unity of action and being (*actio sequitur esse*). Although as a temporal being one can change one's actions for better or worse, the material environment, the culture, the actions of others either limit human freedom or promote it. A spiritual power, freedom in an embodied spirit is conditioned materially and psychologically, just as the intellect is somewhat conditioned by the health of the brain. That is why those who wish to promote communal activity on the part of persons, nations, and races need to provide favorable material conditions as well as education.

Aquinas teaches that since the soul shares its spiritual existence with the body, the body's death does not entail that of the soul.⁶⁴ Materialist philosophers may reject this, but it is not disallowed by at least one contemporary scientist, who has said,

If there is this ignorance of the way in which conscious experiences are related to the brain, there is no reason to deny the possibility that after the disintegration of the brain that comes with the death of the body, conscious selves may have other existences under quite unimaginable conditions. We must recognize that we cannot define how we come to exist as experiencing selves with our ineluctable uniqueness.⁶⁵

Some scientists admit ignorance concerning personal survival; others deny this survival. Some philosophers have declared the possibility of some form of survival; and the Christian Revelation has affirmed the actuality of personal survival.

Augustine describes eternal life, begun on earth, as a community of those in love with God and with one another: such is his City of God. This emphasizes that reality at its most profound and enduring level is interpersonal, a reality that depends on whether per-

⁶⁴ "The Creator gives existence to the soul in the body, while the begetter disposes the body to participate in this existence through the soul united to it"; *On the Power of God*, q. 3, a. 9, ad 20. *On the Soul*, a. 14 c: "It is apparent that the intellect has its own action unshared by the body. Now, anything acts in accord with its nature, inasmuch as things existing of themselves have their own action . . . the intellectual principle by which man knows has its own way of existing superior to that of body and independent of it. . . . We conclude that the human soul is incorruptible"; *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 14. Cf. *De ente et essentia*, chap. 5; *Summa Contra Gentiles* II, chap. 68.

⁶⁵ J. C. Eccles, "The Experiencing Self," in *The Uniqueness of Man. A Discussion at the Nobel Conference*, ed. John D. Roslansky (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1969), 133.

sons freely make communal choices (in Macmurray's phrase). The individualism present in American culture is spelled out in *The Habits of the Heart* by Robert Bellah and others, witnesses to a lack of communal choices. If reality is interrelational, then excessive individualism is psychological suicide. Two recent scientific reports note the positive effects of relating well even in physical nature:

Young nerve cells can wander far greater distances across the growing brain than anyone previously imagined. . . . And once the neurons have settled into a particular neighborhood, they learn what they are meant to do from signals that surround them, rather than from an innate genetic program.⁶⁶

Another scientific team reported

that it had taken cancerous cells that had a genetic defect in their ability to communicate with each other, and then corrected the defect to restore the cancerous cells to apparent health.⁶⁷

Because the human person is related on the existential level to Absolute Existence, on the human level to other persons, maintaining these relationships is essential to personal well-being. In this realm of relation the person nonetheless is free. The person's need to give has the same urgency as nature's need to have.⁶⁸ Altruistic love is grounded in personal existence. The concrete person acts out of ontological plenitude and poverty: giving and receiving. John Macmurray has described the primary interpersonal relation experienced by the human infant on the receiving side. The child is

born into a love-relationship which is inherently personal. Not merely his personal development, but his very survival depends upon the maintaining of this relation; he depends for his existence . . . upon intelligent understanding, upon rational foresight. He cannot think for himself, yet he cannot do without thinking; so someone else must think for him.

⁶⁶ N. Angier, "A Brain Cell Surprise: Genes Don't Set Function," *New York Times*, 28 Jan. 1992, sec. C, p. 1.

⁶⁷ "Clue to Cancer is Sought in Ways Cells Talk," *New York Times*, 21 Jan. 1992, sec. C, p. 1.

⁶⁸ "For natural things have a natural inclination not only toward their own proper good, to acquire it, if not possessed, and if possessed to rest therein, but also to diffuse their own goodness among others as far as possible"; *ST I*, q. 19, a. 2. See also "It is the nature of every actuality to communicate itself as far as that is possible. Therefore every agent acts according as it exists in actuality" *On the Power of God*, q. 7, a. 1. Cf. Robert Johann, *The Meaning of Love* (New York: Paulist Press, 1966).

His *expression of satisfaction* is closely associated with . . . the presence of the mother. . . . It would seem, from the biological point of view, unnecessary. There is no obvious utilitarian purpose in it. . . . It seems impossible to account for it except as an *expression of satisfaction in the relation itself*. . . . This is evidence that the infant has a need which is not simply biological but personal.⁶⁹

The paradox of the person is that while existence or being is the source of his or her uniqueness, it is also the bond which unites one with others. As Gabriel Marcel says,

I have laid such stress on intersubjectivity precisely because I wish to emphasize the presence of an underlying reality that is felt, of a community that is deeply rooted in ontology; without this, human relations, in any real sense, would be unintelligible. . . . In more concrete language, I concern myself with *being* only insofar as I have a more or less distinct consciousness of the underlying unity which ties me to other beings of whose reality I have a preliminary notion.⁷⁰

We see that it is not a case of a person being *either* substance *or* relational—a literal interpretation of Boethius or Marcel. If being is communion, then the person as subsistent both flowers out of communion and is supported or strengthened in singularity by communion. As Paul Henry, my first mentor in Plotinus and Augustine, said so well,

God is the perfect, in fact, the only perfect prototype of that which all love between persons tends to achieve—absolute unity and yet distinction—to be one with the other, not by losing one's identity but by perfecting it, even at the very source of one's being. That is why Divine Existence is the ideal of all personal existence—to be fully oneself, but only in dependence upon, and in adherence to, another in the communion of unity.⁷¹

XII

In conclusion, it is worth noting that all of us are the persons we are trying to understand. In addition to our obvious external

⁶⁹ John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1961), 49.

⁷⁰ Gabriel Marcel, *Mystery of Being*, trans. René Hague, vol. 2 (Chicago: Regnery, 1950), 17.

⁷¹ Paul Henry, *Saint Augustine on Personality* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 10.

life, each of us has privileged access to an inward life in possession of a unique self, expressed by the unique "I." We are aware of that which makes conversation and communion possible: having the inward life of another opened to us, sharing another's personal reality. I have been trying to make explicit what is implicit in all personal experience: a primary awareness of existence by perception and judgment; the relation of our minds to Being; the relation of our wills to Being; the experience of self-identity and self-communication; the experience of personal growth through interpersonal relations.

Such an inquiry into our closest and most mysterious reality has to remain open ended. It can continue to be assisted by phenomenology and the physical, human, and social sciences. Whatever is discovered, however, has to be probed metaphysically, because "existence" (*esse*) is a truly first actuality; it is existence which makes individuals of a certain nature. The mere identification of observable or knowable personal characteristics with personhood is a form of dualism separating person and human being. Another misconception is the separation of rationality from relationality.⁷² The mind knows through its relation to Being; the will is free through this relationship; and love for the Good engages all one's capacities and energies. The so-called primitive peoples knew themselves as enmeshed in relationships; and there is no reason at all to attribute to Greek thinking a view of man as unrelated. On the contrary, in the three leading schools of Greek philosophy (Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic) human rationality was assumed to be relational, and with the Roman Boethius it was not any different.

We have manifested our relationality in joining a metaphysical society. Is not metaphysical thinking a communal activity? Initiated by oneself, it is done with and for others. We have all gained

⁷² The history of the notion of the human person as sketched here shows that both bodiliness and relatedness are intrinsic to a human individual. In her 1990 APA Presidential Address, "A Naturalist View of Persons," to what view is Annette Baier opposing the naturalist view? Is it to that of Descartes and Kant? Why not say that? She speaks of the opposite view as that of the theological tradition but gives no references to a theological work. A view of the human person as equivalent to the soul alone is the view neither of the theological tradition nor of the Thomist metaphysical tradition nor of the Augustinian tradition. See the *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 65 (1991): 5-17.

some illumination on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of our convictions and desires from past and present metaphysicians, and above all from those who with Socrates take seriously the Delphic Oracle's admonition: Know thyself. Socrates began to do this by inquiring. Unless we keep inquiring into what it means to be a person responsible to truth and for goodness, both subsistent and related, independent and interdependent, a unique person who is self-knowable, self-determinable, self-communicable, we can scarcely responsibly follow that other admonition given by one who wrote so well of the depths of misery into which a human person can descend, but wrote also of the heights of human grandeur to which a person can rise in choosing "to be" rather than "not to be" one's fully personal self:

To thine own self be true
And it must follow
As the night the day
Thou canst not then be false to any man.⁷³

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⁷³ William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 1, sc. 3, lines 78-80.

ANIMALS VERSUS THE LAWS OF INERTIA

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I

THIS PAPER INVESTIGATES THE LAWS OF MOTION in Newton and Descartes, focusing initially on the first laws of each.¹ Newton's

¹ This work is based on Part 1 of the author's "Wholes, Parts, and Laws of Motion," *Nature and System* 6 (1984): 195-215, a study of the argument for universal reductionist determinism based on Newtonian physics. In Part 1, the philosophical importance of Newton's third law is asserted without the benefit of detailed explanation (pp. 197-8). The present paper thus endeavors to explain more fully how Newton's third law enables Newton's three laws of motion to be compatible with either reductionist or holist theories of the causes of motion in bodies. The reader is referred to Part 2 of "Wholes, Parts, and Laws of Motion" for the analysis of the complete reductionist argument from Newtonian physics—an argument which, as just indicated, requires more than Newton's three laws of motion. See also note 10 below, and the remarks on reductionism in sections II and III below.

There are many excellent studies of the laws of motion in Newton and Descartes. Among the best known are M. Boas, "The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy," *Osiris* 10 (1952): 412-541; Max Jammer, *Concepts of Force: A Study in the Foundations of Dynamics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); A. R. Hall, *From Galileo to Newton* (New York: Dover, 1981); Alexandre Koyre, "Newton and Descartes," in *Newtonian Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 53-114; N. R. Hanson, "Newton's First Law: A Philosopher's Door into Natural Philosophy," in *Beyond the Edge of Certainty*, ed. R. Colodny (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), 6-28; Richard S. Westfall, *Force in Newton's Physics* (New York: American Elsevier, 1971); Alan Gabbey, "Force and Inertia in the Seventeenth Century: Descartes and Newton," in *Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics*, ed. S. Gaukroger (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1980), 230-320; and I. B. Cohen, *The Newtonian Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). With one exception, these researchers do not assume the (rather unconventional) standpoint adopted here, namely, How is the relation between living beings and the laws of motion to be understood? The exception is A. R. Hall, *From Galileo to Newton*, in which chapter 7 is titled "Problems of Living Things." Although Hall describes the dispute between mechanism and vitalism, there is no examination of the technical details of the argument for universal mechanism.

first law and Descartes' first law were later conjoined in the minds of philosophic interpreters in what thereafter came to be called the law of inertia.² Our analysis of this law will lead to the special significance of Newton's third law, and thus to a consideration of the philosophical implications of Newton's three laws of motion taken as a whole. This paper also involves backward glances at an earlier tradition of physics: How do the laws of motion compare with certain basic elements of the philosophy of nature? Principal results and conclusions are: (1) There is no one law of inertia; rather, Newton's first law is distinct from Descartes' in its implications for our understanding of nature.³ (2) The concept of force entailed by Newton's three laws of motion is not the same as cause of motion as we ordinarily experience and understand it.⁴ (3) Newton's three

² See, for example, Kant's second law of mechanics, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, in *Kants Werke, Akademie-Textausgabe*, bd. 4 (hereafter *Ak 4*) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 543; English translation may be found in Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, trans. James W. Ellington in *The Philosophy of Material Nature* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), p. 104.

³ Since the concepts of mass and inertia as we know and use them are not found in Descartes, one should suspect at first glance that differences must exist between the laws of inertia in Newton and Descartes. "It is in fact anachronistic to ascribe a 'principle of inertia' to Descartes or indeed to anyone prior to . . . Newtonian dynamical researches"; Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 288. The in-depth study of the meaning of this surface distinction forms a large part of Gabbey's expert account; see especially Part 4, where it is shown that the function and context of the law of inertia differ in Newton and Descartes.

N. R. Hanson, "Newton's First Law," describes logical problems involved in Newton's first law. Hanson shows, in particular, that different choices of the logically primitive and derivative among the terms "force free," "uniform," and "rectilinear" lead to "different semantic platforms" within the same mechanical theory (p. 12). Hanson's analysis thus reveals a logical or semantic sense in which there is no one law of inertia. Our account is distinct from, and generally compatible with, both Gabbey's and Hanson's. See, however, note 48 of my "Wholes, Parts, and Laws of Motion."

⁴ The term "cause of motion" is vast in extent; it forms a major theme in the history of science and philosophy. In this paper, we restrict our attention (see the discussion in section III below) to what is involved in the production of accelerated local motions of bodies, most conspicuously living bodies (such as our own) as they move themselves around on a day to day basis. It is with accelerated local motion that the mathematical concept of force in classical mechanics is associated (via Newton's first and second laws). It is fairly common among both physicists and certain philosophers to identify force with cause of accelerated local motion. See,

laws, unlike Descartes', do not rule out internal causes of motion in bodies, and are, therefore, compatible with the traditional definition of nature.⁵ (4) The motor causality principle, often stated as "all that is moved is moved by another," is not as such incompatible with Newton's three laws of motion.⁶

for example, David Halliday and Robert Resnick, *Physics* (New York: Wiley, 1978), 72. See especially Kant's second law of mechanics in *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe*, in *Ak* 4, p. 543; *Metaphysical Foundations*, 104. Newton himself seems to make this identification, for in *De Gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum* he says that "force is the causal principle of motion and rest. And it is either an external one that generates or destroys or otherwise changes impressed motion in some body; or it is an internal principle by which existing motion or rest is conserved in a body, and by which any being endeavors to continue in its state and opposes resistance"; *Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton*, ed. A. Rupert and Marie Boas Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 148. Since we shall argue that Newton's third law is crucial for the meaning of the three laws of motion and the associated concept of force, it is significant that the work cited above is an early, unpublished (and relatively immature) writing estimated by Hall and Hall to have been composed before 1672 (p. 90). In contrast, Newton's third law does not appear in recognizable form before 1684, as Laws 3 and 4 of *De Motu sphaericorum corporum in fluidis*. See *Unpublished Papers*, 243, 267. See also I. B. Cohen, *Introduction to Newton's Principia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 65-6. According to Cohen, the third law of motion "may in fact be one of Newton's most original formulations" (p. 65). See our discussion in section III below, and note 39 below.

⁵ "Nature is a principle and a cause of being moved or of rest in the thing to which it belongs primarily and *per se* and not *per accidens*"; Aristotle, *Physics* 192b21-23; English translations in this paper are taken from *Aristotle's Physics*, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell: Peripatetic Press, 1980), 25. This definition is very concrete, not at all abstract. It can be learned by spending some time in a garden, or with pets. For example, cats act and move in an obvious, characteristic way called feline. Dogs act in a canine way. Birds fly with movements and flight paths characteristic of their kind. These ways of moving *specific* or particular to the natural living kinds have never been derived from the *common* or general laws of physics. Rather, these specific activities seem to be irreducible to the motions and properties of common elementary parts. The source of the bird's characteristic way of moving seems to be internal to the bird in an essential way. Of course airplanes have internal sources of motion, too—engines, fuel, a pilot. For airplanes, however, something other must produce them and start them up. In contrast, birds have babies and do not need pilots. This *irreducibility* of natural substances is the meaning of the adverbial phrase "primarily and *per se* and not *per accidens*."

⁶ *Physics* 241b24-242a16. Other texts are *Physics* 241b34-242a46, 254b8-256a3, and 257a32-b14. See also my "Thomas Aquinas on *Phys. VII.1* and the Aristotelian Science of the Physical Continuum," in *Nature and Scientific Method*, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 109-156.

In view of the accomplishment and probity of recent Newton scholarship, it behooves us to state an important qualification. Whether Newton himself held the interpretation we shall here advance is a question of great interest but one that it is not our intention to answer. Our aim rather is to interpret that tradition of mathematical physics which by its successful development could provide evidence in the argument over nature, motion, and causality. This tradition clearly begins from and incorporates Newton's laws of motion.

Before beginning our investigation, let us review some conventional wisdom concerning the law of inertia. According to Alexander Koyre, an eminent historian of science,

The law of inertia . . . states that a body, left to itself, remains in its *state* of rest or [uniform] motion [in a straight line] so long as nothing intervenes to change it. . . . It is a law of capital importance, for it . . . implies a wholly new conception of physical reality itself. . . . No motion is the consequence of the 'nature' of the moving body, and no such 'nature' could bring about its rest. . . . It is only by 'force' . . . that the *state* of the body can be changed. . . . Since all . . . putting in motion . . . and . . . all cessation of motion . . . , all acceleration and deceleration, involve a cause or, more accurately, a *force*, this [force] must necessarily be conceived as external to, as not belonging to, the moving body which is in itself *inert*.⁷

Indeed, Kant says that "the inertia of matter is and signifies nothing but its lifelessness [*Leblosigkeit*]."⁸ In addition, in *What is a Thing?* Martin Heidegger states that, in view of Newton's first law,

The concept of nature in general changes. Nature is no longer the *inner* principle out of which the motion of the body follows; rather, nature is the mode of . . . the changing relative positions of bodies. . . . We cannot set forth here the full implications of the revolution of inquiry into nature. It should have become clear only that, and how, the application of [Newton's] first law of motion [the standard form of the law of inertia] implies all the essential changes.⁹

These remarks by Koyre, Kant, and Heidegger express conventional wisdom concerning the law of inertia. We shall offer an al-

⁷ Alexandre Koyre, *Galileo Studies*, trans. John Mepham (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978), 130.

⁸ Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe*, in *Ak* 4, p. 544; *Metaphysical Foundations*, 105.

⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1962), 68; English translation in *What is a Thing?* trans. W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Regnery, 1968), 88.

ternative interpretation according to which the law of inertia cannot be the sole and sufficient source of the great and well known seventeenth-century transformation in our understanding of nature.¹⁰ The crux of the argument is this: According to the conventional interpretation, the law of inertia forbids self-initiated motion; no body at rest can put itself in motion.¹¹ This stands in obvious contradiction with the phenomena of living beings initiating their own local motion. The law of inertia thus cannot stand on its own. To save it from the phenomena, it must be supplemented by other principles. It therefore becomes one element in a system of concepts forming an explanatory whole larger than the law of inertia by itself, and in light of which the law must be interpreted. This explanatory whole is different in Descartes' physics than it is in Newton's. Specifically, Newton's first law is linked to the other two universal laws of motion. We shall see that the third law, the law of action and reaction, removes the contradiction between living things and the first law. Although they are compatible with a

¹⁰ This raises the following question: What then is that larger body of accepted scientific knowledge sufficient to provide the materials for a philosophical argument in favor of the seventeenth-century transformation in our understanding of nature? "Accepted scientific knowledge" excludes Cartesian physics and includes Newtonian physics. "Larger body" means larger than Newton's first law. The requisite body of scientific knowledge consists in the following three pieces of Newtonian physics paradigmatically employed in the mathematical description of the solar system: (1) the three laws of motion; (2) mathematical force laws, like the law of gravitation; (3) the parallelogram rule for composition of forces. The latter is Corollary II in Isaac Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, trans. Andrew Motte and Florian Cajori (New York: Greenwood Press, 1962), 15. The argument for universal reductionist determinism based on these items was publicly proclaimed by Laplace; see Pierre Simon Laplace, *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*, trans. Frederick W. Truscott and Frederick L. Emory (New York: Dover, 1951), 4. This argument is assessed in Part II of "Wholes, Parts, and Laws of Motion" (see note 1 above) and found to be unpersuasive. The weak point, quantum physics aside, is an unwarranted universalization of the parallelogram rule for composition of forces. Newton proposed an open-ended research program based on items (1)–(3), above, in *Mathematical Principles*, p. xviii, but seems not to have insisted on its comprehensiveness. That is, unlike Laplace, he did not proclaim that *all* the wholes in nature (ourselves included) were fully governed, and thus their motions fully determined, by those principles. See also our discussion at the conclusion of section IV below.

¹¹ This is in no way at variance with the usual understanding of the law of inertia, namely, that uniform rectilinear motion requires no cause or mover.

corpuscular account of matter, Newton's three laws of motion do not logically entail such an account. By themselves, they are neutral with respect to the distinction, made within ordinary experience, between living and nonliving, between things that move themselves and things that are moved from without. In contrast, Descartes' law of inertia lacks an accompanying law of action and reaction, and is necessarily joined to corpuscularism. The contradiction with living beings is thus removed by recourse to subsensible parts. The resulting Cartesian theory is incompatible with any notion of nature as internal principle of motion and rest.

The preceding was a summary statement of the crux of the argument. Let us now back up and step through it in terms of the relevant texts. We shall examine three versions of the law of inertia: Descartes' first law of nature as given in *Le Monde*, chapter 7; Descartes' first law of nature as given in *Principles* 2.37; Newton's first law of motion in the *Mathematical Principles*. We'll compare and contrast these by addressing to each the following three questions: What does the law govern, that is, What is subject to the law? What is it that persists?—for we know that the law of inertia, however formulated, is about something persisting. Finally, What is needed to effect a change in that which persists?

We begin, then, with Descartes. His first law of nature, as presented in *Le Monde*, is as follows:

Each particular part of matter continues always to be in the same state unless collision with others constrains it to change that state. This is to say, if the part has some size, it will never become smaller unless others divide it; if it is round or square, it will never change that figure without others constraining it to do so; if it is stopped in some place, it will never depart from that place unless others chase it away; and if it has once begun to move, it will always continue with an equal force until others stop or retard it.¹²

What does the law, thus formulated, govern? What is subject to this law? Descartes says "each particular part of matter." For Descartes, of course, "the true form and . . . essence" of matter is

¹² René Descartes, *Le Monde: ou Traite de la Lumière*, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Adam-Tannery (hereafter "AT") (Paris: L. Cerf, 1897-1913), vol. 11, p. 435 (1677 pagination). English translations are in René Descartes, *Le Monde*, trans. M. S. Mahoney (New York: Abaris, 1979), p. 61; and in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), vol. 1, p. 93.

extension,¹³ and he explains, or tries to explain, that one "part of matter" is a patch of extension containing no relative motion of subparts, or whatever may be so considered relative to certain problem contexts.¹⁴ Complete clarity concerning Descartes' terminology here is not essential for the point we are about to make. Let us then go on to ask, What, according to Descartes' first law, persists? The answer is, the *state* of each part of matter—the state of size, shape, rest, local motion in a straight line.¹⁵ Finally we ask, What, according to this law, is needed to effect a change in that which persists? The answer is collision with *others*.

Before looking at Newton's first law, let us check the formulation of Descartes' first law given later in *Principles* 2.37 (here translated from the Latin): "Every thing, insofar as it is simple and undivided, remains, so far as in it lies, always in the same state, and never changes except by external causes."¹⁶ What is subject to this law? Every thing, insofar as it is simple and undivided. The phrase "insofar as it is simple and undivided" is important yet unclear. We discuss it in the following section of this paper. What is it, according to this law, that persists? The state (of every thing), so far as in it lies. The phrase "so far as in it lies" has been discussed by I. B. Cohen, and we need not consider it further here.¹⁷ Finally, what is required to effect a change? External causes. Descartes' first law of nature is more general, more demanding, than Newton's first law of motion. We can see this as follows. Newton's first law is as follows: "Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it."¹⁸ What is subject to this law? Every body. This is quite clear, clearer than Descartes' parts of matter

¹³ Descartes, *Le Monde*, 56; see also *Principles* 2.4 in *AT*, vol. 8(i), p. 42.

¹⁴ Descartes, *Le Monde*, 20–2; see also *Principles* 2.25, in *AT*, vol. 8(i), p. 54.

¹⁵ Rectilinearity is specified by Descartes' third law of nature in *Le Monde*, 71.

¹⁶ Descartes, *Principles* 2.37, in *AT*, vol. 8(i), p. 62; *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, pp. 240–1.

¹⁷ I. B. Cohen, "‘Quantum in se est’: Newton's Concept of Inertia in Relation to Descartes and Lucretius," *Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London* 19 (1964): 131–55.

¹⁸ Newton, *Mathematical Principles*, 13.

"insofar as simple and undivided." What is it about every body that persists? Not its state in general (of size or shape); only its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line—in modern parlance, its velocity. Here, the technical terms "velocity" and "acceleration" are useful; they are defined as follows. Velocity means speed and direction. Thus, a body in local motion with constant velocity is moving such that both its speed and the direction of its motion are unchanging.¹⁹ A body at rest possesses constant velocity in which speed is zero. If the speed of a body, or the direction in which it is moving, or both, change, then the velocity of the body changes, and we say that the body accelerates. The acceleration of a body is the change in time of its velocity. Newton's first law, in contrast to Descartes', is only about the local motion of a body, not

¹⁹ We are suppressing the fundamental question of the frame of reference, or coordinate system, relative to which position, velocity, and acceleration are observed. Relative to an accelerated frame of reference, bodies are observed to accelerate without relation to any forces. For example, imagine observing the world from a merry-go-round. In such frames of reference, then, the strict connection between force and acceleration (or equivalently between force-free environment and constant velocity motion) cannot hold, and so Newton's laws of motion fail. But the earth is like a merry-go-round: it rotates, around its axis and around the sun. Accordingly, in frames fixed on the earth, small force-free accelerations are present (which are treated technically by means of "fictitious forces," for example, the Coriolis force). To be certain that we are in a frame in which Newton's laws of motion could be rigorously true—an inertial frame—we must find someplace in the universe where we can set up a frame of reference known with certainty not to be rotating. It is impossible to find any such place (the sun rotates about the center of the galaxy, which rotates about the center of a galaxy cluster, then a supercluster, and so forth). The culmination of this line of reasoning is Einstein's amazing unification of accelerated frames, gravitation, and space-time geometry, that is, general relativity. See, for example, Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 209–45. What we have described is thus a type of counterfactual that, unlike the two counterfactuals discussed in the later part of section I above, cannot be resolved within Newtonian physics.

For the present investigation we must assume—as is conventionally done in classical mechanics—the existence of a coordinate system sufficiently inertial for Newton's laws of motion to hold to a sufficiently good approximation; that is, force-free accelerations are negligible compared to the animate self-accelerations whose causality is here under study. This type of motion (animate self-acceleration) is then invariant under both Galilean and Lorentz transformations since it necessarily involves (1) center-of-mass acceleration, and (2) change of shape by, thus relative motion of the parts of, the bodies in question. A coordinate system fixed on the earth's surface fulfills the indicated requirement. See also note 52, below.

about its state in general.²⁰ Thus, unlike Descartes' first law, Newton's bears no obligation to account for a change of state in general, but only for a change of velocity, that is, an acceleration. This will be important for our account, in section III below, of the causal neutrality of Newton's laws of motion.

What then, according to Newton's first law, is needed to effect a change in the velocity of a body? Impressed forces. The meaning of this term "force"—experienced by ourselves, and characterized in physics books, as a push or a pull—will be a major theme of this investigation. For now, however, let us note the following simple but very crucial point. This point is common to the first laws of both Newton and Descartes. According to these laws, no body can begin to move by itself; no body can effect its own acceleration from rest to local motion. For Descartes' first laws (in *Le Monde* and *Principles*) say that a change from rest to motion must be the effect of *external* causes. Newton's first law says that a change from rest to motion, thus a change of velocity, an acceleration, must be produced by an impressed force. In order to be impressed upon the accelerating body, this Newtonian force must be exerted by another body external to the one accelerating. For example, we find a grocery cart in the supermarket, and set it in motion by pushing it. In short, according to these laws, no body can have within it the cause of its own acceleration. This agrees with our experience of things that we do not call "alive." But animals, beings that we call "alive," appear to cause their own accelerations all the time. The animals appear to violate the laws of inertia. How is this issue resolved? Consider a cat at rest on the mat. When it gets up and goes, what thing external to the cat effects the change of state of motion?

There should be no doubt or confusion about this issue. The phenomena of animate self-acceleration contradict both Descartes' and Newton's laws of inertia. Accordingly, both Descartes and Newton must have a way of saving their laws of inertia from the phenomena. Both Descartes and Newton must deal with the cat on the mat. Each does so, but in a different way. The philosophical implications are significant. This question—How is the law of

²⁰ I. B. Cohen, in *The Newtonian Revolution* (p. 187), remarks the more restricted character of Newton's *Mathematical Principles* compared to Descartes' *Principles*.

inertia reconciled with the phenomena of animals initiating their own local motions?—is the guiding question for all that follows.

At this point, let us note that the law of inertia is often said to be counterfactual. In fact it is counterfactual not just in one way, but in two ways. First, it is regarded as counterfactual because it specifies conditions of constant velocity motion, which conditions do not exist in nature, namely, absence of all forces. Accordingly, we never observe a body in nature moving in a straight line, at constant speed, without limit. The resolution of this first counterfactual—nonexistent conditions of unobserved motion—is based on the Newtonian concept of net force. We'll look at this in section III. The second counterfactual is the one we have just described; let us describe it again in slightly different terms. The law of inertia says that accelerated local motions (that is, when bodies go from rest into motion, speed up, slow down, change direction) come from sources external to the accelerating body. Within the class of accelerated local motions, however, there is a special subclass of motions that appear to us to come from internal causes, and these are the accelerated local motions of animals, including ourselves, in the common, ordinary course of nature. This second counterfactual—there is no self-acceleration in nature yet there appears to be—is philosophically the more significant. The successful resolution of this second counterfactual is accomplished by Newton, not Descartes, through his third law of motion. By successful resolution we mean that through Newton's third law we shall discover the external force required by Newton's first law (his law of inertia) while preserving the possibility of internal causes of motion. This will mean, however, that the concept of force in the physics deriving from Newton is related to, but is not the same as (thus should not be confused with), cause of motion in ordinary experience and the premodern tradition of physics. But we have gotten ahead of the argument. We must try to develop all this more carefully by looking at how both Descartes and Newton deal with the cat on the mat.

II

Descartes' response to the phenomena of animals on behalf of his first law of nature is given in chapter 7 of *Le Monde*:

Now, even though in most of the motions we see in the true world we cannot perceive that the bodies that begin or cease to move are pushed or stopped by some others, we do not thereby have reason to judge that these . . . rules are not being observed exactly. For it is certain that those bodies can often receive their agitation from the two elements of air and fire, which are always found among them without being sensed.²¹

Sensible wholes must be understood in terms of the subsensible parts of matter. Descartes' resolution is quite simple: he just says that on a sufficiently small scale of size the particles of bodies strictly obey his laws of nature. Thus, in relation to Descartes' law of inertia, the cat, as it accelerates from rest, must not be considered as one part of matter. The motion of this phenomenal whole is caused by the motions of unseen parts of matter present within and around it. The cat is an example of a mixed body, and such bodies contain "*in themselves* some qualities that are contrary" and "that tend to make [them] change."²² Indeed, "all the bodies that appear about us are mixed or composite and subject to corruption."²³ Descartes' first law, then, does not apply to such a body as a whole. This is the reason for the inclusion of the phrase "insofar as it is simple and undivided" in the later statement of the law in *Principles* 2.37. This issue is important, and an adequate account of it would have to clarify the meaning and use of the term "simple" in Cartesian science, and the type of concept formation deriving therefrom in subsequent science—not a simple task.²⁴ For the moment, however,

²¹ Descartes, *Le Monde*, 66–8.

²² *Ibid.*, 40, 42; emphasis added.

²³ *Ibid.*, 42.

²⁴ The relevant concept of simplicity arises in Descartes, *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, ed. Giovanni Crapulli, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). Rule 6 introduces the simple natures as intuitively immediate beginning points of knowledge (pp. 18–19). Indeed, in Rule 8 it is asserted that we "can have certain experience only of the entirely simple and absolute" (p. 27). In Rule 12 we learn that the simple is known completely or not at all, that is, the least knowledge thereof suffices in order to know the whole (p. 47). Extension, as described in *Principles* 2.8, is thus, for Descartes, simple; *AT*, vol. 8(i), p. 44. Rule 12 states that "in the order of our knowledge, each simple thing should be viewed differently than when considered as it really exists" (p. 45). Simplicity is thus a property more of concepts than of real things. Indeed, in *Principles* 2.41, motion is asserted to be simple; *AT*, vol. 8(i), p. 65. Yet a mere concept cannot be acted upon, collide, accelerate and decelerate. Simplicity must then refer to bodies as well as to concepts. The possibility of such reference is the possibility of Cartesian mathematical physics. This great issue (among

the essential point is that no such phrase, "insofar as it is simple and undivided," appears in Newton's first law, for the issue (namely, What is a part?) does not arise within the explanatory system composed of Newton's three laws of motion. How this is so will be shown in the following section.

In Descartes' physics, the simple and subsensible parts of matter in terms of which corporeal phenomena are to be explained came to be called corpuscles.²⁵ Let us relate this point to the issue of holism and reductionism. By holism we mean the idea that there exist in nature wholes whose properties and motions cannot be understood as a sum of the properties and motions of elementary parts.²⁶ Such wholes must be understood as governed by what we have called irreducibly internal causes of motion, that is, principles of change specific to the whole as such. Note well, then, that in Descartes we go directly from first law, to corpuscularism, to reduction of all wholes to subsensible parts that strictly obey Descartes' laws of

others) is discussed by Jacob Klein, *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra*, trans. Eva Brann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968), 197–211; and by David R. Lachterman, *The Ethics of Geometry* (New York: Routledge, 1989), chap. 3. The passages cited in *Le Monde* in notes 22 and 23 above indicate that in applying the notion of simplicity within physics, certain bodies cannot be considered as "simple and undivided" in respect to certain of their changes. These bodies and changes must then be reduced to motions of parts of matter that can be so considered.

²⁵ The term "corpuscle" is Boyle's. See, for example, Robert Boyle, *Origin of Forms and Qualities* (The Theoretical Part) (Manhattan Beach: The Sheffield Press, 1976), p. vi.

²⁶ Although Aristotle is probably the best known proponent of holism (his definition of nature in note 4 above exemplifies it), consider the following formulations by Hegel: "The notion of the whole is to contain parts; but if the whole is taken and made what its notion implies, i.e., if it is divided, it at once ceases to be a whole. Things there are, no doubt, which correspond to this relation; but for that very reason they are low . . . existences. . . . The relation of whole and parts . . . comes very easy to reflective understanding, and for that reason it often satisfies when the question really turns on profounder ties. The limbs and organs, for instance, of an organic body are not merely parts of it: it is only in their unity that they are what they are, and they are unquestionably affected by that unity, as they also in turn affect it. These limbs and organs become parts, only when they pass under the hands of the anatomist, whose occupation, be it remembered, is not with the living body but with the corpse. Not that such analysis is illegitimate: we only mean that the external and mechanical relation of whole and parts is not sufficient for us if we want to study organic life in its truth"; G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), sec. 135, p. 191n. See also sec. 38, p. 63n; and sec. 126, p. 183n.

nature. Descartes' corpuscularism is incompatible with holism, and thus with the traditional definition of nature. Indeed, the term "living"—the premier candidate for a class of wholes unreducible to parts—must, for Descartes, refer to *mere* appearance. In Descartes, the link from law of inertia to the impossibility of holism is virtually immediate. Descartes' resolution of the contradiction between animals and his first law thus contains fundamental implications concerning matter and causality; for the motion of any whole must be a sum of the motions of simple parts—parts governed by Descartes' unchanging laws of nature. Such a reductionist position indeed implies the radical transformation of nature described by Koyre, Kant, and Heidegger in the introduction to this paper. It is not the same, we shall argue, in Newton. Neither Newton's first law, nor Newton's three laws of motion taken together, implies reductionism. Thus, concerning the relation of wholes and parts, the confrontation between the premodern understanding of nature and our own post-Newtonian, and not Cartesian, tradition of physics, is more complex than is often thought to be the case. How then does this relation stand in the physics deriving from Newton?

III

Let us now turn to what we shall call the "causal neutrality" of Newton's laws of motion. Newton's first law requires that for any body undergoing a change of velocity there be a force impressed upon the body. In order to be impressed upon the accelerating body, this force must be exerted by another body external to the former. When the cat on the mat accelerates from rest, what body, external to the cat, impresses a force on it? If no such body and force can be identified, the animal is in violation of Newton's first law. Now this force is specified, and the difficulty removed, by the third law of motion: the mat impresses a force on the cat. That is to say, when the cat pushes down on the mat in order to raise itself up, the mat (and the whole solid structure under the mat) pushes back on the cat. For according to Newton's third law, "To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or, the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts."²⁷

²⁷ Newton, *Mathematical Principles*, 13.

In Newton's physics, forces always occur in pairs. That is, for any force exerted by body *A* on body *B*, there exists simultaneously the force exerted by body *B* on body *A*. These forces are equal in magnitude and oppositely directed.²⁸ There is no time interval between forces in an action-reaction pair. We discuss in section IV the temporal antecedence of "cause" and "effect" characteristic of classical mechanistic determinism, in which the trajectories of certain bodies can be predicted. It will be important to make clear that such "antecedent causality" cannot appear without a force law, the historic example being Newton's law of gravitation; Newton's three laws of motion alone provide no basis for mechanistic determinism. For now, however, we must stick to the main line of argument.

We need to see how Newton's third law of motion works, to see how it functions as the crucial element in resolving the contradiction between Newton's first law (his law of inertia) and the apparent self-acceleration of the cat. In order to do this, let us consider a slightly different and more instructive self-acceleration experiment. Instead of the cat's moving itself up off the mat, let's consider our jumping off our bathroom scale. The scale is most helpful here because it measures Newtonian force in units of pounds or kilograms (force).

We are going to imagine, first, that I stand at rest on the scale. Then we shall imagine that I jump up and off the scale, initiating my own motion upward as I do so. We shall observe the reading on the scale, for it tells us the force exerted by me downward on the scale. Then we shall describe the event in terms of Newton's three laws of motion. We seek, first, to identify the forces impressed on my accelerating body according to Newton's three laws of motion; second, to consider the cause of motion as we ordinarily understand the term. We shall find, first, the external force impressed on me that is required by Newton's law of inertia for my upward acceleration. Second, we shall find that internal causes of this motion are not ruled out by Newton's three laws.

Imagine, then, that I am standing at rest on the scale. Since I am at rest, or, more accurately, the center of mass of my body continues in a state of rest, Newton's first law says that there must

²⁸ They do not cancel each other out because they do not act on the same body.




Figure 1

be no force impressed upon my body. But I look down and see that the scale is reading 170 lb. This is my weight. It is the force of gravity exerted on my body by the earth. Thus I am at rest, but subject to an impressed force. Is the law of inertia wrong? No, because the force on me of 170 lb downward is opposed by another force on me of 170 lb upward. This is where Newton's third law enters the account. This upward force on me is the reaction force of the scale (and the entire solid underlying structure) on me which Newton's third law says must be there.²⁹ To the force exerted by me downward on the scale—a consequence of gravitational force and of the solidity of what I'm standing on—is opposed a force exerted upward by the scale on me. The two forces acting on me while standing at rest on the scale cancel each other out, as shown in Figure 1. Although I am subject to two distinct forces, the net force exerted on me while standing at rest is zero. Newton's first law is satisfied.

From this extremely simple example (remember, I have not even jumped yet) three important points emerge:

- 1) Newton's third law necessarily accompanies Newton's first law; without it we could not have given a consistent account of my standing at rest on the scale.

²⁹ The reaction force here is not a fiction. It is supported by certain experiences. If you walk inadvertently into a wall, as I have done, it feels exactly as if someone shoved you. This can only be an experience, not an experiment.

- 2) Multiple forces exerted on one and the same body can be combined to yield a net or resultant force on the body.
- 3) The reference to impressed force in Newton's first law must be taken in this sense, that is, it must be taken to mean *net* force, the (vector) sum of all component forces exerted on a body.

It follows that Newton's first law need not refer to a counterfactual situation—that first counterfactual we described a short while ago, namely, absence of all forces on a body—in order to have constant velocity motion. Rather, to the extent that we can make devices that effect the cancellation of component forces on a body, we can, to this extent, produce in the laboratory, for a limited time, inertial, that is, constant velocity motion. The air track is such a device. We shall say more about the air track in section V below, when we consider the relation between the law of inertia and the motor causality principle.

Now, however, it is time to jump off the bathroom scale. This is the moment of truth for us animals in relation to Newton's law of inertia. This is where we see how Newton's third law works to specify a net force impressed from without on my body, without which my body could not accelerate upward. Moreover, this is where I shall argue that this net force is perfectly compatible with internal causes of my own motion, thus compatible with my self-acceleration.

Standing on the scale, I carefully crouch preparing to jump. I now push down hard with my legs, projecting myself upward off the scale. As I do this, what does the scale read? In fact, it is difficult to follow the scale reading because bathroom scales are not mechanized to measure accurately a weight gain of 100 lb. in half a second. It is very clear, however, that the scale reading increases during the jump. Once I did this and the scale dial stuck at 250 lb. So let's say that the maximum downward force exerted by me on the scale during my ascent upward is 250 lb. By Newton's third law, the scale must at that moment exert a reaction force of 250 lb. upward on me. Recall that when I stood at rest on the scale, weighing 170 lb., the scale exerted a force upward on me of 170 lb. My push downward on the scale in jumping effects an increase of 80 lb. in the reaction force of the scale upward on me, and this disrupts the equilibrium of forces to which I was subject while at rest. My weight—the force of gravitation exerted by the earth downward on me—is unchanged




Figure 2

throughout; my body weight is determined by my mass, and that of the earth, and neither of these changes when I jump.³⁰ Therefore, the two forces impressed on me at this moment of my jump are 250 lb. upward (according to Newton's third law), and 170 lb. downward (my weight). The resultant force is 80 lb. upward, as shown in Figure 2. This is the net force impressed from without on my body at the moment of my maximum acceleration upward (as I straighten my legs, pushing down on the scale). Without this net force, I could not, according to Newton's first law, undergo acceleration. So far then, we have successfully reconciled the acceleration of animals with Newton's laws of motion. Animals, including ourselves, move themselves around—starting, stopping, speeding up, slowing down, and changing direction—by pushing or pulling, that is, by exerting forces, on environing bodies. The corresponding external forces impressed upon the animals' bodies are the reaction forces, over and above bodyweight, expressed by Newton's third law. These reaction forces are real and necessary. Indeed, if there were no environing bodies for us animals to push or pull on, and which thus exert forces back on us, we animals could not put ourselves in motion. Thus, for the cat on the mat that gets up and goes, the external force has been found.

³⁰ In moving upward there occurs a minute decrease in my weight due to increased distance from the earth, in accordance with Newton's law of gravitation. This effect is negligible in the calculation of the net force on my body.

Now, however, we are at the philosophically critical juncture. We must ask, How does this reconciliation between animals and Newton's law of inertia bear on the possibility of internal causes? Has it ruled out what appears to be the case, and what we all believe based on our own experience, namely, that animals are, unlike machines, true self-accelerators?; that we are thus moved from irreducibly internal causes of motion? It has been twice asserted without argumentation that Newton's three laws of motion are, unlike Descartes' laws of nature, indeed compatible with such internal causes of motion. We must now make the case for this claim. It is important to preface our account by the following remarks, which are intended to forestall a widespread but unjustified presupposition of reductionism, that is, the presupposition that, regardless of technical details, physics has simply shown that parts are always prior to wholes.

In our analysis of Newton's laws of motion, we surely have not gone the Cartesian way, namely, from law of inertia immediately to reductionism, and thus to the impossibility of any essential distinction between animals and machines, between natural and artificial compounds. To get to reductionism within *our* tradition of physics, the physics deriving from Newton, not Descartes, we must go further down the road. Within Newtonian physics the reductionist argument—that all wholes can be fully explained from elementary parts moving along predetermined trajectories—requires not just (1) Newton's three laws of motion, but two additional essential items. They are: (2) force laws, like that of universal gravitation, without which the trajectories of bodies cannot be calculated; and (3) a rule for relating the force exerted by a whole to the forces exerted by its parts, namely, the parallelogram rule for composition of forces, Corollaries I and II of *Mathematical Principles*, on which "depends the whole doctrine of mechanics."³¹ The argument for reductionism based on Newtonian physics, or classical mechanics, is thus technically more complicated than Descartes' corpuscularism. (Perhaps the most basic point of this paper is that technical differences can be philosophically significant.) As indicated in the notes to section I, we have analyzed this argument in a previous work, concluding that it is weak and not persuasive.³² Hence we maintain

³¹ Newton, *Mathematical Principles*, 17.

³² See notes 1 and 10 above.

that it would not be justifiable at this point in our examination of the motions and forces of natural wholes to assume that all such wholes can be taken as mere sums of elementary parts, thereby denying a priori the possibility of internal causes of motion in bodies. Let us then return to the philosophically critical juncture, namely, making clear that Newton's laws of motion and the associated concept of force are compatible with irreducibly internal, or holistic, causes of motion.

Recall that when I jumped off the scale I said, "I now push down on the scale, projecting myself upward." This event is, for our purposes here, the same as the cat getting up off the mat. These actions—of myself (or yourself) on the scale, of the cat on the mat—are paired up, according to Newton's third law, with simultaneous reactions of the scale on me, and of the mat on the cat. Now it surely seems to us that the action of the cat on the mat, and myself on the scale, is not of the same sort as the reaction of the mat on the cat or the scale on me. It is not clear in what sense the latter are actions at all. Indeed, we continue to believe that the agent causes of these motions are *in* the bodies moved, in the sense that I and the cat, not something external, *initiated* our own local motions. I and the cat, not the scale or the mat, answer to the causal question, Who started it? or, Who is responsible? in our interactions with the scale and the mat. Is there here a contradiction between our common experience of internal causes of motion—the perennially problematic character of their ultimate sources notwithstanding—and the description of motion according to Newton's three laws? Do the latter imply that such causality, involving an ordinarily experienced, albeit philosophically problematic, unity of psychic activity and physical motion,³³ is in reality impossible (because the psychic and the physical have nothing in common)? We maintain that there is no contradiction, for Newton's three laws of motion and the associated concept of force are neutral to the question of how actions and reactions are initiated, whether in the moved or in another (thus they cannot sunder the psychic from the physical). With this point, the causal neutrality of Newton's laws of motion begins to emerge. We shall elaborate on this notion in the following. Here it is important to recall that Newton's first law does not require

³³ Plato, *Phaedo* 95E-99D, esp. 98C-E.

that the cat's pushing on the mat be externally caused. It requires only that the cat's change of velocity be linked to the net external force that we identified with the help of Newton's third law.

We must try to bring out more clearly now the difference between (1) the causally neutral symmetry of Newtonian action and reaction forces, and (2) the causal asymmetry of experienced agency and patiency. We shall then maintain that these two things, although distinct and indeed not unified within one definitive account of body, motion, and causality, are nevertheless mutually compatible.

Alan Gabbey, in his well known article on force and inertia in Descartes and Newton, has accurately described a kind of symmetry of the two Newtonian forces in an action-reaction pair: "Newton's *reactio* is at the same time an *actio*, the '*re*' expressing both the fact of dynamical opposition and the fact that [either] one of the bodies can always be taken as that which resists."³⁴ In Gabbey's correct account, the forces in an action-reaction pair are of equal status for the description of local motion, that is, the calculation of net force on, and instantaneous acceleration of, the bodies chosen by us for investigation. But Newton's action-reaction pair says nothing about, and thus neither affirms nor denies, *causal* priority in the motions of interacting bodies.³⁵ (As noted earlier, action and reaction occur simultaneously). It is crucial to see the difference between force in Newton's physics and cause of motion in our ordinary experience of acting and being acted upon. It is also crucial to see that the symmetry or equal status of the action and reaction forces in Newton's third law applies to *quantitative aspects* (250 lb. downward, 250 lb. upward—neither force is privileged for the calculational procedure), and does not extend to the *origins* of forces. It does

³⁴ Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 271.

³⁵ That is, I exert a force of 250 lb. downward on the scale; the scale exerts a force of 250 lb. upward on me; the earth exerts a force of 170 lb. downward on me. The resultant net force on my body is 250 lb. minus 170 lb. equals 80 lb. upward. Who or what initiated the interaction between me and the scale and the earth is irrelevant to the calculation of the net force on, and resulting instantaneous acceleration of, my body. All that is required is the calculation of the net force on the body under investigation through the (vector) addition of all the forces exerted thereon. The calculation of my acceleration would be the same if, instead of my jumping, someone released a powerful coiled spring inserted between my feet and the scale, which then exerted a maximum force of 80 lb. upward on me. In the latter case, rather than acting, I would be acted upon.

not, therefore, conflict with the experienced asymmetry of acting and being acted upon: I initiated the jump; I acted, the scale was acted upon. To this end, let us try to sharpen our view of force in relation to cause of motion.

"Cause of motion" is an extraordinarily broad term, extending from the passive material conditions necessary for changes in physical systems to the purposes or goods for the sake of which human choices are made and actions taken. It forms a major theme in the history of science and philosophy. Here we must restrict our attention to cause of motion insofar as it directly relates to the concept of force implicit in Newton's three laws of motion. Accordingly, by "cause of motion" we mean what is involved in the production of the accelerated local motions of bodies, most conspicuously, but not exclusively, living bodies as they ordinarily move themselves around. This means that just plain pushes and pulls, their specific types and origins, and their common quantitative aspects and effects, are center stage. In living things, pushes and pulls are the crucial link from psychic activity (perception, desire; thought and judgment in human beings) to physical motion. In general, no body in nature can move or be moved effectively without exerting pushes and pulls of one sort or another on other bodies in the environment.

Force in Newtonian physics is a push or a pull considered insofar as measurable and without regard to its origin.³⁶ Force is the measure of *whatever* effects, or tends to effect, a change in the velocity of a body.³⁷ Thus force is defined operationally "in terms of the acceleration that a given standard body [undergoes] when placed in a suitable environment."³⁸ For example, a body of 1 kg. mass accelerating at 1 m. per second is by definition subject to a force of 1

³⁶ The consideration that yields the mathematical concept of force is not simple. It involves the formation of ratios between arbitrary pushes and pulls and a unit measure. Aristotle reminds us that in such cases, the quantitative measure (the force) is not the same as, and thus should not be confused with, the thing measured: "There is nothing great or small, many or few, or generally relative, which is many or few, great or small, or relative to something without [also] being something else in its own right"; *Metaphysics* 1088a27-29, translation taken from Lachterman, *The Ethics of Geometry*, 179.

³⁷ In relativistic interactions (speeds comparable to that of light), mass is not constant and so "change of velocity" must be generalized to Newton's more correct "change in quantity of motion," that is, change in momentum, the product of mass times velocity.

³⁸ Halliday and Resnick, *Physics*, 76.

N. At the level of Newton's three laws of motion there is no specification of causes. Newton himself says in Definition VIII of the *Mathematical Principles*, concerning forces involved in circular motion, "I here design only to give a mathematical notion of those forces, without considering their physical causes and seats."³⁹ This causal neutrality of Newton's three laws of motion and the associated concept of force is part and parcel of the mathematical character of Newton's physics and post-Newtonian physics. It is essential that we take seriously the fact that Newton, in contrast to Descartes, titled his greatest work *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, not *Principles of [Natural] Philosophy*. The point is that Newton's greatest work in physics is mathematical without being committed to an exhaustive explanation of all causes of motion in nature. In contrast, Descartes intended his physics both to be mathematical and to explain all causes of motion in nature in terms of corpuscular figure, extension, motion, and intimations of mass and force never successfully developed. Descartes' philosophical comprehension of a new way of using the mind is of fundamental importance. (Does not Newton's mathematical method involve essentially Cartesian concept formation?) His physics of bodies, of course, failed.⁴⁰

To further illustrate the causal neutrality of force in Newtonian physics, let us look once again at the bathroom scale. Recall that the peak force exerted downward on the scale during my jump was 250 lb. But this force of 250 lb. consisted of two contributions: first, my weight of 170 lb.; second, the voluntary muscular force of 80 lb.

³⁹ Newton, *Mathematical Principles*, 5. Concerning forces, "in *Principia* [Newton] is not concerned with investigations of anything other than their mathematical description"; Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 239. Furthermore, "the origin of physical forces is the central problem of Newton's philosophy of nature"; Hall and Hall, *Unpublished Papers*, 80. Strictly speaking, then, one force cannot be the cause of another, that is, the force of 250 lb. exerted by me on the scale is not the cause of the reaction force of 250 lb. exerted by the scale on me. Rather, my act of pushing on the scale, whose quantitative measure is the force of 250 lb. downward, is the cause of the scale's pushing upward on me, the quantitative measure of which is 250 lb. upward. Such fastidious terminology would, of course, be of little use for the solution of physics problems.

⁴⁰ Note that where Descartes does not need the concepts of mass and force, namely, in optics, he provides first rate physics, culminating in his calculation of the rainbow angle; see Descartes, *Les Meteores* 8, in *AT*, vol. 6, pp. 325-44.

exerted as I extended my legs in the act of jumping. The scale combined two homogeneous effects—170 lb. plus 80 lb.—of two very distinct and heterogeneous causes: gravitational attraction, and animate voluntary muscular action. I weigh 170 lb. in virtue of my, and the earth's, mass; my body weighs 170 lb. dead or alive. I can jump only if I am alive. In jumping, I am the agent, the scale is the patient, whereas in the gravitational interaction of two bodies, no such agent-patient distinction can be made. These two causes of the one force of 250 lb. measured by the scale are thus utterly different in kind.⁴¹ For the description of my motion up from the scale according to Newton's three laws, this difference in causes is of no significance. A net force on a body at time t results in an instantaneous acceleration of the body at time t however that force may originate. (Newton's second law provides the quantitative relation between force, mass, and acceleration.) In terms of the cat on the mat, we attribute causal priority to the living cat's action over the nonliving mat's reaction on grounds of ordinary experience; Newton's three laws of motion are indifferent to this attribution. On the basis of Newton's three laws of motion alone, "the cat is alive, the mat is dead"; "the mat is alive, the cat is dead"; "everything is alive"; and "everything is dead," are all acceptable statements. This is the meaning of the causal neutrality of Newton's three laws of motion and the associated concept of force. These laws are, by themselves, merely guidelines by which to relate the forces, masses, and accelerations, of interacting bodies. Whereas Descartes' three laws of nature have fundamental implications concerning matter and causality, Newton's three laws of motion have no fundamental implications concerning matter and causality. Unlike Descartes' law of inertia, which is restricted in its application to the simple and undivided, Newton's law of inertia, incorporated as the first law in the three laws of motion, applies to every body (*corpus omne*) taken as a whole, as it presents itself, living or nonliving, to our senses. It is compatible with either holism or reductionism. Thus,

⁴¹ Pushes and pulls different in kind have a common quantitative aspect. This fact, which makes possible the Newtonian force concept (without it we could not sum force components different in kind to obtain $F_{\text{net}} = \sum_i f_i = ma$), is prior to the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass. (See Einstein and Infeld, *Evolution*, 31-5, 214-17.) For even if my inertial mass and my gravitational mass differed, we could still apply Newton's laws of motion to my scale jump.

unlike Descartes' first law and its attendant corpuscularism, Newton's first law does not rule out the possibility of nature as internal principle of motion and rest.

IV

Our account of Newton's laws of motion and the associated concept of force calls for a fuller discussion of temporal succession in the relations between action, reaction, net force, and acceleration. We have emphasized that action and reaction forces occur simultaneously; we have used the reaction force (of the mat on the cat, of the scale on me) to determine a simultaneous net force and simultaneously resulting acceleration. Where, then, is the passage of time in all this? The possibility of prediction requires not just the calculation of net force and acceleration at one and the same time, but calculation of the position and velocity of the body at any future time from its position and velocity at the present time. When Kant refers to "that connection of appearances determining one another with necessity according to universal laws," he means determination of phenomena at one time by temporally antecedent phenomena; that is, "that connection" is over time, not simultaneous.⁴² Hume, of course, characterizes the cause-effect relation, insofar as we can know it, in terms of "constant conjunction," in which "the motion which was the cause is prior to the motion which was the effect."⁴³ The standard definition of determinism obviously involves the notion of the time evolution of a system: this process is deterministic if the state of the system at any moment fully determines, or facilitates calculation of, the system's state at the subsequent moment.⁴⁴ How does this picture of deterministic

⁴² Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 414. See also Kant's *Second Analogy*, 218–33.

⁴³ David Hume, "An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature," in *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Charles W. Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 187.

⁴⁴ Determinism is more fundamental than predictability. There are many deterministic but nonlinear systems whose motion cannot be predicted due to sensitive dependence on initial conditions. See, for example, James Gleick, *Chaos* (New York: Viking, 1987), 9–31. The first great successes of classical mechanics involved deterministic systems predictable

antecedent causality emerge within Newtonian physics? Where do we first see a significant Newtonian example of observable data at one time determining observable data at all subsequent times?⁴⁵ To answer this question, we work within the following Newtonian scenario.

Consider a body of mass m subject to a time-varying net force. Let $F(t)$ denote the value of the net force on the body at time t . For example, during my jump from the scale, at the time of my maximum acceleration upward, $F(t) = 80$ lb. Initial conditions are given as follows: at initial time, t_0 (arbitrarily chosen by ourselves), the position $r(t_0)$ and velocity $v(t_0)$ are known by observation (measurement), as is the initial value of the net force, $F(t_0)$. What knowledge about the subsequent local motion of the body, that is, about its future position and velocity, $r(t)$, $v(t)$, can then be inferred from the initial data by means of Newton's laws of motion? The answer is none, for we lack a force law. To make this clear, let us construct a table showing the net force, F , acceleration, a , position, r , and velocity, v , at successive moments of time, $t_0, t_1, t_2, t_3, \dots, t_n$. We will then draw lines representing inferences from the known initial data, $F(t_0), r(t_0), v(t_0)$, to all that can be derived at later times. The basis of this derivation will be Newton's laws of motion, specifically the second law,⁴⁶ $F(t) = ma(t)$, and differential calculus. Calculus is the crucial tool that enables us to estimate new position, $r(t_1)$, given initial velocity, $v(t_0)$, and initial position, $r(t_0)$, and similarly to estimate new velocity, $v(t_1)$, from the initial velocity, $v(t_0)$, and the acceleration, $a(t_0)$, derived by Newton's second law. These estimates of new position and velocity based on previous position, velocity, and acceleration contain errors that are roughly proportional to the time increment, Δt , between successive moments t_0, t_1, t_2 , and so forth. We thus imagine taking Δt to be smaller and

to a high degree of accuracy over long time periods, for example, the solar system. These successes involved the application of the three items listed in note 10 and in section III above (laws of motion, force laws, parallelogram rule). The *philosophic* generalization from successful Newtonian description of certain parts of nature to the whole of nature constitutes universal reductionist determinism, or universal mechanism.

⁴⁵ Galileo's law of fall, $d_1:d_2::t_1^2:t_2^2$, is perhaps the first great example. We focus on Newton due to the greater generality of his principles.

⁴⁶ The first law of course does not apply since the test body is subject to a nonzero net force, F , for the calculation of which the third law is used as appropriate.

time:	t_0	t_1	t_2	$t_3 \dots t_n = t_{n-1} + \Delta t$
net force:	$F(t_0)$	$F(t_1)$	$F(t_2)$	$F(t_3)$
acceleration:	$a(t_0)$	$a(t_1)$	$a(t_2)$	$a(t_3)$
velocity:	$v(t_0)$	$v(t_1)$	$v(t_2)$	$v(t_3)$
position:	$r(t_0)$	$r(t_1)$	$r(t_2)$	$r(t_3)$

Table 1

smaller. (This limiting procedure and the general mathematical results based thereon constitute the content of calculus, developed by Newton and Leibniz precisely to solve the general problem we are considering.)

Table 1 thus arrays time—the independent variable—across the top, and net force, acceleration, velocity, and position as functions of time down the columns. Each line of inference is labeled either *N2*, for Newton's second law (in the form $F = ma$), or *C*, for calculus. By means of *N2* we calculate the acceleration, $a(t_0)$, from the force, $F(t_0)$, and the mass, m . Then, by means of calculus, we advance our knowledge one step ahead in time through the calculation of $r(t_1)$ and $v(t_1)$, and one step further to $r(t_2)$. But this is as far as we can go. We cannot derive $v(t_2)$ because to do so, we must know $a(t_1)$. To know $a(t_1)$, we must know $F(t_1)$. We have no way to determine $F(t_1)$ either from initial data or the quantities just derived. To know $F(t_1)$, we would have to measure empirically the net force on the body at time t_1 . That is, we would have to abandon the program of predictive calculation. Therefore, we have gotten all the knowledge we can get out of Newton's laws of motion and the initial data. This knowledge extends two time steps beyond t_0 and stops. No determinism is possible on grounds of Newton's laws of motion alone.

In order to continue the calculations arbitrarily far forward in time, we need the crucial link from the new position (and/or velocity) to the new value of force, from $r(t_1)$ [and/or $v(t_1)$] to $F(t_1)$. This is precisely what Newton's law of gravitation provides in the case of gravitational forces. That is, for a body whose local motion is fully

time:	t_0	t_1	t_2	t_3	\dots	$t_n = t_{n-1} + \Delta t$
net force:	$F(t_0)$	$F(t_1)$	$F(t_2)$	$F(t_3)$		
acceleration:	$a(t_0)$	$a(t_1)$	$a(t_2)$	$a(t_3)$		
velocity:	$v(t_0)$	$v(t_1)$	$v(t_2)$	$v(t_3)$		
position:	$r(t_0)$	$r(t_1)$	$r(t_2)$	$r(t_3)$		

Table 2

governed by gravitational force, like a planet moving in relation to the sun, future values of position and velocity can be calculated because at each time step the new position, that is, the new distance from the sun, determines the new value of force: $F(t_1) = -GM_s m / r(t_1)^2$, where G is the gravitational constant, M_s the mass of the sun (assumed known), and the minus sign indicates an attractive (as opposed to repulsive) force. Thus for a planet or comet whose local motion is governed by the gravitational attraction of the sun, the array of quantities calculable from initial data, Newton's laws of motion, and the law of gravitation (denoted NG), is shown in Table 2.

Table 2 expresses the logical structure of the Newtonian program, successfully executed for its paradigmatic case, the solar system.⁴⁷ Of course, in the solar system there are nine planets, each attracting and being attracted by all the others. We pass over the large question of the interaction among planets, as well as the role of the parallelogram rule, in order to make our basic point: Newton's three laws of motion (plus initial data) cannot determine the future values of force, position, and velocity; they are not the sufficient basis for that classical mechanistic determinism in which observable data at one time $[r(t_0), v(t_0)]$ determine observable data at any future time $[r(t), v(t)]$. Rather, a necessary condition for deterministic description of the motion of a body is that a force law be discovered, a mathematical equation giving the force on the body as a function of its position (and/or velocity) and physical properties like mass

⁴⁷ Einstein and Infeld, *Evolution*, 28–30.

and charge. Such force laws have been empirically discovered for large bodies, like planets, and small ones, like nuclei and electrons (quantum mechanics required), but not for middle size bodies that we call "alive." We have no mathematical equation whereby we can calculate the net force on the cat's body from its mass, position, and velocity.⁴⁸ This is why Newton proposes the extension of his program from astronomical bodies and motions to other domains by means of the assumption that force laws can be experimentally discovered, not for middle size bodies directly, but for the tiny parts thereof:

I derive from the celestial phenomena the forces of gravity with which bodies tend to the sun and the several planets. Then from these forces, by other propositions which are also mathematical, I deduce the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea. I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend on certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards one another, and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from one another.⁴⁹

Newton passes immediately from planets to particles because the force laws needed for a deterministic account of the bodies we ordinarily experience are not available.

V

It remains for us to address the question of the relation between Newton's first law and the motor causality principle, namely, all that is moved is moved by something. Let us relate this question to the analysis completed above. In our investigation of the cat on

⁴⁸ The problem is that gravitational force only partially governs the local motion of the cat in that the animal weighs a certain amount and, lacking wings, must accordingly move itself along the ground. To make gravitational force fully govern the local motion of the cat, we must throw the cat out the window, that is, compel it to be moved like a falling body or a projectile. In its natural motion, however, the cat is subject to a net force resulting from both gravitation and the reaction force corresponding to the quite unpredictable pushes and pulls it exerts on environing bodies. The latter, like the 80 lb I exerted downward on the scale, and unlike gravitational forces, are not expressible in terms of any known equation.

⁴⁹ Newton, *Mathematical Principles*, p. xviii.

the mat, we found that the presence of net force on a body does not rule out the possibility of internal causes of motion. In this concluding section we will obtain a kind of complementary result, namely, that the absence of net force on a body does not rule out the possibility of external causes of motion. This result will bring fully to view the disjunction between net force in Newton's physics and cause of motion in the philosophy of nature, and will enable us to compare Newton's first law and the motor causality principle.

A cautionary note is in order. Comparisons between ancient and modern physical theories are deceptive. It is easy to see that Aristotle's theory of projectile motion in *Physics* 8.10, according to which air pushes the projectile,⁵⁰ is naive and false. It is another matter to give an account of the relation between the motor causality principle and a fundamental law of post-Newtonian physics that is adequate to the depth and complexity of each. These reflections are, accordingly, far from definitive.

Let us note that it is often thought that the motor causality principle stands in simple opposition to, and is thus refuted by, the law of inertia.⁵¹ The alleged antinomy here is that according to the motor causality principle, all motion requires a cause, whereas the law of inertia says that constant velocity motion has no cause. From these reflections we shall see that the relation between the two is more complex than is often thought to be the case.

We begin with the thesis that a body can move with constant velocity, and, therefore, be subject to no net force; yet external causes are required to produce the motion. In fact, the production of constant velocity motion of any body in the world as it is, thus in the presence of other gravitating bodies, must involve external causes of motion. To see this, consider the most familiar laboratory device used to illustrate Newton's first law: the air track. In this device, a small metal test body rides on a cushion of air along a straight metal track. The air track enables one to reduce the effects of two forces omnipresent in nature, namely, friction and gravitation, as

⁵⁰ *Physics* 266b28–267a21.

⁵¹ For example, see E. T. Whittaker, *Space and Spirit* (London: Thomas Nelson and Son, 1946), 45–6; and the review of recent scholarly opinion by James Weisheipl, "The Principle *Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur* in Medieval Physics," in James Weisheipl, *Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages*, ed. William E. Carroll (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1985), 80.

follows. Horizontal alignment of the track eliminates gravitational force along the direction of motion. The upward push of air (blown by a compressor through small holes cut in the track) eliminates friction between the metal test body and the track, and counteracts the downward force of gravity (the weight of the test body), thereby effecting zero net force on the test body. After being given an initial impulse, the metal body moves along the track with constant velocity, free of net force. Although the vertical flow of air is clearly an external cause required to produce the motion, it does not act, nor does gravity, in the direction of motion. No horizontal forces are required for constant velocity motion along the horizontal air track, nor do any external causes act in the direction of motion. This is the evidence for Newton's first law; this is what the air track is supposed to show. Our experiment is not over, however, because the earth is not flat but round.

Imagine lengthening the air track. Since it is straight and the earth is round, the moving test body must recede from the earth.⁵² As it recedes, the gravitational force exerted by the earth on the test body ceases to be perpendicular to the direction of motion. A component of gravitational force opposite to the direction of motion develops. By Newton's first law, the test body cannot continue to

⁵² The effect of the earth's axial rotation, the first contribution to the noninertial character of our coordinate system (see note 19 above), now becomes significant. For example, for an air track fixed on the earth's surface at the North Pole, thus rotating with the earth in a plane perpendicular to the earth's axis (an assumption that simplifies the following calculation a bit), the ratio of (fictitious) centrifugal force to the component of gravitational force parallel to the air track is $4\pi^2 R^3 / GMT^2$, where R is the distance from the test body to the center of the earth, G is the gravitational constant, M is the mass of the earth, and T is the period of diurnal rotation (24 hours). For a test body moving on the air track through a distance of one earth radius from track origin at the north pole, the centrifugal force is about 1% of the parallel gravitational force component—rather small. Nevertheless, since our experiment is unconstrained by the engineering requirements of actual performance (that is, it is imaginary), we can eliminate axial rotation by gyro-stabilizing the air track with the origin at the north pole. The attempt to eliminate further smaller effects of rotating coordinates takes us off the planet and into the impossible quest for a rigorously inertial frame of reference (see note 19 above). All of this notwithstanding, the salient point of the elongated air track, gyro-stabilized or not, is that gravitational force components parallel to the direction of motion necessarily arise. Therefore, external causes of motion must be introduced to counterbalance them and thereby maintain the condition of zero net force on the test body.




Figure 3

move with constant velocity because it is now subject to a net force retarding its motion along the track. It must decelerate. Constant velocity motion can be maintained only by artfully slanting the air jets in the track such that a component of the force produced by the air flow cancels out the component of gravitational force pulling back on the test body, as shown in Figure 3. This is the real lesson of the air track: the gravitational effects of bodies in the universe necessitate the introduction of external causes of motion (for example, the slanted air flow) and resulting force components parallel to the direction of motion precisely to produce the condition of zero net force corresponding to constant velocity motion. In short, net force on the test body is zero; external causes of motion are necessary. This complements our principal previous result: net force on the cat's body is nonzero; internal causes of motion are possible. What does the motor causality principle have to say about Newton's first law thus explicated?

This famous principle of premodern physics, all that is moved must be moved by something, is stated and proved three times in Aristotle's *Physics*.⁵³ The three proofs differ in type of argumentation and degree of universality. In general, it is well known that the motor causality principle has been a subject of extensive debate and serious disagreement among commentators throughout the history of science, philosophy, and theology.⁵⁴ We will hardly be able here to give it the consideration it deserves. We focus first and

⁵³ See note 6 above.

⁵⁴ See especially William A. Wallace, "Cosmological Arguments and Scientific Concepts," in William A. Wallace, *From a Realist Point of View* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), 309–24.

foremost on the application of the motor causality principle to the very specific case of inertial motion produced by the air track.

Observe, then, that in the terms of premodern science, inertial, constant velocity motion as produced by the air track is not natural but violent or compulsory motion. In the premodern account, natural motion follows from internal active or passive principles, and is always found in nature as we ordinarily experience it: for example, birds flying, fish swimming, trees growing, stones falling are natural motions. Constant velocity motion is not found in nature in this way, but can only be contrived by an apparatus like the air track. This is the basis for the assertion that constant velocity motion is, in the terms of Aristotelian science, compulsory, not natural, motion.

Now the Aristotelian teaching on compulsory motion is fairly clear: such motion must be produced by causes that are external, act continuously, and are in contact with the mobile. This threefold requirement can be derived from statements in *Physics* 7.2 and 8.10.⁵⁵ If it is fulfilled for the air track, then there is no violation of the motor causality principle. Is this threefold requirement—external cause, continuously acting, in contact with the moved—met in the case of the air track? Two out of three are met: our examination of the air track showed that there are external causes of motion continuously acting (in order to maintain the condition of zero net force). But the Aristotelian requirement for contact action in compulsory motion seems not really to be met. Although the air flow here indeed moves the test body by contact, it seems that electromagnetic force could also be used to compensate the parallel component of gravitational force that pulls the test body back. These forces seem not to act by contact (electromagnetic fields are, unlike bodies, interpenetrable).⁵⁶ Thus we offer the conclusion that there is a conflict between Newton's first law and Aristotle's doctrine of contact action in compulsory motion. Does this mean that there is

⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Physics* 243a11–17, and 266b28–30. See also the discussion in our "Aquinas on *Phys.* VII.1," 149–50.

⁵⁶ Our notion of contact comes from ordinary sense experience: we touch or take hold of something, and push or pull it. In contrast, gravitational force penetrates to all the parts of bodies; there is no analogue of touching or contact because gravitational force does not stop and act at the surfaces of bodies. The general, if imprecise, picture of particles and fields offered by modern physics, in fact, seems to deny the reality of contact, for there are no physically real surfaces, only continuously increasing field strengths.

a conflict between Newton's first law and the motor causality principle? The question is complicated by the complexity of the motor causality principle itself. We suggest that the answer is no, there is no incompatibility between Newton's first law and the motor causality principle as such, because Aristotle's doctrine on contact action in compulsory motion is not itself derived from the motor causality principle. It seems rather to be based on the distinction between natural and compulsory motion itself, which large issue goes beyond the bounds of the present investigation. With respect to Newton's first law as instantiated by means of the air track, we have argued that an external moving cause is required precisely to produce the condition of zero net force corresponding to constant velocity motion. This external motive cause satisfies the motor causality principle as applied to the air track. Note also that the motor causality principle covers cases in which contact action is not involved, namely, natural self-movers in *Physics* 7.1, and the natural motion of the elements in *Physics* 8.4. We therefore conclude that as applied to the motion of bodies in the world as it exists, the motor causality principle and Newton's first law are not in conflict.

VI

This completes our analysis of the laws of motion in Newton and Descartes, with backward glances at an earlier tradition of physics. In this analysis we have looked at animals and air tracks. Concerning animals, we found that the presence of net force does not rule out internal causes of motion. Concerning the air track, we found that absence of net force does not rule out, in fact it requires, external causes of motion. Our most essential result is then the difference between net force and cause of motion, and thus the causal neutrality of Newton's three laws of motion and the associated concept of force.

THE DIRECTIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

AMÉLIE OKSENBERG RORTY

I. The Aims and Types of Rhetoric

IN PREPARING A HANDBOOK ON RHETORIC, Aristotle proceeds as he does for a discussion of any craft or practice. After distinguishing it from other closely related arts, he defines its proper aim: that of finding the means that can be used to persuade an audience of any subject whatever.¹ Since the most effective exercise of any craft or faculty is conceptually connected to its fulfilling its norm-defined aims, his counsel is directed to guiding the master craftsman who is responsive to the larger issues that surround the exercise of his skill—a rhetorician speaking about important matters to those authorized to affect them. Aristotle's advice to the rhetorician imports the results of his philosophic investigations: the *Rhetoric* presupposes and is implicitly informed by Aristotle's logical works, by his philosophy of mind, and his theory of action; it is also strongly conjoined with his political and ethical theory. But while the rhetorician relies on these theories, he is not himself a philosopher, logician, statesman, or moralist.²

Ideally, the best rhetoric addresses the minds as well as the psychology of its audience.³ Aristotle chides the authors of earlier

¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1355a4ff., 1355b26ff. (References to this work by book and chapter numbers, or by Bekker numbers, will be provided in the text.) In explicating his definition, Aristotle draws an analogy to medicine: the physician attempts to promote the restoration of the patient just as far as his condition allows. Similarly, although it is sometimes unlikely that the accused will be acquitted, the rhetorician can still offer the best available means of persuasion (1355b5–15).

² Parallel: Aristotle relies on his theory of action, his ethics, and his philosophy of mind, in advising the tragedian, who can use this material without himself becoming a philosopher.

³ Although there are subtle distinctions between oratory and rhetoric, I shall use the terms interchangeably.

handbooks on rhetoric for concentrating primarily on techniques for swaying the emotions of judges and legislators, instead of first and primarily considering the best modes of rhetorical persuasion. Metaphorical speech is most convincing when it figures in reasonable arguments; and even maxim-ridden speeches are more persuasive when their assumptions and conclusions are plausible (1.1, 1.10–12).⁴ Wryly Aristotle complains that addressing the emotions of a judge is like warping a ruler before using it. The best orator does not manipulate beliefs in order to make the worse appear to be the better course, but rather presents the best case in a way that is comprehensible and moving to each type of character.⁵ In presenting the best course as gloriously noble to the young and as prudent to the elderly, the rhetorician need not be lying.⁶ The argument of Aristotle's ethical works is that the best course is, in principle, under ideal circumstances and in the long run, also the most pleasant, the most expedient, and the noblest. As long as his rhetoric is also constrained by what is true and what is best, the rhetorician will not "warp the ruler."

Like all abilities and crafts, however, rhetoric can be used well or ill (1355b18). As the existence of clever villains attests, sheer intelligence is not sufficient for virtue; so too, highly successful but canny and corrupt orators attest to the undeniable fact that not

⁴ Cf. John Cooper, "Ethical-Political Theory in the *Rhetoric*," in *Philosophical Aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. D. Furley and Alexander Nehamas (Princeton University Press, forthcoming); Stephen Halliwell, "Popular Morality, Philosophic Ethics and the *Rhetoric*," in *Philosophical Aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric*; Eugene Garver, "Making Discourse Ethical: The Lessons of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," with a commentary by Charles Griswold, in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 5, ed. John Cleary and D. Shartin (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991); and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "In What Way is Aristotelian Rhetoric an Offshoot of Ethics?" unpublished paper, delivered at a conference on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Helsinki, August 1991.

⁵ See *Nicomachean Ethics* 1113a30–32.

⁶ Aristotle uses the analogy to *skiagraphia* (1414a15) that Plato had developed in *Republic* 10. The proportions of a successfully mimetic sculpture or painting must be adjusted to the perspective from which it will be seen. In taking into account the perspective from which it will be seen, however, the sculptor or painter—and, Aristotle might add, the rhetorician—does not necessarily misrepresent his subject. Only those who do not understand the laws of perspective will construe what he does as distortion. Cf. J.-L. Labarrière, "L'orateur politique face à ses contraintes," in *Philosophical Aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 38–41.

every brilliant rhetorician is a *phronimos*. Even if the audience must be brought to trust the intelligence and the character of the rhetorician, still, a clever huckster might be skilled at presenting himself as a wise ally and advisor without ever coming close to being a *phronimos*. Even if, in principle, the best way to seem wise and good is to be so, even if you cannot fool all of the people all of the time, still you can fool plenty of people plenty of the time.

Nevertheless, even the most debased forms of rhetoric presuppose some knowledge of logic and of ethics. The successfully perverse uses of a craft depend on the techniques and knowledge required by its exemplary exercise. The sophist must know the structure of valid arguments in order to mimic them; the huckster has to know the marks of virtue in order to parade it. Just as the concept of "belief" is essentially linked to that of "truth," so too the concept of "decision" is essentially linked to that of "good," and "persuasive" is essentially linked to "validly argued." The opaque object of every decision is a genuine good; the opaque object of every belief is a genuine truth. Deciders and believers want the intentional objects of their decisions and desires to hit their real, and not merely their notional, objects.⁷ Since even a debased audience aims at the opaque objects of its desires—at the real (and not merely the apparent) good—it implicitly wants its rhetoricians to be, and not merely to seem, good. It is for these functional, normative reasons that the rhetorician must know how to present himself as substantively intelligent and virtuous, rather than merely as cleverly skilled at rhetoric. He must not only convince his audience that his arguments are sound, but also that he has their real interests, and not merely their surface desires, at heart.⁸

This attempt to make the rhetorician seem ethically respectable, however, is surely too easy: after all, rhetorical skills might be *conceptually* linked to knowledge of what is good and what is true, without the *practice* of rhetoric requiring such knowledge. The

⁷ Cf. Terence Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 332; and Henry Richardson, "Desire and the Good in *De Anima*," in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 381.

⁸ "We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine. . . . For it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade or the doctor to heal"; *Topics* 101b5–9.

successful rhetorician might only need to know how to mimic what the various types of audience—the young, the old, democrats, aristocrats—take to be indications of practical wisdom. Aristotle's point about the ethical directions of rhetoric is not the overly strong claim that every successful rhetorician must be a *phronimos*; but it is stronger than the relatively weak claim that, like all crafts, rhetoric is directed to its best and most successful exercise.

Dialectic and Rhetoric. To see how Aristotle charts a middle ground, we need to turn to the relation between dialectic and the three types of rhetoric, to the way that each depends on a knowledge of psychology. As a technical skill, rhetoric is a counterpart (*antistrophos*) of dialectic (1354a1): Aristotle calls it a part of dialectic (*morion*), similar to it (*homoionoma*) (1356a31–32).⁹ There is a double connection between dialectic and rhetoric. First, the *philosophic* analysis of the craft of rhetoric—the account of its aims and structure—proceeds dialectically. The philosopher begins with *endoxa*: the accepted opinions of experts (*sophoi*)—the authors of treatises on rhetoric—as supplemented by general reflection on the practices of exemplary rhetoricians. He attempts as best he can, given the unscientific and problematic character of the subject matter, to bring some systematic order to these *endoxa*, to give sound advice to practitioners. Second, the rhetorician himself, as a practitioner of his art, relies on both the results and the methods or skills of dialectical inquiry. The rhetorician does not have a distinct specific subject matter of his own (1354a1–12, 1355b32–36). He depends on, and must skillfully use, the heterogeneous range of accepted opinion for the details of his arguments: general opinion about *eudaimonia*, the opinion of strategists for arguments on what is genuinely dangerous in battle, the views of philosophers for arguments about what kinds of actions are voluntary and what character traits are praiseworthy, and the views of experienced legislators about what sorts of laws can be enforced. And he must be skilled in techniques of dialectic to address the varied *endoxa* that audiences typically bring to any

⁹ The best treatment of this subject is Jacques Brunschwig's "Rhetorique et dialectique: *Rhetorique et Topiques*," in *Philosophical Aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric*. See also his discussion of dialectic in his *Aristote, Topiques*, vol. 1 (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1967), bk. 1–4, pp. xxii–xxiv, 113–14.

issue. Like the dialectician and the sophist, the successful rhetorician must be able to construct contrary arguments: he must first represent and then refute the considerations that appear to weigh against his position.¹⁰

Though rhetoric absorbs the skills of logic, dialectic, and sophistical argument, it differs from them in some important respects (1355b26). It differs from logic in dealing with contingent particulars; and it differs from dialectic in the specificity of its aim. As a general method of investigation, dialectic encompasses both theoretical as well as practical inquiry: it can serve as "a process of criticism that provides a path to general principles" (101b3-4). Rhetoric has a doubly practical aim: that of bringing an audience to a certain decision, so that they might effectively act in a certain way (104b1-4). It is for this reason that Aristotle also says that rhetoric is an offshoot (*paraphues*) of ethics (*tes peri ta ēthē pragmateias*) that can justly be called politics (1356a26). Offshoots carry nutriments in both directions: on the one hand, the *phronimos* and *politikos* need the skills of the rhetorician for effective public action. On the other hand, many of the premises of rhetoric and some of its aims derive from ethics and politics.¹¹

The Three Types of Rhetoric. The three types of rhetoric—deliberative (*sumbouleutikon*), forensic (*dikanikon*), and ceremonial (*epideiktikon*)—are distinguished by their audiences and aims, as they affect the structures of their arguments (1358a36-1359a5). These primary differences dictate further distinguishing features: the modality and the claims of the three types differ from one another. Deliberative rhetoric is directed to those who must decide on a course of action (members of the assembly, for instance), and is typically concerned with what will turn out to be useful

¹⁰ Cf. Brunschwig, *Aristote, Topiques*, xcvi-civ. Although Aristotle sometimes uses the term *dialectikos* pejoratively, to refer to futile inquiries and disputes that are not capable of strict demonstration (*De anima* 403a2), there is no indication that he intends to denigrate rhetoric because it depends upon and uses *endoxa*. The rhetorician does not become a sophist, in the pejorative sense of that term simply because he constructs contrary arguments. The rhetorician's immediate aim, rather than the structure of his dialectical arguments, determines whether a particular speech is merely sophistical (1355b20-23).

¹¹ Cf. Stephen Halliwell, "Popular Morality, Philosophic Ethics and the Rhetoric," in *Philosophical Aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric*.

(*sumpheron*) or harmful (*blaberon*) as means to achieve specific ends in matters of defense, war and peace, trade, and legislation. Forensic rhetoric is directed to judges and is typically concerned to establish guilt or innocence. Wanting to preserve the independence of deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle warns rhetoricians against confusing issues of benefit and harm with those of honor and lawfulness (*to dikaion kai to adikon*) (1356b23). Superficially at least, epideictic rhetoric is largely ceremonial: it is addressed to a general audience and directed to praising honor and virtue, censuring vice and weakness. Of course, since epideictic rhetoric has an important educative function—since praise and blame motivate as well as indicate virtue—it is also implicitly directed to the future; and its argument sometimes bridges those that are typically used for deliberative rhetoric.¹²

Since the advice of the deliberative rhetorician contains predictions about the likely outcomes of specific policies or courses of action, the conclusions of his arguments are in principle testable by their outcomes. The deliberative rhetorician who wishes to retain his reputation as trustworthy must pay attention to what is, in fact, likely to happen. It is for this reason, I think, that Aristotle is ready to part with his predecessors in the discussion of rhetoric: to distinguish deliberative from forensic and epideictic rhetoric and to make the former the focus of his analysis. The primary importance of truth—as it functions within the craft of rhetoric itself—emerges most sharply with deliberative rhetoric, as it persuades an audience to form *kriseis* that will, in fact, affect their *eudaimonia*.

¹² As their aims and temporal foci differ, so each type of rhetoric has a distinctive exemplary argument form. Examples (*paradeigmata*) are the best sorts of arguments for deliberative rhetoric: it is by the examination of the past that we divine and judge (*katamanteumenoï krinomen*) the future. "Enthymemes are best suited to forensic rhetoric because the past most admits of demonstration [*apodeixis*] and causal [explanation] [*aitia*]" (1368a30–31). (For a full discussion of the enthymeme, see Myles Burnyeat, "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion," in *Philosophical Aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric*. Because it is largely concerned with matters that are not under dispute, amplification (*auxesis*) provides the most suitable arguments for epideictic rhetoric. While stressing the differences between epideictic and deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle nevertheless remarks on the way that deliberative rhetoricians can, by turning a phrase, use *encōmia* to counsel a course of action. "If you intend to praise, consider what you would have suggested; if you intend to suggest (*hupothesthai*), consider what you would praise" (1368a6–9).

Using his knowledge of the psychology of his audience, the deliberative rhetorician must bring them to a decision that they will eventually recognize as having served their interests. His task is the enormously delicate one of triangulating the projectible outcomes of various alternatives with an understanding of how a particular audience can be brought to make a specific decision.⁷ Because he is attempting to form decisions about matters that will turn out to be beneficial and harmful, the deliberative rhetorician needs to understand the range of *appropriate* aims of human action—the constituents of happiness—as well as the *endoxa* concerning *eudaimonia* that provide the substantive background premises for his arguments.

To be sure, the account of *eudaimonia* sketched in the *Rhetoric* is broader than the final account that emerges from the philosophical analysis presented in the ethical works: it includes ends that, while also intrinsically good, are often primarily desired as means (1362a15–1362b9). But while the account of the ends of action in the *Rhetoric* is by no means a philosophically complete or refined analysis, it is correct as far as it goes: the range of things accounted good are genuinely good. While the rhetorician is concerned with the kinds of arguments that can be appropriately used to establish the relative priority among those goods, the task of providing a rigorous account of their normative priority is assigned to ethical and political philosophers.

Although the deliberative rhetorician intends to affect significant political decisions, his task remains more limited than those of either the political philosopher or the statesman. Taking the *endoxa* of his audience—who may, in a democracy, be ordinary people (*oi polloi*)—as relatively fixed, the rhetorician attempts to persuade them of a particular decision or action, without being particularly concerned to educate or structure their fundamental interests. Although ideally he attempts to direct his audience to a course that would promote their real interests in the matter at hand, not even the best rhetorician is concerned to bring his audience to a sophisticated philosophic understanding of their ends, or to promote general *eudaimonia*, all things considered. To sustain his reputation as a trustworthy guide in political matters, the rhetorician need not be a philosopher or a *phronimos*: he needs rather to be able to take advice from a philosophically oriented *phronimos*. Call that person “Aristotle”; and call his advice “The Rhetoric.”

II. The Psychology of Rhetorical Persuasion

Aristotle distinguishes three interconnected dimensions of persuasion (*pistis*): *ēthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. Each of these interdependent avenues to persuasion provides a distinctive reason for the dominant place that Aristotle accords his discussion of psychology in the *Rhetoric*. First, the knowledge of psychology enables the orator to present himself as having a trustworthy *ēthos*. Second, it enables him to address his audience persuasively. Third, it provides some of the basic premises for his arguments.

Since we have already touched on it we can, like Aristotle, be brief about the first. The character of the speaker is manifest in his discourse, in what he says and how he says it (1377b23–30).¹³ It is implicit in the way he argues and in the way he addresses the character and emotions of his audience (1356a5–14). Particularly when he might seem to speak from his own interests or on his own behalf, the rhetorician must establish his credibility, his intelligence (*phronēsis* and *eunoia*), and character (*aretē*), as these might be perceived by audience. There are of course land mines surrounding the phrase “as these might be perceived by his audience.” The rhetorician must understand his audience’s perspective: he shows himself to be trustworthy in their eyes by showing that he understands their interests. His success in urging a defensive military policy depends on his presenting himself as a reliable judge of what is worth fearing; and this in turn depends on his knowing what his audience considers dangerous. But while it is possible to fake an honest manner, it is exceedingly difficult to maintain a reputation for *phronēsis* without actually giving a considerable amount of sound advice. A vulgar rhetorician might for a time succeed in dazzling an audience by playing to their preconceptions. A few persuasive speeches, however, do not make a successful rhetorician. Since a rhetorician’s reputation is, over the course of time, measured at least in part by the consequences of the policies he recommends, it would be difficult for a vulgar rhetorician—one who has only pandered to immediate desires, without considering the real interests

¹³ Cf. E. M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric* (London: Macmillan, 1867), 244–5; and John Cooper, “Ethical-Political Theory in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.”

of his audience—to sustain his reputation for either good sense or virtue.

Still, Aristotle's solution allows for the possibility that a vulgar rhetorician might succeed in fooling the citizens of an extremely corrupt state for a long time: such citizens systematically fail to understand their own well-being. They might, for instance, so deeply prefer wild luxury to a soundly continuing *paideia* that they could not recognize the harmful consequences of following the advice of a vulgar rhetorician who urged them on to ever greater luxury. Indeed, it is one of the signs of a hopelessly bad polity that its citizens are no longer able to distinguish a vulgar rhetorician from a *phronimos*. The dark side of what is usually considered Aristotle's optimism is that a polity gets the rhetoricians it deserves; and the distress of a corrupt polity is deepened by the rhetoricians it favors.

The second reason for including an extensive discussion of psychology follows from the aim of rhetoric. Since the point of rhetoric is to influence the kind of judgment (*krisis*) that is effectively an evaluative decision, rhetorical arguments are presented in the form of condensed and reconstructed practical deliberations (1357a1-2). In principle, the judgments of all three kinds of rhetoric can and in a way should be analyzed and evaluated as conclusions of abbreviated practical arguments.¹⁴ In contrast to the arguments of philosophical dialectic that issue in opinion (*doxa*), or the *mimēseis* of dramatic action that issue in *katharsis*, the judgments formed by rhetorical persuasion carry the weight of decisions. They are not only true or false, validly or invalidly derived, but also appropriate or inappropriate, well formed or malformed. Judicial decisions, legislative enactments, and even ordinary praise and blame express decisions that are, as we would say, performative actions. But since choice requires the conjunction of thought (*dianoia*) and desire (*orexis*),¹⁵ the rhetorician must influence the desires as well as the beliefs of

¹⁴ But when the rhetorician argues from signs, examples, or maxims, the "hidden" argument has to be constructed before it can be evaluated. Myles Burnyeat has argued that the enthymeme is not an abbreviated or condensed syllogism with a missing premise. See Myles Burnyeat, "The Origins of Non-Deductive Inference," in *Science and Speculation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. 193-206; and Myles Burnyeat "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion," in *Philosophical Aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric*.

¹⁵ See *De anima* 3.10; *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.2.

his audience, even when there are *phronimoi* among them. Precisely because his arguments are presented in the form of a deliberation (*bouleusis*) (1357a1-3), it is entirely appropriate and indeed necessary for the rhetorician to address the character of his audience: he crystallizes their general ends to form specific desires.¹⁶ The orator's discourse (the *lexis* of his *logos*) provides a mediating link that connects the character and desires of his audience to the (presumptively legitimate) ends he himself wishes to promote.

III. Psychology as a Central *Topos* of Rhetoric

The third reason for Aristotle's including a detailed discussion of psychology is that it provides the basic premises—the basic knowledge—for the substance of rhetorical arguments. Even though rhetoric has no distinctive subject matter—information about the aridity of the enemy's territory, for example, or the distance between an accused criminal's house and the location of the crime—its domain is nevertheless roughly focused on voluntary human action. Although anything or everything might in principle be relevant to a rhetorical argument, it is relevant only insofar as it sheds light on decision or action. It only makes sense to introduce information about the aridity of an enemy's territory if it might affect a decision about whether to go to war. It only makes sense to introduce information about the distance between the house of an accused person and the scene of a crime if that information might be relevant to determining his guilt.

The psychology of the *Rhetoric*, however, hardly qualifies as explanatory scientific knowledge. The *endoxa* that serve as the background of Aristotle's guiding counsel to rhetoricians—the rough generalizations of informed folk-psychology—do not, as they do in

¹⁶ There is, however, an important difference between the idealized forms of deliberation described in the ethical works, and the kind of deliberation presented by a rhetorician. The rhetorician urges his audience to act on a decision: to treat it as a detachable conclusion of a fully constructed practical syllogism. But even when a rhetorical argument would be valid if it were all fully spelled out, it does not, as it is presented, always integrally connect premises to a conclusion. I shall return to this issue later when I discuss the role of *phantasia* and *lexis* in rhetorical argument.

De anima and the ethical works, provide the beginning of a philosophical analysis, one that attempts to reconcile the conflicting opinions of experts and to systematize the convictions of reflective practice. Like the pretheoretical biology of which it is a branch, prescientific psychology is qualified by many different kinds of contingent variables.

Psychology, however, is even further from being rigorous than biology. The range of variables that affect our psychology is "up to us" to an astonishing degree. Indeed, rhetoric, politics, and poetry would have virtually no place if this were not so. To begin with, *phantasia* is distinguished from both perception (*aisthēsis*) and thought (*dianoia*) in being, to some extent at least, "up to us" (*eph' hēmin estin*). While forming opinions (*doxa*) is not up to us, we can, in principle, call up mental images (*eidōlopoiountēs*) at will.¹⁷ Because of the central connection between *phantasia*, *pathē*, and *orexis*, the latitude of what is "up to us" in forming our working psychology extends far beyond the constraints set by our biology.¹⁸ Since human psychology is also strongly affected by education and political circumstance, its generalizations are not only qualified for constitutional, psychophysical factors, but also for other complex subvariables: age, sex, and temperament; in a democratic polity or in an aristocracy.

The psychology that is essential to the *Rhetoric* suffers from yet a further restriction. Unlike the analysis of *aesthēsis* and *phantasia* in *De anima*, and the characterization of *phronēsis* in the ethical works, the discussion of character and the emotions in the *Rhetoric* does not proceed by constructing ideal types. The rhetorician is

¹⁷ *De anima* 427b15–21.

¹⁸ In what way can *phantasia* call up mental images? Is there some connection between the latitude of *phantasia* and the way that we (or at any rate some of us) are responsible for our actions? Cf. Malcolm Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination," in *Essays on De Anima*, 249–77; John McDowell, "The Role of *Eudaimonia* in Aristotle's Ethics" in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 277–9; Martha Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), essay 5; David Charles, *Aristotle's Theory of Action* (London: Duckworth, 1980); David Charles, "Fear: Imagination and Belief" (unpublished talk); David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*; and Dorothea Frede, "The Cognitive Role of *Phantasia* in Aristotle," in *Essays on De Anima*, 279–95.

concerned with the typical psychology of the ambitious youth or the power-hungry demagogue rather than with the idealized psychology of the *phronimos* or that of the relatively noble tragic protagonist.¹⁹ Even the best of deliberative rhetoricians attempting to persuade his audience of significant benefits and dangers can only rely on rough generalizations about the psychology—the interests, motives, and habits—that might be typical of potential allies and enemies. He can only address the fears and hatreds that are typical of various audiences, presenting considerations that are, at best, likely to move them to pity or emulation.²⁰

IV. Aristotle's Theory of Character²¹

Because the substantive psychology of the *Rhetoric* has its sources in Aristotle's more theoretical works, we must turn to the *Metaphysics* and the *Categories* for a discussion of the genus of character and of the emotions, to *De anima* for a sketch of their psychological functions, to the *Politics* for an analysis of their education and their role in civic life, and to the ethical works for an analysis of their relation to *prohairesis*.

The Typologies of Character. Aristotle begins his various discussions of character with a typology or catalogue rather than with a general definition or description. Not surprisingly, the emphasis

¹⁹ The difference between the treatment of character in the ethical works and its treatment in the *Rhetoric* affords a nice example of the difference between the analysis of an ideal type and the analysis of a stereotype.

²⁰ Consider a parallel: Instead of resembling a quasi-scientific treatise on chickens, or even a treatise on animal husbandry, as directed to breeding the best, most fertile chickens, the *Rhetoric* is like a treatise directed to farmers, telling them how to get the varieties of the ordinary run of chickens to lay good eggs. For all of that, Aristotle is not one to shy away from giving important advice based on rough generalizations where it can be usefully given.

²¹ I am indebted in this section to Mary Whitlock Blundell for her careful study of the various senses of *ēthos* in her "Ethos and *Dianoia* Reconsidered," in *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics*, ed. Amélie O. Rorty, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

and the perspective of these catalogues differ with the context of the discussion. These differences do not, I think, indicate that Aristotle's views on character are inconsistent or vacillating. As the focus on these topics shifts, distinctive aspects become salient, and different *aporiai* emerge as centrally relevant.

The catalogue of character types in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1145a15–1145b21) introduces a discussion of the vexing problem of *akrasia*: the problem of how someone who knows what is good can nevertheless voluntarily act badly, despite there being a conceptual correlation between the intellectual and the motivational aspects of *phronēsis*. The discussion is constructed to serve as a frame for an investigation of the features of character that conduce to virtue and vice, weakness (*akrasia*) and strength (*enkrateia*), brutishness (*thēriotēs*), and heroic godlikeness (*aretē heroikē kai theia*).²² The analysis of the individual virtues and of the psychology of the *phronimos*²³ are a continuation of that discussion: it is a zoom lens, close-up view of the character of the *agathos*.

The catalogue of character types in the *Politics* serves as a frame for investigating the correlation between the aims and structures of a state and the psychology of its citizens. Following the Platonic view that different types of states foster distinctive psychological types with distinctive action-guiding ends, Aristotle analyzes the motives to liberty in democratic states, to wealth in oligarchic states, to self-protection in tyrannies, and the focus on education (*paideia*) and lawfulness central to aristocratic states. Since each type of polity is susceptible to specific and distinctive sorts of disorder and instability, he discusses the motives for revolution (*metabolē*) and political strife (*stasis*)²⁴ characteristic of different states. Because the *Politics* is a normative as well as a descriptive work, it includes a discussion of the psychological qualifications for citizenship and of the education of the civic virtues.²⁵

The Constituents and Genus of Character. The major constituents of character—habits (*hexeis*), dispositions (*diatheseis*), and natural capacities (*dynamēis phusikai*)—clearly fall under the

²² *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.1, and 1145a15–1145b7.

²³ *Ibid.*, 3.6–5.11.

²⁴ *Politics* 1301a19–1307b25.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1328a18–20, 1327b19–20, 1332a41–1332b11.

category of quality (*poiotēs*).²⁶ The qualities of a thing are, in the first instance, the differentia of its essence; and secondarily they are the modifications (*pathē*) of the sorts of things that are capable of change (*kinoumenon ousion*).²⁷ Because virtues and vices are modifications, they can also loosely be classified as qualities.²⁸ *Hexeis* are especially stable and enduring dispositions, which express or initiate activities that are typically well or poorly exercised.²⁹ Significantly, *hexeis* are active dispositions to action and motion (*praxis kai kinēsis*): if they were not, Aristotle says, there would be an infinite (*apeiron*) regress of "havings," a having of a having to activate the disposition.³⁰ A *hexis* is not a possession (*ktēsis*), but a way of functioning.³¹ To have a habit just is to be endogenously disposed to act in a certain way whenever appropriate occasions or circumstances arise, without the need of any further causes or changes in one's condition. Most *hexeis* are configurations of traits (*diatheseis*) by virtue of which a thing acts or functions in a specific way: it is for this reason that their exercise can be judged good or bad (*eu ē kakos*).³² It is also for this reason, among others, that Aristotle classifies virtues as *hexeis*, indicating that they form a person's second nature: dispositional tendencies to action that require no further cause to activate them when the appropriate occasion for doing so arises.

²⁶ See Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 108–13.

²⁷ *Metaphysics* 1020a33–1020b23.

²⁸ But in *Physics* 246a3–10 the virtues are classified with relations that are neither alterations nor subject to alteration. They can, however, change as a result of other alterations. The virtues of the young are not, for instance, themselves changed by the aging process: courage does not become cowardice. But a person's virtues can be affected by bodily changes: so as the body's temperature cools with age, the elderly find it easier to achieve sexual *sōphrosunē*.

²⁹ *Metaphysics* 1022b4–14. To call them "states," as J. L. Ackrill does in his translation, is to suggest they are static rather than dynamic; J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 104. But despite this infelicity, Ackrill's comments on 8b26–10a11 (pp. 104–7) are admirably helpful.

³⁰ *Metaphysics* 1022b5.

³¹ Cf. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Gamma, Delta and Epsilon*, trans. with notes by Christopher Kirwan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 170–1.

³² *Metaphysics* 1022b10–11; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1145a15–1145b7. I shall use the term "traits" to refer to each and to all the constituents of character: habits, dispositions, and natural capacities.

The dispositions and habits that constitute character are layered in what seems to form a veritable archeological site. Some traits, such as being hot-tempered or slow-witted, are constitutionally based; others derive from a person's social condition (as those in power are said to be serious and dignified) (1391a20–30); yet others are formed by an individual's polity. Still others (the habits that constitute the virtues and vices, for example) derive from individual education and experience.³³

As it is described in the *Rhetoric*, a person's character combines relatively specific first order traits with a variety of second order dispositions. Among the first are the love of honor typical of the young, the love of liberty typical of citizens in a democracy, and the suspiciousness of the elderly. Some second order traits are modifiers or modalities of first order traits (as the intensity with which the young love and hate; the feebleness of the emotions of the elderly); others are dispositions to acquire specific first order traits. (Because the elderly are fond of themselves [*philautoi*], they are disposed to being small-minded and primarily guided by considerations of utility.) Many second order *hexeis* are dispositions that govern or control first order *hexeis*. However difficult it may be, a constitutionally irascible person can, in principle at least, be good tempered (*praōs*): for him, being so requires controlling some first order traits. Many *hexeis*—particularly the cognitive components of the virtues and vices—are (what we might call) actively magnetizing. Because they structure what is salient or dominant in an individual's perceptual and conceptual field, they can predispose him to specific emotions. (For instance, someone who habitually sees situations as dangerous is especially liable to fear; one who is habitually focused on the distribution of honors or wealth is especially liable to envy or emulation; one who habitually notices slights is disposed to anger even though he might not be constitutionally irascible.) Both first order and second order character traits typically appear along a continuum of paired contraries. The various *hexeis* that form an individual's character fall somewhere on a scale between affability and surliness, between extravagance and miserliness.

Can two individuals have roughly the same character, but one be virtuous the other not? Not surprisingly, the answer is in one

³³ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1104a33–1105a16.

sense no and in another yes, depending on the level of precision and detail with which we are concerned. In one sense, since character includes habits and ends that arise from individual experience and circumstance, it is as wholly individuated as anything within an Aristotelian frame can be. On this level, an individual's character includes the specification of his virtues. But for other purposes—like those of the *Rhetoric* for example—individuals can be adequately characterized by their general features. To say of someone that he is a powerful young democrat or an old aristocrat is to specify a vast range of his traits, the directions of his thoughts, habits, desires. In this sense, two individuals of the same character type can differ in virtue, can differ in the specific ways that their ends form their desires.

Putting words in his mouth, we can now present a rough first approximation of Aristotle's account of character. A person's character consists of those long standing actively dispositional qualities and traits—his natural capacities and habits—that (by setting the general direction of his desires and the range of his passions) direct his choices. It is his nature and his second nature.

The Structure of Character. A person's character, particularly as it structures his evaluative judgments and choices, is not, however, just a heap of heterogeneous qualities: natural capacities, habits, and desires of all sorts. After all, the old, as well as the young can be concerned with matters of honor; the young, as well as the middle aged can be concerned with matters of security; the citizens of a democracy can be concerned with wealth as well as with liberty. Character is a stable and enduring configuration of these, structured in an order of relative strength and importance.³⁴

But there are distinctive measures by which the ordering of strength and importance takes place. The distinction between *hexis*

³⁴ Cf. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Gamma*, *Delta* and *Epsilon*, 170. Since a person's character is a structured, layered configuration of traits rather than a heterogeneous set of haphazardly organized qualities, it also falls under the general category of *diathesis*. In the *Metaphysics* the *diathesis* of a thing is said to refer to the configuration or organization of its aspects or parts, as we might speak of the dispositions of the rooms of a house or the disposition—presumably the relative power (*kata dunamin*)—of reason in relation to *aesthēsis* (1022b1ff.).

and *diathesis* is introduced as a distinction between relatively enduring qualities and those that are hard to change. Yet Ackrill notes that a relatively enduring quality (like health) might be easy to change, while it might sometimes be difficult to change one of short duration—one that, like knowledge, might have been recently acquired.³⁵ A habit (*hexis*) that is strong by one measure might be relatively weak by another; and certainly, while reason has priority over perception by most measures of importance, perception might well have priority over reason in strength.

The first approximation to Aristotle's account of character must, therefore, be modified: character is the *configuration of hierarchically ordered, long standing, actively dispositional qualities and traits*—a person's capacities and habits—that (by setting the general direction of his desires and the range of his passions) direct his choices. In one way, therefore, a person's character can be summarized by his ends, as they form an organized system of ordered preferences, the structure of his practical reasoning. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle puts the importance of this aspect of character very strongly. *Prohairesis*, he says, involves reasoning towards an end: it requires the combination of thought (*dianoia*) and desire (*orexis*).³⁶ Since thought (*dianoia*) moves nothing, choices require a combination of thought and *ēthos*. The ultimate source (*archē*) of action is the person (*anthrōpos*), presumably conceived as a structured unity of his character traits. For the purpose of understanding deliberation and choice, a person's character is a structured unity of a special kind, the union of reason and desire.

Character and Dianoia. Are there two, perhaps even three conceptions of character, having no bearing on one another?³⁷ In the *Rhetoric* character is described as constituted by those traits that are organized in archeological layers of deep-seated dispositions, ordered by their relative persistence and strength—many, like laziness or timidity, having no apparent bearing on the person's ends (1113a30ff.). In the ethical works, however, character is manifest in the hierarchy of ordered desires or preferences that, together

³⁵ Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, 104.

³⁶ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139a32ff.

³⁷ Cf. Blundell, "Ethos and Dianoia Reconsidered"; Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, vol. 3, p. 193.

with *dianoia*, determine choice and action.³⁸ In this sense, a person's character reveals his moral standing as virtuous or vicious. How, if at all, is archeological character (irascibility, impulsiveness, mistrustfulness) summarized or expressed in the preference rankings that affect *prohairesis* and that determine a person's ethical standing?

In one way, it would appear that there is—and should be—no relation between a person's character and his thought (*dianoia*). Because *nous* and *dianoia* are, by definition, truth-oriented, they are not—or at any rate should not be—affected by the archeological aspects of a person's character. We can distinguish two levels of *orexis* and *dianoia*. The higher levels are best exemplified in the practical reasoning of the *phronimos*: his desire is right, his thought is true, and they coincide, in such a way that the source of his deliberation can be indifferently called *oretikos nous* or *orexis dian-oetikē* (desiring-thought or thought-defined desire).³⁹ His archeological character is compatible with his rational preferences. In one way, the thought of the *phronimos* is unaffected by any "lower level" traits, by age, wealth, or, in a way, even by the specific features of the polity in which he lives. Indeed he would not qualify as a *phronimos* if they were. But the relation between the *phronimos*'s character-*hexeis* and his preferences can also be described in another way: his archeological character is adequately expressed in desires that are entirely compatible with the truth-bound directions of his *dianoia*. His intellect (*nous*) permeates or guides those aspects of his reasoning that, like perception and imagination, might be affected by his archeological character.

This way of characterizing the *ēthos* of the *phronimos* raises an extremely difficult question—one that Aristotle did not himself address directly. To what extent do a person's general ends determine his desires? Can his ends be specified in a number of mutually exclusive ways? Are all *phronimoi* identical for practical purposes, despite their historical and political differences? On the one hand, the *phronimos*'s desires are formed by what is good and what is true, rather than by the practices of his *polis*. On the other hand, the ends and practices of his *polis* not only set the frame of his deliberations, but also partially constitute his preferences. There is, on

³⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139a32ff.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1139b5–6.

the surface of it, a simple reconciliation of these apparently conflicting conditions. Although the ends of his *polis* in part formed the character of the *phronimos*, they do not figure in his deliberations by virtue of that fact, but rather by virtue of the fact that they constitute the objective frame and material of those deliberations. But this solution is too simple: The *phronimos* is, after all, not, as a *phronimos*, a contemplator focused on eternal, unchanging matters. He is rather a historical and politically located person.

Aristotle might typically answer that in a sense all *phronimoi* are alike, and that in a sense they are not, depending on the level of generality with which their characters and preferences are described. All *phronimoi* are, for instance, committed to preserving the integrity of their *polis*; and all are committed to an objective inquiry into what that integrity requires. Nevertheless, as their polities differ, one *phronimos* might reasonably favor the restriction of trade, while another favors its expansion, as the clearest and best means to that end. This solution, however, only allows for some differences between Athenian and Spartan *phronimoi*: can two Athenian *phronimoi* differ on trade policy? Can their clusters of virtue differ? The *phronimoi* described in the *Nicomachean Ethics* would seem to be identical: there is no sign of Aristotle's thinking that the virtues might be sufficiently in tension so that one *phronimos* might, for instance, be more courageous than temperate, while the virtues of another *phronimos* might balance at a different point. But the description of the *phronimos* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is manifestly strongly idealized. It is open to Aristotle to acknowledge that in an ordinary, run of the mill, good polity, two relatively sound, trustworthy *phronimoi* might differ in the balance of their virtues, and in the balance of their advice.

So much for the *phronimos*. For the rest of us, matters are more complicated: the fit between our thoughts and desires is not so neat. Each type of character has its own perspective on what is desirable, seeing it as noble, expedient, or pleasant.⁴⁰ The practical reason of ordinary folk, however intelligent and astute they may be, is influenced by their character-*hexeis*, their age, their social status, the polity in which they live.⁴¹ Their desires are not only

⁴⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1113a31-33.

⁴¹ There are land mines buried beneath the glossy reference to the influence of character traits on practical reasoning. Just how does

constrained by such character traits, but are also directed and strongly specified by them. This does not mean that their characters completely determine their desires. After all, many fortuitous circumstances, including the speeches of rhetoricians, enter into the full specification of their desires.

We are now in a position to understand why the psychology of the *Rhetoric* does not include a separate discussion of desire. The descriptions of character have already specified the archeologically based desires and *dianoia* of each character-type. They have specified the active, magnetizing, cognitive and motivational habits and dispositions that select the foci of attention: the characterological scanners or filters that form a specific sort of interpretation for whatever a person sees, presenting it in such a light as to elicit certain desires or emotions. Given a dangerous situation, the young are likely to be challenged, and to delight in being challenged; given the very same situation, the elderly are likely to foresee and to fear disaster.

V. Emotions (*Pathē*)

We have still to see why, despite the fact that Aristotle has already described some of the emotions that are typical of the various types of character, he nevertheless treats them separately. The answer is, in a way, quite straightforward: whether or not a person is virtuous, his character is directly expressed in his desires. But a person's character—indeed his virtues or vices—is expressed in his habits and dispositions *concerning* his emotions, rather than in the emotions that fortuitously happen to move him.⁴²

Typologies of Pathē. Aristotle gives us several different lists or catalogues of *pathē*. In each case, he selects examples from what

character "affect" or "influence" perception, desire, and *dianoia*? Are the features of an individual's character expressed *in* his ends and actions? Or do character traits in some unspecified way *cause* him to have those ends and perform those actions? Or do they provide a thicker description of desires and actions?

⁴² *Nicomachean Ethics* 1106b16–26.

is after all a vast and heterogeneous class in such a way as to forward his immediate concerns. The catalogue of sample emotions (appetite [*epithumia*], anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendliness, hatred, longing, jealousy, and pity) presented in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.5 is introduced tangentially, in the course of locating the genus of virtue.⁴³ The inclusion of appetite—which, like desire, would seem to be an endogenous function of character—might initially seem anomalous. But since the *Ethics* list is focused on those conditions for which a person is not praised or blamed, and since *epithumiai* can be roughly characterized as constitutionally based appetites, they can (for the purposes of that particular discussion) be listed with *pathē*, even though their basic characterological and motivational status is quite different from standard passions.⁴⁴ Although the virtues and vices are like passions in being accompanied by pleasure and pain,⁴⁵ they are not passions: for we are not praised or blamed for being frightened or indignant, but for our dispositions concerning them, whether we flee in fear or are steadfast, whether we speak out in indignation at tyranny or remain self-protectively silent. Moreover, we are said to be moved by our emotions (*kata men ta pathē kineisthai*), but disposed towards virtue and vice rather than moved by them (*ou kineisthai alla diakeisthai*) (1106a5–7).

The list of passions in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is introduced in a discussion that is primarily directed to showing that virtue falls within a mean between two extremes, where the extremes are often passions.⁴⁶ Some passions can themselves be located in a mean between two extremes. Modesty, for instance, lies in a mean between being self-effacing and being shameless.⁴⁷ Even in such cases, however, the relevant virtue is a disposition concerning the passion, rather than the passion itself. The *phronimos* is not necessarily always modest: he is so in the right way, at the right time.

⁴³ For a discussion of the differences between the several catalogues of *pathē*, see Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 117–18.

⁴⁴ There are other examples of cross-listings. Anger, for instance, is listed along with desire; reason and habit among the causes of action; *Rhetoric* 1369a6. The explanation is again relatively straightforward: anger involves a desire for revenge, and so, like other desires, it carries a presumption to action.

⁴⁵ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1105a16.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 1108a30–1108b7.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1108a35–36.

Finally, descriptions of the passions figure importantly in the analysis of the individual character virtues. Since the virtues are *hexeis* concerning *praxis* and *pathos*, the individuation of each virtue typically includes a description of a set of relevant *pathē*, and the kind of pleasure or pain that is associated with it.⁴⁸ Still, since those descriptions are focused on the way that the virtue controls or directs passions, rather than on the passions themselves. We need to turn elsewhere for an account of the nature of the passions.

The list of *pathē* in the *Rhetoric* seems, in a way, arbitrary: it could easily have been longer or shorter. The *pathē* that are discussed at length—anger, fear, envy, pity—are strongly linked to specific pleasures and pains, closely associated with *phantasiai* that clearly affect desire and judgment. As long as we have a healthy sample of *pathē* that are manifestly important in persuasion, Aristotle can safely assume that astute readers could construct a reasonable analysis of the typical causes, objects, and occasions for other moving *pathē*.⁴⁹

The Genus and the Functions of Pathé. The most comprehensive account of *pathē* appears in the *Metaphysics*, where they are characterized as (a) qualities in respect to which a thing can change (its color or mood, for instance); (b) the alteration itself (blushing or anger, for instance); (c) injurious or painful alterations (a wound, for instance); or (d) extreme misfortune, like that suffered by Priam.⁵⁰ So described, the class of passions is very broad indeed:

⁴⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1104b4–1105b16.

⁴⁹ See David Charles, "Fear: Imagination and Avoidance" (unpublished talk delivered at a conference on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Helsinki, August 1991) for an excellent discussion of the role of *phantasia* in producing and sustaining action-guiding fear. Although Aristotle always connects *pathē* to pleasures and pains, it is not clear that the connection is always strong enough to motivate action. In any case, Aristotle's account of the motivating functions of pleasure and pain cannot be assimilated to theories that treat them as extensionally identifiable, presumptively moving to pursuit and avoidance.

⁵⁰ *Metaphysics* 1022b15–23. Some constitutionally based emotional dispositions (irascibility or a chronic sense of shame, for example) are classified as qualities, because they are enduring and difficult to change; *Categorias* 8b25–9b12. Because they are, in a way, endogenous in requiring no further causes to activate them, they are presumably also *hexeis*; cf. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 113–18. For a more extended discussion of the class of *pathē* as it encompasses physiological modifications

it includes physical as well as psychological reactions; it is often reasonably translated as "experience."⁵¹ By contrast to an entity's active essential functions (*ergon*) and its natural dispositions, its *pathē* are typically accidental and exogenous conditions. But this is an area where there is a good deal of cross-classification. A belief or a desire formed by hypnosis or drug-induced mania can, for instance, be classified with *pathē*, even if the belief happens to be true and the desire happens to be right (*orthos*). On the other hand, some indignation—the wrath of Achilles, for example—is the expression of a long standing characterological disposition, rather than a *pathos*, even though indignation is typically a *pathos* (1369a6).

The discussion of *pathē* in *De anima* focuses on their dual identification as physical and psychological conditions. It includes an account of their primary causes, aims, and functions. In that context (*De anima* 403a25–403b10) anger is said to be individuated and identified by the boiling of the blood around the heart *and* by its typical causes and objects: the pain of an unjustifiable thought of returning pain for pain. The quasi-physiological treatment of the *pathē* has been assigned to the *physikos*; the rhetorician must rely on the dialecticians—on the moral philosopher and the folk psychologist—for an account of the ways that character and the emotions affect choice.⁵¹ The characterization of *pathē* in the *Rhetoric*—"those [exogenous] changes (*metaballontes*) which produce a difference (*diapherousi*) in [a person's] judgments (*kriseis*), and are

as well as the kinds of cognitively individuated emotions that are in principle subject to voluntary control, see A. O. Rorty, "Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of *Pathē*," *The Review of Metaphysics* 37 (March 1984): 521–46.

⁵¹ Cf. *De motu animalium* 701b20ff.

⁵² The division of labor in the analysis of the emotions, however, is at best quite complex, at worst unclear. The physiology studied by the *physikos* is never purely material. It already contains a form-defined intentional selector: not any boiling of the blood around the heart, but the blood boiling in anger—rather than, say, solely from fever. Nor is the psychologist's contribution purely conceptual. As Jonathan Barnes observes, the dialectical definition of anger marks it as painful (*lupē*), which is, "with the body" (*kata ton somaton*) (*De sensu et sensato* 436a10–b2); Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle's Concept of Mind," in *Articles on Aristotle*, vol. 4 (London: Duckworth, 1979), 37. In *De motu animalium* Aristotle combines the physiological with at least some psychological dimensions of movement and action: *phantasiai* change the size, shape, and temperature of the bodily parts (701b12–32).

accompanied by pleasure and pain" (1378a20–21)—is clearly derived from the first two conditions of those presented in the discussion of *pathē* in the *Metaphysics*.⁵³

We are now in a position to see yet another reason why the *Rhetoric* includes a zoom-lens, close-up picture of emotions, but not of desires and thought. The psychology of the *Rhetoric* forms a neat pairing between character and emotions, as respectively the active and passive features that affect a person's judgment and choice. In his discussion of character, Aristotle stresses the active aspect of *hexeis*: they form and direct patterns of salience in a person's perceptual, cognitive, and motivational field. A person's character sets a pattern of activity that does not require any further external causal intervention. By contrast, the motivational force of *pathē* derive from changes brought about by external causes.

Psychological passions—passions narrowly conceived as emotions—are differentiated from the larger class of reactions by the conditions which individuate them: by the way they affect us (*dia-keimenoī*), and by their typical causes, objects, and rationale (1378a22–30). But if emotions are themselves changes, of what are they changes? Since *pathē* have, as it were, a double-entry book-keeping, they are both physical and psychological changes that themselves generate further changes. The boiling of the blood around the heart in anger, for instance, presumably generates further physical changes. But what matters for rhetoric are the series of psychological changes that mark each *pathos*. Anger, for example, involves the thought that one has been unjustifiably injured, along with the pain that normally accompanies that thought and that generates a desire for revenge, along with the pleasurable anticipation—presumably involving calculative *phantasiai*—of revenge.

Because Aristotle's discussion of the individual passions is limited to those features that are relevant to the rhetorician's craft, he does not raise the kinds of questions that would be germane to a philosophical account. Do the various psychological components of anger form a causal sequence? Are the thoughts associated with

⁵³ Aristotle's omission of the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1105b21 condition that emotions involve pleasure or pain is puzzling, particularly since his descriptions of particular passions typically characterize them as painful or pleasurable. The omission seems all the more glaring because his discussion of *akrasia* rests on his view that pleasure can affect judgment. Perhaps, for once, he uncharacteristically took something for granted.

anger *phantasiai*? Is the connection between the cognitive and the motivational aspects of a *pathos* always mediated by pleasure and pain? What conduces to the persistence of the attitudes that the rhetorician has aroused? Since Aristotle's account of the narrative structure typical of emotions—the way they cluster in patterns of presuppositions and opposition, their characteristic causes and consequences—remains particular, directed to the analysis of specific emotion types, we must project the material scattered in the corpus to form a speculative construction.

One of the central ways that the rhetorician affects the evaluative decisions of his audience is by evoking memories associated with *pathē*-laden *phantasiai*. The motivating passions of anger, fear, and emulation can be aroused by eliciting specific sorts of thoughts and *phantasiai*. Calculative *phantasiai* can specify the motivational direction of a passion once it is aroused. Having aroused anger or emulation, the rhetorician can specify its motivational direction by evoking calculative *phantasiai* of a particular revenge or competition, one which is so related to specific pleasures and pains as to engender the relevant desire (1385a21ff., 1388a36ff.). Even passions that are not strongly motivational (shame, pity, envy) are affected by, and in turn affect, *phantasia* (1384a24, 1385b16ff., 1387b22ff.).

The Persuasive Force of Phantasia and Phantasmata. The motivational force of pleasure and pain is announced in *De anima*: "when the object [of perception] is pleasant or painful, the soul . . . pursues or avoids the object. To be pleased or pained is to act . . . towards what is good and bad" (431a11–16). "An animal is not capable of appetite [*orektikon*] without *phantasia*; and all *phantasia* is either calculative [*logistikon*] or sensory [*aesthētikon*]" (433b28–30). The next move is that of linking perception to *phantasia*, and *phantasia* to pleasure and pain: "To that part of the soul which thinks [*dianoetikē*], *phantasmata* take the place of perceptions [*aisthēmata*]" (431a14–15). Since the cognitive component of an emotion is a *phantasia* associated with pleasure or pain, it is presumptively motivating. The most helpful and telling passages are in *De motu animalium* 701b33 and following: they have the further merit of combining Aristotle's physiological with his psychological account of the sources of motion.⁵⁴ "Alteration [in the motion of animals]

⁵⁴ English translation for this is taken from Martha Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De motu animalium*, 233ff.

is caused by *phantasiai* and sense perceptions and thought [*ennoiai*]” (701b16ff.). “Such things as shuddering and being frightened are *pathē* and changes [*alloiōseis*]” (701b23). “The origin [*archē*] of motion [*kinēsis*] . . . is the object of pursuit and avoidance.” The *pathē* “of confidence, fears, sexual arousal, and other painful or pleasant [*lupēra kai hēdeia*] bodily conditions [*sōmatika*] are accompanied by heating or chilling” (702a3ff.). *Pathē* prepare [*paraskeuazei epitēdeios*] the parts of organs [for motion], desire [*orexis*] [prepares] the *pathē*; and *phantasia* [prepares] desire” (702a18ff.). *De anima* presents this summary: “If one regards the *phantasia* as [sort of] like thinking [*noēsin*], then desire [*orexis*] and mind [*nous*] are capable of causing movement [*kinounta*]” (433a10).⁵⁵

In arguing that the soul uses *phantasmata* in thinking, Aristotle may be extrapolating from the practice of accompanying mathematical discussions with sketches of geometrical figures.⁵⁶ It is an explanatory strategy that he has used elsewhere: public debate, attempting to form an “all things considered” judgment by weighing the pros and cons advanced by different speakers, provides the model for intrapsychic deliberation. There are, however, enormous difficulties in interpreting Aristotle’s account of *phantasia* and *phantasmata*. To begin with, his discussions are brief, often introduced tangentially in the course of another investigation, and scattered in works that seem to have been initially written at different periods. The frequently cited etymological connections to the cognates of *phainesthai* and even to *phaos* are tempting, but tantalizingly unclear. Even when he presents direct discussions of *phantasia*,⁵⁷ Aristotle is primarily interested in differentiating *phantasia* from *aesthēsis*, from *hupolēpsis*, and from *doxa*. We know more about what *phantasia* is not than we know about what it is. Although *to phantastikon* and *to aesthētikon* are the same faculties or capacities, they are different in being or essence (*einai*): a *phantasia* can occur in

⁵⁵ Myles Burnyeat helped me to see that in saying that *phantasia* is sort of like thinking, Aristotle is not saying that it is a type of thought. *Phantasiai* are always particular: we use them in thinking, as a way of connecting some of our thoughts to sensations. Cf. Frede, “The Cognitive Role of *Phantasia* in Aristotle.”

⁵⁶ Cf. David Gallop, “Animals in the *Poetics*,” in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Julia Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

⁵⁷ *De anima* 427b15–429a9, 431b3–19, 433b28ff.; *De somniis* 458b10–460b28; and *De motu animalium* 701b34–702a22.

the absence of "its" *aesthēsis*.⁵⁸ While there is no *hupolēpsis*—taking something to be the case, as in opinion or thought—without *phantasia*,⁵⁹ *phantasia* is neither opinion (*doxa*) nor perception (*aesthēsis*) nor any combination of these.⁶⁰ Although it is not possible to think without *phantasmata*, there is, for example, a distinction between thinking of a triangle without any reference to its size, and considering a triangle of a determinate size, as the exemplar of the properties (say the sum of its interior angles) that are the proper objects of the thought.⁶¹ Aristotle need not be implying that *phantasmata* are determinate images: there might be many other properties of such *phantasmata*—their color, for instance—that remain indeterminate and unspecified.

Beyond the difficulties presented by the texts themselves, there are those that arise from our own associations, from the history of the philosophical derivatives and descendants of *phantasia*: seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories of images and imaging; the role of imagination and the schematism in Kant's transcendental psychology; the pejorative post-Romantic distinction between fantasy and the imagination; recent discussions of the intentionality of mental activity. All of these give us glimpses of *phantasia*, glimpses that mislead us.

This much at least seems clear: both sensory and calculative *phantasiai* are particular. They are the experimental content of perceptions that, unlike the perceptions themselves, can remain in the mind to reappear in dreams, after-images, and memories; they are what the mind uses to think. Unlike proper perceptions—perceptions of proper objects—they can be false; they give specific directions to desires in producing motion and action.⁶² Beyond this we must turn to speculation. I suggest that *phantasiai* are how things appear to us, *given who, what, and where we are*. Since we are virtually always in some condition of desire, our perceptions carry a set of associated (but not constitutive) *phantasiai*. If we

⁵⁸ *De somniis* 459a15ff.

⁵⁹ *De anima* 426b16.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 428a25ff.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 449b31–450a5.

⁶² Useful discussions of the functions of *phantasia* are to be found in Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination"; Frede, "The Cognitive Role of *Phantasia* in Aristotle"; and in Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De motu animalium*, esp. essay 5.

take these *phantasiai* literally, if we confuse them with perceptions, they are, as Aristotle says, almost always false—just as a sketch of a triangle in the sand would, if taken at face value, give a misleading idea of its properties. Although we can easily be misled, however, we need not be. What we make of *phantasia*, how we take them, is at least partially up to us. Situated as we are, at a great distance from the sun, it appears to us, when we see it, as an object with a small diameter. Similarly, situated as a hungry person might be, a wax apple might appear juicy and succulent, good to eat. These *phantasiai* do not have the force of opinions. Our perceptual *phantasiai* of the sun does not determine or dictate our beliefs about its size. Nor does a hungry person's *phantasiai* fix his opinions about a wax apple: if it did, he would, other things being equal, reach out to eat it. In neither case does the *phantasia* always involve seeing *as if*, or seeing under a cognitive description: for animals—who do not think, and certainly do not think hypothetically—have *phantasiai* that guide their desires to appropriate movement. Happily and significantly, *phantasiai* can be focused on properties that objects really have. The object of desire (*orekton*) is said to start a movement (*to orekton gar kinei*),⁶³ a specific desire is, as it were, elicited by the perceived qualities of a specific object.⁶⁴ Aristotle seems to think there is a preestablished harmony between (1) the proper object (*orekton*) of an animal's desires, (2) the way that those normatively proper objects appear to it, and (3) the animal's normally having (under the best circumstances) well-formed desires. Thus for us as well: under the best circumstances, the way things seem to us bears a law-like relation (1) to our situations and desires, and (2) to the way things are. But we are not always in the best circumstances: our situations, desires, and passions can skew our *phantasiai*, the way things appear to us. Still, what we see—the perception proper—is, as such, by definition always true. To a hungry person, a wax apple seems edible, even succulent, even when he knows he is looking at a bowl of artificial fruit. But what he *sees*, as the proper objects of sight, are the proper qualities of that object, whatever they may be.

⁶³ *De anima* 433a18–19.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 433a15–31. Cf. Henry Richardson, "Desire and the Good in *De Anima*," in *Essays on De Anima*.

Now what has all this to do with rhetoric? An important part of the rhetorician's skill is that of evoking the *phantasiai* of his audience in just such a way as to elicit the *pathē* associated with the sorts pleasures and pains that will elicit appropriate desires. For instance, if he thinks it best to provoke his audience to revenge, he awakens anger by attempting to draw a vivid picture of the enemy as having unjustly injured the *polis* (1382a18ff.). He tries to make former allies appear as enemies. Or if he wants to persuade his audience to retreat from an exposed position, he elicits its fear by evoking vivid *phantasiai* of imminent danger (1382a20ff.). In order for the rhetorician to form just the right sort of action-guiding desire, rather than whirligig diffuse *pathē*, he must be quite precise about the imagery of his speech. The *phantasiai* that he elicits should be associated with highly specific pleasures and pains: the pleasure of a specific sort of revenge in anger, for instance, rather than that of successful competition in emulation. But since *phantasiai* are affected by the audience's general background desires and emotions, the rhetorician must bear in mind the character of his audience. Since the elderly and the young have different backgrounds and general desires, the rhetorician must attempt to evoke the *phantasiai* appropriate to each group, as a way of specifying their respective general background preoccupations. To persuade the young to take revenge, the rhetorician must evoke *phantasiai* of injured honor; to persuade the elderly, he must evoke *phantasiai* of the loss of property. *Phantasiai* specify pleasures and pains: they give a determinate direction to the desires that they generate. Indeed, the details of a specific *phantasia* are associated with a pleasure or pain that contributes to that *phantasia*'s individuation, and thus presumably to the desires it forms. To persuade the young to take their revenge by going to war rather than by an act of betrayal, the rhetorician should evoke highly specific calculative *phantasiai* of specific strategies that would bring glory on the battlefield. To persuade the elderly of the same course, he should add a vivid description of its low-risk gains.

Aristotle does not address a central problem about the role of the passions in successful rhetorical persuasion. For deliberative persuasion to be successful, it is essential not only to arouse, but also to stabilize appropriate emotions, along with their attendant desires. It is not enough that the audience be moved at hearing the

rhetorician's speech in the assembly: the audience's *kriseis* must be sufficiently stable to guide its future decisions and actions when the time comes to issue orders to the fleet, or to order the prison guard to administer hemlock to Socrates. It is, after all, a very poor rhetorician indeed whose persuasive arguments—however strong they may have been on the occasion of their delivery—are insufficiently binding, so that the Athenians, for instance, having decided to send a ship to Mytelene, are moved to recall it the following day. The conclusions of valid practical syllogisms can be, and are, detached from their premises: their reliability is assured by the argument. Although rhetorical arguments are formed on the model of a deliberation, however, and are in principle ideally capable of being reconstructed as valid inferences, they often take an indirect or condensed route through *phantasiai* and their associated *pathē*, as well as through maxims, analogies, metaphors, and enthymemes. Their conclusions are correspondingly unstable: even when an audience has been persuaded—when it has detached the conclusion from the rhetorician's *logos*—it can be swayed to a decision by a different set of rhetorical considerations. So how do the best rhetoricians succeed in binding as well as eliciting the audience's evaluative decisions?

We can speculate about a variety of possible solutions to how Aristotle's deliberative rhetorician attempts to assure the stability of the audience's persuasion. Since Aristotle does not address the problem directly, there is little textual evidence to help us select among them. Aristotle might have taken the view that *phantasiai* and the passions reinforce one another by what Hume rather mysteriously calls a double relation between impressions and ideas: just as a particular *phantasia* evokes a typical emotion, so too specific emotion-types tend to evoke characteristic *phantasiai*. The mutually reinforcing cycle would presumably continue until another set of associations intervene. The "double relation" introduced by rhetorically induced *phantasiai*, and its attendant motivating passions, would be reestablished when an appropriately similar set of perceptions occurred. While this solution has considerable attractions, it seems to bypass the formative force of rhetorical persuasion. If a set of perceptions is sufficient to elicit a motivating passion when it is time to act, then the rhetorician's speech plays little role in persuasion.

Another solution—one closer to Aristotle's primary directions—is to say that the successful rhetoricians arouse *phantasiai* and *pathē* that are closely associated with the strongly dispositional desires

of the audience. That is, after all, the point of the rhetorician's understanding the character of his audience: to bind their convictions, he must not only recognize their immediate desires, but also the deeper, more stable structure of their motivation. It might well be a feature of the connection between *phantasiai* and pleasures and pains that their associated *pathē* can easily become relatively entrenched, available to be aroused whenever appropriate circumstances present themselves. This solution would require Aristotle to differentiate the *phantasiai* and *pathē* aroused by the poets from those aroused by the rhetorician. This is just what he does in the *Poetics*: what differentiates the pity and fear aroused by poetic tragedy from those aroused by rhetorical discourse is that the structure of the plot is designed to effect a *katharsis* of the emotions, while the *lexis* of the rhetorician is designed to lead to a detachable, action-guiding *krisis*.

Just how do the *krisis* formed by rhetorical persuasion function in the appropriate context, long after the initial conviction? Do they form dispositional memories, elicited in whatever ways other dispositions become active when the appropriate occasion arises? What feature of the disposition is, so to say, triggered by an appropriate occasion? What is it about an occasion that triggers the activation of the disposition? I suggest a two-part solution: the rhetorician's craft is that of finding a way to bind the *phantasiai* that he evokes with the sorts of *orexeis*, thoughts, and *pathē* that are, and are likely to remain, dispositional in the required way, readily available to be elicited on the appropriate occasion. The rhetorician's *speech*—the details of the *lexeis* of his *logos*—has specified the audience's general, background desires, in such a way that they will affect its interpretations of the occasion for action. When the *stratēgos* sees the changing of the guard of the neighboring *polis*, he will describe it in the rhetorician's ringing words (*lexeis*): the enemy is preparing for war. Having been moved by that speech to prefer an offensive to a defensive strategy, an attack will be prepared. It is the eloquence of rhetorical speech that turns early persuasion to later action: by describing the changing of the guard as a hostile act, the *stratēgos* evokes *phantasiai* associated with the specific decision formed in the assembly.

VI. The Aristotelian Legacy

Nowhere are contemporary parallels to Aristotelian theory more evident than in the unsolved, apparently intractable *aporiai*

that we share with Aristotle. Indeed, it is, ironically, at just those places where we find ourselves dissatisfied with the incompleteness and even the evasiveness of Aristotle's account that we come upon the stubborn problems of our own theories. We find ourselves issuing promissory notes in roughly the same places where Aristotle tends either to change the subject, or to wave the problem on, to be resolved contextually. One of the most vexing of these problems is, of course, that of specifying the relation between the physiology and the psychology of character, perception, desire, and the emotions.

Not surprisingly, the general problem of specifying details of an intentionalistically oriented, physicalistic psychology ramifies to other areas and other disciplines. How, if at all, do character traits like impulsiveness or brashness affect the beliefs and desires that enter into practical reasoning? Are modes of practical reasoning and practical wisdom culturally and politically invariant? Are the general ends of a sound polity sufficiently indeterminate to allow for disagreement among its wisest and best statesmen?

Some of the submerged problems of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* affect our own deliberations about public and political discourse. As it stands, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* does not address a problem implicit in the substantive connection that he draws between rhetoric, politics, and ethics. That connection sets the larger frame for his insistence that the best rhetorical arguments rest on true premises and valid arguments. Should the rhetorician educate his audience as well as persuade them? Should he attempt to improve their characters, to draw them as close to *phronēsis* as their natural capacities allow? Or should he rest content with addressing their immediate concerns as best he can? Of course Aristotle, refined contextualist that he is, has several answers to these questions. As a master craftsman, the rhetorician has no political or educative responsibility. But the true *politikos*, who has for the sake of exercising his own craft acquired rhetorical skills, bears the responsibility of educating his citizens, as well as satisfying their needs and constructing sound political institutions. While the rhetorician *qua politikos* must engage in deliberation, the *politikos qua* rhetorician takes the outcome of that deliberation as fixed. However he himself may have reached it, the rhetorician *qua* rhetorician starts with the conclusion—starts, that is, with what he wants the audience to accept—and is concerned to construct the arguments that will best bring his audience to that predetermined judgment. There is no general rule to determine

when the rhetorician should take on the responsibilities of a *politikos*: like all ethically and politically decisive matters, that must be left to the judgment of the *phronimos*.

Like Aristotle, we want it both ways: on the one hand, we treat all forms of oratory—journalism, political negotiation, election strategies—pragmatically, as directed to finding the most efficacious argument to produce the most satisfactory results. But, like Aristotle, we also construe “the satisfactory result” morally: we hold our rhetoricians responsible not only for reasoning well, but also for telling us the harsh truths we might need to hear, however they might jar with our characters or confound our desires.⁶²

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⁶² I am indebted to the organizers of the 1991 Helsinki conference on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* for stimulating my interest in the *Rhetoric*, and to the other participants in that conference for their illuminating papers. The van Leer Institute in Jerusalem generously provided hospitality and ideal working conditions for study and writing. I am also grateful to Mary Whitlock Blundell, Myles Burnyeat, David Furley, Ruth Nevo and Markus Woerner for helpful discussions and corrections. An earlier, abbreviated version of this paper, “The Psychology of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*,” was delivered to the Boston Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy at Wellesley College; a longer version, edited by William Wians, is to be published in their *Proceedings*.

HEGEL ON SLAVERY AND DOMINATION

STEVEN B. SMITH

DOES SLAVERY EXIST BY NATURE, as some throughout history have been taken to believe? Or is slavery merely conventional, sanctioned by the opinions and practices of diverse communities? Is it a punishment for sinfulness or proscribed by the natural law? Can one sell oneself into slavery as the result of a free exchange, or is slavery prohibited by virtue of the natural rights of the individual? Is slavery a necessary moment in the struggle of human beings to attain mutual recognition and respect? Or have modern institutions like the market economy and the state created new and potentially more ominous forms of oppression?

The answer is yes to all of the above—or at least so people have from time to time believed. The point that even a relatively brief survey suffices to show is that the problem of slavery is by no means exhausted by the treatment of chattel slavery which is the kind of slavery most Americans will readily identify and which the Thirteenth Amendment abolished. Chattel slavery is, to be sure, one but only one example of a problem that goes far deeper. To inquire into the grounds of slavery is in fact to examine the root causes of human domination, misery, and oppression.

Perhaps no thinker has given more sustained thought to the problem of slavery than has G. W. F. Hegel.¹ Indeed, Hegel's dialectic of lordship and bondage in the *Phenomenology of Mind* has been called by one historian "the most profound analysis of slavery

¹ Throughout this paper I cite both English and German editions of Hegel's works. The German edition is *Werke in Zwanzig Bänden*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971). Henceforth this will be cited as "*Werke*," with reference to volume and page number. All translations are from English editions except where I have indicated my own departures.

ever written.”² Like all important texts, Hegel’s lordship and bondage chapter has given rise to a wealth of commentary. The most influential of these commentaries by far has been Alexandre Kojève’s *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, which attempted to establish a direct philosophical link not only between Hegel and Marx but between Hegel and Heidegger.³ Kojève’s magisterial study had the great merit of elevating the problem of mastery and slavery to the central motif of the entire Hegelian *Phenomenology*. For Kojève and the host of interpreters who followed in his wake, Hegel’s treatment of master and slave became the ground of history; and the dialectic of labor the key to human emancipation. Moreover, Kojève’s insistence on the phenomenological realism of Hegel’s study led to an unequivocally “atheistic” interpretation of the dialectic.⁴

More recently, however, George A. Kelly, in an influential article, has depicted Kojève’s “social” or “anthropological” reading of Hegel as misleading and one-dimensional.⁵ While admitting that “every student of Hegel is deeply enriched by Kojève,” Kelly argues

² David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 558.

³ Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, ed. Raymond Queneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1947); a partial English translation was prepared by James H. Nichols, Jr. under the title *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968). Kojève’s influence on contemporary European thought has been the subject of a number of excellent studies; see Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 9–47; Michael Roth, *Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Stanley Rosen, *Hermeneutics and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 87–107; Steven B. Smith, “Hegel and the Three Crises of Rationality,” *Social Research* 56 (1989): 943–73.

⁴ “But very few of his readers have understood that in the final analysis dialectic meant atheism. Since Hegel, atheism has never again risen to the metaphysical and ontological levels. In our times Heidegger is the first to undertake a complete atheistic philosophy. But he does not seem to have pushed it beyond the phenomenological anthropology of the first volume of *Sein und Zeit*”; Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, p. 259, n. 41. Kojève concludes that this anthropology “adds, fundamentally, nothing new to the anthropology of the *Phenomenology*.” For Heidegger’s later reflections on Hegel’s anthropological method see his *Hegel’s Concept of Experience*, trans. Kenley R. Dove (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); see also Kenley R. Dove, “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method,” *Review of Metaphysics* 23 (1970): 615–41.

⁵ George A. Kelly, “Notes on Hegel’s ‘Lordship and Bondage,’” *Review of Metaphysics* 19 (1966): 780–802.

that Kojève's "unilaterally 'social' interpretation of the *Phenomenology*" has led him to ignore the profound psychological dimensions of the problem, as well as to import "anachronistic overtones of the Marxian class struggle" into the text.⁶ Slavery is as much a moral and psychological problem as it is a social and political one, something that takes place within one self-consciousness as well as between more than one of them. Slavery, he admits, is "a multidimensional problem—and a paradoxical one" which cannot be reduced to social categories alone. Thus while Kelly avers that "Kojève's original exegesis of Hegelian themes is a profound work for our times," it has the disadvantage that it "ignores the depth and passion of Hegel's Greek attachments," as well as "the complicated range of his struggle with the Kantian split vision."⁷

There is much in Kelly's splendid analysis with which I agree. What I propose here, however, is a third reading of the slavery motif in Hegel which attempts to reestablish neither the social nor the moral-psychological, but the theological, dimension of the problem. Unless we bear in mind the deeply theological structure of Hegel's categories, we will be unable to comprehend the full power of Marx's and Nietzsche's rebellion against it. Before considering further Hegel's analysis of this problem, two preliminary observations are worth keeping in mind.

First, in contrast to the dominant interpretation of this motif, I suggest that Hegel's views on slavery are less important as an anticipation of Marx than as a repudiation of Aristotle. Repudiating Aristotle's famous doctrine of "natural slavery" and his belief that every social order can be divided into rulers and ruled, Hegel maintains that we are beings who fundamentally desire to be recognized or respected by others. Hegel's conception of mastery and slavery as historical categories rather than permanent features of any social order is related to his philosophy of history as a process of *Bildung* or emancipation from servitude. A work like the *Phenomenology* is crucially misunderstood if one overlooks the fact that it is directed primarily against the Aristotelian teaching on natural slavery.

Second, in opposition to the reigning opinion—to be examined more fully below—that regards slave labor as containing the key to its own emancipation, Hegel maintains that not labor but

⁶ Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's 'Lordship and Bondage'," 782.

⁷ Ibid., 801.

Christianity is the cause of the transition from slave-holding antiquity to modernity. Rather than a regressive phenomenon, Christianity is the bearer of a far reaching culture of egalitarianism that Hegel believed would ultimately abolish altogether the archaic categories of master and slave. This essay is in part an effort to re-establish the Christian or, more specifically, Protestant conception of liberty underlying Hegel's views on recognition and emancipation.

I

Hegel's account of slavery is unique in the annals of thought in its attempt to derive slavery neither from nature, nor providence, nor chance, but from the very structure of self-consciousness (*selbstbewusstsein*). The natural human condition for Hegel, as for Hobbes, is one of struggle, in which one self-conscious subject seeks to gain "recognition" from another.⁸ The ensuing "struggle for recognition" (*Kampf des Annerkennens*) is an attempt to account not only for the origins of consciousness but for the complex relationship of self and other. The central moment in this struggle is not, however, the fear of death, as with Hobbes, but rather the interest in recognition from others. Consider the following passage from the *Phenomenology*:

Self consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or "recognized" . . . Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty is still without truth. . . . The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must enter into this struggle, for they must bring their certainty of themselves, the certainty of being for themselves, to the level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the case of the other and in their own case as well.⁹

The struggle for recognition remains, as it were, the pivotal moment in the Hegelian philosophy of self-consciousness. On this

⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, vol. 3, *Philosophy of Mind*, trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), par. 432, pp. 172-3; *Werke*, vol. 10, pp. 221-2.

⁹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), 229, 232-3; *Werke*, vol. 3, pp. 145, 148-9.

account, the self is what it is primarily through its relation to other selves. It is, above all else, the desire to be recognized or esteemed by others that is the quintessentially human desire. Indeed, the desire for recognition is a desire unlike all other desires. It is a desire not for any particular thing but a desire for the approbation of others. Animals may desire physical pleasures but only humans can desire the desire of another.¹⁰ No dog desires the love, esteem, or respect of another dog. While for moralists like Rousseau it is precisely the concern with the opinion of others that contains the seeds of moral and political corruption, for Hegel this concern is the core of our humanity. We are so constituted that we cannot live, or at least live well, without the respect or esteem of others, if our desires are not recognized by them.¹¹

Hegel imagines the struggle taking place originally in a state of nature where each self-consciousness demands recognition from the other without having to grant it in turn. It is from this life and death struggle for recognition—not unlike what Hobbes described as a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, in which man's passions for honor and prestige are asserted over his fear of violent death—that the relation of master and slaves arises. This fear arises because in the course of the struggle one of the parties is unwilling to go all the way and risk his life for the sake of recognition, thereby submitting to the other, granting recognition without requiring it in return. In short, the vanquished subordinates his own desire for esteem to the even stronger desire for self-preservation. In the *Encyclopedia* version of this story Hegel writes the following:

But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution, the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. While the one combatant prefers life, retains his single self-consciousness, but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recognized by the former as his superior. Thus arises the status of *master and slave*.¹²

¹⁰ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 426, pp. 167–8; *Werke*, vol. 10, pp. 215–16.

¹¹ “Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in another self . . . each has ‘real’ universality in the shape of reciprocity, so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman, and is aware of this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows him to be free”; Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 436, p. 176; *Werke*, vol. 10, p. 226.

¹² Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 433, p. 173; *Werke*, vol. 10, pp. 222–3.

Like Aristotle before him and Nietzsche later on, Hegel disputes the liberal account that says society is the result of a contract between persons who are already free, equal, and rational. For Hegel, civil association has its origins in the difference between the prideful and self-assertive few and the timid and fearful many. The desire for recognition is in the first instance a noble desire akin to the Aristotelian virtue of *megalopsychia*.¹³ Magnanimity, Aristotle writes, is the crown of the virtues which presupposes all the other virtues and enhances them. As its name implies, magnanimity is concerned with the "greatest things," those things being honor and dishonor. The magnanimous man is, then, the free superior individual who claims much and deserves much. Magnanimity is also a peculiarly aristocratic virtue presupposing not only great wealth but the leisure to use it well. Magnanimity or noble pride is thus correlated with the aristocracy, while fear of death is correlated with the lower classes. It is the virtue of a small minority which in turn presupposes a hierarchical society divided into superior and inferior classes or estates.¹⁴

Hegel's account of the resolution of the struggle of master and slave reads almost like a burlesque on Aristotle's account of slavery in the *Politics*.¹⁵ For Aristotle, we recall, slavery is justified because it is the political institution that corresponds most closely to the natural hierarchy or inequality between body and soul. Just as it is the function of the soul to rule the body, so is it the function of thoughtful men to rule thoughtless ones. If nature provides a model or paradigm for political institutions, then slavery has its origins in human nature itself. Just as the soul and body can work together to produce a healthy or well-functioning individual, so can master and slave work together to produce a household and a *polis*.¹⁶

¹³ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1123b26–1124a4; see also Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.20.

¹⁴ For a discussion of this see Steven B. Smith, "Goodness, Nobility, and Virtue in Aristotle's Political Science," *Polity* 19 (1986): 5–26, esp. 17–25.

¹⁵ *Politics* 1254a28–1255a2, 1255b4–15, 1327b27–29, 1328b37–1329a2, 1330a25–33.

¹⁶ Aristotle's analysis of slavery has given rise to a wealth of literature. For two recent studies see Nicholas D. Smith, "Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery," in *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics*, ed. David Keyt and Fred D. Miller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 142–55; Abram N. Shulsky, "The 'Infrastructure' of Aristotle's *Politics*: Aristotle on Economics and Politics," in *Essay on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science*, ed. Carnes Lord (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 74–111.

Hegel turns the Aristotelian account on its head. The basis for slavery is the need of one self-conscious mind to be recognized by another. In the ensuing struggle the vanquished grants recognition to his lord by the very fact that he is forced to work in his service. The master's enjoyment is predicated upon his freedom from work. The recognition which the master now enjoys, however, is no longer accorded by an equal but by a degraded "tool" who is merely employed to serve his lord's material comforts.¹⁷ The master, ironically, finds himself in the same situation as Aristotle's magnanimous man, who desires honors and recognition above all else but finds them unworthy of him once they have been bestowed. The master is somehow greater than any mark of recognition he might receive. What's more, rather than having attained to a level of contemplative autonomy, the master comes to realize his dependence upon the slave. He may have believed himself a being *an sich*, but he is in fact a being *für sich*.

This change in self-consciousness on the part of the master finds a corresponding change on the part of the slave. Through labor (*Arbeit*) the once fearful slave learns to conquer his fear of death and in the process develops a sense of his own self-worth. Labor is no longer conceived here as the biblical curse of Adam but becomes the basis for historical progress and the movement of humanity toward a deeper level of self-awareness. Labor effects a double transformation: first of the natural world and then of the slave's own sense of self: "Thus precisely in labor where there seemed to be merely some outsider's mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware, through this re-discovery of himself by himself, of having and being a 'mind of his own'."¹⁸

It is often argued by Marxian interpreters that this passage shows Hegel's awareness of the role of labor in history. His discussion of the slave acquiring a "mind of his own" is the moment when the slave allegedly comes closest to anticipating a sense of working class consciousness. It is well-known that prior to the composition of the *Phenomenology* Hegel had been studying Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and Sir James Steuart's *Principles of Political Economy*.¹⁹ Both of these works, it is argued, helped to

¹⁷ *Politics*, 1254b16-23.

¹⁸ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, 239; *Werke*, vol. 3, p. 154.

¹⁹ Hegel's relation to political economy has been extensively glossed

move Hegel away from an erstwhile classicism that favors nonproductive action to a modern perspective which emphasizes labor or *poiesis*.²⁰ Marx himself even notes the affinity between Hegel and political economy when he says that "Hegel's standpoint . . . conceives labor as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man."²¹

This line of commentary has been more or less accepted by subsequent interpreters who have taken the master and slave relation out of its context in ancient Greek culture and used it, in the words of Kelly, as a "regulative ideal . . . for clarifying the progress of human history."²² The danger with this view, as noted earlier, is that it sees Hegel only as a kind of proto-Marx. Kojève, the most profound of the *marxisant* interpreters, has made the master-slave relation and the dialectics of labor the set piece of his reading of Hegel. "Work," he writes,

is *Bildung*, in the double meaning of the word: on the one hand, it forms, transforms the World, humanizes it by making it more adapted to Man; on the other, it transforms, forms, educates man, it humanizes him by bringing him into greater conformity with the idea that he has of himself.²³

Virtually the same position is adopted by Georg Lukàcs in his commentary on this passage in *The Young Hegel*. Lukàcs maintains that in his early writings "Hegel had completely overlooked the presence of slavery in Greek civilization," while only in the *Phenomenology* do we find an emerging awareness of the role of class struggle in history.²⁴ Here for the first time we find expressed "the realization that the high-road of human development, the humanization of man, . . . can only be traversed through work."²⁵ He

by Paul Chamley, *Economie politique chez Steuart et Hegel* (Paris: Dalloz, 1963); Raymond Plant, *Hegel* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973), 57, 114; Georg Lukàcs, *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1975), 170-4, 323-9; Laurence Dickey, *Hegel: Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit, 1770-1807* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 192-9.

²⁰ Manfred Riedel, *Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy*, trans. Walter Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 133-7, 176-83.

²¹ Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in *Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 112.

²² Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's 'Lordship and Bondage,'" 802.

²³ Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 52.

²⁴ Lukàcs, *The Young Hegel*, 327.

²⁵ Ibid.

concludes with the observation that "unalloyed enjoyment" consigns the master to "sterility" while labor "raises the consciousness of the servant above that of his master in the dialectics of world history."²⁶ Similar statements can be found in a host of other interpreters.²⁷

I would like to depart from these interpreters long enough to suggest that for all the wealth of commentary to the contrary, labor plays a relatively minor role in Hegel's account of the transformation of master and slave and the struggle for recognition. Labor may discipline the will of the slave, but this does not make him any less a slave; just as leisure may dissipate the strength of the master, but this does not make him any less a master. Far from abolishing slavery, the labor process merely ratifies and confirms it. Adapting an argument from Dieter Henrich, labor produces no dialectical development but rather generates an endless, repetitive cycle of domination and servitude.²⁸ If this is correct the whole Marx-inspired interpretation of Hegel as the heir of classical political economy may be in need of rethinking.

II

The abolition of slavery, then, is not the result of the "transformative" or "expressive" power of human labor but of the introduction of a wholly new principle in world history. That principle

²⁶ Lukàcs, *The Young Hegel*, 327.

²⁷ Consider some of the following: "Fear and service cannot by themselves raise the slave's self-consciousness to genuine independence; it is labor that transforms servitude into mastery"; Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 175-6. "Through work, the slave rises from the disintegrative to the productive and self-productive consequences of negativity. . . . In making things himself, the slave substantializes himself in the products of his labor"; Stanley Rosen, *G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 163. "Labor is . . . the vehicle that transforms this relationship. The laborer's action does not disappear when the products of his labor appear, but is preserved in them. . . . The objects of his labor are no longer dead things that shackle him to other men, but products of his work, and, as such, part and parcel of his own being"; Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 116-17.

²⁸ Dieter Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), 95.

is Christianity. It is Christianity, according to Hegel, that for the first time introduces the idea of universal recognition. The archaic struggle for prestige culminated in a world rigidly divided into masters and slaves, superiors and inferiors; it knew nothing of the universal and fundamental equality of mankind as such. This was exclusively the contribution of Christianity to world history. Christianity introduced the idea of the "I" or the "free infinite personality" that is higher than and defeats the social categories of master and servant. Long before Nietzsche contemptuously described Christianity as "Platonism for 'the people'," ²⁹ Hegel saw in it a powerful movement towards egalitarianism and freedom.

Indeed, the same critics noted above who emphasize the creative and transformative power of labor systematically undervalue the contribution of Christianity to the abolition of slavery. Thus Kojève interprets Hegel's as a fundamentally "atheistic" and "anthropological" social theory because of its repudiation of the Platonic and Christian notions of "transcendence" and the beyond (*Jenseits*). ³⁰ Likewise, Lukàcs even more bluntly declared the theological interpretation of Hegel to be a "reactionary legend" fostered by the ideologues of Wilhelmine Germany. ³¹ Even those who have written more sympathetically have referred to Hegel as standing in the genre of "civil theology" concerned not so much with religious truths as with social peace and stability. ³² For all of these reasons it is difficult today to reestablish the view that for Hegel religion in general, but Christianity in particular, is the locus of a profound moral truth.

This truth, as noted above, is found in the conception of individual or subjective liberty. This truth entered the world initially with Christianity, was deepened by the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, and Kantian morality, and has received its most far-reaching institutional expression in the modern state with its constitutional guarantees of the public recognition of the right of personality. ³³ This idea of subjectivity and individual freedom made

²⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), 3.

³⁰ Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 100-49.

³¹ Lukàcs, *The Young Hegel*, 3-16.

³² Plant, *Hegel*, 32.

³³ This is treated at greater length in Steven B. Smith, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 98-131.

its appearance only "a millenium and a half" ago, when "the freedom of personality began through the spread of Christianity to blossom and gain recognition as a universal principle," although even now it is still confined to "a small part of the human race."³⁴ It is "the right of the subject's particularity" that remains "the pivot and center of the difference between antiquity and modern times."³⁵ This right has even become "the universal effective principle of a new form of civilization" among whose "primary shapes" are "love, romanticism, the quest for the eternal salvation of the individual," as well as "the principle of civil society" and "the constitution of the state."³⁶

Hegel in fact makes not just the infusion of liberty but also the disappearance of slavery into a litmus test for the difference between the ancient *polis* and the modern state. It was in the Greek world that the consciousness of freedom first arose, but this was still understood as freedom for a few. The *schönen Freiheit* of the Greeks, which Hegel certainly never underestimated, was nevertheless dependent upon slavery—a fact which rendered that liberty "an accidental, transient, and limited growth."³⁷ Note here that while Hegel recognizes the importance of slavery in the ancient world, he nowhere indicates that slave labor was responsible for the transition to modernity. He goes out of his way instead to indicate that it is "the *Christian* principle of . . . Freedom" that was the causal agent.³⁸ To be sure, the awareness of this freedom did not make slavery immediately disappear; much less did freedom come to predominate in the social and political spheres. It remained "a problem whose solution and application required a severe and lengthened process of *Bildung*."³⁹ Only in the "German nations" (*germanische Nations*) under the influence of Christianity did the principle of universal freedom begin to make inroads, where at last it was possible to

³⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), par. 62, p. 51; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 133.

³⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 124, p. 84; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 233.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), 18; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 31.

³⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 19 (emphasis added); *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 32.

³⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 18; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 31.

regard "the history of the world as none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom."⁴⁰

The awareness of the principle that all human beings as such are entitled to freedom marks the decisive point of difference between ancient and modern times. Hegel especially takes to task Plato's *Republic* for denying the role of individual liberty in determining matters of family and career. In Plato's *Republic*, "The subjective end simply coincided with the state's will," whereas "in modern times . . . we make claims for private judgment, private willing, and private conscience."⁴¹ While in the "the states of classical antiquity, universality was present, but particularity had not then been released," it remains "the essence of the modern state" that "the universal be bound up with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well-being."⁴² The Platonic *kallipolis* may have represented "the substance of ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth," but this was at the expense of doing violence to the principle of the free personality. Plato tried to exclude this principle by "setting up in opposition to it his purely substantial state" with its strict controls on property ownership, marriage, and the family. Thus for Plato, "Subjective freedom does not count, because people have their occupations assigned to them by the Guardians."⁴³ "But subjective freedom," Hegel concludes, "which must be respected, demands that individuals should have free choice in this matter."⁴⁴

It is, then, the presence of the "I will" that is the minimum necessary condition for the emergence of the rights of personality. Hegel uses this presence which accompanies all our actions as the foundation of modern freedom:

Even in the beautiful democracy of Athens . . . we cannot help noticing that the Greeks derived their final decisions from the observation of quite external phenomena such as oracles, the entrails of sacrificial animals, and the flight of birds. . . . At that time, self-consciousness had not yet advanced to the abstraction of subjectivity, not even so far as to understand that, when a decision is made, an "I will" must be pronounced by man himself. This "I will" constitutes the great

⁴⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 18, 19; "Die Weltgeschichte ist der Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit"; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 32.

⁴¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 261A, p. 280; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 410.

⁴² Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 260A, p. 280; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 407.

⁴³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 262A, p. 280; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 410.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

difference between the ancient world and the modern, and in the great edifice of the state it must therefore have its appropriate objective existence.⁴⁵

To be sure, the Christian idea of personality and will had an important precursor in Socrates, whom Hegel calls "the inventor of *Moralität*."⁴⁶ Prior to Socrates, the Greeks had a purely "customary morality" wherein family and *polis* were bound together in "a concrete unity of spirit." It was Socrates and the Sophists of the fifth century B.C. who taught that not custom but the individual moral agent "who has the consciousness of what he is doing" is the true arbiter of right and justice. Socrates' discovery of the subjective or reflective side of morality which submits existing laws and institutions to the bar of one's own critical rationality thus manifested itself as a "revolutionary" moment within the Athenian ethical order of his day. It is precisely the emancipation of thought from customary restraints that brought about the "corruption" of Greek ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), but also made space for the free individual as such.⁴⁷ Thus did Socrates, who "posited the individual as capable of a final moral decision," succeed in making himself into a demigod "in the Greek sense."⁴⁸

Yet at the same time that the new principle of moral personality came as a liberation from the yoke of custom, it also contained, Hegel sees, a "deeply tragical character," which for the first time set the individual at odds with his country. This tragedy consisted in the conflict or collision between two equally valid sets of rights: those of the individual and those of the community.⁴⁹ Thus while Socrates may have urged his followers in the *Crito* to continue to perform their public duties as citizens, it became clear that it was not "the actual state and its religion" that was their home, but "the world of thought." The habit of critical thought for which the Athenians had accused Socrates had taken root among themselves. The fragile unity which held the archaic *polis* together was now torn irrevocably asunder. The trial and execution of Socrates came too late to restore harmony. The "higher principle" of self-reflection

⁴⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 279A, p. 288; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 449.

⁴⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 269; *Werke*, vol. 12, pp. 328–9.

⁴⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 267; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 326.

⁴⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 269–70; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 329.

⁴⁹ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 508, p. 251; *Werke*, vol. 10, p. 315.

which Socrates had announced to his jury in the *Apology* had already "proved the ruin of the Athenian state."⁵⁰

It is important to remember that for Hegel the idea of individual personality, of this "I will," only entered the world with the advent of Christianity. Even today, Hegel freely admits, the respect for the autonomy of personality is far from universal. The idea is regularly attacked as "indefinite, ambiguous, and open to the greatest misconceptions" which have been of "tremendous consequence in practice."⁵¹ It is due to Christianity that we have acquired the belief that freedom is "the very essence of mind . . . [and] its very actuality":

Whole continents, Africa and the East have never had this Idea, and are without it still. The Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, did not have it. On the contrary, they saw that it is only by birth, . . . or by strength of character, education or philosophy . . . that the human being is actually free. It was through Christianity that this Idea came into the world. According to Christianity, the individual *as such* has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love, destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself, and have God's mind dwelling in him: i.e. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom.⁵²

Hegel makes it supremely clear that it is only through Christianity that slavery has been surpassed and rendered a thing of the past. The very idea that the human personality is of "infinite value" and an object of "divine love" is absolutely inimical to slavery. Obviously the full weight of this thesis was neither known nor accepted overnight; for this to be accomplished wars had to be fought, battles won, and blood shed. Nevertheless, the central proposition of Christianity is "an ever present sense that men are not and cannot be slaves."⁵³ The very idea that a person's life or property rests on the "arbitrary will" of another represents an "outrage" which can no longer be tolerated. Indeed, the claim that the individual be recognized as a person rather than a thing is no longer a mere "impulse" (*Trieb*) but a rational demand of "uncontrollable strength."⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 270; *Werke*, vol. 12, pp. 329-30.

⁵¹ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 482, p. 239; *Werke*, vol. 10, p. 301.

⁵² Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 482, pp. 239-40; *Werke*, vol. 10, pp. 301-2.

⁵³ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 482, p. 240; *Werke*, vol. 10, p. 302.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

The result of this demand for universal, equal recognition is that slavery has been rendered anachronistic. Slavery belongs wholly to the ancient world, where its existence even there was only "relatively justified." Just as John Stuart Mill remarked that "despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians,"⁵⁵ so does Hegel treat slavery as a necessary stage in the development of freedom. "To become free," he remarks, "to acquire the capacity for self-control, all nations must therefore undergo the severe discipline of subjection to a master."⁵⁶ The examples he uses are the tyranny of Pisistratus at Athens, and the period of kingship in early Rome which made possible "that admirable Roman virtue of patriotism." Under such circumstances both slavery and tyranny are "relatively justified" (*beziehungsweise Berechtigtes*), while for those who remain slaves, lacking the courage to fight for freedom, "no absolute injustice is done."⁵⁷

The idea that slavery is a necessary stage in historical development is vividly illustrated by Hegel's treatment of African slavery in the *Philosophy of History*.⁵⁸ Lacking any conception of justice or right, Hegel tells us, the African evinces "a complete contempt for man" and hence a "lack of respect for life" itself. Accordingly, "slavery is the basic legal relationship in Africa," where the distinction between master and slave is "endemic and accepted as natural."⁵⁹ It follows for Hegel that in a culture where human life has

⁵⁵ John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 11.

⁵⁶ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 435, p. 175; *Werke*, vol. 10, p. 225.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 173-90; *Werke*, vol. 12, pp. 120-9. Given the sensitive nature of the subject of Africa, it is surprising that it has evinced little attention. An exception is W. H. Walsh, who remarks that while "Hegel was no racist, . . . the picture he offers of Negro society in Africa is far from attractive"; W. H. Walsh, "Principle and Prejudice in Hegel's Philosophy of History," in *Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives*, ed. Z. A. Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 192. Another exception is Shlomo Avineri, who limits himself to the more neutral observation that Hegel's remarks about black Africa "bear witness to his astonishingly wide range of reading"; Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 223, n. 8. He later mentions that while Hegel had "a very low view of African culture," this was mitigated by a more optimistic assessment of the ability of American blacks to absorb European culture (p. 236, n. 48).

⁵⁹ Hegel, *World History*, 183; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 125.

little or no value, the enslavement of Africans by Europeans is at least partially justified on the ground that it can educate the African to have "consciousness of his freedom." Even though slavery is "unjust in and for itself," the lesson to be drawn is not that slavery must be abolished here and now, but rather that a person "must first become mature before he can be free," and consequently that "it is more fitting and correct that slavery should be eliminated gradually than that it should be done away with all at once."⁶⁰

Hegel's treatment of slavery here is an instance of his more general method of treating a people's beliefs and attitudes as relative to the level of their social and political development. Even if it is the case that "rational states" no longer tolerate slavery, it still remains "an aspect of the process whereby humanity gradually attains a higher ethical existence and corresponding degree of culture [*Bildung*]."⁶¹ Although "it is now generally accepted that man, as a human being, is free," this crucial insight still requires "the substantial ethical life of a rational state" to give it force.⁶² The primary function of the state is to educate all to an appreciation of the dignity of man and the equal recognition of rights. As Hegel's remarks on the persistence of slavery in the new world appear to indicate, while Africans were brought to the Americas initially as a labor force, their "susceptibility" to European culture makes them ideal candidates for manumission.⁶³

Hegel's comparative method of approaching slavery was taken in part from Montesquieu, who put the problem of slavery, quite literally, at the center of his work.⁶⁴ In *De l'esprit des lois* he says that slavery is an "absolute evil useful neither to the master nor the slave."⁶⁵ Slavery, he avers, runs "contrary to the fundamental principle of all societies."⁶⁶ Yet even while Montesquieu denounces slavery as the greatest of evils, he says it can be justified when circumstances so dictate. In excessively hot climates where only

⁶⁰ Hegel, *World History*, 184; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 129.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Hegel, *World History*, 165; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 109.

⁶⁴ Montesquieu's treatment of slavery occurs in the fifteenth of thirty-one books of his *De l'esprit des lois*, ed. Robert Derathe, 2 vols. (Paris: Garnier, 1973).

⁶⁵ Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois*, bk. 15, chap. 1, p. 261. Translations from this work are my own.

⁶⁶ Ibid., chap. 2, p. 263.

“the fear of chastisement” can induce men to work, “slavery,” he remarks, “is more reconcilable to reason.”⁶⁷ Slavery may be unnatural, but it is also unavoidable in those parts of the world—for example, Persia—which have never known “moderate government.” Slavery, ordinarily the greatest evil in Montesquieu’s political lexicon, may be justified if the circumstances warrant it.⁶⁸ Montesquieu proposes that “possibly there is no climate upon earth where the most laborious services might not with proper encouragement be performed by freemen,” but he prefaces this hopeful remark with the observation, “I know not whether this article be dictated by my understanding or my heart.”⁶⁹

Despite Hegel’s statement that slavery may be “relatively justified,” there can be little doubt that he regards its continuation as an anachronism fated to disappear with further advancements of *Geist*. If, like Montesquieu, he could sometimes suggest that slavery can be reconcilable to reason, he can also maintain that slavery is a false and comparatively primitive phenomenon that belongs either to the ancient world or, what amounts to the same thing, to primitive societies. Consider the following passage from the *Philosophy of Right*:

The position of the free will, with which right and the science of right begin, is already in advance of the false position at which man, as a natural entity and only the concept implicit, is for that reason capable of being enslaved. This false, and comparatively primitive phenomenon of slavery is one which befalls mind when mind is only at the level of self-consciousness. The dialectic of the concept and of the purely immediate consciousness of freedom brings about at that point the fight for recognition and the relationship of master and slave.⁷⁰

Even slavery, Hegel adds in a note, is a voluntary phenomenon, for

if a man is a slave, his own will is responsible for his slavery, just as it is its will which is responsible if a people is subjugated. Hence the wrong of slavery lies at the door not simply of enslavers and conquerers but of the slaves and conquered themselves.⁷¹

The above *Zusatz* might seem to be a classic example of blaming the victims for their own misery. Nevertheless, the force of this

⁶⁷ Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois*, bk. 15, chap. 7, p. 267.

⁶⁸ Ibid., chap. 11, pp. 270–1.

⁶⁹ Ibid., chap. 8, p. 268.

⁷⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 57, p. 48; *Werke*, vol. 7, pp. 123–4.

⁷¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 57A., p. 239; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 126.

passage will be lost if we fail to put it in the context of Hegel's secular theodicy, whose aim is nothing less than the worldly incarnation of the divine *logos*. For Hegel, this *logos* speaks with a Protestant inflection. The effectual truth of this *logos* is not a teaching of otherworldliness, but rather the "reconciliation" of the human and the divine, the kingdom of the man and the kingdom of God. The meaning of the Christian *logos* is not to be revealed in the beyond, but within or at the "end of history."⁷² The end of history, however, is not some kind of eschatological destruction of the world, but its consummation or fulfillment in time. This consummation takes place in Hegel's theory of the modern state or, more generally, in the modern, secular-Protestant world. "The history of the world," he says at the conclusion of his lectures on the *Philosophy of History*, "is the true Theodicy, the justification of God *in history*."⁷³

The meaning of this consummation of the *logos* is made clear in paragraph 552 of the *Encyclopedia*. Here Hegel describes at length the view that "religion is the very substance of the moral life of the state," and goes on to remark that it has been a "monstrous blunder" of modern times to regard these two spheres, the secular and religious, as separate, much less "mutually indifferent."⁷⁴ What distinguishes the modern bourgeois Christian state from, say, the Greek *polis* or the Catholic Middle Ages is that God is no longer conceived as other to or alien to the believer but as "the very substance or indwelling spirit of self-consciousness." Hegel goes on to draw the following political conclusions. The Catholic religion with its conception of the Lord of Hosts as an "external thing," and its hierarchical conception of the relation between laity and clergy, is adequate only to "governments which are bound up with institutions founded on bondage . . . i.e. with institutions that embody injustice and with a morally corrupt and barbaric state of society."⁷⁵

Like a host of social and political theorists after him, Hegel relates Christian freedom, especially the emancipation from both

⁷² See R. K. Maurer, *Hegel und das Ende der Geschichte* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965); Rosen, G. W. F. *Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*, 43-6, 280-3; and Smith, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism*, 217-31.

⁷³ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 457 (emphasis added); *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 540.

⁷⁴ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 552, p. 284; *Werke*, vol. 10, p. 356.

⁷⁵ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 552, pp. 284-5; *Werke*, vol. 10, pp. 357-8.

spiritual and temporal slavery, with the institutions of modern society. The Protestant conception of individual liberty carries over into every dimension of family, civil society, and the state:

Instead of the vow of chastity, *marriage* now ranks as the ethical relation; and, therefore, as the highest on this side of humanity stands the family. Instead of the vow of poverty . . . is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligence and industry—of honesty in commercial dealing, and in the use of property—in short moral life in the socio-economic sphere. And instead of the vow of obedience, true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state. Thus, and thus only, can law and morality exist.⁷⁶

He concludes his discussion with the statement that "the divine spirit must interpenetrate the entire secular life. . . . The moral life of the state and the religious spirituality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength."⁷⁷

III

Hegel's identification of the secular-Protestant world with the reality of freedom did not survive his own lifetime. Even before the ink was dry on the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, cracks began to appear in his monumental assimilation of reason and reality. Indeed, the post-Hegelian critique of Hegel was motivated by the belief that Hegelianism had not solved the problem of slavery but had merely deferred it. The so-called left and right wings of Hegelianism fell apart precisely over the degree to which they believed institutions like civil society and the state were either preconditions for or impediments to future emancipation.⁷⁸

According to the right Hegelians (and Hegel's liberal critics), the *Philosophy of Right* was nothing but a justification, in fact a sanctification, of reality as it stood in Hegel's own era. If, as Hegel

⁷⁶ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 552, p. 286; *Werke*, vol. 10, pp. 358–9.

⁷⁷ Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, par. 552, pp. 286, 291; *Werke*, vol. 10, pp. 359, 365.

⁷⁸ See Horst Stucke, *Philosophie der Tat* (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1963); and Karl Lowith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought*, trans. David Green (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 63–134.

asserted in the Preface to the book, all philosophy is simply "its time apprehended in thought" (*ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfasst*),⁷⁹ then this must be true of Hegelian philosophy as well, which must shun any attempt to ascend from the is to the ought and must limit itself to the description of what appears. Freedom must be sought entirely within the existing institutions of the Prussian monarchy and the state bureaucracy as these stood circa 1821. For those on the left, however, the Hegelian *Rechtsstaat* was at best a necessary but not a sufficient condition of freedom. The famed identity of reason and reality was not for them a description of an existing state of affairs but one which was yet to be accomplished. Rationality was postulated as a goal to be achieved rather than a fait accompli. From here it was but a short step from theory to practice, from interpreting the world to changing it.⁸⁰

Now it is obvious that neither of these positions has any evident trumping power over the other. In their eagerness to turn Hegel into the theorist of the Restoration, the defenders on the right risked conflating *Wirklichkeit* with *Existenz*.⁸¹ *Wirklichkeit* is a technical term in Hegel's vocabulary which means not what merely happens to exist or any contingent state, but what is fully in accord with rationality. Not all historical reality is *wirklich*, but only what advances the cause of freedom. The critics on the left, however, ran the equally dangerous risk of turning reason into a kind of Kantian *sollen* divorced from existing institutions and practices. Reason must be located within the world, or as Hegel reminds us in paragraph 342 of the *Philosophy of Right*, "World history is the necessary development . . . of the moments of reason and so of the self-consciousness of freedom and of mind."⁸² The task of philosophy is to discover the immanent forms of rationality from within what exists and to seek to reconcile us to them.

⁷⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 11; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 26.

⁸⁰ See Yirmiah Yovel, "Hegel's Dictum that the Rational is Actual and the Actual is Rational," in *Konzepte der Dialektik*, ed. Werner Becker and Wilhelm Essler (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981), 111-27; and Emil Fackenheim, "On the Actuality of the Rational and the Rationality of the Actual," *Review of Metaphysics* 13 (1970): 690-8.

⁸¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, vol. 1, *Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), par. 6, p. 9; *Werke*, vol. 8, pp. 47-8.

⁸² Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 342, p. 216; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 504.

The left Hegelian critique of slavery grew out of Hegel's depiction of the universal competitiveness and acquisitiveness of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* as a "system of needs" whose principle is individual self-interest.⁸³ In civil society individuals face one another as buyers and sellers of property who are free to pursue their own interests. Hegel here relates the socially emancipated individual with the emergence of "the burgher or bourgeois."⁸⁴ It is precisely the dominance of the bourgeois over the classical *citoyen* that characterizes civil society as "the achievement of the modern world."⁸⁵ At the same time, however, civil society, as "an association of members of self-subsistent individuals" brought together for the purpose of "attaining their particular and common interests,"⁸⁶ is unable to prevent the creation of a "rabble of paupers."⁸⁷ An "excess of wealth" on the one side is not great enough to check "excessive poverty" on the other. The "amassing of wealth" is coupled with "the subdivision and restriction of particular jobs," and with an inability "to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially intellectual benefits of civil society."⁸⁸ Hegel describes the creation of an underclass which is not simply defined by material deprivation, but also by the lack of any "sense of right and wrong, of honesty, and the self-respect which makes a man insist on maintaining himself by his own work and effort."⁸⁹ In what is surely one of the greatest pieces of understatement found anywhere in the Hegelian corpus, he notes that the problem of poverty remains "one of the most disturbing problems which agitate modern society."⁹⁰

Marx's entire critique of political economy, and therewith his analysis of slavery, could well have developed out of an internal analysis of the paragraphs on civil society in the *Philosophy of Right*. The core of Marx's critique is that civil society is not an emancipatory institution but the creator of new forms of domination and servitude, which he characterizes by the term "alienation."⁹¹ Marx's attack

⁸³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 188, p. 126; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 346.

⁸⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 190, p. 127; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 348.

⁸⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 182A, p. 266; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 339.

⁸⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 157, p. 110; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 306.

⁸⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 244, p. 150; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 389.

⁸⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 243, p. 150; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 389.

⁸⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 244, p. 150; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 389.

⁹⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 244A, p. 278; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 390.

⁹¹ Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," *Marx-Engels*

on the alienating functions of bourgeois society begins, as we have seen already, from the proposition that the essence of man is labor and that under modern conditions the laborer is forced to alienate, that is, sell that labor power for a wage. The instrumentalization of labor power, its degradation from an end to a means, along with the increasing division and particularization of tasks, all contribute to the spiritual and even physical deformation of humanity.⁹² To be sure, Marx praises civil society and Hegel, its greatest theoretician, for liberating men from the various ethical and political restraints put upon human activity in ancient and medieval times. This emancipation, however, has been only "partial" at best, with the result that the "materialism" and "egoism" of civil society have served to alienate men from their social and communal nature (*Gemeinwesen*).⁹³ What is needed, then, is a fully "human" or "social" emancipation to liberate men from the individual and collective antagonisms engendered by market relations.

In his later works Marx refers to this "partial" emancipation of the workers in a capitalist economy as "formal" or legal freedom. The worker is formally or legally free because he is the owner of his own labor power, or of what Locke referred to as "the labor of his body and the work of his hands."⁹⁴ Unlike the ancient slave or the medieval serf, the modern worker is free to come and go as he pleases, to change employers, to enter into contracts with whomever he chooses. Indeed, modern exchange relations are the very basis of the type of freedom which Marx castigates as "a very Eden of the innate rights of man" where "alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham."⁹⁵ "Equality and freedom," Marx explains in the *Grundrisse*, "are thus not only respected in exchange," but "the exchange of values is the productive, real basis of all equality

Reader, 70–81. See also Daniel Bell, "The Debate on Alienation," in *Revisionism*, ed. Leopold Labedz (New York: Praeger, 1962), 195–211.

⁹² Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 359–68.

⁹³ Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 84, 496. See also Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 79, 81; and Nancy L. Schwartz, "Distinction Between Public and Private Life: Marx on the *zoon politikon*," *Political Theory* 7 (1979): 253–6.

⁹⁴ John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), sec. 27, p. 329.

⁹⁵ Marx, *Capital*, 176.

and freedom."⁹⁶ Unlike Aristotle, who asserted the primacy of the political, Marx makes civil liberty, and hence servitude, dependent upon the state of productive relationships. Much like Hegel, Marx even contrasts "the freedom and equality in the world of antiquity," which presupposed "direct forced labor" as its foundation, to the freedom that obtains in modernity, where "labor is neither forced" as in antiquity, nor takes place "with respect to a common higher unit (the guild)" as in the Middle Ages.⁹⁷

Yet even as Marx notes the positive features of modernity, his tendency is to belittle and even mock these as but sham advances which conceal fundamental inequalities of power and status. It is precisely the deceptive equality of the exchange relationship that hides the new and real forms of human dependence. Thus, in the market place "both sides confront each other as persons," and "formally their relation has the equality and freedom of exchange as such"; but in reality this freedom and equality is "a mere semblance, and a deceptive semblance" at that.⁹⁸ Even if the worker may feel himself to have "a wide field of choice, of arbitrary will, and hence of formal freedom," this choice and freedom is severely constrained by his dependence on capital as such. Hence while the Roman slave was held by "fetters," the modern laborer is bound by "invisible threads" such as "the *fictio juris* of contract."⁹⁹ The fact that the worker is free to sell his labor power to whomever will buy it gives rise to the ideological illusion that he is free; and in a phrase that Aristotle would have clearly understood, Marx describes the free laborer as a "wage slave."¹⁰⁰

If Marx developed one side of the critique of Hegel, it was left to Nietzsche to develop the other. Nietzsche was less concerned with the economic aspects of domination than he was with the political. For Nietzsche, it was Hegel's divinization of the state that created the most formidable obstacle to human freedom. The following passage from *The Gay Science* is only a case in point:

The decline of the faith in the Christian god, the triumph of scientific atheism, is a generally European event in which all races had their

⁹⁶ Marx, *Grundrisse*, 464.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Marx, *Capital*, 574.

¹⁰⁰ See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "Marx on Aristotle: Freedom, Money, and Politics," *Review of Metaphysics* 34 (1980): 351-67.

share and for which all deserve credit and honor. Conversely, one might charge precisely the Germans . . . that they *delayed* this triumph of atheism most dangerously for the longest time. Hegel in particular was its delayer par excellence, with his grandiose attempt to persuade us of the divinity of existence, appealing as a last resort to our sixth sense, "the historical sense."¹⁰¹

Nietzsche's worries about the divinization of the state are not merely hyperbole. As even friendly interpreters of Hegel have had to note, Hegel is often his own worst enemy. There is in the first place the infamous statement that "the state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial will",¹⁰² and the state is "the march of God in the world."¹⁰³ There is further the statement that "as high as mind stands above nature, so high does the state stand over physical life," so that "man must therefore venerate the state as a secular deity."¹⁰⁴ Similar statements abound in the *Philosophy of History*, where we read that "only in the state does man have a rational existence," for the state is, properly speaking, the end for which its citizens are but "instruments."¹⁰⁵ Likewise, Hegel remarks that while individual greatness may develop in solitude, it is only through assimilating oneself to the ends of the state that one becomes great.¹⁰⁶

It is not difficult to show that such statements are often qualified, even in the same passages, to indicate a more balanced perspective. The point is that for Nietzsche the horrifying feature of the Hegelian state, which is to say the modern state as such, is not that it controls the monopoly of physical force but that it contains the means of moral and spiritual power. The modern state has become a new idol which has stepped into the void left by the death of God. According to Nietzsche's Zarathustra, *der Staat* is "the name of the coldest of all cold monsters," which, he says, paraphrasing the language of Hegel, roars, "On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordering finger of God am I."¹⁰⁷ This new idolatry

¹⁰¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), par. 358, pp. 306-7.

¹⁰² Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 258, p. 155; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 399.

¹⁰³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 258A, p. 279; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 403.

¹⁰⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 272A, p. 285; *Werke*, vol. 7, p. 434.

¹⁰⁵ Hegel, *World History*, 94-5; *Werke*, vol. 12, pp. 56-7.

¹⁰⁶ Hegel, *World History*, 96; *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 59.

¹⁰⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 1.11.

of the state has in turn created a new class of bureaucratic masters who, unlike the older European ruling classes, administer the state according to the principles of utility and the greatest happiness for the greatest number.¹⁰⁸

Nietzsche's understanding of the origin of the state owes much to Hegel's analysis of the struggle between master and slave in the *Phenomenology*. But while Hegel uses this image to account for the development of self-consciousness, Nietzsche uses it to account for the transition from one form of morality to another.¹⁰⁹ In the *Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche regards master morality as involving a struggle for pure prestige or recognition, whereas slave morality involves a preoccupation with concerns like security, defense, and the preservation of life itself. The morality of the slaves is an essentially reactive disposition which Nietzsche describes as a form of *ressentiment* or revenge.¹¹⁰ In a dazzling series of epigrams he traces this new moral outlook back to Socrates, or rather "Socratism," with its "plebian" attempt to impose order and form upon the Dionysian power of the passions.¹¹¹ The modern state is not "the actuality of concrete freedom" that it was for Hegel, but rather an escape from the freedom that belongs only to those unable or unwilling to withstand it.

Nietzsche builds upon Hegel even where he appears to depart most dramatically from him. Hegel, we recall, interprets Christianity as ending the archaic struggle between master and slave by its showing that the individual as such, the "I" alone, is worthy of respect or "recognition." Nietzsche turns this around by arguing that Christianity represents nothing more than the triumph of slave morality and the plebian spirit of revenge. In fact, all the "isms" and ideologies of the modern world—democracy, socialism, pacifism, humanitarianism, and so forth—are nothing but secularizations of Christian slave morality. Democracy, with its demand for

¹⁰⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1969), 1.2, 1.10, 2.12; *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), secs. 201, 204, 206, 260.

¹⁰⁹ Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, 2.17–18.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.10–13, 2.20, 3.15.

¹¹¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), sec. 15; cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), secs. 1–12.

equal rights for all, is unthinkable except as a residue of an understanding of the Christian God for whom all souls are equally and infinitely valuable.¹¹² The result of this process of secularization has been, ironically, not the liberation of man as the thinkers of the Enlightenment believed, but, again, his enslavement to new forms of mass organization and control. "The democratic movement," Nietzsche writes in *Beyond Good and Evil*, "is not only a form of the decay of political organization but a form of the decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value."¹¹³

Hegel and Nietzsche differ not only with respect to the causes of slavery, but also over its fate. Hegel takes the abolition of slavery to be a central feature of modernity and a benchmark in his depiction of moral and historical progress. For Nietzsche, however, slavery, rather than being the exception, has become the norm in modern democracies. Thus he reviles democracy as "instinctively hostile to every other form of society except that of the autonomous herd",¹¹⁴ and in the same text he excoriates "this degeneration and diminution of man into the . . . dwarf animal of equal rights and claims."¹¹⁵ By removing all traditional forms of deference and authority between classes ("the pathos of distance"), the democratic state introduces "a new and sublime development of slavery."¹¹⁶ Democratic man is developing into the distinctively leaderless animal, one who "is prepared for slavery in the subtlest sense."¹¹⁷

What, exactly, is this new form of slavery? What is slavery in its "subtlest sense" and most "sublime" form? The highest form of slavery is summarized in Nietzsche's teaching on the "last man," which might not unreasonably be compared to Hegel's "burgher or bourgeois."¹¹⁸ Nietzsche's last men are not slaves because they live under the domination of another, but because they are unable to imagine themselves as being anything other than what they are. The *letzten mensch* is the final form of democratic man who lives

¹¹² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, sec. 202.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, sec. 203.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 202.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, sec. 203.

¹¹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), sec. 954.

¹¹⁷ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, sec. 242.

¹¹⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 190, p. 127.

only for pleasure and whose idea of happiness is confined to material comforts. Such individuals are prized, above all, for their utility to society rather than for their capacity to challenge or threaten it; that is what makes them so contemptible in Nietzsche's eyes. Like Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote about the coming of democracy with the impending sense of "religious dread" with which one would approach a mighty juggernaut,¹¹⁹ Nietzsche sees the "homogenizing of European man" as a "great process" that cannot be obstructed and perhaps should even be "hastened."¹²⁰

Nietzsche clearly believed that hastening the rule of the last men would simultaneously generate their antithesis, the superman or *Übermensch* who will put an end to the petty rivalries and national vanities of the old Europe.¹²¹ Nietzsche describes this superman not as the bearer of a Lincolnian new birth of freedom but as the herald of a planetary tyranny.¹²² Far from deploring this fact, he welcomed it. The harsh enslavement imposed by the supermen is the only way of destroying the nihilism latent within the Christian West and restoring to it some order of rank.¹²³ The advent of the superman will in turn inaugurate an era of "great politics" characterized by wars on a global scale to be followed by the emergence of a new aristocracy which will rule by its own self-imposed imperatives.¹²⁴ The task of Nietzsche's great politics of the future, then, is not to abolish slavery but to reconstitute it.

IV

What, then, is the legacy of Hegel's analysis of slavery? If his attempt to locate the problem within a historical theodicy can no

¹¹⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York: Doubleday, 1969), 12.

¹²⁰ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, sec. 898.

¹²¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1969), sec. 2.

¹²² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, sec. 242.

¹²³ Georg Lukàcs maintains precisely the opposite of the truth when he claims that "what Nietzsche provided here was a morality of the socially militant bourgeoisie and the middle-class intelligentsia of imperialism"; Lukàcs, *The Destruction of Reason*, trans. Peter Palmer (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981), 353. It was rather the "militant bourgeoisie" and "middle-class intelligentsia" against whom Nietzsche wrote.

¹²⁴ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, sec. 960.

longer be maintained, his emphasis on mutual recognition and respect remains central to contemporary discussions of equality and anti-discrimination law.¹²⁵ If his idea that slavery is a necessary stage in the struggle for freedom would be contested, his insights into the psychology of domination and the interactive context of freedom remain very much alive. If few would today readily accept the theological basis of emancipation and freedom, Hegel's repudiation of natural hierarchy along with permanent characteristics of rulers and ruled remains a deep and enduring legacy of the modern sensibility. Moreover, if few would so wholeheartedly identify the modern state and the market economy with the reality of freedom, none should deny that politics must serve the end of educating citizens toward an increased appreciation of the rights of moral personality and the duties of moral responsibility. In fine, then, one could say of Hegel's analysis of slavery what Churchill said of democracy, namely, that it is the worst except for all the alternatives that have been tried.

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¹²⁵ For a recent attempt to use Hegel for these purposes see Andrew Koppelman, *The Foundations and Limits of the Anti-Discrimination Project* (New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming).

SCHOPENHAUER AND DIRECT REALISM

R. J. HENLE

I

THE MAIN THESIS OF THIS STUDY¹ may be summarized as follows: (1) In Schopenhauer's earliest work, *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, two different lines of philosophical thought can be identified, each arising from a different source. (2) The first of these is the a priori Kantianism and idealism heavily emphasizing the function of the a priori principle of causality, and the forms of time and space. This line comes from Schopenhauer's study of Kantianism. (3) The second line of thought consists of an implicitly realistic analysis of perception which seems to arise from Schopenhauer's personal reflection on perceptual experience. This experiential analysis seems to be partially due to his medical studies, as his use of medical rather than philosophical authorities indicates. (4) This realistically oriented element can be extricated from the totality of Schopenhauer's philosophy with the result that it can furnish new insights valuable for the understanding and confirmation of philosophical direct realism.

A secondary conclusion might be that a similar analysis might be usefully applied to other philosophers resulting in better understanding of the philosophers themselves and with contribution to philosophical thought itself.

¹ This paper is based entirely on Schopenhauer's earliest work, *Ueber die Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes Vom Zureichenden Grunde* (Schopenhauer's *Sämtliche Werke*) ed. Arthur Hübscher, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden, F. A. Brockhaus, 1911). The English translation used in this paper is *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, trans. E. F. Payne (Lasalle: Open Court, 1974).

II

In order to provide a philosophical basis for the identification of the realistic theme it is necessary to set forth some of the definitions and positions of philosophical direct realism.

"Realism" as used in this discussion may be defined as the conviction that there exists, independently of human knowledge or willing, a more or less structured world containing material entities, that is, entities extended in three dimensions, existing in space, resistant, generally shaped, and possessing a variety of qualities; and that human beings can gain considerable objective knowledge of these entities.

Realism may be "natural" or philosophical. Philosophical realism may be direct or indirect. Natural realism is the universal conviction all people have that they are living in a really existing world of material entities. It is generally admitted that this conviction is so strong that no philosophy can eradicate it. Descartes made the absolutely permanent character of this conviction an essential part of his indirect argument for a limited realism.² But Descartes maintained that philosophically this limited realism has to be justified by a reasoning process. He was thus an indirect realist.

On the other hand, direct realism is the philosophical position that holds that this conviction cannot be demonstrated and needs no demonstration because it is immediately evident from personal human experience. This is the sort of realism implicit in Schopenhauer.

The philosophical problem for the direct realist is to discover, analyze, and make explicit the precise human experience that justifies direct realism and puts it beyond all doubt. Some direct realists present their evidence, often forcefully, but without detailed analysis.³ For the purpose of this study a more precise analysis is necessary. That analysis reveals that the basic certitudinal evidence for both natural and philosophical direct realism lies in the

² René Descartes, *The Meditations Concerning First Philosophy*, trans. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), 125-6.

³ See for example Etienne Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance* (Paris: Tequi, 1939).

intellectual perceptual awareness of the active and exploratory general touch experience.⁴ It is this type of direct realism that Schopenhauer describes and to which he gives additional personal insights.

A brief example may explain that type of evidential experience just referred to. Take a piece of wood about a foot long and two or three inches wide or thick. Now explore the wood with your hands, moving them around the wood. You are immediately aware that there is an object outside your hands. Your hands move; the surface of the wood does not move with them. Put the wood between your hands; you cannot join your hands. Put the wood down. You cannot reproduce that experience as you can the image of a green tree in your imagination. You cannot produce a sensation that resembles that experience. You may have hot or cold sensations. They are irrelevant to the fact that you have direct experience of an external, resistant, shaped object that is in no sense part of you. In such integral touch experiences there are no illusions of objectivity,⁵ no possibility of error. The experience includes sense *and* intellect. There is not a sensation or a group of sensations which are examined intellectually, but rather the entire experience is saturated with intellectual awareness.⁶ Thus arises a quite different definition of "perception." Perception is a complex knowledge process by which, through combined sense and intellectual activity, we come to know an object presented here and now in sense experience. Through hundreds of such experiences do we develop our habitual awareness of the real material world.

Within this habitual awareness we learn to use the other senses as sources of information and as guides to action. The senses thus

⁴ For this analysis see R. J. Henle, "A Phenomenological Approach to Realism," *An Etienne Gilson Tribute* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), 68-85. See also R. J. Henle, "Basis of Philosophical Realism Re-examined," *The New Scholasticism* 56 (Winter 1982): 1-29; and R. J. Henle, *Theory of Knowledge* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1983), 80-128.

⁵ There are some cases of alleged illusions, for example, if one puts a pencil between two fingers and closes one's eyes, it may seem that there are two objects. This is an illusion with regard to number, not to objectivity. The experience is impossible unless there is an object between the fingers.

⁶ See Henle, *Theory of Knowledge*, 84.

act together as a system⁷ through which the senses other than general touch (especially sight) obtain a derived objectivity of their own. Schopenhauer especially clarifies this latter point.

A brief account of four main sources of skepticism about the existence of a real material world may also be useful for the identification of Schopenhauer's Realism. First, most attacks on the reliability or objectivity of the senses begin by concentrating on the sense of sight. Stress is laid on the numerous illusions, "deceptions": hallucinations and dreams, the bent oar, the two suns, varying colors on the necks of pigeons, the relativity of color vision, and so forth. After rejecting sight as a source of reliable knowledge of an external world, this rejection is simply extended to all the senses, including touch. Sometimes a general sense of touch is dismissed because of the relativity and subjectivity of the specific temperature sensations. Descartes, after a brief reference to dreams and the deception of the senses,⁸ simply dismisses any consideration of sense as an original source of objective knowledge. Schopenhauer does not make this mistake. He *begins* his discussion of the senses with the objectivity of the sense of touch. This seems to be a personal discovery of Schopenhauer's.

A second common mistake, especially of early modern philosophers, is the belief that in all cases of perception there is always some subjective element which is the true object of awareness. This element may be an impression, a sense idea, a sensation, an image. Somehow whatever we know of the external material world must be derived from these subjective objects. In Descartes, sense ideas, which are characterized by obscurity and confusion, are created by God and only because of His veracity do they reveal to some extent the real material world. In Berkeley ideas (sense ideas) are created by God and, in themselves, constitute the world people call real. There is no objective correlate. For Hume impressions are produced by unknown causes and all knowledge is at the sense level. In Leibniz the ideas are precreated by God and unfold during time in pre-established harmony with the real world. Thomas Reid clearly

⁷ See James J. Gibson, *The Senses Considered as Perceptive Systems* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960).

⁸ Descartes, *Meditations*, 76-7.

identifies this mistake and effectively criticizes it.⁹ In the case of the complex general touch experience described above, awareness, both sensitive and intellectual, terminates cognitively at the external object.

A third source of skepticism is the confusion concerning the nature and activity of the intellect and the nature and activity of the senses. Sometimes intellection completely disappears in a philosophy. Thus, in Hume, all conscious activities must be explained at the sense level by impressions, ideas, feelings, and so forth. As a result, all intelligibility and necessities disappear in sense experience. In such a system nothing can be known of an external world. There can be no realism. Schopenhauer maintains a radical distinction between intellect and sense.

Sometimes intellection is recognized but almost completely separated from sense experience. In Berkeley the (sense) ideas have no intrinsic intelligibility or connections; only the notions are intellectual. In direct realism there is a clear radical distinction between intellection and sensing,¹⁰ but intellectual awareness pervades all sense awareness so that cognitively the intellect is in direct contact with the external objects. When a person places his hand on the surface of his desk, he is immediately aware that he is feeling a smooth external surface and he immediately understands he is so doing. Without any reasoning or intervening cognitive elements he can immediately express the intellectual judgment, "I am feeling a smooth external material surface." This analysis is implicit in Schopenhauer's realism.

A fourth source of skepticism is a confusion between perceptual judgments based on *per se* perceptions and those based on *per accidens* perceptions. If a person picks up a rock and says, "I am holding a hard object in my hands," this is a *per se* perceptual

⁹ See Thomas Reid, "Reflections on the Common Theory of Ideas," in *The Intellectual Powers of Man* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 211-86. Cf. R. J. Henle, S. J., "Thomas Reid's Theory of Signs," in *Semiotic 1983*, ed. Jonathan Evans and John Deely (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987),

¹⁰ Descartes illustrates the difference between sense and intellect in a striking example. He says he can both conceive a triangle and imagine a triangle, but he cannot imagine a thousand-sided figure, though his concept of it is perfectly clear and distinct. See Descartes, *Meditations* 6.

judgment because the total evidence is being presented in this experience. If, on the other hand, a person says, "I hear a fire engine," this is a *per accidens* perceptual judgment based partially on previous experience and associations. Though such judgments of the latter sort are generally correct, they can be mistaken because most sounds, for example, can be reproduced without the presence of the usual source. Descartes' reference to what he saw when looking out the window of his study is an example, though he used it as a basis of skepticism.¹¹

Schopenhauer appears to be quite aware of the importance of this distinction, though his terminology is different.

III

As already stated, the texts for this study are taken exclusively from Schopenhauer's earliest work, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*.¹² More precisely, these texts are drawn from section 21, "The A Priori Nature of the Concept of Causality. Intellectual Nature of Empirical Intuitive Perception. The Understanding" (pp. 52-121).

Within section 21 there appear to be two different sets of ideas and, correspondingly, two different sources of evidence. These two philosophical themes sometimes intertwine and sometimes stand almost side by side in apparent contradiction.

One source of thought, which is the basic one for the entire treatise, is doctrinaire Kantianism according to which the empirical world is "constructed" by the understanding applying the a priori concept of causality to the sensations—which contain nothing resembling their causes—with the aid of the a priori forms of inner sense, time (the possibility of change), and of outer sense, space (the possibility of bodies appearing in space). These texts will be referred to as *K*.

The other set of ideas appears to result from Schopenhauer's personal reflection on and analysis of experience. These ideas will

¹¹ Descartes, *Meditations* 2, p. 89.

¹² See note 1 above. Hereafter, page numbers given in the text will refer to this volume.

be referred to as *S*. Included in *S* are Schopenhauer's reference to medical texts and anecdotal accounts (of blindness, and so on) from newspapers and other publications. In fact, it seems clear that the appearance of *S* in the midst of *K* is due to the fact that Schopenhauer early on studied medicine, a study which tends to be realistically detailed. Hereafter the key texts will be numbered for easy reference.

IV

The basic specific text is found in section 21, pages 75-120. The first part of this text (pp. 75-9) is devoted to an explanation of the Objective Intuitive Perception, strictly in accord with *K*. The Objective Intuitive Perception is the process by which the understanding "constructs," "brings into being," the objective world of bodies; or it is the way the "beautiful world arises." The process begins with "sensations" which are "modifications of the body," "lie under the skin," and have nothing resembling their external causes. Next, the understanding—wherein there lies ready-made, prior to all experience, the law of causality—goes to work on the sensations and turns them into "effects," and so refers them to their causes out of which the understanding, with the help of the a priori form of inner sense, time, and of the a priori form of outer sense, space, constructs the empirical world.

The intellect is constituted by the understanding and the reason. The understanding is intuitive and simply applies the law of causation. The reason is the faculty of abstract thinking (it alone deals with concepts) and is the faculty of logical reasoning. Thus these two together constitute the intellect which is simply identical with the brain. Schopenhauer makes the following important points: Perception is intellectual, intuitive, and makes no use of concepts. Now, since Schopenhauer here gives the most comprehensive explanation of "sensation" according to *K*, and since it is in such sharp contrast to some of what follows, the entire text is here quoted.

Text 1

For what a poor, wretched thing mere sensation is! Even in the noblest organs of sense it is nothing more than a local specific feeling,

capable in its way of some variation, yet in itself always subjective. Therefore, as such, this feeling cannot possibly contain anything objective, and so anything resembling intuitive perception. For sensation of every kind is and remains an event within the organism itself; but as such it is restricted to the region beneath the skin; and so, in itself, it can never contain anything lying outside the skin and thus outside ourselves. Sensation can be pleasant or unpleasant—and this indicates a reference to our will—but nothing objective is to be found in any sensation. . . . Yet it remains mere sensation, like every other within our body; consequently, it is something essentially subjective. (pp. 76–77)

Schopenhauer concludes the first part of this section by saying, “I will now show in more detail the great gulf between sensation and intuitive perception” (p. 79). In view of this, the very next paragraph in which *S* appears is, to say the least, surprising. The next text is the basic one for *S*:

Text 2

Properly speaking, only two senses, touch and sight, are of use to objective intuitive perception. These alone supply the data, and on their foundation the understanding enables the objective world to come about through the process just mentioned. The other three senses on the whole remain subjective; for it is true that their sensations point to an external cause, but yet contain no data for determining its spatial relations. (p. 79)

As Schopenhauer begins his study of the senses, he makes a capital distinction between touch and sight on the one hand, and between the other three senses of smell, taste, and hearing on the other. These three latter senses remain subjective even after the operation of the Objective Intuitive Perception. Only touch and sight have a degree of objectivity and supply specific data to the understanding, or later to empirical intuitive perception. In this objectivity, as will be seen, touch holds the primacy—a primacy of infallible objectivity. This is most striking in view of the almost universal, previous practice of early modern philosophers of beginning with an analysis of vision and a rejection of its objectivity, and therefore of all sense objectivity.

Now, as if he has given too much to touch and sight, he quickly repeats *K*:

Text 3

. . . However, what touch and sight supply is still not by any means intuitive perception, but only the raw material for this; for perception

is so far from being found in the sensations of these senses that, on the contrary, they do not resemble at all the qualities of things presented to us by means of them, as I shall show in a moment. (p. 80)

The objectivity asserted in Text 2 cannot arise from sensations but rather from immediate intuitive contact with the objects. Later, in Text 11 below, Schopenhauer will base the infallibility of touch on the fact of direct "contact" with the object. Schopenhauer constantly repeats his position that sensations remain subjective and cannot contain anything resembling their causes. Yet he will assert that touch yields very specific and objective data (see Text 10 below).

V

At this point the consideration of touch must be interrupted in order to study the subjective senses. Schopenhauer's treatment of these senses is enlightening in itself and is a necessary prelude to the completion of the primary discussion of touch.

In Text 2 Schopenhauer distinguished taste, smell, and hearing as senses which are mainly subjective and remain so. The temperature sense, which Schopenhauer identifies as part of the data of touch, should be classified with these three. In this Schopenhauer is clearly mistaken. Temperature has often been included in touch since it usually arises within the integral touch experience. But it has a distinctive content, a subjective sensation that is radically different from the data of the general sense of touch. If one explores a round object with the hands, the shape discovered is a quality of the external body. Whether that body is hot or cold is totally irrelevant to the discovery of its shape. If one holds a hot ball in his hands for a short time and then puts the ball down, he will continue to feel heat in his hands. That is, felt heat is a subjective sensation, while the awareness of a round object ceases at once. Moreover, the sensation of heat does not resemble or disclose the nature of the external activity that stimulates the temperature sense. Therefore, the temperature sense is analogous to taste and smell. Hence, hereafter the temperature sense will be classified with the subjective senses, thus raising the number of such senses to four.

Schopenhauer says very little about taste and smell, but that little is very important and is expanded in the subsequent more extensive treatment of hearing:

Text 4

The other three senses on the whole remain subjective; for it is true that their sensations point to an external cause, but yet contain no data for determining its *spatial* relations. . . . Therefore those three senses can, of course, serve to announce to us the presence of objects already known to us in another way; but no spatial construction and thus no objective intuitive perception is brought about on the basis of their data. We can never construct a rose from its perfume, and a blind man can hear music all his life without obtaining the slightest objective representation of the musicians, the instruments, or the vibrations of the air. (p. 79)

Implicit in this Text is a distinction of great importance which Schopenhauer does not express with precision. In fact, he has no terminology for dealing with it. This distinction is the standard scholastic one between *per se* and *per accidens*. *Per se* these senses terminate at a specific kind of sensation which is a subjective event. The qualities or data which they attain by their very nature are *per se* qualities of the sensations. Thus we always and *per se* taste flavors, smell odors, hear sounds. We smell an odor; it can be strong, sweet, or have a distinctive quality such as that produced by Lysol or lilacs. These qualities bear no resemblance to any outside body. We learn from experience, both our own and that of others, how to connect specific odors with specific kinds of things. These connections are *per accidens*, not arising out of the *per se* qualities. If on entering the dining room one smells a very distinctive sharp odor, he knows that sauerkraut is on the menu. This was learned "in another way," that is, by past association, not by *per se* analysis of the particular odor. The *per accidens* use of these senses is of great importance for dealing with the real world. For example, experience and reflection can vastly extend use of these senses. A chef can recognize many more spices by smell than the ordinary diner. Tea tasters and wine tasters show how delicately discriminatory the sense of taste can become.

In the *per se* use of these senses, there can be no deception. We smell the odor we smell. We taste the taste we taste. In the *per accidens* use, however, mistakes can be and are made. One may smell lilac and really do so. He looks about for lilac bushes, although the source was actually the strong perfume of a passing lady. In addition, the senses may be modified by illness, so that sweet milk will taste sour. But most mistakes are easily corrected.

VI

As pointed out above, Schopenhauer said very little about taste and smell; but of hearing he gives a somewhat more extended and careful analysis. Like taste and smell, hearing is a subjective sense and yields no data concerning the nature of external bodies:

Text 5

A blind man can hear music all his life without obtaining the slightest objective representation of the musicians, the instruments, or the vibrations of the air. (p. 79)

Moreover, in hearing there is a very definite and clear sensation, namely, the sound or the tone itself. Sound is an internal event of which we are clearly conscious. *Per se* we experience only sound and its proper qualities of volume, pitch, and quality.

Text 6

But the tone never indicates spatial relations, and never leads us to the nature of its cause. On the contrary, we stop short at the tone itself; consequently, it is no datum for the understanding that is constructing the objective world. (p. 80)

Schopenhauer cites music as one of the great values of the sense of sound, since music is an artistic product in our sensitivo-intellectual consciousness arising from a planned stimulation of the various qualities of sound itself. Even though we *per se* "stop short" at the tone, what is true of the other subjective senses is true of hearing, namely, that it can "announce to us the presence of objects already known to us in another way." This means that we have an enormous use of sound through *per accidens* connections. Through experience and investigation we learn to identify an incredible number of things "known to us in another way."

This extended use becomes so second nature that instead of saying, for example, "I hear a noise made by a police car," I say simply, "I hear a police car." The sound becomes almost a formal (or pure) sign;¹³ and so sound becomes a constant source of information and of protection.

¹³ The classical systematization of the formal sign comes from John Poincaré, *Tractatus de Signis*, ed. John Deely (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). For contemporary application see John Deely, "Towards the Origin of Semiotic," in *Sight, Sound and Sense*, ed. Thomas Sebeok (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1978), 1-30; Henle, *Theory of Knowledge*, 54-5, 60-1; and Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, *Man's Knowledge of Reality* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1956), 86-7.

Of course, as in all *per accidens* connections we can and do make mistakes. I think I hear shots when, in fact, it is a radio drama next door or backfiring in the street. I think I hear thunder but it's only a large truck passing by. Such mistakes can easily be corrected and, besides, the usefulness of sound far outweighs them.

One remarkable thing about hearing, to which Schopenhauer does not allude, is this. We learn immediately to project familiar sounds to the point of origin of the vibrations. Thus, I hear shouting *in the street*. I hear hammering *next door*. I hear someone walking *in the corridor*. Of course, because this is learned, that is, is *per accidens*, mistakes can be made. Ventriloquists and echoes can mislead us.

Schopenhauer points to spoken language as one of the great contributions of hearing.

Text 7

On the other hand, the sense of hearing is of great value as a medium of language, whereby it is the sense of *reason* or of the rational faculty. (p. 79)

Schopenhauer has said (in *K*) that sensation is a poor thing that requires the application of the a priori forms of the understanding to give rise to the beautiful empirical world. Schopenhauer's own analysis in *S*, however, shows that the sensation which is the sound is rich in itself and in its many uses. The understanding supplies only intellectual awareness; it supplies nothing of the proper nature of sound (that is, from sense experience), nor does it "refer the sensation" to its external causes. If it did, we would all be aware of the vibrations of the air which are the external cause of sound. We have to discover sound waves by experimentation and reasoning.

Schopenhauer is correct in saying that in the subjective senses our sensitivo-intellectual awareness terminates initially and *per se* at the sensations. As he points out, we can use the qualities of these sensations, which we intuitively apprehend, for useful ends such as the production and enjoyment of music. More important than all this, however, we learn to use these very sensations to transcend them, as it were, and enable us to make objective judgments of the real world which we know in another way, namely, through touch and sight.

VII

The sense of touch, which is quite different from the three (or four) senses just discussed, must now be more thoroughly examined. In Text 2 Schopenhauer says that only touch and sight supply objective data for the Objective Intuitive Perception. What data does touch supply?

Text 8

Touch, on the other hand, immediately supplies the data for the knowledge of size, shape, hardness, softness, dryness, moisture, smoothness, temperature and so on. (p. 81)

It has already been shown above why temperature does not belong in this list. The other data are qualities of external bodies, not the content or qualities of sensations. It should also be emphasized that this data furnishes knowledge—not feelings, or pleasure, or sensations, but knowledge. Moreover, touch *immediately* supplies these data. This is a crucial difference, and it indicates the complete objectivity of the sense of touch. Pitch is a quality of sound and not of any external body. Hardness is a quality of an external body, not of the hand or of a subjective sensation or of the imagination. Taken as *S* this description exactly corresponds to the integral touch experience, for there are no sensations corresponding to these data. As one places his hand on the surface of a desk, he is immediately aware of the external surface. This experience cannot be analyzed into (1) a sensation, then (2) the application of the principle of causality, and then (3) the perception of an extended material surface.

Text 9

On the other hand, it is true that touch is restricted to *contact*, but its data are so *infallible* and varied that it is the most radical and thorough sense. (p. 81, emphasis added)

Touch is in direct contact with the material object, and this establishes its infallibility. In contrast, in hearing, our sensitivo-intellectual awareness stops short at the "tone," the sensation. In touch, our sensitivo-intellectual awareness is in direct contact with the material body and so immediately reports the qualities of material bodies. This is confirmed by the very next text.

Text 10

Indeed perceptions through sight ultimately refer to touch and sight can be regarded as an imperfect touch extending to a distance and making use of the rays of light as long feelers. It is therefore exposed to many deceptions just because it is limited entirely to qualities that are brought about through the medium of light; and so it is one-sided. (p. 81)

The objectivity of sight depends on the objectivity of touch. The fallibility of sight taken in itself is due to the fact that there is a *medium* in sight perception, namely, light. There is no medium, physical or cognitional, between the sensitivity of the hand and the surface it touches or the ball it holds. Touch is the ultimate test and guarantee of the objectivity of sight. Psychologists and psychiatrists know this. If you can put your hand through the pink elephant, there is no pink elephant. If you cannot grab the shadow by your bed with your hand, it is just a shadow.

Text 11

In this it [touch] is assisted by the shape and mobility of the arms, hands, and fingers from whose position the understanding, by touching bodies, derives the data for constructing them in space; it is also aided through muscular power by means whereof it knows the weight, solidity, toughness, or brittleness of bodies; all this with the least possibility of deception. (p. 81)

Movement and exploration by the hands are essential parts of the integral touch experience. Although Schopenhauer's understanding of the contribution of the hands, and so forth, is somewhat different, his account is closer to *S* than to *K*. Again he emphasizes the infallibility of touch:

Text 12

If in the dark I put my hand on a flat surface . . . or seize a ball of some three inches in diameter, then in both cases it is the same parts of the hand which feel the pressure. Only from the different position, assumed by my hand in the one case or the other, does my understanding construct the shape of the body, contact with which is the cause of the sensation, and it confirms this sensation for itself by my varying the points of contact. (p. 82)

In this text Schopenhauer identifies a number of internal sensations and explains that by a complicated sort of calculation from which we discover the shape of the ball. These sensations are not

sensations of touch, nor is there any experiential or reflective evidence that we employ any such inferential process. This may be an effort by Schopenhauer to justify his a priori assumption that in all sense knowledge there are intermediate sensations. This is contradicted by his description of, and emphasis on, the direct and immediate "contact" of touch with the external object (see Text 9 above). Moreover, these sensations are not caused by external bodies. Our effort to grasp and explore generates tensions and conscious use of muscles. When, blindfolded, we attempt to determine the shape of an external object, our focus is entirely on the outside body. We can, of course, change our focus and ultimately reflect on the internal kinesthetic sensation, but we do not use them to calculate the shape of the external body. In Text 11 Schopenhauer is much closer to describing the role of exploration by hands and fingers and of movement in our acquisition of objective knowledge through touch.

As stated above, Schopenhauer assumes that in all sense experiences there are sensations that function in the Objective Intuitive Perception. It was shown above, both from experience and from Schopenhauer's own *S* description, that there are no touch sensations, no conscious or cognitive medium between human sensitive-intellectual awareness and the external object. We are immediately aware of an external object, and through external exploration immediately grasp its shape.

VIII

We are now ready to relate our conclusions concerning touch to our original project. If we extricate all the *S* elements from the *K* context, we can enumerate the following points:

- (1) Perception always involves intellectual activity as well as that of sensitivity.
- (2) The touch experience involves "grasping," holding, movement, exploration by hands and fingers. (Thus the elements of space are already given in immediate touch experience; there is no need for an already existing a priori form of "space.")
- (3) Initially no deductive reasoning is involved in perception. ("Reason" functions later.) Perception is "intuitive."

(4) Through touch we are in immediate, direct contact with external bodies. There are no touch sensations and no cognitional intermediates.

(5) For the reasons stated in (4), perceptions based on touch are infallible and beyond doubt.

(6) For the same reason, the data supplied for perception through touch are size, shape, hardness, softness, dryness, moisture, smoothness, and so forth. These are all real qualities of real external bodies, not of sensations (as loudness is a quality of the sensation "sound"); and they are not "modifications of the organism."

(7) The combination of all these points amounts almost to a description of the Integral Touch Experience. Thus the combination, contrary to *K*, presents the infallible intuitive evidence for the existence of, and our knowledge of, an extended material world of bodies—that is, the evidence for direct realism.

The integral touch experience is the test and guarantee of the objectivity of sight and of the objective use of the other three (or four) senses. Another more general conclusion is this: This is another instance that confirms the belief that all idealisms imply realism, that idealism is a pathological function of realism.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

MATTHEW CUDDEBACK AND STAFF

ACHINSTEIN, Peter. *Particles and Waves*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 337 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper \$24.95—Clearly written and persuasively argued, this book illustrates how far philosophers of science have progressed since the heyday of logical positivism. In contrast to the positivists who ignored the "context of discovery" while forcing scientific inquiry into their a priori logical constraints of the "context of justification," the present approach carefully examines previous scientific discoveries to determine whether the procedures followed conform to commonly espoused theories of scientific method. Achinstein carries this technique to perfection.

Selecting three outstanding developments from nineteenth-century physics in which the investigators were especially concerned with methodological techniques, the book is correspondingly divided into three parts. Part 1 discusses the two predominant theories of light in the nineteenth century: Newton's corpuscular theory, and the later opposing theories of Huygens, Young, and Fresnel. Part 2 examines Maxwell's use of the kinetic theory of mechanical "molecules" or particles to explain the behavior and laws of gases. Part 3 describes J. J. Thomson's experiments with cathode tubes demonstrating that cathode rays are composed of electrons and determining their mass to charge ratio. Each part is further divided into essays presenting the historical background followed by analyses of the methodological strategies employed, along with critiques of their historical and recent interpretations. Focusing particularly on the justification for introducing unobservables (particles, waves, and electrons) in these investigations, Achinstein abstracts from the underlying methods of inquiry and inferential patterns of reasoning their essential logical structures, giving the reader the impression of witnessing the actual thought processes of the scientists. These arguments then are assessed as to their probable truth by transposing them into the probability calculus.

The primary message of the book is that when one compares the methodologies used in the historical episodes with the standard

* Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

interpretations of the hypothetico-deductive method or the inductive model, they do not match. The *h-d* method was usually supplemented with "independent warrant" consisting of references to independent supporting data, as well as with "eliminative arguments" discrediting the opposing hypothesis; the inductive method based on observable data generally included inferences beyond those obtained from observations. Furthermore, the usual interpretation of the *h-d* model, as implying predictions that directly specify the experiments used to test them, is refuted by Achinstein's study. Predictions *are* deduced or derived from the system of hypotheses composing the theory, along with suitable background information; but usually they are too general to depict specific experiments which instead are imaginatively devised to generate data that one hopes can be used in evaluating the hypotheses. Included is a very interesting discussion of the question of possible alternative hypotheses versus "the only game in town" argument.

The conception of scientific method that emerges from this excellent study—consisting of the problematic situation, formulation of hypotheses, derivation of implications, devising of experimental tests, and inferential reasoning connecting these processes—is much more subtle, varied, and complex one than usually depicted. Although Achinstein does not draw this conclusion himself, it seems to this reviewer that his book indicates that what is the justification for introducing and for believing in unobservables increases with the advance of science. It would be interesting to carry this inquiry to the present, analyzing such remarkable twentieth-century experimental achievements as the discovery of the neuron, the determination of the molecular structure of DNA-RNA, and the detection of particles like the *psi/J* and *W* and *Z* Bosons. As it is, this work should prove to be a landmark in the continuing study of the evolution of scientific methodologies.—Richard H. Schlagel, *The George Washington University*.

- ADAMS, Elie M. *The Metaphysics of Self and World: Toward a Humanistic Philosophy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. xv + 325 pp. \$44.95—This impressive, self-contained, and philosophically rich work is the last of Adams's trilogy about "the upheavals and dislocations in the culture and the resulting human identity crisis occasioned by the rise of modern science and its naturalistic world-view" (p. xii). Continuing the critique of naturalism developed in his *Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View* (1960) and *Philosophy and the Modern Mind* (1975), this book argues that the naturalistic world-view, with its restriction of the intelligible to the factual and existential as grasped by sense perception, consists of a set of false assumptions and incoherent presuppositions about the constitutional principles and powers of the human mind and the categorial structure of the world. The inadequacies of naturalistic categories, Adams contends, systematically lead us into error; we are no longer able to

think clearly or well about ourselves or our world. Modernity's embracing of naturalism has undermined the possibility of a healthy culture in which human persons can flourish, and it has resulted in a cultural crisis. That this is so is evidenced, Adams believes, by the widespread sense of malaise and alienation, as expressed in our literature and art; by the steady erosion of the effectiveness of our social, political, and economic institutions; and by the widely perceived loss of purpose and legitimacy of the humanities themselves. The task of reconstructing our culture requires, it is argued, the revitalization of the humanities; it requires the guidance of cultural analysis and criticism grounded in a humanistic philosophy which acknowledges and defends the reality of value, meaning, and mind.

In chapters 2-5, Adams subjects the naturalism of classical and contemporary analytic empiricism to sustained analysis and criticism. In these densely argued chapters, naturalism is found wanting; its various reductionist strategies result in incomplete and incoherent accounts of the semantic and epistemic powers of the human mind. The issue of naturalism is a self-defeating relativism and skepticism which is unable to ground even the practice of science. In these same chapters, Adams argues that we possess a wide range of semantic and knowledge-yielding powers including somatic and sensory perception, affective/conative experience, perceptual understanding, expression perception, and reflective awareness. Through these powers, he contends, we encounter a world consisting of factual, semantic, normative, personal, and social realities. On these objective grounds, the humanities can reestablish their identity and legitimacy and aid us in our efforts to overcome the crisis of modernity.

In chapter 6 Adams contends that "human beings must be conceived in terms of the humanistic categories of meaning, logic, normativity, and personhood" (p. 225). In conjunction with a presentation of a realistic theory of logic and ethics, he argues that a human person is a rational and moral agent and, as such, is constituted by the imperatives to know and to "live a life of one's own that would be worthy of one as a human being and as the individual one is" (p. 218). The normative structure of personhood provides the objective ground for Adams's defense, in chapter 7, of a liberal social and political order which protects human rights and provides the conditions for human flourishing. In the speculative and concluding chapter of the work, Adams explores the implications of his humanistic philosophy for religion and theology and for questions concerning ultimate reality.

This compelling and provocative work represents a significant contribution to contemporary realism, to the philosophy of culture and civilization, and to our understanding of and appreciation for the significance of the humanities in the late twentieth century. While the book's style is technical in places, this work merits a wide readership in the academic community and among those concerned with our contemporary cultural crisis.—Mark Bandas, *University of Richmond*.

ADDIS, Laird. *Natural Signs: A Theory of Intentionality*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. xii + 180 pp. \$29.95—All we have

are appearances, memories, and words, in our consciousness. Addis writes about several entities which are not simply any of the above but are deemed essential to discussion of what consciousness is and does. He directs praise and criticism to other writers as he approves or disapproves of their assertions about reductionism, materialism, dualism, aboutness, and physical particulars, to name a few items. To read the book one must learn of all these things and see how the author interrelates them to the notion that human consciousness is intentional.

Addis claims that we have states of consciousness the contents of which are given to us by our physical surroundings. Each state of consciousness is intentional for each is about something. These states are the primary mental beings, while sensations and emotions and perceptions are developed with them. These are never empty of content, consequently there is no empty sensory conscious act open to our scrutiny. Consciousness is always of something but never of its bare self.

He defines a natural sign as an entity which represents something other than itself. The usual contents of consciousness are natural signs. If the author stayed with the self-evident function of the appearances of things he could have written a treatise on the role of signs in recognizing, imagining, explaining, and theorizing. Instead he wants to reinforce the self-evident by proposing arguments to show that intentionality is a property of a mind being aware that it is aware. Intentionality, he claims, is not cultural nor linguistic; it is as natural as seeing this page, where the appearances called letters are also the appearances we see as being the words on the page.

The dialectical argument claims that if there are no natural signs there can be no representation in any matter whatsoever. The reader is to assume, however, that there is not only presentation of particulars to sensory awareness, and sensation, but also representation of physical things in that same awareness, and perception of non-self-entities. Of course, then, awareness must be a representing of things by means of natural signs! The same argument, repeated, claims that when human behavior varies according to what one is thinking, there must be descriptive properties included in the natural signs—that is, our states of consciousness must represent things. A third version of the same argument holds that when one is imagining that Sirius has ten planets, he is certain that he is imagining this and also certain that Sirius does not have planets. A property of my conscious state that Sirius has ten planets accounts for my certainty, he says.

Aristotle says that the sense in act is the sensible in act, and also that there is never an error regarding the presence of the proper sensible to the healthy sense organ. Recast, this states that actual sensing is always about some physical thing, and that sensing replicates the appropriate appearances of things. Addis's version is that the direct perception of our surroundings puts us in knowing touch with the physical objects, and we can have indefectible knowledge of these objects.

In the realm of imagination, where thinking is expressed, Aristotle believes that there is great likelihood of error occurring. Addis

believes that a sort of intentionality is present in the realm of imagination—regarding Sirius, for example—and that he can be quite certain (correctly so) about this. In another place he claims that in any form of awareness, from abstract thought to brute sensation, a property occurs as aboutness of that of which we are aware. There must be something, then, which intrinsically represents. Since language does not do this, mind must. Everything that is mental is so only by virtue of its intimate connection with the intentional.

One must have a keen interest in fine distinctions and subtle differences of opinion to get the most out of these issues as Addis deals with them. Definitions, and other ways of making clear what mind and perception are thought to be, would make it easier to read this book.—Francis Collingwood, *Marquette University*.

BRANN, Eva T. H. *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance*.

Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991. xiv + 810 pp. \$75.00—

This book is at once the most definitive and the most comprehensive book of its kind ever written. No other study begins to rival this splendid assessment of the many sides and sorts of the imagination, its unending vicissitudes, ramifications, extensions, and applications. Lucidly composed, carefully thought out, and forcefully presented, the eight hundred pages of this treatise are as informative as they are witty, as concise as they are expansive, as precise as they are suggestive. For anyone who wants to know how imagination has been regarded in Western philosophical and psychological, literary, and religious thought, this text is an indispensable resource, a treasure-trove of insight and knowledge.

In the Preface and Introduction, Brann distinguishes her venture from postmodern disillusionments with imagination, setting forth a model of imagining as an internal power, primarily visual, that represents absent things as present by way of resemblance. Put simply thus, the reader might think that the book to follow will merely replay an Aristotelian view of the image as at once an entity in its own right and a likeness of that of which it is the image. It soon becomes clear, however, that matters are much more complex than this. An incisive treatment of Aristotle himself demonstrates the limitations of his position—as well as its inherent truth—and treats of the positions of Plato, the Stoics, the Epicureans, Plotinus, the Neo-Platonists, and St. Augustine. Modern philosophers from Descartes to Bergson, and twentieth-century figures such as Husserl, Bachelard, and Ryle are decisively treated. At each point, the author manages to be sympathetic yet critical—and, not least of all, to weave a coherent narrative throughout.

This is only the beginning of the tale, though. Brann next takes up cognitive psychological approaches to imagination with abundant reference to recent experimental paradigms of the nature and status of mental imagery, including a perspicuous account of the “double

coding" (that is, verbal and visual) of memory images. She also discusses children's imagination (with emphasis on Piaget's understanding), daydreams, hypnotic and hypnagogic imagery, and the neurological basis of images. In Part 3 Brann gives a discerning account of the ontological standing of mental images, drawing on Plato, Wittgenstein, Brentano, Russell, and Meinong. She manages to do justice to all of these competing positions, while clearly stating her own preferences—a not inconsiderable feat in this arcane and highly technical area. Part 4 takes up the place of images in literature, and pursues this topic by deft analyses of Homer's *Odyssey*, Romantic poetry, and the novels of Robbe-Grillet. Questions of simile, metaphor, and myth are treated with subtlety and wit. Issues of depiction, with particular focus on the spatiality of imagining, are then considered in Part 5, where the reader will also find enlightening discussions of the role of imagination in Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry, and, more generally, in model-making and picturing of many kinds. Part 6 scrutinizes utopias, degenerate imaginings, and religious aspects of imagination, in bold strokes. Also found in this last part is a charming treatment of "places and passions" in which Proust's and Bachelard's "topographies of the imagination" are delineated, along with affective and emotional dimensions of imagination. The book concludes with penetrating reflections on "imaginative transparency" and "thoughtful transcendence."

To read a book such as this requires leisure and patience—and a passion for "the life of the imagination" (the title of the Coda). But the time it takes to peruse this text is well spent indeed. This is a book written in the grand manner. The reader has the experience of being led on an exquisite voyage into the imaginary, both its close-up minutiae and its farthest reaches. Not only does it do justice to its topic by its scrupulous scholarship and strong intelligence, it transforms the topic itself by revealing features of, and whole species of, imagination which have never been so compellingly and sensitively discussed within the space of a single book. I recommend it to all who care about the fate of imagination in a time of boundless but facile images, and to all who wish to know more about how imagination "bodies forth the forms of things unknown."—Edward S. Casey, *SUNY at Stony Brook*.

CLARK, Maudemarie. *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xiv + 298 pp. Cloth, \$39.50; paper, \$12.95—In this book, Clark attempts to reconstruct the complicated and shifting account of truth that informs Nietzsche's philosophical writings. The centerpiece of her study is a carefully documented interpretation of the development of Nietzsche's position on truth. She persuasively demonstrates that Nietzsche actually came to reject the early position on truth for which he is currently honored by post-modern scholars. Clark interprets the evolution of Nietzsche's

position on truth as a sustained exercise in self correction, to which she attributes some of the most significant insights of his philosophical career.

Nietzsche's early position on truth, which Clark locates primarily in his unpublished essay *On Truth and Lie In the Extramoral Sense*, identifies truth as a "movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms." In his early writings, Nietzsche thus assumed that truth is merely a (valorized) species of illusion; any true theory, he concluded, necessarily involves a (pragmatic) falsification of the world. According to Clark, Nietzsche derived this position not from a theory of language as irreducibly figural (as is popularly believed), but from his twin commitments to a representational theory of perception and a metaphysically freighted correspondence theory.

As Nietzsche gradually disavowed his earlier forays into metaphysics, his position on truth changed accordingly. In order to defend her "neo-Kantian interpretation" of Nietzsche's eventual position, Clark helpfully distinguishes between cognitive capacities and cognitive interests. The former determine the ken and scope of human knowledge, while the latter comprise "the cognitively relevant properties we want from a theory or set of beliefs *other than truth* (e.g., simplicity, comprehensiveness, etc.)" (p. 48). Clark relies on this distinction to attribute to Nietzsche a version of antirealism: whereas truth may elude our cognitive capacities, "truth cannot be independent of our cognitive interests, or our best standards of rational acceptability" (p. 60). Although we cannot hope to gain knowledge of things-in-themselves, we may nevertheless ascribe truth to those theories that satisfy our cognitive interests.

Clark suggests that we view the development of Nietzsche's position on truth as an attempt to implement this antirealism. She shows how Nietzsche gradually purged his thought of the metaphysical remnants that gave rise to his early position on truth. His celebrated perspectivism, for example, which became prominent in the writings of 1886-88, functions to abolish the residual representationalism of his thought.

Clark also presents a compelling case for viewing Nietzsche's evolving position on truth as central to his philosophical project as a whole. She contends, for example, that Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal is designed to reverse the corruption of the will to truth that animates Western philosophy and science. Nietzsche believes that in order to recuperate the will to truth, he must create a new ideal for it to serve, that is, an alternative to the ascetic ideal. Clark interprets Nietzsche's most elusive teaching—the thought of eternal recurrence—as possibly sheltering this new ideal. As a potential guardian of the will to truth, the teaching of eternal recurrence may play a role in determining the future directions of philosophy.

This book is an important contribution to Anglo-American Nietzsche scholarship. It represents the most ambitious (and most successful) attempt to date to subject Nietzsche's philosophy to the rigorous analysis usually reserved for mainstream philosophers. Carefully

argued and scrupulously researched, this impressive study demonstrates both the possibility and the value of taking Nietzsche seriously as a thinker of the first rank. Maudemarie Clark has delivered a book that should stimulate Nietzsche scholarship for many years to come.—Daniel W. Conway, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

CLARKE, Stanley G., and SIMPSON, Evan, eds. *Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989. x + 308 pp. Cloth, \$49.50; paper, \$16.95—In recent years there has been a revolt in moral philosophy against the idea that the purpose of moral philosophy is to produce the kind of highly abstract, universalistic, formal theories of morality that have been developed by such philosophers as Hare, Gewirth, and Rawls. Instead, it has been argued, moral philosophers should undertake more limited, contextualized, nonformal projects that focus on "local practices," moral traditions, and the role of the emotions in moral perception and action. This volume contains twelve of the best essays in this new style. In addition, there is an excellent introduction and a short "Guide to Recent Literature" that, save for its near exclusive focus on work done in the analytic tradition, is nicely comprehensive. The selections are what one might expect, with a few notable exceptions. For example, it contains no essay by Isaiah Berlin, despite the editors' acknowledgment of the importance to this body of work of the idea of moral pluralism. On the other hand, it does contain MacIntyre's "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narratives, and the Philosophy of Science," which is only tangentially related to moral philosophy, rather than, for example, a chapter from his more directly related *After Virtue*.

As most of these essays are readily available, the main virtue of this book—other than its bringing these essays together for comparison—is in the insights and theoretical organization provided by the introductory essay. Fortunately, this essay is extremely helpful. As Clark and Simpson indicate in their title, the book focuses on two related topics. The first group of essays centers on several criticisms of the attempt to develop normative theories, such as contractarianism and utilitarianism, which seek to articulate principles that can be deductively used to "guide our behavior by systematizing and extending our moral judgments" (p. 2). These theories have been criticized on three grounds: They "misrepresent the semantic features of moral norms," a theme developed in Annette Baier's "Doing Without Moral Theory?"; they cannot accommodate properties of virtues having no connection with rational principles (developed in John McDowell's "Virtue and Reason"); and they wrongly deny the existence of unresolvable moral conflicts (developed in Stuart Hampshire's "Morality and Conflict") (p. 9). As Clarke and Evans point out, this critique of foundationalist, normative theory inclines these philosophers to a more holistic coherentist position that makes use of a version of reflective equilibrium (see, however, Cheryl Noble's "Normative Ethics

Theories" for a criticism of this method) and a more textured conception of the emotions (see Martha Nussbaum's "Finely Aware and Richly Responsible": Literature and the Moral Imagination").

The second half of the book, on "moral conservatism," contains essays that attempt to do moral philosophy without theory. These essays are conservative in that they seek to understand and criticize morality from the inside. The authors of these essays are united by the idea that "moral and political norms cannot be [rationally] rejected on the basis of critical standards contrary to the fundamental values and practices of the community" (p. 15). As the presence of articles by Richard Rorty, Bernard Williams, and Charles Taylor indicates, however, the adoption of moral conservatism in this sense does not require the rejection of political liberalism and its causes, although several writers in this style, such as Michael Oakeshott, do make such a rejection.

The contribution that the introductory essay makes to the book could have been further enhanced if the editors had tied their essay directly to the selections, rather than just discussing the movement in general terms. Despite this flaw, however, this volume helps give form to this emerging style of moral philosophy.—Roger Paden, *George Mason University*.

DAHLSTROM, Daniel D., ed. *Nature and Scientific Method*. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 22. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991. xii + 328 pp. \$48.95—Although it is not immediately evident from the title page, this book is dedicated to William A. Wallace. This will be welcome news indeed to Wallace's many admirers, and a fitting tribute to a scholar who has contributed so much to the history and philosophy of science (for Wallace's impressive list of publications, see pp. 309–18). The sixteen articles that comprise the volume are almost evenly split between the philosophy and history of science, with seven articles included within philosophy of science in Part I under the rubric of "Contemporary Issues," and nine articles on the history of science in Part II bearing the title "Historical Studies." In a helpful, brief introduction, the editor briefly describes each article, most of which emphasize methodology.

As in virtually all festschrifts, the articles bear little relationship to one another and cover a wide range of topics. A few even make some effort at linkage with Wallace's own work (for example, Rom Harré, "Causality and Reality"; and Patrick A. Heelan, "Hermeneutical Philosophy and the History of Science"). As one might have hoped for in a festschrift honoring Wallace, one article, "Ludovico Carbone's Commentary on Aristotle's *De caelo*," by Jean Dietz Moss, is devoted to the scholastic author Carbone, trained at the Collegio Romano (though oddly not himself a Jesuit). In 1986, Moss discovered a manuscript in Florence containing commentaries on Aristotle's *De*

caelo and *De generatione* written in 1594 by Carbone. By comparing Carbone's commentary on *De caelo* to Galileo's similar treatise, Moss not only shows interesting similarities, but also observes that Carbone's commentary differs from Galileo's largely because Carbone's interests were theological, as contrasted with the more philosophical interests of Galileo and the Jesuits at the Collegio Romano. Moss concludes the article with a useful appendix outlining the contents of Carbone's treatise.

As is also fitting, two articles treat of the reaction to the Copernican system, one concerned with Paolo Antonio Foscarini, the other with Galileo. The former, "Foscarini's Defense of Copernicanism," by Richard J. Blackwell, briefly analyzes Foscarini's *Letter*, published in 1615, which was condemned on March 5, 1616; and analyzes the unpublished *Defense* of the *Letter*, written a few months later. Despite the importance of the letter, "Galileo scholars have almost completely ignored it" (p. 200), probably because Favaro omitted it from his edition of Galileo's works. Blackwell seeks to remedy this gross oversight and to determine the role of the *Letter* "in the Galileo affair" (pp. 200-1). Foscarini's *Letter* not only failed to effect a reconciliation between Copernicanism and Scripture, but may "have inadvertently provided an excellent opportunity for the Holy Office to send a forceful, albeit indirect, message to Galileo by placing the *Letter* on the Index" (p. 210).

In "Galileo and Probable Arguments," Sylla presents much that is new, interesting, and provocative. She captures the difficulties that Galileo faced and the subtleties involved in presenting his case for the Copernican system. She believes that by treating "physical and religious questions within a rhetorical context," Galileo was led unavoidably "to have a greater commitment to probable arguments than he may have recognized as scientifically justifiable" (p. 212; see also pp. 233-4), which is presumably what got him into trouble. One could argue, however, with at least equal plausibility, that Galileo used the rhetorical method because he was already convinced of the absolute truth of the Copernican system and thought a rhetorical format might best serve his proselytizing goals. A shrewd, tough-minded scholar like Galileo seems unlikely to have been led into trouble by the literary form he chose to convey his message. Although Sylla makes Oresme a methodological soulmate to Buridan, and therefore an advocate of the *ex suppositione* approach, she offers no evidence for her assumption.

If Galileo and Ludovico Carbone might best represent Wallace's fundamental interest, the inclusion of many other famous authors will undoubtedly please him. If we move chronologically from the ancient world to the modern, separate articles are devoted to John Philoponus ("Philoponus on Separating the Three-Dimensional in Optics," by Jean de Groot), Thomas Aquinas ("Thomas Aquinas on *Phys.* VII.1 and the Aristotelian Science of the Physical Continuum," by R. F. Hassing), Francis Bacon ("Bacon's Critique of Ancient Philosophy in *New Organon I*," by Richard H. Kennington), Isaac Newton ("The Problem of Method in Newton's Natural Philosophy"),

Immanuel Kant ("Kant's Metaphysics of Nature," by Daniel O. Dahlstrom), Thomas Reid ("The Reidian Tradition: Growth of the Causal Concept," by Edward H. Madden), and Pierre Duhem ("Duhem's Interpretation of Aristotle on Mathematics in Science," by Francis J. Collingwood).

The four remaining articles appear in the first part on "Contemporary Issues." They are "Explaining," by Robert Sokolowski; "Abstraction and Imagination in Human Understanding," by Jude P. Dougherty, who argues that thinking about scientific issues and problems requires images of real objects; "Baffling Phenomena," by Nicholas Rescher; and "Basic Science Is Innocent; Applied Science and Technology Can be Guilty," by Mario Bunge, an article whose title reveals its major thrust.

A brief review can hardly do justice to a diverse collection of sixteen articles. For most of them, little more than author and title have been cited. Nevertheless, there is much here to enrich the mind, and the diversity and quality of these contributions mirror the diversity and high quality of William Wallace's publications throughout his long and distinguished career.—Edward Grant, *Indiana University*.

EWIN, R. E. *Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. ix + 212 pp. Cloth, \$39.50; paper \$14.95—Undoubtedly, Ewin's view of Thomas Hobbes's moral philosophy offers a fresh counterpart to most current analytical readings of Hobbes by recent American scholars, such as Gregory Kavka and Jean Hampton. Staying close to Hobbes's text, this Australian professor is continuously in debate with these two authors, criticizing their game theoretic reconstruction of Hobbesian philosophy. Ewin's main purpose seems to be the revival of Hobbes's reputation as a moral philosopher.

With a deeply methodological approach, Ewin shows, in the first chapter, the frequent confusion about the sense Hobbes gives to the term "cause," especially if it is understood in the context of modern science. Though disputable, for Ewin the causal relationship described by Hobbes is always a logical relationship that holds between names, not an empirical relationship that holds between things (p. 16). When Hobbes claims to have set out the cause of something, he is not claiming that the cause actually existed or really produced the particular thing in question; he is giving a model for it. This allows Ewin to conclude the following: "The contract, as a model for the state, need not be an actual contract, and the natural condition of mankind need not have been actual in order to play a part in Hobbes's story of the generation of the state" (p. 2).

In the second chapter the author proposes that if we are to live peacefully together despite our disagreements, then we must be prepared to accommodate ourselves to others within certain limits. Right reason would be the corresponding power to set those limits, but it

cannot do that because there is no natural right reason. For Hobbes, each man takes for right reason what is his own (*Leviathan* 5). So we must have recourse to an artificial right reason; we must turn to conventional decision procedures that will give us a binding public judgment (p. 43). The introduction of an artificial right reason does not determine what is true, but it does make possible the determination of what is to be done in the face of continuing disagreement about what is true. It introduces a public level of judgment, provided by the sovereign, that takes precedence over merely private judgments (pp. 31-2). There remains a further problem about whether Hobbes can remove private judgment from his theory. The author discusses it in chapter 3, which is devoted to the inalienable right to self-preservation.

This right appears to be an insurmountable problem for Hobbes as long as it is part of his theory, because it means that private judgment does not always give way to public judgment. Every man in his natural condition has, formally, only two rights: the right to self-preservation and the right to judge for himself (p. 70). The problem Ewin arrives at is the following. The only right we have in our natural condition is the right to do whatever in our judgment is necessary for our preservation; but we retain that right in civil society because the point of social life is to give security of life to each of us. If we retain in civil society all the rights that we had in our natural condition, how can we have left our natural condition?

Ewin answers this question, in chapter 4, with an original interpretation of Hobbes's state of nature, though I think it is an indefensible reconstruction, of the type he is continuously criticizing. He distinguishes two different sorts of "state of nature" in Hobbes; the anthropological and the logical. He considers the state of nature as a sort of relationship in which the terms can change (p. 103). We shall be in our natural condition with respect to some people or groups, and are likely to be, at the same time, out of it with respect to other people or groups (p. 104). Ewin argues that this consideration must be distinguished from the radical form of our natural condition, which he tries to show—I think unsuccessfully—Hobbes believed to be impossible. The author asserts that Hobbes in fact employs a *reductio* argument about authority, showing that authority is necessary to human life because it is what distinguishes the radical form of man's natural condition, considered as an impossibility, from life in civil society (p. 101).

Ewin analyzes, in chapter 5, the laws of nature as qualities disposing man to peace. Hobbes says that the laws of nature are binding *in foro interno* (in conscience or in the intention) in the state of nature, but binding *in foro externo* (in act) only in civil society. For the author, Hobbes does not mean that in our natural condition we must try to be just, kind, and so on, but need not succeed, whereas in civil society we must succeed. Ewin thinks that the same qualities of character (as Hobbes refers to the laws of nature in *Leviathan* 26) would operate in different ways in the quite diverse contexts of civil society and the radical form of our natural condition (p. 118). Thus

he concludes that the laws of nature cannot be effective in the radical form of our natural condition because, though not all of morality is conventional, it all presupposes a background of convention.

Hobbes's account of the laws of nature, as he makes perfectly clear in *Leviathan* 15, is his moral philosophy: a philosophy of virtues and vices, of qualities of character rather than of rules. Ewin suggests that if we can remove the errors in Hobbes's account of the virtues—errors into which, from Ewin's viewpoint, he was led by his model of explanation—then perhaps we can escape the problem about the relationship between private and public judgment in Hobbes's moral theory (p. 144). Hobbes's moral theory, however, is not simply a virtues theory. It requires a rights theory to make it work. Hobbes argues that the laws of nature require the civil law, that is, the interpretation by the sovereign, if they are to be effective. Ewin considers that the main error was that Hobbes took as his model for the virtues self-interested people calculating the policies that would best serve their long-term interests. If Hobbes had not made that mistake, the author asserts, he need not have committed himself to the more excessive elements in his theory of sovereignty, and especially to the idea that public judgment must have unfettered rule over private judgment (p. 157). I think we actually cannot talk of an authentic virtues theory if virtues and vices are ordered to self-preservation as the supreme goal or value.

The last chapter before the conclusion is concerned with the virtues and the roles of reason. Reasoning, and the making of judgments in theoretical reasoning, play complex roles in virtues, but Ewin believes they do not play the role that they are given in Hobbes's model of explanation. That role is one of calculating policy in terms of one's interests. Hobbes's model is inadequate for the virtues. For Ewin, "that procedure is not one that could produce the virtues, let alone one that guarantees that they be produced" (p. 189).

The author's conclusion tells us that "the more that people recognize the basic truth in what Hobbes says, or the more that people have the virtues set out in the laws of nature, and treat each other in the appropriate manner, the less that we shall need a Hobbesian sovereign and the more capable that we shall be of having genuinely democratic communities" (p. 205). This seems to me an extremely optimistic view and, perhaps, an ingenuous way to force the conclusion that Hobbes actually was a virtue theorist.—María L. Lukac de Stier, *Instituto de Filosofía Práctica, Buenos Aires*.

GALSTON, William A. *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 354 pp. \$49.50—Galston's study of liberalism sets out to establish the autonomy of liberal political thinking from older, more traditional concepts of the good. The author attempts to anchor his discussion in the liberal political theories of Locke and Kant and in a critical assessment

of democratic socialists Ronald Dworkin, Judith Shklar, John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and Michael Walzer. Though the book is cluttered with name references, the strongest presences may be those that are unannounced. Galston's object brings to mind the postmodernist quest for a nonfoundationalist philosophy. Like nonfoundationalist ethical thinkers, Galston is looking for an immanentist interpretation of the good, which rests on self-enclosed and self-referring premises about the relative value of human actions. Individual self-realization, mutual respect of persons, and government by consent, are all concepts upon which his analysis turns. Another undisclosed point of reference for this book is Hans Blumenberg's *Über die Legitimität der Neuzeit*, a seminal exposition of the moral and intellectual autonomy of the modern age. Like Blumenberg, Galston is intent on showing that modernity, here identified with liberal society, can stand on its own philosophical feet. Those feet are individualistic but also fortified by utilitarian and neo-Kantian components, without the acknowledged admixture of preliberal legacies. Galston takes the need for a purely liberal ethic for a liberal society so seriously that he contends with radical democrat Jürgen Habermas for not taking it seriously enough. Unlike Galston, Habermas insists that democratic pluralism requires core values that do not derive entirely from liberalism. Significantly, neither thinker bothers to make much of a distinction between welfare state democrats and classical liberals. Economic collectivism is not seen as incompatible with the principle of individuality, providing the collectivist arrangements can be linked to individual interest.

This reviewer's reaction upon reading Galston is to wonder about the need for his work. Though intelligently written, it tells little about the world we inhabit or are likely to experience. Do people respect each other or at least desist from inflicting harm because they are guided by Galston's construction of an autonomous liberalism? The focusing of classical and medieval philosophers on ethical habits, and of nineteenth-century sociologists on the role of authority in their discussions of moral behavior, may provide a useful corrective to Galston's speculative theory. His attempt to prove that "liberalism contains within itself the resources it needs to declare and define a conception of the good and virtuous life" may be less intellectually and morally relevant than the counterthesis Galston rejects. Quite surprisingly, he names as the most compelling representatives of that alternative position the radical social engineer Habermas and the journalist Irving Kristol. Surely he could have found more able and more consistent modern exponents of historical continuity, starting with Burke and Hegel.—Paul Gottfried, *Elizabethtown College*.

GHINS, Michel. *L'inertie et l'espace-temps absolu de Newton à Einstein: une analyse philosophique*. Brussels: Palais des Académies, 1990. 238 pp. n.p.—It is no inconsiderable endeavor to undertake a philosophical analysis of the notions of inertia and absolute space from Newton to


Einstein. This is all the more so insofar as Ghins' approach is far from the orthodoxy of the logical empiricists: his claim is that the scientists themselves were seeking to attribute the effects of inertia to real causes, or, in other words, "to specify adequately the system or systems of reference relative to which motions, whether accelerated or not, would give rise or not to such effects" (p. 9). In terms of this causal point of view, he then defines the fundamental question as that of the determination of the inertial or noninertial character of a motion or of a reference system (p. 10).

The book is not meant for the casual reader, but rather for those who already possess some knowledge of the physics and the mathematics of the theories involved. It is generally accurate, although sometimes spotty in its survey of the development of the concepts. It is accompanied by an analysis of these concepts, which remains largely within a limited framework, constituted in large part by a division (chap. 1) of the senses in which space-time may be said to be absolute or relative. These senses are then later to be applied to various motions in order to determine the degree to which accepting the absolute or relative character of a motion involves adopting an absolute or relative conception of space-time, in some respect. The division itself is somewhat problematic, as are the definitions on which it is based, and this may be held responsible for many of the limitations of the philosophizing attempted in the book. The categories used are the following: the logical sense, the physical sense, the empirical sense, the ontological sense, and the mathematical sense. The reader will look in vain for any more fundamental questions on the very notions of space-time or inertia as a force, or of motion as an entity outside of any such framework. In this sense, the promised philosophical analysis turns out to be largely descriptive, rather than critical—although there is much effort made to return to the fundamental question, as Ghins sees it, each time some new theory is examined.

Chapter 2, on Newtonian and classical physical conceptions of space-time and inertia, is a bit weaker than the chapters on relativity. The positions of Newton, Leibniz, Euler, and classical mechanics are examined, before proceeding to a conclusion on the extent of the relationist objections of Leibniz and Mach.

Chapter 3, on electromagnetism and special relativity, puts much emphasis, quite naturally, on Minkowski's space-time. It ends with a most interesting and crucial examination of the question of the possible circularity of the definition of an inertial system in special relativity (pp. 129–34), which turns around Jon Dorling's claim (1978) that it is possible to determine whether a system is inertial by purely geometrical means.

Chapter 4 is on general relativity. The presentation of H. Weyl's and of Weinberg's positions are particularly interesting. These are followed by an analysis of the implications of Mach's position, followed by the problem of rotational motion in general relativity. In the closing part of this long and final chapter, we return to the question of the absolute or relative character of space-time, now in the context of Einstein's theory of gravitation. Finally, in a concluding note, the



author is forced to admit that in keeping with what was announced in the preface (p. 11), no formulation of the theory completely avoids circularity in the definitions of an inertial system. He then proposes that any solution to this problem must come from abolishing the local distinction between inertial and noninertial systems. Moreover, this would require that all forces be geometrized, perhaps by using a space of more than four dimensions. Many readers will be skeptical about such an approach, however, given its failures in the past, and will be looking to more sophisticated mathematical tools, or even to a completely different formulation of the problem itself. The book ends rather abruptly here, with no general conclusion or summary.—Warren Murray, *Université Laval*.

GÓMEZ-LOBO, Alfonso. *La ética de Sócrates*. Cuadernos de la Gaceta, vol. 56. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989. 186 pp. n.p.—Alfonso Gómez-Lobo seeks to unravel in this work the ethical doctrines truly taught by Socrates. Without venturing into the complexities of the “historical Socrates,” the author offers a brief treatment of the relation of the sources, indicating the problems which they pose and the bases on which he founds his study (pp. 14–28). Plato’s dialogues are evidently the most important ones, although Gómez-Lobo considers Aristotle’s testimony to be highly reliable; and to discern among the doctrines contained in the dialogues that which is authentically Socratic, he refers to this latter account. Aristotle’s major affirmations regarding Socrates are confirmed fully in the early Platonic dialogues and partially in the dialogues of the middle period.

For Socrates, as well as for Plato and Aristotle, an act may be considered ethically positive when it responds to the demands of practical reason, which in turn aims for the realization of man’s good. In consequence, Gómez-Lobo formulates the first principle of Socratic ethics as follows: “(P1) An act is rational if and only if such act pursues something good for the agent” (p. 30). In the mind of the ancient Greeks, the fullness of human good (*eudaimonia*) is determined by a set of publicly accepted criteria called *aretai* (pp. 31–2). Gómez-Lobo maintains that for Socrates, *eudaimonia* and the practice of the *aretai* proper to human beings are one and the same thing.

In the first chapter the author asks whether there is really something called Socratic ethics. Doubts arise as a result of the typical affirmation made by Socrates regarding his own ignorance. To overcome this difficulty, Gómez-Lobo examines with a keen analytical and philological sense some texts taken from the *Apology*. His study of Socratic irony leads to the conclusion that in the field of ethics the aforementioned affirmation should not be understood as one of radical ignorance, but rather as one expressing a permanent willingness to reexamine personal convictions (p. 53). Socrates’ recognition that he knows something morally relevant is due to the need to rationally justify decisions. The basic criteria for making the right decisions

are examined by the author in chapter 2. It is beyond doubt that for Socrates the *aretai* imply duties; but in his teachings the decisive notion is not that of duty but that of good. For this reason, Socratic ethics is not deontological, although neither is it teleological.

The third chapter is dedicated to the study of the criteria which justify Socrates' decision in the *Crito*. Gómez-Lobo formalizes these criteria into principles, the most significant of which is the following: "(P12a) Something is good for an agent if and only if it is morally right" (p. 95). The violation of these principles brings with it disastrous consequences for the polity. Far from being consequentialist, however, Socratic ethics affirms that it is the acts themselves and not their consequences that bear moral qualities (p. 88).

Chapters 4 and 5 present a sharp analysis of Socrates' discussion with Polus and Callicles in the *Gorgias*. Socrates' position runs counter to common belief, since he maintains that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it. The opposing doctrines which hold that the good life is one of pleasure and power are thereupon subjected to an unrelenting refutation (*elenchos*). Although a moral agent always seeks his own good, nevertheless, not all apparent goods are real. In his discussion with Callicles the uncertainty of whether goods such as pleasure and power are merely conventional, or something natural, comes to fore. Gómez-Lobo later inquires whether "Socrates searched for anything similar to a 'natural' foundation for his ethics with the end of providing it with a solid base" (p. 123). The early Platonic dialogues do not show any sign that Socrates ever tried to justify his moral principles directly (pp. 117-18). Nevertheless, in the *Gorgias* he already proposes an overtly metaphysical foundation based on the idea of an order that is both natural and universal. But if this idea is (as it seems) a principle of Pythagorean inspiration, then we cannot ascribe such a doctrine to the historical Socrates, and should instead think that it is a novelty introduced by Plato (pp. 138-9).

What, then, does the genuinely Socratic foundation of ethics consist in? Socrates highly values the logical consistency of the set of ethical propositions which an individual believes to be true (p. 144). In short, he professes a fundamental trust and confidence in human rationality. Despite the fact that human beings often err in determining the good, mistakes do not occur always nor does one err inevitably: people never cease to have a minimum of correct valuational beliefs (p. 145). The corruption of the human *ethos* hereby presents an invulnerable limit.—Alejandro Llano, *University of Navarre*.

HALPER, Edward C. *One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Central Books*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989. xl + 309 pp. \$48.50—This is the second volume (though the first to appear) of a three-volume study of one and many in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. It covers *Metaphysics* 6, 7, 8, and 9. Chapter 4 summarizes the results

of the textual analysis. Halper argues against three interpretations of form. (1) Against the view that form is individual, he presents texts showing the universality and knowability of form. Form is universal because it is one in formula. (2) Against the view that form is a kind of universal (a species-form or lowest-level universal), he presents texts which insist on the numerical unity of form. Form is individual because it is numerically one. (3) The view that form is neither universal nor individual does not square with the requirement that form be the cause of unity in a thing.

Halper's view is that form is both universal and individual. It is not that form is a universal or that form is an individual, but rather form possesses characteristics of universality (the unity in formula by which form serves as principle of becoming and of knowledge), and characteristics of individuality (the numerical unity by which form serves as principle of a thing's unity and being). So characterized, form resolves aporiai: whether the principles of things are their kinds or their constituents; whether the principles are the highest or the lowest genera; whether there is some principle apart from individuals; whether principles are one in number or one in species. Form breaks these aporiai by possessing seemingly contrary types of unity. Platonic Form was supposed to combine these types of unity, but failed to do so. Aristotle does not reject the notion of something's being both universal and particular; he intends his own forms to be exactly that. He does not change the Platonic requirements for principles; he meets them (p. 246).

This combination of types of unity is grounded in form's actuality. Actuality causes numerical unity in a composite by causing continuity between or among the material constituents. Actuality also makes form to be one in formula. Form is an actuality, and so it is without parts; it is numerically one and its formula is indivisible (p. 248). Actuality is the function in virtue of which a thing is what it is, a function which is also a capacity and which is its own end (pp. 249-50).

The problem of individuation is really two problems. If we ask for the principle that makes one composite different from other composites, the answer is matter; but if we ask for the principle of the composite's identity, the answer is form (p. 251). Of its own nature form individuates itself by a physical process. Form imitates pure actuality by manifesting itself in a plurality of instances. Reproduction, development, and plurality of composites are aspects of form's self-manifestation in matter. (How this works is a problem of physics, not strictly of metaphysics.) "From the perspective of form, individuals are merely vehicles for form's continued existence" (p. 252).

Halper's prose is clear, his argumentation forceful. His analytical Table of Contents, Glossary, Bibliography, and Index are helpful. Some readers may find that Halper makes the central books tidier than they actually are, and his Aristotle may strike some readers as too Platonic. But his proposals are grounded on meticulous textual analyses, and his interpretation of Aristotelian form merits the attention of every serious student.—Arthur Madigan, *Boston College*.

HEGEL, G. W. F. *The Encyclopedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*. Translated by Theodore F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1991. xlviii + 381 pp. Cloth, \$34.95; paper, \$14.95—The appearance of this translation is a major event in English-language Hegel studies, for it is more than simply a replacement for Wallace's translation *cum* paraphrase—long a subject of despairing, if not disparaging, comment. Hegel's Prefaces to each of the three editions of the *Enzyklopädie* are translated for the first time into English. There is a very detailed introduction on translating Hegel's German (35 pp.), which serves not only as a guide to the translators' usage, but also to Hegel's. Also included are a detailed bilingual annotated glossary, very extensive bibliographic and interpretive notes to Hegel's text (28 pp.), an index of references for works cited in the notes, a select bibliography of recent works on Hegel's *Logic*, and a detailed index (16 pp.).

The translation is guided by the (correct) principle that rendering Hegel's logical thought clearly and consistently requires rendering his technical terms *logically*. This requires using as many parallel technical terms as possible, but it also requires some inventiveness, for there are several important technical terms in Hegel's *Logic* that notoriously have no counterparts in any other logic. *Aufhebung* is rendered as "sublation." In his Minority Comments on Terminology, Suchting points out how artificial this is, but I agree with the majority policy on this translation. (Suchting makes a valiant case that "suspension" serves the need, but the negative connotations, for example, suspended licenses, are too strong in English.) *Allgemeine*, *Besondere*, and *Einzelne* are translated by "universal," "particular," "singular" (not "individual"). This is a wise choice, given Hegel's view that every individual combines aspects of each of these three logical moments. *Wesen* is translated as "essence." This is often both good and necessary, but there are many occasions when Hegel avails himself of the Aristotelian flavor of *Wesen* as referring to a single being with an essence. Suchting is right that consistently rendering Hegel's term leads to distorting Hegel's meaning. For example, God is the "supremely real essence" (§36Z) (I use "Z" for *Zusatz* to avoid any confusion of "A" with *Anmerkung*) and man is a "rational essence" (§82Z). He suggests footnoting the German term when needed. There is another alternative: cuing the relevant German term with a subscripted suffix; referring to an extant individual, *Wesen* could be rendered as "being_w." *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* also present problems, since English only has one word. The translators make two words out of one by hyphenating "ob-ject" to translate *Gegenstand*. This is cumbersome. While it does work, a subscript would be simpler (object_g).

Hegel's use of the term *Dasein* presents particular problems. Harris and Geraets are right that "determinate being" is an awkward and misleading translation of *Dasein*. They instead use "thereness," "being-there," "what is there," and (occasionally) "way of being." "Thereness" is awkward English, but it does have the merit of

conveying the very undeveloped concept Hegel designates as *Dasein*. Suchting is right, however, that many of Hegel's uses of *Dasein* are nontechnical, and that consistently translating this term as "thereness" leads occasionally to horrid results, for example, "Does thereness belong to God?" (§28Z), or the "judgment of thereness" (§172), or "a *Beyond* that can only have its place and thereness in the subjective understanding" (§38R). I agree almost always with Suchting's minority comments, especially with his view that nontechnical uses of a term require colloquial translation, perhaps with footnotes. His points of dissent are footnoted, and I recommend consulting his comments.

I must take strong exception to one translation. *Entäußerung* is translated as "uttering" or, occasionally with respect to God, "self-emptying." Utterances are speech acts. The vast majority of forces do not speak, though it is acceptable English to say that forces are expressed. Yet we repeatedly read about "force and its utterance" (for example, §§21Z, 28Z, 136) and "the uttering of the concept" (§177). This is awkward and seriously misleading, especially now when there are so many variants and proponents of the view, strongly opposed by Hegel, that the nature of reality is a function of our language.

Having said this much, I must insist that these are points of translation one can live with. Bearing the translators' policies in mind allows one to read this translation readily. It is very exact, and where the translation diverges from the original, or involves interpolation, the original is given in footnotes. Wallace's translation is renowned for fluidity, but if one reads it for comprehension (which students must do, even if their teachers know the original), and one is honest, one must constantly ask, What could this possibly be rendering? It is a significant merit of the present translation that this question rarely arises. When it did arise for this reader, I found that the translation accurately reflected the peculiarities of Hegel's German. The text is clearly, if compactly, printed and well bound. The price makes it affordable for students. This ought immediately to become the standard translation of this important work.—Kenneth R. Westphal, *University of New Hampshire*.

HYMAN, Arthur, ed. *Maimonidean Studies*. Volume 1. New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1990. 264 pp. n.p.—This new annual series devoted to the greatest medieval Jewish scholar is fitting recognition both of its subject and of the lively state and high quality of contemporary Maimonides scholarship. Edited by the distinguished historian of medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy, Arthur Hyman, the *Studies* will feature essays on Maimonides' contributions to Jewish law and Jewish philosophy; their rabbinic, Hellenistic, and Islamic sources; as well as their influence on later Jewish, Latin, and early Modern thought. It will also carry articles on Maimonides' writings on biblical exegesis, medicine, and science; historical essays on

Maimonides as a communal leader; essays on his family, his environment, and era; the Maimonidean controversies; and linguistic studies of his Hebrew and Arabic.

This first volume is good evidence of both the range of subjects the *Studies* will address and the high quality of its essays. Of ten papers, two (both in Hebrew) are on legal topics. Another, by Joel Kraemer, presents in translation two letters by Maimonides (preserved in the Cairo Genizah) which help fill in our relatively meager biographical knowledge of their author's role as a communal leader. Paul Fenton presents (in Arabic and in English translation) and discusses selections from a commentary on selected portions of *Prophets*, written by Maimonides' father-in-law R. Hanan'el ben Semu'el, who with Maimonides' descendants founded a sufi-influenced pietist circle; and it was in the direction of pietism that Maimonideanism developed in Egypt. The volume concludes with a bibliography (prepared by David Lachterman) of Maimonides scholarship in English and major European languages from 1950-1986. (A bibliography of Hebrew writings will appear in volume 2 of the *Studies*.)

The remaining six papers in the *Studies* exemplify recent trends in the study of Maimonides' philosophy. Sarah Klein-Braslavy takes the approach that Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed* is primarily a work of philosophical scriptural exegesis; her paper reviews in detail Maimonides' references to Solomon and Solomonic scriptures (for example, *Proverbs* and *Ecclesiastes*) to show how Maimonides uses them to articulate and justify his own views concerning the proper methods of studying esoteric texts on metaphysical topics.

The one topic in Maimonides' philosophy that has attracted the most attention in recent years is Maimonides' view of the limitations of human knowledge. Charles Manekin enters this debate with his paper which presents a good rational reconstruction of Maimonides' conceptions of belief and certainty, which Manekin then uses to argue that Maimonides' account of divine (including negative) attributes, far from being skeptical, is meant to provide the philosopher with a way of forming representational beliefs about the deity that are certain. Another trend in recent years has been the investigation of the history of interpretations of the *Guide*. In this vein Eliezer Schweid contributes a learned, critical account of the debate over the *Guide* between Julius Guttman and Leo Strauss earlier in this century.

The last group of essays exemplify the comparative study of Maimonides with other medieval Jewish philosophers. Daniel Lasker shows Maimonides' (surprising) influence on late Karaite theories of prophecy and law—an influence which he argues contributed to the rapprochement between late Karaism and the Rabbinism to which Maimonides subscribed. Tamar Rudavsky compares Maimonides' Aristotelian theory of time with Crescas's subjectivist conception with an eye toward the implications for their respective theories of creation. Finally, Seymour Feldman's essay (which, with Manekin's, is the most philosophically sophisticated in the volume) shows the enduring influence of the Kalam on medieval Jewish philosophy by closely ana-

lyzing Isaac Abravanel's fifteenth-century reformulation of Kalamic arguments for creation in reaction to their critique by Maimonides.

This first volume amply demonstrates that we should welcome and support the arrival of *Maimonidean Studies* on the philosophical scene.—Josef Stern, *The University of Chicago*.

JANSSENS, Jules L. *An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sina (1970–1989) Including Arabic and Persian Publications and Turkish and Russian References*. Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, series 1, vol. 13. Leuven: University Press, 1991. xxviii + 358 pp. 2,100 BFr—This expensive but elegant volume offers an extensive bibliography concerning editions and translations (chap. 1); bibliography (chap. 2); biography (chap. 3); UNESCO-MILLENNARY various publications (chap. 4); general studies in philosophy (chap. 5); logic and epistemology (chap. 6); linguistics, terminology, and poetry (chap. 7); psychology and paedagogics (chap. 8); politics and ethics (chap. 9); metaphysics (chap. 10); religious themes and mysticism (chap. 11); sources (Greek) (chap. 12); Ibn Sina and other Arabic thinkers (chap. 13); influences (chap. 14); sciences (chap. 15); medicine (chap. 16); and varia (chap. 17), which includes unexpected studies such as those on the postage stamps on Avicenna by G. Farid, on the morphology of Avicenna's skull by S. Kansu, and on the influence of Bishop Caramè's translation of one of Avicenna's metaphysical texts on Ezra Pound by M. Little.

The striking features of this bibliography are its completeness, its accuracy, and its annotations. Many items are provided with a fairly detailed summary and a brief appraisal. These annotations are priceless.

Consultation is very easy since the title page of each chapter indicates its subdivisions as well as eventual cross references. Items are numbered in each subdivision. The authors' index refers to the chapter and subdivision followed by the number of the item.

This painstaking and thorough work is a model of accuracy and patience. This is bibliographical scholarship at its best and ought to grace the shelves of any college or university seriously interested in the Arabic and Persian Ibn Sina, or the Latin Avicenna, or both. One can only hope that the author will have the opportunity to realize his wish to update it regularly (p. xv).—Thérèse-Anne Druart, *The Catholic University of America*.

KIRMMSE, Bruce. *Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. xi + 558 pp. \$35.00—This book is a tour de force in intellectual history. Kirmmse has brilliantly

unearthed and synthesized the diverse social, political, ethical, and religious background of nineteenth-century Denmark from the onset of agrarian reforms to the shift from absolute monarchy to constitutional government. Kirmmse provides interesting chapters on such Golden Age cultural figures as Oehlenschläger, Mynster, Heiberg, Martensen, Grundtvig, Clausen, and others, and the romantic, Hegelian, elitist, populist themes and tensions elicited from their respective views. My brief review cannot possibly do justice to the elaborate historical detail and interpretation found in Kirmmse's book.

I found the chapter on J. P. Mynster a veritable gem, particularly Kirmmse's often bitterly humorous rendition of Mynster's defense of Adam Oehlenschläger's Jesus-Nature poem. Kirmmse also nicely recounts the Grundtvig-Clausen feud over the question of the custodianship of culture. Grundtvig was a populist, while the liberal Clausen favored a supply-side form of noblesse oblige. The liberals favored a restricted form of universal (male) suffrage (a "royal twenty-five percent") to counterbalance any misguided voting by peasant riffraff. But Kirmmse's perceptive historical eye uncovers therein some alleged ideological distinction without difference. When Clausen lost to the peasant Hans Hansen in the Praesto district election of 1848 to the Constitutional Assembly, this event proved too unsettling even for Grundtvig. Both the liberals and Grundtvigians smeared Hansen, forcing his resignation; into the breach stepped candidate Grundtvig to win the reelection, showing himself more mandarin than populist. When the radical liberal, Orla Lehmann, lost an election to a local peasant in Bornholm, the liberal shibboleth of equality before the law was hermeneutically nuanced to mean a meritocracy-based equality. Even the radical liberals wanted the guidance of public affairs to reside with the talented, the wealthy, and the well-educated—hardly a radical break with the Golden Age conservative mainstream.

In the second part of the book, "Denmark's Kierkegaard," Kirmmse carefully analyzes Kierkegaard's post-postscript literature and attempts to unravel his political philosophy. Overall, Kierkegaard is not a conservative or an antimajoritarian, but basically an upholder of "egalitarian individualism." On the ethico-religious level, Kierkegaard is a prioritarian, maintaining the Matthewian injunction to seek first the Kingdom of God and all else will be given to you (in contrast to Grundtvig's admonition of "first the human, then the Christian"), and wrestling with all the dialectical tensions that ensue (sometimes with vacillation) involving the role of apostleship, martyrdom, and community. Kirmmse provides an excellent dissection of *A Literary Review*, *Edifying Discourse*, *Works of Love*, *The Crisis* and *A Crisis in the Life of an Actress*, *Christian Discourses*, *Training in Christianity*, and so forth.

Kierkegaard wanted no part with any coterie, the numerical, the crowd, or the bourgeois philistinism of the Oehlenschläger-Mynster group or the Heiberg-Martensen alliance. The genuine Christian perspective accentuates the category of the individual: a self forged by suffering and grace through the God-relationship. Kierkegaard was also suspicious of any Rousseauian "general will" approach to

politics or any form of "worldly shrewdness." Instead Kierkegaard advocated simple human honesty. The "Unconditioned" provides the limit of the post-1848 new representative democracy. Kierkegaard inverts Feuerbach, maintaining that it is anthropology that becomes theology: "the religious is eternity's transformed rendering of the fairest dream of politics." That is, humanity flourishes and is perfected via religion. Accordingly, it is quixotic to seek human equality solely in the political realm, and by so failing to draw boundaries, to engage in the "acoustic illusion" that conflates *vox populi* with *vox dei*.

In his later "attack" literature (which Kirmmse surprisingly seems to impugn as "rabble rousing"), Kierkegaard becomes the auditor of Christendom, informing it of its bankruptcy. I am uncertain that Kirmmse is correct in claiming that Kierkegaard holds that Christianity has no positive contributions to make to socio-political life. I would think that there need be no radical dualism between the affairs of Jerusalem and Babylon, as some either/or's can be both/and's. Politics and religion are not so compartmentalized that "there are no positive inferences of political content to be made from Christianity" (p. 448). Of course, politics would gain immeasurably in any "present age" if people adopted Kierkegaard's beseeched-for human honesty, cast off the masks of self-deception, and admitted that "the task of life is precisely to be reformed, because every person is a born hypocrite by nature."—John Donnelly, *University of San Diego*.

KULSTAD, Mark. *Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection*. Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1991. 183 pp. DM 98—This book is an exemplary study of a relatively narrow yet critically important part of Leibniz's thought. It is organized around two main axes. First, Kulstad offers a careful analysis of the concepts of apperception, consciousness, and reflection as they occur throughout Leibniz's philosophy, with particular emphasis on the *New Essays* and their relation to parallel themes in Locke. Second, he explores the connection between these concepts and Leibniz's attempt to establish a demarcation between the mental activity of animals and that of humans. Ideally, Leibniz's treatment of apperception should suggest how such a boundary can be drawn. In Kulstad's view, Leibniz succeeds in this to a considerable degree, although there remain underlying tensions which serve to complicate Leibniz's position.

Chapter 1 lays out the basic lines of the problem. According to the "standard view," the concepts of apperception, consciousness, and reflection are equivalent for Leibniz and indicative of the distinction between human souls (or spirits) and the lesser souls of beasts. Beasts, on this reading, perceive, but they do not apperceive (or exhibit reflexive knowledge of) those perceptions. Against this view, Kulstad adduces several texts where Leibniz clearly assigns a capacity for apperception to beasts. It is representative of the care of his

treatment that Kulstad does not claim these texts to be decisive, but instead sketches several alternative interpretations, including his own view that Leibniz distinguishes two kinds of apperception: one based on "simple" reflection, which is common to beasts and humans; the other involving "focused" reflection, or reflection on what is properly speaking "in us," which belongs only to humans.

Chapter 2 traces the development of Leibniz's position on these topics from the late 1660s through his correspondence with Arnauld. Leibniz is shown to adopt early on a distinction between perception or mental action on the one hand, and consciousness or reflection on the other. The latter operation is conceived as a form of memory: "all consciousness or reflection is a sensing that we have sensed" (pp. 64-5). With regard to the mental activity of animals, Leibniz's view evolves through several stages. Starting from a broadly Aristotelian position which recognizes sensitive souls in animals, he briefly embraces the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are simple mechanisms, before returning to a version of the earlier position. In his correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz maintains that beasts are endowed with "animal feeling" or sensation, but not consciousness or reflection.

As a prelude to his examination of the *New Essays*, Kulstad turns in chapter 3 to Locke's treatment of consciousness and reflection. After a painstaking survey of possible readings, he concludes that Locke adopts no one consistent position in his *Essay*, but instead vacillates under the influence of two competing tendencies: one which leads him to identify reflection with consciousness of mental operations (thereby upholding the empiricist maxim that all ideas are derived from sensation and reflection), the other which leads him to distinguish reflection as a higher form of perception that produces clear and distinct ideas of the operations of the mind. In chapter 4, the centerpiece of the book, Kulstad confronts the *New Essays* themselves. His novel reading of this work stresses the presence of two distinct species of apperception, here characterized as apperception of what is "outside of us" (external things, sensory images), and apperception of what is "in us." The scope of the latter extends beyond the immediate objects of reflection (the soul, its properties and operations) to include also those innate ideas and principles which are formed from these by abstraction and composition. Again, the implication is that Leibniz's theory of apperception contains the resources to define a type of consciousness appropriate to animal souls, while at the same time reserving intellection for spirits.

A final chapter focuses on §4 of the *Principles of Nature and of Grace*, a late text which many have read as supporting the view that animals lack apperception. On the basis of the drafts of this essay, Kulstad shows that this apparent relapse on Leibniz's part occurs only in the final version of the text; earlier versions suggest a position much like that of the *New Essays*. Given the nature of this essay—a popular summary of his system designed in part to win the approval of the influential circle of the Duc d'Orléans—it is tempting to infer that Leibniz may have deliberately blunted the force of his position here in order to bring it more in line with orthodox Cartesianism.

Kulstad, however, draws a more cautious conclusion, seeing signs of a genuine uncertainty on Leibniz's part as to how best to proceed. In this, he is perhaps a little too cautious. While some unclarity remains in Leibniz's attitude towards the role of reflection in beasts, the evidence of his later writings strongly favors the position that beasts possess a type of apperception. Thanks to Kulstad's skillful analysis it is now possible to say much more precisely how this concept figures in Leibniz's attempts to define a boundary between animal souls and rational spirits.—Donald Rutherford, *Emory University*.

LOWE, E. J. *Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. vi + 210 pp. \$39.95—This book is an extended reflection on a basic but far-reaching claim: "There are no 'bare' particulars" (p. 3). Because "individuals are necessarily individuals of a kind," Lowe argues, "realism with regard to particulars or individuals . . . implies realism with regard to sorts or kinds" (p. 5). A "sortal" concept (a label which Lowe borrows from John Locke) is "a concept of a distinct sort or kind of individuals" (p. 1). Lowe's purpose in this book is to examine the meaning and implications of sortal concepts, and to challenge relativist conceptions of identity and reductivist strategies in metaphysics.

Since the meaning of any given sortal concept depends on some criterion of identity for individuals of that sort, Lowe begins his argument by discussing sortal terms and criteria of identity (chap. 2). A criterion of identity is a semantic rule which specifies, in an informative way, "what it takes for x and y to be the same or different" (p. 16). While the criterion of identity associated with a given sort may make use of the notion of identity itself, the criterion can be informative "by alluding to the identity of things of another sort or sorts" (p. 20). This, of course, raises the further question: Must we acknowledge an infinite regress of criteria of identity for sorts, or is there some "basic" sort whose criterion of identity cannot be expressed in terms of any other sort? Lowe leans towards the latter of these two options, suggesting that the requisite basic sort may be that of "person" (to be discussed later in the book).

Lowe turns next to the meaning of individuals and sorts, and the instantiation relation between them (chap. 3). He suggests the following: " X is an *individual* if and only if X is an instance of something Y (other than itself) and X itself has no instances (other than itself). X is a *sort* if and only if there is something Y such that Y is an instance of X and Y is distinct from X " (p. 38). This definition, while clearly distinguishing between individuals and sorts, also allows for the possibility of one sort instantiating another, as in the relation of species to genus. Contrary to reductivist metaphysics, the meaning of "individual" here (and thus the difference between "individual" and "sort") depends upon the indivisibility of *reference*, rather than upon *material* indivisibility.

Lowe's next move is to defend the absolutist conception of identity against the relativist position of P. T. Geach (chap. 4). According to the absolutist conception of identity, "an individual of one sort or kind cannot also belong to another sort or kind with a different criterion of identity from that of the first" (p. 53). Lowe's critical response to Geach proceeds by way of a *reductio* argument: if we were to say that some individual x belonged to two different kinds, and that these two kinds had different criteria of identity (and thus different conditions of persistence), then we would be laying ourselves open to "the intolerable possibility that circumstances should arise in which [we] would be obliged to say that x both *did* and *did not* cease to exist" (pp. 56-7).

Lowe strengthens his case against the relativity of identity by arguing for the necessity of acknowledging a distinctive "is" of constitution (chap. 5). As Lowe states, putative examples of the relativity of identity arise only where the sortal terms in question are conceived as having different criteria of identity associated with them (for example, when one wants to identify "river" and "water"); however, the putative identification of individuals having different criteria of identity seems plausible only when one (mistakenly) conflates the distinctive "is" of constitution with some other sense of "is." To summarize, the relativity of identity would imply the possibility of identifying two individuals falling under two different kinds, where both (a) these two kinds have different criteria of identity associated with them, and (b) the identification of the two individuals in question does not rest on the equivocal use of "is." As Lowe argues, however, the identity relativist cannot have it both ways.

After having laid the foundations for antireductivist metaphysics and an absolutist view of identity, Lowe begins to apply his principles to some disputed questions. Concerning the relation of parts to whole, Lowe argues that one can distinguish between three different kinds of wholes (aggregates, collectives, and integrates), and that some wholes, but not all, are distinct from any sum of their parts (chap. 6). Turning to the fascinating and complex issue of personhood, Lowe argues that persons are neither identical with, nor constituted by, the physical entities in which they are embodied; in fact, since a "person" is probably not constituted by anything at all, it is most likely that the sortal term "person" is unanalyzable and "basic" (chap. 7). Discussing the role of sorts in nomological generalizations, Lowe argues that the assertion of scientific laws commits us to some version of realism with regard to sorts; Lowe himself is most sympathetic to Aristotelian realism, according to which sorts are distinct but not separable from their individual instances (chap. 8). In the penultimate chapter, Lowe articulates the revisions which would have to be implemented if orthodox formal logic is to accommodate dispositional predicates with sortal terms in subject position (which are ineliminable, on Lowe's view) (chap. 9). Finally, Lowe addresses the difficult problem of the analysis of sentences containing semantically complex sortal terms (chap. 10). Carefully argued and well written, this study will be a challenge to anyone who wants to deny that "there are no

'bare' particulars," as well as to anyone who has paid lip service to this claim without thinking through its far-reaching implications.—Michael Baur, *The Catholic University of America*.

MARGA, Andrei. *Rationalitate, comunicare, argumentare*. Cluj: Dacia, 1991. 327 pp. 99lei—Marga is the Dean of the school of philosophy at the University of Cluj, and his study seems to mark an interesting change in Romanian philosophy. In the last sixty or seventy years philosophy had been in that part of the world primarily Platonic, Hegelian, or existentialist, with an undisguised suspicion towards technological and rationalist orientations. There are a number of signs that the almost exclusive commitment to idealist modes of argument is being replaced in Romania by a much more diverse intellectual landscape.

Marga describes himself as a neopragmatist in the tradition of Peirce, James, and Dewey. His option seems grounded on two main foundations. One is that pragmatism, more than other discourses, can provide underpinnings and justifications for democratic, individualist, and rational modes of socio-political organization. The other is that overly comprehensive idealist doctrines (in the Hegelian and Platonic mold) lead to incomplete or distorted relationships to reality. In the specific circumstances of Eastern Europe (and particularly of Romania), Marga contends, these grounds are good enough to impel a pragmatic reconstruction of philosophy.

Marga does not propose a simple return to James, however. His book, which is filled with references and sometimes even comes to resemble an extended collection of review articles, filters neopragmatism through analytical philosophy, and particularly approves of the objective realism of Hilary Putnam. Marga also carefully confronts his own views with alternative positions, such as those of Habermas, Noica, or Sloterdijk. His conclusion is that while rationalism must remain the intimate core and the guiding force of any historical progress and of any modernizing process, it must also be qualified in a great many ways. The aporias of rationality ought to be, he says, the preeminent topic of contemporary philosophy. A purely instrumental and analytical understanding of reason is dated and useless, Marga concludes. Pragmatic consequentialism ("ideas have consequences"), the theory of communication and argument, and an understanding of social interaction (in the broadest sense, mythical projections and religious images also belong here, Marga admits) must shape and modify this kind of central rationalism.

Marga's work is interesting in two ways at least: first because it suggests certain historical changes in Eastern European thinking, that is, a renewed respect for empirical and rational approaches and a desire to search for the most adequate instruments in dealing with the world. Implicit here, and not insignificant in my opinion, is the fact that Eastern Europe intellectuals are still firmly convinced that

philosophical options do make a difference and should be treated with due gravity. Second, it incorporates a wealth of nuances, combinations, and unexpected partial syntheses of Western-generated ideas with some original qualifications and certainly with specific readings of major modern texts. While Marga's book is not devoid of some strongly personal judgments and pleasing theoretical surprises, I believe it should be noted primarily as an enormously solid, earnest, and erudite, applicative effort.—Virgil Nemoianu, *The Catholic University of America*.

MCMULLIN, Ernan. *The Inference That Makes Science*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1992. 112 pp. n.p.—This is the 1992 Marquette Aquinas lecture, the fifty-third in a distinguished series sponsored by the Wisconsin Alpha Chapter of Phi Sigma Tau. Though presented as a lecture, it is clearly the outline of a project that draws upon Ernan McMullin's considerable knowledge of the history of the philosophy of science and his realistic assessment of contemporary scientific inquiry. His is a large canvas and he admittedly paints with wide brush strokes. His major thesis, contra the positivism that lingers in some quarters, is that nothing other than a realist philosophy of science will enable one to make sense of contemporary natural science. A very literal reading of Aristotle leads him to distance himself from the Stagirite in certain respects, but McMullin's is fundamentally an Aristotelian analysis of science. To have science is not merely to know what is given in experience and codified in laws of nature, but to have an explanation of the given in terms of its proper causes. It is not enough to know that copper is malleable, conducts electricity, takes on a certain hue under such and such circumstances, and has a melting point of 1083 degrees centigrade. To have scientific knowledge of a material which has been used since antiquity is to know why it has these properties. Such knowledge is not obtained by simple observation, but is gained by the inference which leads to the postulation of an unobserved structure. McMullin believes that empiricists in the tradition of Bacon, Hume, and Mill are hard pressed to explain the inferential leap from observed effect to inferred cause. In passing he notes, "Though Bacon is trying very hard to separate himself from the Aristotelian tradition, one can still catch echoes of [Aristotle's] *epagoge*" (p. 72). Reviewing Mill's logic of science, McMullin observes that at the same time Mill was writing that causal relations hold only between observables, "the growing reliance of natural scientists on non-inductive inference to and from observables was leading to dramatic advances in fields like optics, chemistry and theory of gases" (p. 77).

McMullin is convinced that the empiricist can never feel at ease with theoretical terms which refer to unobserved structures. The empiricist has gone to great lengths to contrive devices such as "correspondence rules" to get around the hard fact that theoretical

constructs are not of the same order as empirical laws. Science is not simply description and prediction as the empiricist would have it. Science produces explanations of the given in terms of that which is not given except by way of causal inference.

McMullin employs the term "retroduction" to explain the complex processes of modern theory construction and its testing. Retroduction is the ongoing inferential process characteristic of modern science that includes deduction, induction, and abduction. Induction seeks the correlation between variables. It provides the so called laws of nature. But laws are the explananda; they are questions, not answers. "Taking the observed regularity as effect, one seeks by abduction a causal hypothesis which will explain. . . . The inference here is therefore not the abduction alone, which is still a conjecture; it is the entire process of abduction, deduction, observational testing, and whatever else goes into the complex procedure of theory appraisal" (p. 91). Science, of necessity, is communal activity and is open-ended. That the perfect or complete explanation is in many cases apt to remain a goal does not, however, belie the validity of the partial insight gained. As Aristotle might have put it, we know the natures of things through their behavior, and we can predict their future activity on the basis of insight gained into their natures.

Given McMullin's clarity and straightforwardness, this slim volume is apt to become a valuable teaching aid to those charged with introducing students to the philosophy of science.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

MORAVCSIK, Julius M. *Thought and Language*. The Problems of Philosophy: Their Past and Present. New York: Routledge, 1990. ix + 283 pp. \$35.00—In accordance with the aims of the series in which this book appears, Moravcsik treats of ontology, thought, and language, twice: once, in Part 1, in order to set out the problems and trace their history, both ancient and modern; and again, in Part 2, in order to present his own views on the issues.

In his first pass at ontology, Moravcsik considers several etiolations of the fundamental questions that are especially pertinent to his later treatments of thought and language: What exists (is real)? and, What is it to exist (be real)? Thus, we are presented with the contrasts between universals and particulars, between events and material objects, and between realism and skepticism concerning the modal notions of possibility and necessity. These last notions are shown to be involved in principles of individuation for various kinds of things—and in particular, in their persistence conditions. Thus, humans may undergo certain changes and still exist; but humans cannot take on characteristics of numbers. Here, as elsewhere, Moravcsik provides numerous informative sketches of the immediate philosophical past: of Quines' views of modality and ontological commitment, and of Strawson's linkage of ontological priority with supposed identificational dependency, for example.

Moravcsik's own ontological commitments are generous and abundant in that he holds that universals are as fundamental a category as particulars, events as fundamental as material bodies, and that the distinction between universals and particulars requires realism about modalities. Much of this is persuasively defended. There is, for example, an illuminating account of the spatio-temporal structure of bodies and events.

Moravcsik's most fundamental thesis about thought is that humans are basically "explanation-seeking and puzzlement-removing creatures" (p. 49). Thus, the fundamental unit of cognition is explanations of various scope, which do, however, include the more often studied unit of belief. Unfortunately we do not, at present, seem to be in a position to say anything very positive and specific about such notions as understanding and belief. Certain contemporary theories are criticized as unwarrantedly restrictive. Thus, behaviorism urges us to stay as close to surface observability as we can, foregoing the kind of "deep" account we may need to understand our understanding of language or mathematics. Similarly, the functionalist rules out certain kinds of discoveries about the relations between the objects of thought and human physiology by identifying the objects of thought with ways of specifying functional states. More generally, any kind of naturalism is seen as undefended prejudice about what form our theories may take. Key notions of cognition are best construed as ontologically indeterminate. Belief and thought are regarded as complexes which include a certain object, agency, and felt experience—which exert a mutual logical influence on each other analogous to Gricean elements of a sense. The "objects" of thought take on a special importance because, *inter alia*, thoughts are individuated in terms of their objects.

Moravcsik's treatment of language is guided by the Aristotelian triad of thought, language, and reality; the relations between them; and his conception of mankind as *homo explanans*. This orientation leads him to propose a "lexical" theory, so called because of its connection with the linguist's lexicon. Roughly, it is stated thus: "To know the meaning of a word 'w' is to have a representation of that in virtue of which something counts as a *w*: hence to have a rough explanatory scheme for *w*'s" (p. 215). In practice, Moravcsik gives lengthy characterizations of such words as "bird," "university," and "gentle," in terms of four factors: ontological category, and differentiating conditions such as individuation principles, function, and causation or agency. Some readers may quibble with Moravcsik's emphases regarding language. Does not, for example, Grice's distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning deserve much greater attention? The author does, however, provide at least sketches of major contemporary views of language, including those of Frege, Kripke, Putnam, and Grice.—David Welker, *Temple University*.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *Unmodern Observations*. Edited, with an Introduction by William Arrowsmith. Translated by William Arrowsmith

et al. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. xix + 402 pp. \$40.00—The volume under review brings together new translations of the young Nietzsche's four published *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* (1873–76) and, from his contemporary literary leftovers (*Nachlass*), a portion commonly called "Wir Philologen," here translated, rightly enough, "We Classicists." The latter is an important gift to the English-speaking student of Nietzsche since (1) it starts, as the only previous translation could not, with the leftovers as chronologically ordered by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari; (2) it is fully annotated, in some places beyond Colli/Montinari; and (3) it is introduced by Arrowsmith so as to highlight Nietzsche's struggle with the classicists (and hence also with his younger self).

The latter helps us understand the former four anew. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche tells us that all those of his good books which precede *Zarathustra* lead to it and to the Nietzsche who became who he was—a destiny, he says. Toward these twined ends, even the four "observations" make their contribution. Thus, his polemical destruction of D. F. Strauss showed he was no Jack of dreams, as Hamlet was accused of being, and that his success confirmed Stendhal's advice to a young man: enter society with a duel. At the time, however, Nietzsche did not know Stendhal, and had already been destroyed in a duel by another young man, Dr. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, whose criticism of his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), although answered by Erwin Rohde, sullied Nietzsche's reputation for philology. Moreover, while Nietzsche seems to have destroyed Strauss, he did not secure success for himself. Upon the publication of the author's first "observation," the *geehrter Bürgermeister und bunte Dichter* Gottfried Keller in Zurich confided to a friend that he foresaw trouble for the author.

What Nietzsche's elder colleague at Basel, Jacob Burckhardt, thought of his second observation, on history, in which he (Burckhardt) is a veiled subject and the chief veiled addressee, is hard to say. Nietzsche mentions Burckhardt only once, but we cannot tell whether he classes him antiquarian, or monumental, or perhaps even critical—only that the reader is provoked to wonder. Burckhardt must have. Although when news of the burning of the Louvre by the Communards reached Basel in 1871, Burckhardt may have sought out the author to commiserate with him, we have it on the later authority of Franz Overbeck that behind the reserve in Burckhardt's letters the writer trembled; but whether at the publication of his own unacknowledged thoughts, or at their publication without his veil of scholarship, irony, and moderation, it is hard to say.

In any case, the moderation the young Nietzsche may have showed in his failing to complete his series of lectures on "The Future of Our Educational Institutions" was not moderate enough. If Nietzsche had not had tenure upon arrival at Basel, he might never have been offered it. He got it on the strength of his philology and the recommendation of the renowned philologist Ritschl: "Whatever he wants to do he will be able to do." Feeling that strength in himself, Nietzsche applied for a professorship in philosophy. He was politely rebuffed.

Had he been granted it, he might never have become a philosopher. One of things Nietzsche's *amor fati* means is that a philosopher gains more from his failures than other men gain from their successes. It is similar with his thoughts—there too, he gains more than his readers, let alone his nonreaders. Verily, *tunc bene navigavi cum naufragium feci*.

Arrowsmith's faithful translation of "We Classicists" is important for another reason. In his later criticism of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche revealed that he had never mentioned the most important matter. "We Classicists" confirms this; in it will be found a continual struggle with Christianity, much criticism and yet some praise. Both the criticism and praise must be reckoned with in appreciating the celebration of Apollo and Dionysus in that rhapsody, for although Nietzsche clearly contrasts pagan tragic religion to Christian redemptive religion, still, the dying Dionysus is the classical god closest to Christ. In *Zarathustra* he will be the god whom Zarathustra thinks so much about that he refuses to use his name when referring to him. In his last letter Nietzsche himself summed up the path he had taken away from philology, from Basel, and from Burckhardt, when he wrote to Burckhardt: "Lieber Herr Professor, zuletzt wäre ich sehr viel lieber Basler Professor als Gott; aber ich habe es nicht gewagt, meinen Privat-Egoismus so weit zu treiben, um seinetwegen die Schaffung der Welt zu unterlassen."

The translations, by three different hands, differ. The one of the "History" essay is inferior in exactness to the Peter Preuss translation (Hackett), which also concedes nothing to short-winded, shallow-chested modernity which, as Nietzsche complained, cannot articulate a long, complex sentence and so must chop it up into simples (which concession Arrowsmith anomalously defends). If Preuss were to translate the other three, up to the level already achieved, he would deserve the tetrathalon medal in "unmodern" translation. As a group the extant Hollingdale translations are as worthy, except for the one of the Strauss piece. Here Herbert Golder has had the daring to translate the section of this essay in which Nietzsche criticizes the writing of Strauss in philological detail. It was a no-win task. Since it is truly impossible, you are vulnerable to any B.A.-lite faultfinder, but he has done it well, and it was worth doing; for Nietzsche, the only great writer to have taught writing explicitly (to Lou Salomé, to Reinhardt von Seydlitz), is here thrashing a brazenly bad pupil, which is instructive to others. (All great writers teach by example; here Nietzsche teaches with a whip.) The translation of the Wagner essay, however, is inferior to Hollingdale's translation, and the introduction to it is self-indulgent—twenty-four pages to match Nietzsche's sixty-page essay! The Dannhauser introduction to "History" is a model of studious subordination to greatness and teacherly concern for the student reader. The Schacht introduction to "Schopenhauer" rightly wonders how Nietzsche understood the difference between Schopenhauer and Socrates, since the latter remained an *Erzieher* of Nietzsche's longer than the former. The copyediting of the volume is sometimes careless, and the editing sometimes misguided: some paragraphs indented a proper amount, others five times as much.

In sum, Arrowsmith's presentation of Nietzsche's classical thoughts is most welcome. It is nearly twenty years since a portion appeared in *Arion*; must we wait another twenty for him to be allowed to add translations of Nietzsche's philology, the protocols of his own courses, and perhaps Wilamowitz's attack and Rohde's answer? It is a scholarly scandal of the first order that while the flow of turgid, heavy, frantic, and empty books on Nietzsche increases, especially translations from the French, and while self-esteeming North American Nietzscheans continue to cite the fraud-child Will to Power (which "llama" sister Elizabeth aborted from Nietzsche's leftovers according to one of twenty-five plans in his notes—all rejected by him along with the whole project, as Montinari has shown), still no translation of the Montinari-Colli arrangement of the Nietzsche *Nachlass*, or the Janz biography, or the books by Fink, Löwith, Müller-Lauter, and Guérin, has appeared in English. Along with these translations, we need an Arrowsmith translation of all relating to Nietzsche the classicist. Germanless classicists could use it; Germanless Nietzsche readers would love it. Perhaps modernity might benefit.—Michael Platt, *East Wallingford, Vermont*.

PANGLE, Thomas L. *The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Age*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 227 + vi pp. \$25.95—A collection of speeches and papers, some delivered before political groups, Thomas Pangle's newest book contains little if any serious scholarship. It consists mostly of polemics against an ill-defined postmodernism, which take as their starting point Pangle's idiosyncratic conception of modernity. From this perspective the overshadowing cultural problem of contemporary America is the overabundance of academic postmodernists who raise disagreeable hermeneutic questions. Starting with Martin Heidegger and culminating in Jean-François Lyotard, these thinkers have destroyed fixed meanings and undermined the faith in democratic values and rational discourse as defined by Pangle and other Straussians. Pangle celebrates both the civil rights revolution and the feminist movement in paragraphs full of purple prose. Though a self-described conservative, he avoids giving offense to those insisting most stridently on political correctness. His own quarrel, like Allan Bloom's, is with antimodernist German thinkers and with their French imitators who are now seen as threatening "modernity." Pangle's own modernity is the sum total of his value preferences. It is antiseptically free of the nonmaterialist religious figures of the early modern period—such as Luther, Calvin, and Loyola—and of the theoretical defenders of that peculiarly modern institution, the nation state. All modernity, for Pangle, is conveniently reduced to his own reading of John Locke and of other thinkers who can be at least plausibly if not always accurately presented as democratic individualists.

Because of the obvious ideological intent of his chapters, as a defense of the current version of American democracy, Pangle is never

particularly attentive to the need for accurate depiction. He states emphatically that Heidegger sought to rescue "values," particularly "the clarification and articulation of a people's highest values," from "hypertrophic reason." According to Heidegger as interpreted by Pangle, modern rationalism "endangers and banalizes 'values' by its relentless tendency to reduce to a 'common' level what is *distinguished* and hence truly evocative of sacrificial love and devotion." Despite the misleading insertion of quotation marks, Heidegger, who detested all "values" as necessarily subjective, could never have made the statement Pangle ascribes to him. It is Pangle, not Heidegger, who wishes to teach values—or, better still, have the government impose them. Though some of his presumed auditors would not have cared about such conventions, scholarly readers would be justified in asking to see Pangle's sources for his comments on Heidegger's values.

This reviewer is also unclear about whether Pangle's early America believed primarily in Pangle-Locke or in biblical Christianity. Depending on the section one looks at, the answer can be either. In point of fact, it can be argued that even fervent Lockeans among early American leaders were often, like James Wilson and George Mason, remarkably eclectic in their thinking. Wilson, an effusively devout Christian, thought that Locke's social contract theory was politically useful for Americans. Like other American founders, he ascribed his own religious orthodoxy to the deist Locke, without being influenced by philosophical materialism. Forrest McDonald has documented in a multi-volume study the workman-like fashion in which the federal union was constructed. The founders adapted political theorists to their practical needs without becoming doctrinaires of any one school. Unfortunately, as the prominent Locke scholar Richard Ashcraft has observed, Pangle is unwilling to learn from those who differ in their conclusions from the prescribed Straussian answers. It is doubtful that the present review will alter that situation.—Paul Gottfried, *Elizabethtown College*.

PARRY, William T., and HACKER, Edward A. *Aristotelian Logic*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. x + 545 pp. Cloth, \$49.50; paper, \$16.95—This is a textbook on traditional deductive logic, designed for a one semester course. Topics such as definition and the informal fallacies take the scope of the book somewhat beyond the boundaries of formal logic. Although the subjects covered in this book are for the most part topics standard in Aristotelian textbooks, the detail of the analysis exceeds the standard treatment. The book is divided into five main parts. The first part deals with the basic concepts of logic, and the second part specifically examines the basic concepts of Aristotelian logic. Part 1 introduces the reader to the notions of argument and of validity. A valid argument is an argument whose conclusion follows necessarily from its premises, whereas a deductive argument is an argument that claims to be valid.

Part 1 also examines propositions, logical form and counterexamples, terms, definition, and division and classification. The two chapters on terms and definition are particularly dense and thoroughly analyzed. In the latter chapter alone the authors introduce some thirty-six definitions on the material.

Part 2 focuses on the basic concepts that will be required for later work in Aristotelian syllogistic. It begins with an analysis of the standard categorical propositions, explains the traditional square of opposition, and examines the immediate inference of conversion. It devotes two brief chapters to existential presupposition in Aristotelian logic and the distribution of terms.

Part 3 examines those immediate inferences that are not used in the Aristotelian syllogistic to derive valid forms. This list includes obversion, contraposition, and inversion. The authors take up the problem of mediated inferences in Part 4. They present the doctrine of the standard syllogism as a deductive system, and give the doctrine in its modern form, with twenty-four valid forms in four figures, rather than Aristotle's doctrine of fourteen valid forms in three figures. They follow Aristotle's method of showing validity by reduction to first-figure forms, and demonstrating invalidity by citing counterexample. In a subsequent chapter they approach the syllogism and the problem of its validity from the more familiar textbook perspective of formal rules. The authors also cover sorities, enthymemes, the hypothetical and the disjunctive syllogism, and the dilemma. They also devote whole chapters to the problems of standardizing categorical propositions and of reducing the number of terms in arguments.

Part 5 deals with the informal fallacies. The authors' treatment of this topic is distinctive by virtue of its theoretical sophistication and scholarliness. They devote an entire chapter to the relation of the nature of fallacy to the concept of proof. Contextual fallacies, they point out, are not errors in drawing the conclusion from its premises, but errors that prevent an argument from proving its thesis.

Most of the chapters of this book are followed by several pages of exercises, and some chapters have appendices that pursue further some point raised in the chapter. For example, chapter 10 has an appendix intended to serve as a historical introduction to the notion of distribution; and chapter 8 has an appendix on the differences between the scholastic and the modern doctrines of the square of opposition. The book contains thirty-eight pages of endnotes; these can serve as a basis for further study.

It is unfortunate that such a scholarly and thorough introduction to deductive logic is marred by so many typographical errors. Most are merely misspellings, but some can interfere with reader comprehension, especially if the reader is not already familiar with the material. This text can be recommended to anyone who wants to learn about Aristotelian logic, but its very density of details will impose a heavy burden on the instructor to motivate the typical undergraduate student found in a logic course.—Gary Bedell, *Rockhurst College*.

PEPERZAK, Adriaan Theodoor. *Hegels praktische Philosophie: Ein Kommentar zur enzyklopädischen Darstellung der menschlichen Freiheit*

und ihrer objektiven Verwirklichung. Spekulation und Erfahrung, abt. 2, bd. 19. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991. 372 pp. DM 198—This is an interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of subjective and objective freedom as presented in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. The interpretation takes the form of a detailed commentary on the sections on practical subjective spirit and objective spirit from Part 3 of the *Encyclopaedia*.

The *Encyclopaedia* underwent three editions during Hegel's own lifetime (1817, 1827, 1830). In its first edition, the practical philosophy of the *Encyclopaedia* thus preceded the publication of Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1820). In all three editions the text of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* consists of a series of terse doctrinal statements (*Paragraphen*). In his lecture courses on the philosophical encyclopaedia Hegel would dictate the *Paragraphen* and then explicate them by lecturing from notes or excerpts. The posthumous edition of Hegel's collected works uses sets of student lecture notes to reconstruct Hegel's additions (*Zusätze*), and appends those to the individual *Paragraphen*. That editorial practice remains controversial. Peperzak's commentary is strictly limited to the authentic text of the *Paragraphen*.

Peperzak's interpretation and comparison of the three editions focuses on the argumentative structure of the text and on the reasons for the changes introduced by Hegel into the second and third editions of the *Encyclopaedia*. The commentary covers the following topics from Hegel's theory of the practical: the will, property, contract, punishment, morality, ethical life in general, the state, international relations, and world history. Peperzak excludes from his interpretation the sections on family and civil society introduced into the second and third editions of the *Encyclopaedia*. Those sections will be treated in a separate commentary on Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. A detailed afterword on the general importance of Hegel's practical philosophy and on points of criticism has also been deferred to that sequel to the present volume.

Peperzak's commentary is set up as follows: first comes a *Paragraph* from the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, followed by Peperzak's concise commentary. After that, the corresponding *Paragraphen* from the second and third editions of the *Encyclopaedia* are presented, followed by Peperzak's commentary, which includes a comparison between the different versions. The inclusion of Hegel's text with the commentary eliminates the need to consult the three versions of the *Encyclopaedia* when studying the commentary. Moreover, Peperzak presents Hegel's text in a graphic form that illustrates the syntactic arrangement of Hegel's long and convoluted sentences. The degree of detail in Peperzak's commentary can be gathered from the following figures: sixty-four *Paragraphen* in the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia* and sixty-seven *Paragraphen* in the second and third editions of the *Encyclopaedia*, none of them longer than a few sentences, are addressed in three hundred forty-five pages of commentary.

At key points the running commentary is interrupted by retrospective sections, often in the form of schemata (pp. 97–8, 132,

179–85, 359–61). Particularly instructive are two interpolated sections: the first one, on the logic of Hegel's philosophy of the will, details the logical development of the concept of the will (pp. 90–6); and the second one, on ethical aspects of Hegel's theory of practical subjective spirit, addresses the proto-ethical nature of moral feeling (pp. 99–106).

Peperzak regards the presentation of the realization of human freedom in the *Encyclopaedia* as an attempt on Hegel's part to integrate, to the highest degree possible, previous philosophies of human practice into his own philosophy of spirit. The two main influences detected by Peperzak are the neo-Aristotelian psychology of eighteenth-century German academic philosophy (*Schulphilosophie*), and Kant's practical philosophy. By contrast, the role of Plato and Aristotle is considered less important in the texts under consideration (pp. 18–19).

Peperzak's commentary is an important contribution to Hegel scholarship and will prove an indispensable tool for the in-depth and comparative study of Hegel's practical philosophy in the *Encyclopaedia*. With its micrological orientation and its focus on immanent interpretation, it clearly belongs to the long-standing German tradition of Hegel interpretation. Readers of Peperzak will look forward to the author's overall assessment and critical evaluation of Hegel's philosophy of freedom in his upcoming work.—Guenter Zoeller, *The University of Iowa*.

RUBEN, David-Hillel. *Explaining Explanation*. The Problems of Philosophy: Their Past and Present. New York: Routledge, 1990. xi + 265 pp. \$39.95—Books in this series have a first part providing an introduction to and history of a problem and a second part which builds up to the author's own views. For his historical treatment of the problems of explanation Ruben selects Plato, Aristotle, Mill, and Hempel. The space devoted to Plato and Aristotle (a chapter on each) is rather unexpected, but as with the other figures considered Ruben focuses on themes of relevance to current debates. Thus the discussion of Plato is largely on whether two "opposites" can explain the same thing and whether the same thing can explain two opposites. On Ruben's intricate analysis, the issue has a bearing on probabilistic dependency theories of explanation and on whether causes need be either necessary or sufficient for their effects. The discussion of Aristotle introduces among other things the idea that an adequate theory of explanation will have metaphysical underpinnings; it should, in other words, fit "what we think the world is like" (p. 86). Ruben is sympathetic to this idea and pursues it more fully later. Mill figures largely as a precursor of Hempel, but there is an interesting discussion of the relation between Mill's view that explanations are deductive arguments and his rather peculiar thesis that deduction is not "real" inference. Not surprisingly, the Hempelian account forms the main backdrop to Ruben's constructive analysis. Among the main topics discussed are (1) the ontology of explanation (what explains what?),

(2) the standard counterexamples to the Hempelian account, (3) the introduction of a causal condition into the analysis of explanation, (4) the role of laws in relation to explanation, (5) whether explanations are arguments, and (6) whether all explanation is causal. The discussion is clear and thorough all the way through. In dealing with (1) Ruben skillfully works up to the view that "facts explain facts only when the features and the individuals the facts are about, are appropriately conceptualized or named" (p. 180). This brings out the sense in which explanation is "epistemological." (Three) is crucial to the ensuing discussion, since if, as Ruben suggests, we "put the 'cause' back into 'because'" to deal with (2), the idea that laws must figure in explanantia, and the idea that explanations must be arguments, seem less compelling. Still, a further question is whether all singular explanations are causal. Ruben delivers a negative answer. There are explanatory identities. "A particular's having a property, described or conceptualized in one way, can explain the same particular's having the *same* property, described or conceptualized in another way" (p. 219). There is no self-explanation here given the favored ontology of explanation. There would be self-causation if such explanations were causal. So they are not causal. But even noncausal explanations explain something by "showing what is responsible for it or what makes it as it is" (p. 233). That, Ruben concludes, is what explanation is all about.

This carefully crafted book is a valuable resource for students, teachers, and researchers, who run up against the complexities of explanation. The discussion is dense and subtle. Though not overly technical it is quite heavy going and would be most useful for those who already have a more general background in the philosophy of science. There is no discussion of whether the explanation of action raises any distinctive problems, though Plato's rejection of physical explainers of action in the *Phaedo* is closely related to the thought that agents do what they do because of what they think best. The absence of any treatment of this theme, however, does not detract from the overall merits of the book.—Alan Millar, *University of Stirling, Scotland*.

SORELL, Tom. *Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science*. New York: Routledge, 1991. vii + 206 pp. \$45.00—With this book a critical gap has been filled in the ongoing grand debate over the complex relationship between philosophy and science. Scientism, or the attitude of ascribing inordinate value to the scientific while simultaneously diminishing the value of the nonscientific (p. 9), is at once the most pervasive and the least coherently attacked problem besetting philosophy's relation to science. Sorell masterfully sets out to analyze and refute the principal manifestations of what he terms the old and the new scientism in philosophy.

He begins with a critical look at scientism in our century as exemplified by the assumptions of "scientific empiricism" (chap. 1). He

focuses on the members of the Vienna Circle which began in the 1920's: Carnap, Neurath, and von Mises. The prevalent scientific tendency there is to unify the natural sciences with the social sciences and the humanities in the manner of an updated encyclopaedism reminiscent of D'Alembert and Diderot. Sorell then examines the presumed roots of this twentieth-century philosophical scientism, whose proponents hark back to the rationalists of the seventeenth century. He convincingly absolves both Descartes and Bacon of the excesses of their philosophical descendants without denying the scientific features inherent in their thought. In the same context he takes issue with Rorty's claim that philosophy is epistemically overloaded.

As a response to scientism, Sorell, in chapters 3 and 4, turns appropriately to Kant, in whose critical philosophy are embedded abundant correctives circumscribing the respective limits of pure and of practical reason. "It will emerge," writes Sorell, "that Kant is much better disposed to the non-cognitive faculties and the non-sciences than a scientific philosopher could be expected to be" (p. 55). Common criticisms of the sciences on moral grounds are then taken up—that science involves pride, that it produces evil, that it leads to decadence and loss of meaning—and put to rest. Sorell's point all along is that science as such is certainly not the culprit; the abuse of science by those who do not acknowledge its limits, however, and the associated infatuation of certain philosophers with this abuse, is. Kant and Nietzsche are squared off on the question of morality versus vitality in culture, and Kant is vindicated.

The controversy between C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis over the "two cultures" of the sciences and the arts is revisited with a view to showing the one-sidedness of both positions. Only the humanities can play the role of wholesome moral mediator that would alleviate the estrangement brought on by scientific objectification. The views of philosophers like Scruton, O'Hear, Feyerabend, and Rorty are presented and disputed.

The final two chapters return to the new scientism as a form of naturalism which either obliterates philosophy as a distinct subject, insisting it be subordinated to, and merged with, science (Quine); or prescribes a form of mechanistic reductionism of both philosophy and science to "neurophilosophy" (Churchland). In either case, as is evident in most departments of philosophy throughout the leading universities of the Anglo-Saxon world, metaphysics has assumed the character of a dirty word, and some sort of monistic biologism reigns supreme. Sorell is rigorously unsparing in criticizing this neopositivist dogmatism. In methodically debunking its smug but deluded self-confidence, he reasserts philosophy's autonomy to investigate and inform us about a whole range of questions science cannot address.

Sorell sticks unswervingly to treating scientism in philosophy. Scientific popularizers turned pseudo-philosophers (for example, Stephen Jay Gould or Carl Sagan) are purposely not approached. Sorell correctly sees some value in scientism outside philosophy serving as an antidote to antiscientific and pseudo-scientific ideas like creationism (pp. 2, 177). The task of exposing the dangerous errors of

popular scientism, however, remains urgent despite this minor side benefit it has of undermining antisience. I maintain that in the long run popular scientism is morally more damaging than even obscurantism.—Habib C. Malik, *The Catholic University of America*.

STEPHAN, Achim. *Sinn als Bedeutung. Bedeutungstheoretische Untersuchungen zur Psychoanalyse Sigmund Freuds*. Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, bd. 24. Edited by Günther Patzig, Erhard Scheibe, and Wolfgang Wieland. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989. xiv + 174 pp. DM 98—This dissertation concentrates on the problem of the meaning of dreams and hysterical representations according to Freud. As a result of his contacts with Breuer and his treatment of patients, Freud began to look for the psychical meaning of dreams and discovered a connection with previous traumatic experiences. The meaning of a symptom is the "where from," "to where," and "what for."

Dreams are a manifestation of unconscious psychic activity. Hysteria is a transformation of a psychical content into bodily phenomena. In dreams, on the other hand, thoughts are represented. But this is contradicted by the fact that dreams do not know the "either . . . or," nor do they use negations. The so called manifest phenomena are an expression of experiences, emotions, and thoughts, which are now hidden but may become conscious again (chap. 3). To discover the underlying psychic facts Freud (in later years) used the method of free association. The main objection to this method is that these free associations are haphazard and attribute too great a role to the psychoanalyst. Freud answers with the assumption of determinism.

In his *Zur Auffassung der Aphasie*, Freud argues that a perturbation of the ability to use language may also go back to psychical factors (chap. 4). In the important fifth chapter Stephan discusses Freud's view that neurotical symptoms, dreams, and so forth are transformations of the normal expression of thoughts; this process is largely unconscious and results from association. Contemporary theorists no longer accept Freud's explanation. The last chapter acquaints the reader with later discussions concerning the concept of meaning in psychoanalysis. The views of Habermas, Lorenzen, Lacan, and Shopen are mentioned. Stephan is critical of Lacan and dwells on how Shopen wrestled with Freud's concepts of meaning. What does Freud mean when he states that manifest phenomena are meaningful? Is it the same as when we say that language has a meaning? One should rather consider these phenomena as effects manifesting their cause. Stephan finally mentions how Rubinstein substituted the category of classification (based on shape or function) for Freud's theory of association. Manifest phenomena signify representations but point also to that which is meant by them. In an appendix Stephan raises some objections against Freud's theory that dreams are always an expression of unfulfilled wishes.

The book is well written, although some explanations are somewhat short (for example, on schizophrenia). It is completed by a good bibliography.—Leo J. Elders, *Kerkrade, Netherlands*.

VAN PELT, Robert Jan, and WESTPHAL, Carroll William. *Architectural Principles in the Age of Historicism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. ix + 417 pp. \$27.50—This is a work that is extremely interesting, instructive—and problematic. Its authors are two architectural historians and theoreticians who are dissatisfied with both the modern notion of historical progress and the postmodern notion of sheer historical flux as they impact architectural theory and practice. For both moderns and postmoderns, the past is a matter of antiquarian curiosity at best. The authors aim at securing, from the study of the past, principles for the education of “citizen-architects” who will connect person to person and human beings to the world. Both stand in some way under the acknowledged influence of Leo Strauss, who viewed “Western civilization in its premodern integrity” as the creative tension between Athens and Jerusalem (p. 5). They embody this tension in the structure of the book, where the odd chapters display van Pelt’s orientation toward Jerusalem and its prophetic tradition, while the even chapters show Westphal’s orientation toward Athens and the philosophic tradition.

The work is framed by van Pelt’s chapters on “Heraclitean Heritage” as an introduction, and on “Apocalyptic Abjection” as an epilogue; it is punctuated by his chapters on “Prophetic Remembrance,” “Athenian Assurance,” and “Paratactical Dejection.” These latter fall under the general umbrella of “The Debate” and alternate with Westphal’s successive chapters on “Politics,” “Building Types,” “Architectonics,” and “Cities.” This format suggests that one author will make an assertion which the other will counter; but such is, for the most part, not the case. It is more like two different melodies developed in two different keys alternating with one another but providing variations on a similar theme. I will consequently treat each of them as wholes.

Westphal attempts to build an architectural theory which begins with politics as the foundation. He unfolds his thought by setting out a series of parallel contrasts between the lower and the higher: settlement and city, arrangement (facilitating) and institution (ennobling), *Historie* and *Geschichte*, beginning and origin, copy and imitation, craftsmanship and artifice, version and type, fact and value. For Westphal, architecture ideally subserves the political effort of establishing the conditions for the perfecting and ennobling of human beings. This task allows the value-sorting in the list we just made. He grounds building types in primary human activities: the *tholus* in veneration, the *templum* in celebration, the *domus* in dwelling, the *taberna* in trading, the *theatrum* and *regia* in political activity. He discusses structural types, analyzes material components and,

following Vitruvius and Alberti, develops rules for stability and beauty. He also points to such final considerations as collocation and congruity which, being beyond rules, are finally matters for judgment, "the soul of reason" (p. 276). His treatment culminates in the consideration of cities where architectural means and building components are taken up into a final pattern to establish a fully humane city form. For Westphal, architecture ideally imitates nature in its productive activity and thus creatively translates the principles of normative architecture into different historical environments. Westphal thus subsumes aesthetics and culture under the overarching purpose of perfecting and ennobling human beings. His treatment ends with a brief reference to contemporary buildings which illustrate the right and the wrong in architectural practice.

Van Pelt's discussion is a search for a framework in a philosophy of history developed through concrete historical attention, especially to ancient Athens and Nazi Germany. He sets himself against any approach to the past which does not draw positive nourishment from the study of history for life in the present and which claims that one can understand the past without feeling attracted and placed under demand by the values it embodies. He explores the possibility of "a normative understanding of architectural history through the application of the Judeo-Christian historiographical paradigm to the architecture and urban form of the classical Greek city" (p. 114). This involves the unpredictable emergence of events in the past that function as types for understanding and constructing what is subsequent. Inspired by Karl Jaspers' view of the Axial Age of history, van Pelt views the emergence of classical Athens, located within that age, as the axis of Western architectural history.

He goes on to discuss six architectural types in the cityscape of Athens. He locates them in relation to the interplay of Polis, Acropolis, and Necropolis. The Forum was the place for the decisive activity of the Polis; the Acropolis represented the ideal and the future; and the Necropolis embodied the enduring presence of the past. The theater is presented as "the paradigm for the theoretical unification of the world, of civic consciousness and thinking about architecture" (p. 241). The centrality of the theater shows that architecture is more than Norberg-Schulz's *genius loci* or Pevsner's object of aesthetic intention or Heidegger's dwelling—or even Westphal's manifestation of politics.

Van Pelt embeds his discussion within the history of Athenian institutions and leans heavily upon Thucydides and Sophocles and the reading of the latter by Hölderlin and Heidegger. He takes as paradigmatic Hölderlin's call for a repetition of Greece in the Germany of 1800, where repetition meant not copying but reversing the Greek's feat of ordering their native irrationality through the assimilation of the "Junonian sobriety" of the Egyptians (p. 248).

In the course of his Hölderlinian analysis of Sophocles, however, van Pelt experienced a "shattering intuition" (p. 278) which led him to withdraw from the "debate" at chapter 7, for which he substitutes, without commentary, Hölderlin's poem, *Haelfte des Lebens*. The

poem's two short verses contrast the ripeness of round pears and the graciousness of swans gliding over the waters with the coldness of winter and the creaking of weathervanes in the wind. An analysis of the poem had appeared forebodingly near the end of the first chapter where it was taken to challenge Heidegger's grounding of building in poetry; and the last stanza appears starkly in the final chapter of the book, added as an epilogue in view of the breakdown of van Pelt's part of the project. The epilogue cites Jean Amery's recollection of the closing lines of the poem during a march back to the barracks at Auschwitz. The chapter focuses upon the architecture of Auschwitz and provides graphic eyewitness description of the boiling fat of bodies being incinerated in the cremation pits. Van Pelt comes to believe that "the intellectual after Auschwitz is doomed to discover sooner or later that the foundations of . . . learning are sunk in an abyss of despair . . . [and that] the ground . . . is cursed with an unredeemable past" (p. 380). Beginning his epilogue with a quote from the deconstructionist Julia Kristeva, van Pelt deconstructs his own project.

In a way this is van Pelt's book. In two hundred forty-nine pages he provides a rich historical-reflective matrix for the one hundred twenty-one pages that house Westphal's ahistorical construction. Both authors essentially go their own ways, however, and there is little mutual acknowledgement. What is strange, even beyond the strangeness of publishing such an aborted project, is the fact that Athens-Westphal has no reply to the despair of Jerusalem-van Pelt. There is no dialogue, no debate: only two projects, one deconstructed and broken off in tortured despair, framing the other's confident reconstruction.

The framing is intriguing: Heraclitean flux in the first chapter and despair of meaning in the last. If, following a Straussian reading, one then looks to the central chapter, one finds Athenian assurance rising up out of flux and despair. If one attends further to the way Hölderlin's *Haelfte des Lebens* runs through van Pelt's chapters from beginning to end, one wonders if the construction is deliberate: the Athenian project survives the flux of the book's own alleged initial plan.

As far as Westphal's contribution is concerned, intriguing and promising as it is, it is so skeletal and at times abstruse that one would have wished that he had appropriated equal space and time to develop it further. In particular, the reader would be aided by more detailed consideration of the buildings he finds wrong and those he finds right. The fundamental positions offered likewise require something more than confident proclamation, though they present a clear target.

All things considered, this is a work which, though in many ways unsettled and unsettling, merits a reflective reading. Perhaps the juxtaposition of the two projects provides—and is intended to provide—a mirror of ourselves.—Robert E. Wood, *University of Dallas*.

ix + 257 pp. \$14.95—Festivals, as Hans-Georg Gadamer once pointed out, differ from other events due to their special temporal structure. They allow whoever participates in them to experience time with reference to its lingering rather than its passing away, by marking off a space between the moments of everyday life—a “while” whose duration refuses to be measured by the clock.

This collection of ten essays, most of which have not been previously published, or appear here for the first time in English translation, celebrates Gadamer’s “in-betweenness” as a philosophical thinker. In contrast to his critics on the left (who attack Gadamer’s hermeneutics for being “conservative” and “nostalgic”) and the right (for whom it is “radical” and “nihilistic”), contributors to this book, looking thoughtfully and favorably upon philosophical hermeneutics, present to the reader its advantages as a “moderate” theory of interpretation.

The essays are divided into three categories: the true, the good, and the beautiful. Not surprisingly for a book with such a positive disposition towards Gadamer, this Kantian arrangement has little to do with one of this work’s major aims: showing how hermeneutics approaches certain boundaries—for example, between philosophy and poetry, poetry and politics—with the effect of revealing how they falter and prove unstable.

Only in this book’s lead piece, written by Reiner Wiehl, is the character of Gadamer’s thinking situated within the conventional context of German Romantic hermeneutics. By contrast, Jean Grodin groups Gadamer along with Ricoeur and Rorty as direct inheritors of Nietzsche’s recognition of the universality of interpretation and of the problem of relativism posed by Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Grodin gives a good argument for how the hermeneutics they represent takes its sense of direction from the experience of human finitude without turning its back on trying to achieve objectivity in interpretation. David Hoy frames the question of Gadamer’s relativism within the context of contemporary debates about constitutional interpretation and, while drawing a clear line between relativism and hermeneutical pluralism, suggests how interpretation can allow room for disagreement without being arbitrary. Robert Dostal also takes up the relation of Gadamer to Nietzsche, discussing how Gadamerian hermeneutics maintains the difference between a text and its interpretation—something that vanishes in Nietzsche’s creative hermeneutics. In addition, he explains how Gadamer’s view of interpretation can involve an ethics of humility and trust without lending support to Habermas’s objection that Gadamer’s hermeneutics turns over too much authority to the text.

Georgia Warnke, Fred Dallmayr, Dennis Schmidt, and Dieter Misgeld all write on the political character of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Warnke addresses the different principles of justice defended by Michael Walzer and John Rawls. He makes perceptive use of Gadamer’s principle of effective history to defend both of these antifoundationalists against charges of subjectivism. In a warm tribute to Gadamer, Dallmayr shows how Gadamer’s writings about Plato’s political philosophy, published when the Nazis were in power, can be

read both as a subtle statement against totalitarianism and also as a demonstration of how Gadamer's idea of public justice, in reflecting the importance of self-regard, departs from the conventional liberal view of justice. Dating Gadamer's interest in the relationship between language and political practice from this same period, Schmidt raises the question of how poetic language can be said to have political power. He explores the idea that poetry presents a disruptive challenge to ways of theorizing about the *polis* that rely on metaphysical concepts such as stability and subjectivity. In the only piece in this collection openly critical of Gadamer, Misgeld adroitly uncovers a wide difference between Gadamer's model of private conversation between friends and that of political conversation between states. Misgeld comes to the conclusion that it makes sense to call him both a liberal (with regard to his view of culture) and a conservative (with respect to his politics).

In a related vein, Véronique Fóti, struck by the contrast between Gadamer's considerations of Paul Celan's poetry and Heidegger's silence over it, demonstrates how, as a response to the Holocaust that aims to shake up stable unities of meaning, Celan's poetry presents a challenge to Heidegger's poetics and political thinking. Finally, Kathleen Wright sets up a dialogue between deconstruction and hermeneutics in order to clarify how each views the relation of philosophy and literature. Derrida, she argues, preserves the difference between them, while Gadamer, in taking philosophy as a model for interpretation and poetry as a model for the text, joins them together.

Overall, the essays in this collection are insightful and, almost without exception, straightforwardly written. This book not only leads the reader to an increased understanding of Gadamer's hermeneutics, but does so in a hermeneutical way. It helps to enlarge the Euro-centered, epistemologically oriented perspective often adopted for understanding hermeneutics by showing the importance and richness of the ethical-political dimension of Gadamer's thinking; it draws Gadamer into a dialogue with American critics of hermeneutics such as Stanley Rosen, and other American philosophers not usually associated with hermeneutics such as John Rawls. In addition, it reminds the reader that not only philosophical movements, but also the terrible events of this century, shape the historical context within which Gadamer's hermeneutics is situated. For these reasons, Wright's collection is an appealing and valuable one.—Diane P. Michelfelder, *California Polytechnic State University*.

YEARLY, Lee H. *Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 280 pp. \$16.95—For some years Yearly has devoted himself to the study of the comparative philosophy of religion and is now convinced of the importance of this kind of study: it enriches us because it makes us attentive to certain aspects of a work we had previously overlooked;

it shows how pervasively we are tied to a particular culture; and it helps develop those abilities that allow us to appreciate different visions of the world.

In this book Yearly wants to chart "similarities in differences" and "differences in similarities" in the theory of virtue of two great philosophers who lived in different cultures and periods of history. Subsequently he passes to an examination of their respective conceptions of courage. As was to be expected, the historical and cultural background of both philosophers leads to considerable differences in their respective theories. In order to explain these discrepancies and to see similarities, Yearly speaks of primary and secondary conceptions. He thinks that Aquinas's theory of the parts of a virtue allows us to integrate several forms of virtuous behavior described by Mencius. The idea of analogical predication is likewise helpful in integrating different conceptions of one tradition into another. Mencius's view of courage stresses the religious importance of this virtue, but shows certain points of contact with the account Aquinas gives in the *Summa Theologiae*.

What should we make of this unusual book? It would seem that this sort of investigation of a particular theme can only be meaningful if one is clear about the metaphysical positions of each author. If Mencius subscribes to a certain materialistic monism and has a different view of the relation of the human person to society, as well as of the last end of man, from that underlying Aquinas's philosophy, any comparison of points of detail will lose much of its interest; its value will be reduced to that of an introduction to different worlds of thought. Furthermore, Yearly seems to think that the ahistorical perspective and insensitivity of Aquinas to the social location of ideas is a disadvantage (p. 182). But does Yearly's position not imply that beforehand any attempt to reach a *true* theory of courage valid for man as such in all cultures is doomed, and that any comparative study never gets beyond the level of collecting different views? Another remark is in order: concern with method and insistence on the difficulties of such an intercultural comparison take up much space of this book. Yearly himself is aware that scholars in either of these two fields (Confucianism, and medieval philosophy and theology) may not feel at ease with his treatment. Nevertheless, his endeavor and instructive remarks must be appreciated.—Leo J. Elders, *Kerkrade, Netherlands*.

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS*

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 65, No. 4, Autumn 1991

Feyerabend, Realism, and Historicity, STEVEN YATES

Paul Feyerabend has recently attacked the separability principle which holds that objects, facts, and laws can be separated from the historical circumstances of their discovery. This paper presents a realist defense of the principle from Feyerabend, in that attempts to eliminate it either generate unacceptable empirical consequences or logically self-destruct. In arguing the former, the author shows that Feyerabend's view has the consequence that processes occurring on the outer planets are indeterminate in nature prior to their discovery and become determinate when observed by our instruments. In the case of the latter, Feyerabend's appeal to history leads to the result that historical traditions have definite properties discoverable by the historian or anthropologist, reviving the separability principle. Finally, it is argued that Feyerabend confuses epistemological and ontological issues, that his reading of realism is too restrictive, and that his own position in the debate fails to escape self-refutation. The author concludes that Feyerabend's antirealism is incoherent and should be rejected.

Tradition, Friendship and Moral Knowledge, STEPHEN A. DINAN

This paper investigates the rather significant role that friendship plays in the communication of moral knowledge, a communication which takes place in the social process called "tradition." The claim is defended that without friendship the transmission of moral knowledge in tradition, as well as the continued development of such knowledge, would be impossible.

* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

Ever since the Enlightenment criticized what it perceived to be the irrationality of tradition, the properly *cognitive* function of tradition has been largely ignored, if not rejected outright. The paper begins, therefore, by showing that the primary function of tradition is to communicate truths which are essential to our ability to dwell meaningfully and practically in the world. It then investigates the nature of moral knowledge, the communication of that knowledge in tradition, and the resulting relationship which exists between friendship and moral knowledge, in order to show the necessity of that relationship.

Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Bilateral Nuclear Sieges,
ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

This article argues against the Finnis-Grisez-Boyle claim that all uses of nuclear weapons by the United States are immoral by asserting that the traditional rules of siege warfare provide a limited basis for permitting the use of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of nuclear weapons has changed the relationship of noncombatants to combatants, and made noncombatants morally equivalent to noncombatants in a siege. Just as in a siege, they are "pressed up against" combatants, and opposing armies cannot "get at" one another without placing each other's noncombatant populations in jeopardy. Traditional rules of siege warfare would allow commanders to use some nuclear weapons to attack some sorts of military targets where noncombatants would be killed. Limited use of nuclear weapons is not justified by this alone, but only if it protects the order of justice and defends the innocent from unjust aggression.

Aristotle and the Overcoming of the Subject-Object Dichotomy,
JAMES R. MENSCH

Since Descartes' time the problem of the subject-object relation has bedeviled philosophy's attempts to understand the world. The framework it has left us with has been one in which we picture the subject as somehow "here," the object as another thing "there," and their relations as describable according to the laws of causality. This paper relates some of the ways in which this framework does not work and then turns to the basis of this failure. This is the notion that space and time are independent, yet determinative of the realities which fill them. The author then shows how, by following Aristotle's relativization of space and time (his making them nonindependent attributes of bodies), one can account for knowing without falling into the paradoxes of this framework. After discussing the relation between potentiality and presence, the paper ends with an Aristotelian account of "where" the teacher is when he teaches.

Levinas on Desire, Dialogue and the Other, DAVID JOPLING

Levinas's conception of the transcendental structure of human experience as essentially ethical is explained in such a way that it is accessible

to philosophers not acquainted with phenomenology and the dialogical approach to ethics. His view that we are morally responsive creatures "all the way down" is situated vis à vis the thought of Plato, Descartes, Sartre, Derrida, and Iris Murdoch through the discussion of a number of shared issues: Western philosophy's rationalism, the concept of a person, the self-other relation, the concept of responsibility, and existential ethics.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 29, No. 1, January 1992

Nagarjuna's Paradox, PAUL T. SAGAL

The paradoxical nature of Nagarjuna's teaching has long been obvious. Put baldly, the claim is that all views are absurd. But then the view that all views are absurd should also be absurd. The present paper considers a number of different responses to the paradox, both from within and without the Mādhyamika perspective. Nagarjuna's paradox is for us a close relative of the well known *Epimenides*, the paradoxical assertion by Epimenides, the Cretan, that all Cretans are liars. The *Epimenides* is not usually treated as a genuine paradox, since it cannot be true but can be false. Nagarjuna's paradox is in a sense a more extreme version of the *Epimenides*, for it apparently holds not merely that all views of a certain class are false but that they are absurd, that is, self-contradictory. Approaches to the resolution of Nagarjuna's paradox will of course likely parallel approaches to the resolution of the *Epimenides*.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 70, No. 2, June 1992

Abortion and Embodiment, CATRIONA MACKENZIE

This article develops a feminist defense of abortion which criticizes and departs from traditional feminist appeals to bodily autonomy that are based on proprietorial models of the body. The author's argument in defense of a woman's right to abortion focuses upon a number of interconnected considerations, including: an account of the kind of moral responsibility exercised in decision making about abortion; a view of fetal worth as tied to both intrinsic and relational properties; and a phenomenologically based interpretation of embodiment and bodily autonomy in pregnancy. On the basis of these considerations, she shows how proprietorial accounts of bodily autonomy can justify abortion only as a right to evacuation of the fetus from the uterus, and argues that, on the basis of the view of bodily autonomy developed in the article, abortion can and

should be justified as including the right to demand fetal death, not merely fetal evacuation.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 70, No. 3, September 1992

Gettier and Scepticism, STEPHEN CADE HETHERINGTON

Edmund Gettier's classic paper is never regarded as being skeptical about knowledge. That reaction is mistaken; his paper is skeptical. It is an implicitly skeptical attack on epistemological knowledge of the nature of knowledge. To establish this point about Gettier's argument, an account of what it is to be skeptical is offered: a knowledge-denial is skeptical if and only if it is sufficiently surprising to a relevant group of people.

The Suberogatory, JULIA DRIVER

The distinction between obligatory and supererogatory acts has for many years been widely recognized among philosophers as a fruitful one. This paper explores the significance of a parallel distinction between forbidden and "suberogatory" acts. Whereas supererogatory acts are good to do, but not required, suberogatory acts are bad to do, but not forbidden. This paper argues that this distinction's obscurity is unwarranted by showing how it can be used to illuminate some ethical problems.

Natural Meaning, ARDA DENKEL

This paper revises the distinction between natural and nonnatural meanings. Its principal purpose is to show that the criterion of factivity, that is, the claim that in natural meaning X means that r entails that r , is not fulfilled in every case that is *not* nonnatural. The paper considers and rejects the singularistic interpretation according to which X means that r asserts a singular implication. It is argued that, instead, the claim that a particular X means that r should be interpreted as an assertion of "indication," the truth of which is supported by the lawful co-occurrence of X and r as types. If such a co-occurrence is deterministic, then factivity holds for any particular assertion of meaning falling under that regularity. It is concluded that factivity is satisfied only by a subset of claims of meaning failing to be nonnatural, and that there is a gradation of cases between such a strictly natural meaning and the nonnatural.

Counterfactuals and Event Causation, CHARLES B. CROSS

According to the basic Humean counterfactual analysis of causation, event c is a cause of event e if and only if e would not have occurred if c

had not occurred. As an *analysis* of event causation this claim is problematic, yet intuitions support the idea that counterfactuals and causation are connected. This essay rehabilitates the connection by arguing that the Humean criterion works if the counterfactual is evaluated not at the level of the actual world (in general) but at the level of each member of a class of possible worlds not contaminated by the presence of counterfactual causes of a given effect. The resulting thesis is not an analysis of causation, but it does solve some of the most persistent problems faced by counterfactual analyses of causation, namely, the problems of preemptive overdetermination, symmetric overdetermination, and overdetermination by alternative causes, as well as the problem of epiphenomena, and the problem of effects.

Trying Without Willing, TIMOTHY CLEVELAND

Volitionism is the doctrine that all human intentional actions involve a special kind of event called a "willing." In recent years, in order to establish volitionism, philosophers have focused on cases of people who try to move paralyzed limbs. These cases of trying supposedly isolate a willing, a kind of event essential to all human intentional action. This paper presents an analysis of these cases based on the notion of *de re* intention which (a) helps provide an understanding of what the main tenets of a substantial version of volitionism are, (b) provides an account of the special cases of trying that does not involve willings, and (c) places this account of trying within a general framework for understanding intentional action. The result is a philosophy of action without willings.

Modal Metaphysics and Comparatives, PETER MILNE

The Problem of Psychophysical Causation, E. J. LOWE

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 32, No. 2, June 1992

Metaphysics: Should It Be Revisionary or Descriptive?
RON BONTEKOE

Putnam's conception of what is involved in the pursuit of truth is preferable to Davidson's because it implies no unwarranted confidence in the truth of our current beliefs, and thus does not tempt us to draw premature conclusions about "the large features of reality." The endeavor to clarify and sharpen our beliefs exactly as they are now (on the Davidsonian assumption that they must be largely true) is the wrong program

for metaphysicians to adopt, since it freezes into immobility an inquiry that should be progressing toward new levels of understanding.

Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,
BRYAN W. VAN NORDEN

The article presents brief summaries of the ethical views of two ancient Chinese Confucians, Mengzi (or Mencius) and Xunzi (or Hsün-tzu), and argues for the following. Mengzi holds that all humans have incipient virtuous inclinations, and that moral self-cultivation involves stimulating these inclinations so that they develop into mature virtues. Neither being nor becoming a virtuous person requires acting against one's desires. In contrast, Xunzi claims that acting against one's desires is possible and, in fact, necessary in the early stages of self-cultivation. Finally, it is suggested that Xunzi's slogan, "human nature is evil," must be understood against the background not only of Mengzi, who claimed that "human nature is good," but also of Gaozi, who claimed that human nature is morally neutral.

Realism and Idealism in Peirce's Cosmogony,
DOUGLAS R. ANDERSON

Charles Peirce's cosmogony involves an apparent tension concerning the status of initial ideas. On the one hand, Peirce's realism argues for their full independence as reals; on the other hand, his objective idealism and theism suggest their dependence on God as a mind or "analogue of mind." Peirce appears to resolve this tension by maintaining elements of both his realism and his idealism in his cosmogony. He does so by asserting that God, or God's love, serves as a necessary condition for the reality of the initial ideas and by holding, through his agapasticism, that the ideas, as Firsts, retain an element of spontaneity or freedom. From another angle, it is plausible to suggest that for Peirce God functions as a continuum through which the initial ideas develop their own continuities. Such a view allows Peirce to understand evolution as a developmental teleology in which both order and spontaneity play significant roles.

*Culture as a Human Form of Life: A Romantic Reading
of Wittgenstein,* YUVAL LURIE

The idea that human beings are essentially cultural beings underlies many of Wittgenstein's remarks. On this reading, the ancient distinction between culture and nature is central to his reflections on language. By placing emphasis on deeds, Wittgenstein overcomes the metaphysical distinction between culture and nature, so that cultural behavior need no longer be contrasted with natural behavior. This suggests that rules and concepts are abstracted expressions for socially administered deeds. A culture can then be seen as shared forms of life in which organic and

communal forces merge so as to provide human beings with a spiritual bond. In so doing it also provides human beings with a home in place of the one they no longer have in nature. Language, on this reading, is a great cultural work.

Explaining Strange Parallels: The Case of Quantum Mechanics and Mādhyamika Buddhism, ARUN BALASUBRAMANIAM

The article argues that the parallels discerned between the epistemological and metaphysical implications that seem to be suggested by the quantum theory and the doctrines of Mādhyamika Buddhism are not parallels of identity that arise because physicists and mystics are confronting the same objects. They are parallels of analogy rooted in the structural similarities to be found between properties of quantum objects observed through physical instruments and those of gestalt objects in the mystic's deconditioned perceptual experience. This is exemplified by carefully examining the analogies between the situation set up by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and that involved in the perception of ambivalent gestalt figures. In both cases it becomes evident that the results of observation are crucially shaped by the selection of the observational context. It is this contextual dependence of properties that is at the root of the strange parallels.

Lacan's Philosophical Reference: Heidegger or Kojève?
PHILIPPE VAN HAUTE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 89, No. 4, April 1992

Knowledge is Merely True Belief, CRISPIN SARTWELL

This paper presents an argument for the conclusion that the only logical requirements for knowledge that *p* are that *p* be believed and that *p* be true. In particular, if the argument is sound, there is no justification condition on knowledge. The argument proceeds as follows. Knowledge is our epistemic goal with regard to particular propositions. If it is held that accounts of justification must be metajustified by their conduciveness to truth (as on most recent treatments of the question), then the claim that knowledge is (at least) justified true belief is redundant. If, on the other hand, it is held that justification is not connected with truth (as in the view put forward by William Lycan), then knowledge is an incoherent notion: it postulates two epistemic goals which can conflict.

A Sentential Theory of Propositional Attitudes,
MICHEL SEYMOUR

The paper provides first a general framework for the semantics of propositional attitude sentences. It then formulates different locutionary

conditions for the use of those sentences. Then it tries to show how a sentential theory can very well be integrated within such a framework. The paper claims that the very large variety of uses can be accounted for not in spite of the fact that we are dealing with a sentential theory, but rather precisely because we are doing so. The solution rests upon representing the logical form of those sentences with the apparatus of substitutional quantification. The paper ends by showing how such a substitutional representation can help to solve traditional difficulties that plague the sentential theory.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 89, No. 5, May 1992

Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did? RÜDIGER BITTNER

No, it is argued, it is not reasonable to regret things one did. The dispute here is between Spinoza, who thought that regretting what one did only makes bad things worse, and Bernard Williams, who argues that regret is necessary to retain one's identity and character as an agent. This argument and a number of others in favor of regret are shown to be powerless, and so Spinoza's thought turns out to be right.

Pointers to Truth, HAIM GAIFMAN

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 89, No. 6, June 1992

Indispensability and Practice, PENELOPE MADDY

In contemporary philosophy of mathematics, the Quine-Putnam indispensability arguments play a central role both in motivating versions of nominalism and in supporting versions of realism. This paper suggests that in fact views of mathematics based on indispensability considerations yield an account of mathematics in its relationship to natural science that is inconsistent with both scientific and mathematical practice. From a sufficiently naturalistic perspective, such an inconsistency would require one to reject indispensability arguments as fundamental to mathematical ontology or epistemology. Given the prominence of indispensability considerations in the contemporary debate, this would amount to a substantial revision of current thinking.

*The Skeleton in Frege's Cupboard: The Standard versus
Nonstandard Distinction*, JAAKKO HINTIKKA
and GABRIEL SANDU

The distinction between standard and nonstandard interpretations faces anyone using interpreted higher-order logic, although it was explicitly formulated only in 1950 by Leon Henkin. The standard interpretation is tantamount to the idea of arbitrary function, which played an important role in the foundational discussions of the nineteenth century. It is shown here that Frege, in effect, opted for a nonstandard interpretation, although not for its most common version on which only definable higher-order entities exist. For Frege, concepts are more fundamental than their value-ranges, for example, classes. He fails to assume that for each class there is a concept having it as its value-range; thus he commits himself to a nonstandard interpretation. Frege does not grasp the idea of arbitrary function either. It follows that Frege's project would have failed even if he had not run into paradoxes; he could not have captured adequately such principles of mathematical reasoning as induction.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 30, No. 3, July 1992

*Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function of
Political Authority*, PAUL J. WEITHMAN

Scholars of medieval political philosophy have long contrasted the political theories of Augustine and Aquinas. Augustine thought the primary function of political authority is the restraint of vicious behavior; Aquinas attributes to it a more positive role. Scholarly arguments appeal to the texts in which these authors discuss whether there would have been political authority had original sin not been committed. Augustine's remarks in *City of God* suggest he thinks not; Aquinas explicitly says otherwise. This article examines both authors' texts. Augustine, it is concluded, did not think attachment to the common good of great moral value and denied that promoting such attachment is among the functions of political authority. Aquinas had a different view of the common good. He thought attachment to it morally improving and numbered promoting this attachment among political authority's proper functions. It is a function government would have exercised even had humanity remained sinless.

Descartes and Dream Skepticism Revisited, ROBERT HANNA

In the first of his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes raises a famous skeptical doubt about perceptual knowledge, on the basis of our inability to distinguish between waking and dreaming; but in the sixth *Meditation* he appears to remove this doubt summarily in a single

paragraph. Critics of Descartes (beginning with Hobbes) have been nearly unanimous in claiming that the antiskeptical argument in the sixth *Meditation* is fallacious and ill-conceived. But this claim is based on a misreading of the texts. In fact, the argument is much stronger and more sophisticated than most have thought. It is possible to give a careful rereading of the controversial antiskeptical argument in the sixth *Meditation* which shows (a) that Descartes in fact argues for a much weaker—and therefore more defensible—conclusion than has traditionally been thought; and (b) that the argument makes a crucial appeal to the causal sources of waking perceptual experiences, not merely to the coherence of waking perceptual experiences.

Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking,
GUENTER ZOELLER

In a famous aphorism the German physicist and essayist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799) suggested replacing the expression “I think” with the phrase “it thinks,” understood along the lines of the construction, “it lightens” (*es blitzt*). The article argues that Lichtenberg’s view on the subject of thinking is Kantian in nature, and that it is part of Lichtenberg’s critical appropriation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, but that it falls short of the complexities of Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. The article starts out with a detailed reconstruction of Lichtenberg’s Kant reception; it then places the aphorism on the “it thinks” in the context of Lichtenberg’s philosophical psychology. From there moves on to an account of the similarities and differences between Lichtenberg’s and Kant’s views on the self. It concludes with a metacritical assessment of both authors’ views on the subject of thinking.

Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle,
HENRY R. RICHARDSON

The Molyneux Problem, MENNO LIEVERS

MIND

Vol. 101, No. 403, July 1992

Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content,
FRANCES EGAN

Computational theories, it is argued, are individualistic—they taxonomize mental states without essential reference to the subject’s environment. Representational content plays a role in computational psychology analogous to the role played by explanatory models in the physical

sciences. The contents ascribed to mental states in explanatory models of computational theories of *perception* typically do make essential reference to the subject's environment; hence, such theories are both individualistic and externalist.

Time and the Anthropic Principle, JOHN LESLIE

This defends Brandon Carter's doomsday argument. Carter's anthropic principle can remind us that observers are most likely to find themselves in the most richly inhabited spatio-temporal regions. This could much increase the estimated probability that our technological civilization was not the very first in a universe which would later contain hugely many—and, similarly, that you and I were not in the first 0.01% of the human race, which we could easily be if it survived for long at even its present size, let alone if it spread through the galaxy. In other words, it could strengthen our expectation of Doom Soon. The argument survives numerous ingenious objections, such as that a longer lasting human race represents more chances of having a life at all. Its force is lessened, however, if the world is radically indeterministic.

Causing, Delaying, and Hastening: Do Rains Cause Fires?
PENELOPE MACKIE

As Jonathan Bennett has pointed out, we tend to regard hastening something as causing it, whereas we do not tend to regard delaying something as causing it. This asymmetry in our treatment of delaying and hastening is puzzling. For example, it suggests that it is more natural to regard making happen earlier as causing than to regard making happen later as causing; but why should this be? The principal aim of the article is to account for this asymmetry. Following the rejection of various proposed explanations (including those suggested by Bennett and by Lawrence Lombard), it is argued that the asymmetry results from a difference in the ways in which delaying and hastening are related to preventing. The explanation is compatible with the view that, in general, delaying is not causing. It is also compatible, however, with a pragmatic account of our reluctance to treat delaying as causing.

Naturalism and the Mental, MICHAEL TYE

One project which many contemporary philosophers take to be of cardinal importance is the development of a satisfactory naturalistic theory of the mind. Without such a theory, it is feared, the mental will remain forever enigmatic; or, more radically, if the natural world is taken to be all that there is, the deeply ingrained conception we have of ourselves as undergoing and acting on mental states will be threatened. The aim of the article is to develop and defend a naturalistic approach to the mental which is in keeping with our ordinary, pretheoretical conception of

naturalism, and which has the effect of rendering type reductions or analyses otiose. In the course of developing this position, some comments are made which run counter to orthodoxy both about the relationship of the mental to the physical and about Brentano's problem.

What Happens When Someone Acts? J. DAVID VELLEMAN

Full-blooded human action entails an agent's bringing something about. If we wish to avoid Chisholm's conclusion that such causation by an agent is a primitive mode of causation—distinct from, and on a par with, causation by events and states—then we must find some nexus of events and states to which agent causation can be reduced, or on which it can be said to supervene. Attempts to naturalize agent causation in this manner (Frankfurt, Watson, Ginet, Bishop) have tended to propose a nexus of events and states to play the role of the agent's bringing something about. What is needed, however, is a nexus of events and states to play the functional role of the agent. This paper proposes such a reduction of agent causation.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 42, No. 167, April 1992

Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue, ROGER CRISP

The paper concerns the question of which decision procedure is recommended by utilitarianism. The most plausible version of utilitarianism is outlined. Problems for such a theory as a decision procedure, arising from the circumstances of decision making and the nature of utility, are discussed. An argument of Hare's for adopting nonutilitarian decision procedures on utilitarian grounds is considered. Finally, it is suggested that utilitarianism recommends a life of virtue.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
Vol. 101, No. 1, January 1992

Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends, STEPHEN DARWALL,
ALLAN GIBBARD, and PETER RAILTON

Philosophical theorizing about ethics has undergone a remarkable rebirth in the wake of the great expansion of normative ethics during the past two decades. This article attempts a critical survey of various recent trends in ethical theory, including constructivism, practical reasoning theories, noncognitivism, secondary-quality theories, and reductionist and

nonreductionist naturalisms. Issues about analysis and normativity are traced from their origins in Moore's *Principia Ethica* down to current debates over the ontological, epistemic, and practical standing of ethics. Also discussed are areas where clarification or progress seems most needed in ethical theory, as well as recent critiques of the enterprise of ethical theorizing.

History of Philosophy in Philosophy Today; and the Case of the Sensible Qualities, MARGARET D. WILSON

The paper is divided into three sections. Section 1 is concerned with the general relation between history of philosophy and philosophy. According to the central line of argument, there is currently no general, well-defended position on this issue. A tolerant openness to various outlooks is recommended. Section 2 examines a number of recent treatments of the status of sensible qualities, and of the primary-secondary quality distinction. One conclusion is that historical interpretation has changed in ways that are chronologically linked to changes in philosophical ideology with regard, specifically, to views about the relation of philosophy to science. In section 3 it is argued that present day discussions of sensible qualities tend to accept too uncritically the seventeenth-century framework. Subsequent developments, both scientific and philosophical, need to be taken more seriously into account.

Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990, TYLER BURGE

The Naturalists Return, PHILIP KITCHER

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
Vol. 101, No. 3, July 1992

Leibniz's Phenomenalisms, GLENN A. HARTZ

Leibniz recognized two principal types of perceived bodies: aggregates (collections of monads or of "small" corporeal substances) and corporeal substances (fancy aggregates supervised by a "dominant monad"). He employs three models: (1) perceptual, (2) mereological, and (3) supervenience. On (1), aggregates are phenomenal appearances mistakenly judged by the perceiving mind to be extramental bodies possessing secondary qualities, unity, spatial continuity, and reality. Model (2) says aggregates, viewed from an extramental perspective, are nonunified collections of an infinite number of discrete substances: they have no "metaphysical skin" holding those substances in any particular arrangement. Arguments are presented against Robert M. Adams' claims that such

extramentally considered aggregates are spatially continuous, and that a principle of aggregation determines how their constituent substances are arranged. Corporeal substances are also given a mereological construal. Model (3) claims that both sorts of bodies have derivative force which supervenes on their constituent substances' primitive force. These analyses are melded together into an overarching account of the sufficient conditions for Leibnizian bodies.

The Relational Nature of Color, EDWARD WILSON AVERILL

That x is yellow is analyzed in terms of the three way relation x -is-yellow-for-population- y -and-environment- z . Such relational colors are constructed from the logically primitive relation x -and- y -look-the-same-in-sensuous-color-to- w -under-conditions- z . This primitive relation fails to hold under certain conditions due to physical differences between x and y . These physical differences anchor the colors constructed from the logical primitive in the world. This relational account of color avoids a modal problem common to property accounts (set out in the beginning of the essay); it can define "looks yellow" in terms of "is yellow" without running into the circularity problems of some dispositional accounts; and it makes being yellow for our population in our environment an objective fact, and so does not have some of the problems of subjective accounts of color.

Reasons and Reductionism, MARK JOHNSTON

PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 67, No. 261, July 1992

Solitary Rule-Following, T. S. CHAMPLIN

Can a rule be followed by a lifelong total solitary? Wittgenstein said that following a rule is a custom. It can be the custom of a lifelong solitary person on a desert island to do something, but this does not mean that he has brought it about that it is the custom on his island to do what it is his and only his custom to do. For there to be a custom in existence on an island, many people must observe it. Because it is in the latter, not the former, sense of "custom" that following a rule is a custom, the answer to our original question is no. Following a rule is like following a fashion. A lifelong solitary can dress in a certain fashion, but he cannot be in or out of fashion. It can be his rule to do something but he cannot establish a rule.

Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution, J. O. NELSON

A Humean canvas of experience can seem to divest all inductions of whatever pre-analytic certainty and rational justification they possess.

This article argues that a Humean canvas of experience, freed of various theoretic and attitudinal prejudices, can return to inductions their preanalytic certainty and rational justifications (the problem of induction). For one thing, by resorting to an empirically founded appeal to kinds, realistically conceived, the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the grounds of an induction and the induction can be bridged without illegitimately converting inductions into formal deductions. Again, by resorting to an empirically founded appeal to pure presents, the predictions made in inductions can be, in spite of the skeptical import of an unknowable future, rationally validated. These two projects being successfully completed, the problem of induction is resolved.

Language and the Society of Others, GUY ROBINSON

From the beginning there have been two rival views of Wittgenstein's "private language argument." One makes it deeply revolutionary, challenging the premise of the era's individualistic guiding myths and philosophic constructions—the imagined solitary presocial language user who is nevertheless rational and can found society. The radical reading draws from it the conclusion that this creature is of no substance and is an impossibility, because language is necessarily social, requiring communion with others. It connects with Marx's view that individuals are not a starting point but a historical distillation. The rival view limits the argument to the soft target, necessarily private, unshareable languages, and leaves the creature and the myths standing. The paper aims to support the radical reading by focusing on language acquisition, coming to the conclusion that language cannot be imposed by God, by nature, or by conditioning, but requires the social relation of teaching and learning.

McTaggart at the Movies, GREGORY CURRIE

Theorists of film have claimed that cinematic images are present tensed, insofar as they represent fictional events as happening now for the viewer. This paper argues that this view is difficult to square with anachrony (flashes backward and forward). The paper suggests that we can make sense of anachrony without the idea of the present tensedness of such images by appealing to the difference between tensed and untensed temporal relations. It turns out that in an important sense anachrony is a dramatic/pragmatic notion as well as a temporal (but tenseless) one.

Philosophy and its History, FREDERICK C. COPLESTON

If the word "history" is understood as referring to historiography and its products, the claim that philosophy and its history are two distinct, though interrelated, things may seem to be obviously valid. If, however, the word "history," in the phrase "philosophy and its history," is understood as referring to the actual development of philosophical thought through

the centuries, it may seem to be obviously true that philosophy and its history are identical. Both theses are or can be made true by definition, and the question arises whether such playing with words can serve any useful purpose. By contributing to the activity of clarification, the distinction might perhaps jolt someone into questioning his or her dogmatically narrow and cramping idea of "true" or "genuine" philosophy. This suggestion does not necessarily imply that the truth-seeking aim of philosophy can never be attained.

Wholes, Parts and Infinite Collections, P. O. JOHNSON

In the *Principles of Mathematics*, Russell, influenced by Cantor's work on infinite quantities, abandoned the commonsense notion that the whole must be greater than the part and asserted that where both are infinite, they can be similar. He argued that if we accept this principle, we can resolve the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise; and unless we accept it, we cannot resolve the Tristram Shandy paradox. But this principle is shown to be neither necessary to nor sufficient for the solution of either paradox. Both can be resolved, however, by recognizing the impossibility of an infinite whole or part. It is also suggested that this might provide the solution to Russell's paradox of the class of classes that are not members of themselves, since such a class would also have to be an infinite whole.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Vol. 52, No. 2, June 1992

Heidegger's Question of Being and the "Augustinian Picture" of Language, HERMAN PHILIPSE

It has been shown by K. O. Apel and others that there is a striking similarity between Heidegger's destruction of the ontology of presence and the critique of the "Augustinian picture" by the later Wittgenstein. Without denying the fruitfulness of Apel's view, this paper argues that Heidegger, in asking the question of being, fell victim to the spell of Augustine's conception of language. The argument focuses on the relation between the question of being and Husserl's theory of categorial intuition.

Direct and Indirect Belief, CURTIS BROWN

Examples due to Tyler Burge and Saul Kripke show that one could be in the same belief state but have different objects of belief; and one can have the same objects of belief in virtue of being in different belief states. One's being in a particular belief state is nevertheless best characterized by the immediate objects of one's belief: those propositions one would believe in any situation in which one were in that belief state. So there is

a distinction between two sorts of belief: one directly believes one's immediate objects of belief, and indirectly believes the rest of the propositions one believes. The article develops and defends this distinction between direct and indirect belief, sketching an account according to which our direct beliefs together with our circumstances determine the rest of our beliefs, and applying this account to some puzzles about belief.

Skepticism and Interpretation, KIRK LUDWIG

This paper examines two arguments Donald Davidson has advanced recently to show that skeptical doubts about empirical knowledge are misplaced. The first argues from a requirement of universal intercommunicability of languages, and the intelligibility of an omniscient interpreter, to the conclusion that we cannot be massively mistaken about the world. It is shown that apart from doubts about the intercommunicability of all languages, this argument begs the question. The second argues that the publicity of language requires adopting the interpreter's standpoint in investigating meaning and the propositional attitudes; and from this it argues to the conclusion that our beliefs must by and large be about their causes. It is shown that the requirement placed on the publicity of language is too strong, and how the public character of language can be accounted for in a manner compatible with the possibility of massive error about the world. The paper ends with a suggestion for an alternative approach to skepticism.

Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology,
HAROLD BROWN

The main thesis of this paper is that direct realism does not leave us in a better situation than indirect realism for learning the nature of the physical world. In either case, claims about physical objects must be justified by the hypothetico-deductive procedures that provide the basis for all justifications of scientific theories. The main metaphysical thesis of direct realism is accepted in this paper, and the heart of the paper consists of a reconsideration of two traditional arguments against direct realism: the arguments from illusion and from causality. These arguments are reconstructed as arguments for an epistemological, rather than a metaphysical, conclusion.

Almost Indiscernible Twins, H. E. BABER

Distinct objects may be very similar, indeed, almost indiscernible. Moreover, individuals of most sorts are such that they could have been slightly different from the way they are. It would seem to follow that where a pair of objects is, as it were, composed of almost indiscernible twins, one twin or both could have been slightly different in such a way that, though distinct, they were absolutely indiscernible and thus constituted a counterexample to Identity of Indiscernibles. It is argued that

this apparently intuitive argument against Identity of Indiscernibles is flawed and should not force us to conclude that Identity of Indiscernibles is false.

The Epistemic Role of Qualitative Content, THEODORE SCHICK

The qualitative content of a mental state is its affective component—its “raw feels,” so to speak. According to traditional empiricism, qualitative content is part of the meaning of mental terms, for one cannot know what a mental term like “pain” means unless one has experienced pain. According to contemporary materialism, however, qualitative content is not part of the meaning of mental terms, for the meaning of a term is determined by its causal-relational properties, and one can know these without knowing its qualitative content. It is argued that while having a knowledge of a term’s qualitative content may not be necessary for having a knowledge of its meaning, it is necessary for having a complete knowledge of its meaning. On this view, one who has a knowledge of a term’s qualitative content will have a better understanding of it than one who does not, for not only will such a person be better able to use the term, but he will also have a better understanding of why it is used as it is. Since our knowledge of qualitative content affects our understanding of certain terms, it plays an epistemically significant role in limiting belief.

Semantics and the Psyche, MARCELO DASCAL
and AMIR HOROWITZ

Three recent papers in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (vol. 49.4, 1989) deal with the idea of psychosemantics. Jacqueline attacks Searle’s Chinese room argument and Searle replies by defending again his claim that syntax does not suffice for semantics, and that for something to display semantic properties it must possess the causal powers of the brain. Bogdan, on the other hand, attacks the idea that “semantics runs the psyche,” and then argues that Fodor’s program of naturalizing psychosemantics fails insofar as it does not explain what it is that makes a state intentional in the first place. This paper tries, first, to rebuff Bogdan’s first attack on psychosemantics. It then attempts to show (and criticize) how Searle does attempt to answer to Bogdan’s second claim, and why Fodor does not, from his point of view, have to bother about it. These observations will shed light on a crucial difference between Fodor’s and Searle’s views about intrinsic intentionality—and, we hope, on the issue of intrinsic intentionality itself.

Induction and the Gettier Problem, RICHARD CREATH

In the third edition of *Theory of Knowledge*, Chisholm proposes a revised solution for the so called Gettier problem. A variant of Gettier’s example is provided which shows that this latest solution does not work.

PHRONESIS
Vol. 37, No. 1, 1992

Change and Contrariety in Aristotle, JAMES BOGEN

Aristotle says that in all coming to be and passing away things arise from or perish into contraries or into intermediates which lie in between and are derived from contraries (*Physics* 188b21-26, and elsewhere). This paper takes up two questions about this: (1) Does Aristotle say enough about contrariety to justify our interpreting it as a nontrivial and principled scientific generalization?; (2) Since quantities have no contraries (*Categories* 5b12-14), can Aristotle's assertion be applied to growth and other quantitative changes? The author tries to answer these questions by appeal to material in *Metaphysics* 10. The answers this text suggests fall out of doctrines which the author thinks are vital for an understanding of Aristotelian natural science.

Aristote, l'imagination et le phénomène: l'interprétation de Martha Craven Nussbaum, RENÉ LEFEBVRE

Phantasia, pace Martha Nussbaum (*Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*), is not "our interpretation of the data." There is little room in Presocratic philosophy for a conception of *aisthēsis* as interpretative, and Aristotle sees perception as a reception and an actualization, not an interpretation; where there could be an interpretation of the data, *phantasia* is not mentioned. While reading Aristotle, one must not overestimate the relationship between *phantasia* and *phainesthai*, because for Greek thinkers and Aristotle himself, appearing is first something that being does; it is not a product of mind. Aristotle is not much interested in "phenomenology," but makes a new faculty enter philosophy under an ancient name. Moreover, the true Aristotle is more ambitious than Nussbaum's "saving Aristotle's appearances."

Friendship and the Comparison of Goods, MICHAEL PAKALUK

The article is ultimately concerned with the relationship among the three forms of friendship distinguished by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.2-3, and also with comparisons of the goods that are central to each of these forms. It argues that 8.1.1155b12-16, which raises a logical question concerning classification, is of crucial importance for understanding Aristotle's views on these matters. It maintains that the final sentence of this passage, b15-16, refers back to *Ethics* 1.6, Aristotle's criticism of a Platonic theory of goodness. This is argued for by rejecting various linguistic arguments that have been brought forward for athetizing b15-16, and also by establishing that the philosophical issues underlying b12-16—

which concern the possibility of comparisons between things different in kind—are of a piece with those taken up in 1.6.

In Defense of an Alternative View of the Foundation of Aristotle's Moral Theory, TIMOTHY D. ROCHE

Aristoteles' Glücksbegriff in der Nikomachischen Ethik. Eine Interpretation von EN I.7.1097 b2-5, PETER STEMMER

RATIO

Vol. 5, No. 1, June 1992

Redundant Truth, PHILIP HUGLY and CHARLES SAYWARD

Two versions of the redundancy theory of truth are distinguished: strong and weak. An argument put forth by Michael Dummett concludes that the weak version is vitiated by truth-value gaps. That argument is criticized in the paper. It is also argued in the paper, however, that the strong version of the redundancy theory is vitiated by truth-value gaps.

God or Orienteering? A Critical Study of Taylor's Sources of the Self, MELISSA LANE

The article identifies three claims made by Taylor in *Sources of the Self*, and four arguments used to support them. The claims are that (1) we must have a morality; (2) our morality must have a certain structure; and (3) its structure must be based on an incomparably higher good. The four kinds of argument are defined in the article as phenomenological, Transcendental, Best Account, and Historical. By investigating whether and how the three claims are supported by the four arguments, the article seeks to clarify and assess the intended results of Taylor's multifaceted text. It is the article's thesis that the Transcendental argument can establish only claim (1) of morality; that the Best Account argument can establish claim (2) of structure; but that the Best Account and the Historical arguments conflict fatally in attempting to establish claim (3), leaving us torn between a transcendent good and Transcendental orientation.

A Problem About Sanctions In Brandt's Utilitarianism,
WALTER E. SCHALLER

According to Richard Brandt, to say that an action is morally wrong is to say that it "would be prohibited by any moral code which all fully

rational persons would tend to support.” The most important feature of a moral code is that people have certain intrinsic desires and aversions, including the disposition to feel guilt for acting contrary to moral requirements. Although Brandt introduces the idea of guilt as a sanction in order to distinguish wrong actions from merely inexpedient or undesirable actions, by doing so, it is argued in this article, he begs the question. One must already know whether a given rule belongs in a moral code before one can determine whether violators ought to be subject to a moral sanction. That people should feel guilty for a given action presupposes the wrongness of their action; it cannot be part of the criterion of a wrong action.

*Cambridge, Jena or Vienna?—the Roots of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus*, HANS-JOHANN GLOCK

Scepticism and Goldman's Naturalism,
MARKUS LAMMENRANTA

On Some Objections to Relativism, JOHN PRESTON

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS, 1991-92*

The University of Alberta
(35) (30) (18)

The University of Arkansas
(15) (12) (9)

Boston College
(143) (85) (15)

RICHARD BELLEVILLE, "In Defense of Fatherhood." Adviser: Peter Kreeft.
ALLEN HANCE, "Person and Law in Hegel's Jena Writings." Adviser: Oliva Blanchette.
KAYANO MIZUNO, "Shinran's Pathos of the Infinite." Adviser: Peter Kreeft.

Boston University
(50) (50) (19)

SUSAN MOONEY, "The Evolution of Sex: A Historical and Philosophical Analysis." Adviser: Sahotra Sarkar.
MARK WEBER, "Wittgenstein on the Experience and Content Model of the Mind." Adviser: Jaakko Hintikka.

University of British Columbia
(23) (21) (14)

PETER APOSTOLI, "An Essay in Natural Modal Logic." Advisers: Richard Robinson, Ray Jennings.

Brown University
(29) (28) (13)

STEVEN HALES, "On the Possibility of Epistemic Certainty A Posteriori." Adviser: Roderick M. Chisholm.

* The three figures below each institution's name refer to (1) the number of graduate students enrolled in its philosophy department, (2) the number of "full-time" graduate students as the term is understood by the institution, and (3) the number of faculty members teaching in the graduate program.

DEAN ZIMMERMAN, "Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts?" Adviser: Roderick M. Chisholm.

Bryn Mawr College
(2) (0) (4)

TERRANCE WRIGHT, "Intentionality and Pure Logical Grammar in Husserl's Theory of Meaning."

The University of Calgary
(24) (24) (14)

ANDREW BEARDS, "Objectivity and Historical Understanding." Adviser: B. M. Baker.

DAMON A. GITELMAN, "Conceptual Scheme Differentiation." Adviser: K. E. Nielsen.

MICHAEL MILDE, "Gauthier, Rawls and the Social Contract in Contemporary Political Philosophy." Adviser: K. E. Nielsen.

The University of California, Davis
(35) (35) (12)

The University of California, Irvine
(36) (30) (13)

GAYNE ANACKER, "Two Logically Distinct Varieties of the Design Argument for the Existence of God: Analogical and Confirmation of Hypothesis." Adviser: Nelson Pike. Awarded in 1991.

BRUCE BOYER, "Dynamic Default Logic." Adviser: Peter Woodruff. Awarded in 1991.

JOHN COE, "Aristotle and Standards of Evaluation in an Ethics of Virtue." Adviser: Gary Watson.

CARLOS COLOMBETTI, "Global Problems and International Cooperation." Adviser: Gregory Kavka.

CHRISTOPHER SLUPIK, "An Interpretation of Hume's 'Of Miracles'." Adviser: Nelson Pike.

The University of California, Los Angeles
(50) (44) (14)

ADELEKE SEGUN ADEOFE, "Personal Identity and Reidentification." Advisers: Keith Donnellan, Joseph Almog.

PHILIP MACLEAN CLARK CLARK III, "The Irrelevance of Desire: An Essay on the Rationality of Action." Adviser: Philippa Foot.

DANIEL EDWARD GUEVARA, "The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kantian Moral Theory." Adviser: Robert M. Adams.

ADELE MERCIER, "Linguistic Competence, Convention and Authority: Individualism and Anti-Individualism in Linguistics and Philosophy." Adviser: Keith Donnellan.

The University of California, Riverside
(42) (41) (15)

- DAVID W. BARLOW, "Seeing and Hitting the Target: Aristotle's Aims in the *Ethics*." Adviser: David K. Glidden.
RICHARD LANGER, "The Right to Autonomy and the Right to Life." Adviser: John Martin Fischer.

The University of California, Santa Barbara
(34) (34) (11)

- ALEKSANDAR JOKIC, "Explaining Scientific Discovery." Adviser: Burleigh Wilkins.

The University of California, San Diego
(35) (33) (17)

- SYLVIA CULP, "Methodological and Ethical Issues in Experimental Inquiry: The Human Genome Initiative." Adviser: Philip Kitcher.
LOUIE MATZ, "Subjectivity and the Good as the Terms of Freedom in Plato and Hegel." Adviser: Robert Pippin.
ERIC PALMER, "A Critical Examination of the Notion of Scientific Rationality." Adviser: Philip Kitcher.
JON STEWART, "The Transition from 'Consciousness' to 'Self-Consciousness' in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit." Adviser: Frederick Olafson.
ELLEN WATSON, "Meaning, Metaphysics and Society." Adviser: Paul Churchland.

The Catholic University of America
(100) (54) (20)

- DAVID JOHN DE LEONARDIS, "The Ethical Implications of God and Unity in Nicholas of Cusa." Adviser: George McLean.
MARY K. DUCEY, "Aristotle on Pleasure: Reconciling Three Different Accounts." Adviser: Eugenio Benitez.
JACQUES A. DUVOISIN, "Aporia and Poetry in the Logic of Plato's Dialogues." Adviser: Eugenio Benitez.
EDWARD JAMES FURTON, "Reference and Representation in John of St. Thomas' Theory of Signs." Adviser: William Wallace.
ANDREW PETER MURRAY, "Intentional Species and the Identity Between Knower and Known According to Thomas Aquinas." Adviser: John Wippel.
IZUCHUKWU MARCEL ONYEOCHA, "Power and Authority in John Locke." Adviser: Richard Kennington.
GEORGE NORRIS PIERSON, "*Geist* and *Leben* in the Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer." Adviser: Daniel Dahlstrom.

The University of Chicago
(79) (72) (19)

- PATRICK CROSKERY, "Institutional Utilitarianism." Adviser: Russell Hardin.

JOSEPH FELSER, "R. G. Collingwood's Early Philosophy of Religion and Its Development." Adviser: Alasdair MacIntyre.

RICHARD GILMORE, "Philosophical Health: Wittgenstein's Method in *Philosophical Investigations*." Adviser: Leonard Linsky.

STUART GLENNAN, "Mechanisms, Models and Causation." Adviser: William Wimsatt.

The University of Cincinnati
(20) (15) (12)

The City University of New York
(111) (81) (33)

MARK BALAGUER, "Knowledge of Mathematical Objects." Adviser: Arnold Koslow.

JOHN PATRICK TEEHAN, "The Art of Scientific Morality: A Study of John Dewey's Moral Method." Adviser: Stefan B. Baumrin.

The University of Colorado
(76) (73) (22)

KEVIN W. GIBSON, "Some Ethical Problems in Mediated Dispute Resolution." Adviser: Dale Jamieson. Awarded in 1991.

The University of Connecticut
(30) (26) (16)

CHENYANG LI, "A Contextual Approach to the Question of Being." Adviser: Joel Kupperman.

Cornell University
(34) (34) (13)

SUSAN E. BABBITT, "Rationality and Integrity: The Role of Transformation Experiences in Defining Individual Rational Standards." Adviser: Richard Boyd.

STERLING V. HARWOOD, "Judicial Activism: A Restrained Defense." Adviser: David Lyons.

RODERICK T. LONG, "Free Choice and Indeterminism in Aristotle and Later Antiquity." Adviser: T. H. Irwin.

STEPHEN A. MAITZEN, "Theism as Theory: Issues in the Epistemology of Religious Belief." Adviser: Norman Kretzmann.

MARI E. ORSER, "Liberal Censorship: Liberalism and Acceptable Limits on Freedom of Expression." Adviser: Henry Shue.

G. BRIAN PENROSE, "The Liberal Commitment to Democracy." Adviser: Nicholas Sturgeon.

DePaul University
(65) (25) (12)

- JOHN BARASINSKI, "A Metaphysical Experience of the Absolute." Adviser: Manfred Frings.
PETER MERWIN, "The Symbolic Universe of Ernst Cassirer and the Oglala Lakotas." Adviser: Michael Naas.

Duquesne University
(46) (34) (10)

- MATTHEW CHUKWUELOBE, "The Relevance of Heidegger's Articulation of Death to Eschatology From An Igbo Perspective." Adviser: Wilhelm S. Wurzer.
TERRY KASELY, "Husserl's Cartesian Heritage and the 'Fifth Meditation'." Adviser: John Scanlon.
MICHAEL OPHARDT, "The Meaning of Style." Adviser: Wilhelm S. Wurzer.
JAMES QUICK, "The Dream of Philosophy: A Deconstruction of Reason." Adviser: Wilhelm S. Wurzer.
LEWIS SCHIPPER, "The Aesthetic Appreciation of Spinoza's Ethics Based on the Quest for Truth and Self Knowledge." Adviser: Wilhelm S. Wurzer.
KURT TORELL, "History, Science and Counterfactual Conditionals." Adviser: Lester Embree.

Emory University
(56) (37) (14)

- KENNETH L. ANDERSON, "Freedom, Meaning, and the Other: Toward Reconstructing a Sartrean Theory of Language." Adviser: Thomas R. Flynn.
RANDALL E. AUXIER, "Signs and Symbols: An Analogical Theory of Metaphysical Language." Adviser: Donald Phillip Verene.
PATRICIA J. COOK, "'Forgetting' in Plato's Dialogues." Adviser: Donald Phillip Verene.
TONG-SIK KIM, "The Limits of Ungrounded Rhetoric: A Criticism of Rorty's Views of Language, Truth, and Philosophy." Adviser: Nicholas G. Fotion.
PETER S. WASEL, "Skepticism and the Promise of Philosophy: An Essay on David Hume's Pyrrhonism." Adviser: Donald W. Livingston.
JAMES J. WINCHESTER, "Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn." Adviser: Rudolf A. Makkreel.

University of Florida
(12) (9) (13)

- DANIEL SALVANO, "The Idea of Community in Hegel's Philosophy of Right." Adviser: Robert D'Amico.

Florida State University

(29) (23) (8)

MICHAEL KELLY, "Logic as Know-How: Toward a Reconception of Logic."

Adviser: Eugene F. Kaelin.

SUSAN MARY ROUSE, "Pragmatic Reconstruction of the Institutional Theory of Art." Adviser: Eugene F. Kaelin.

Fordham University

(129) (92) (20)

GREGORY KERR, "Maritain's Receptive Intuition and the Benefits of Art."

Adviser: Deal W. Hudson.

Georgetown University

(67) (58) (22)

CAROL JEAN BAYLEY, "The Impact of Values and Worldviews on the Sciences and Practice of Medicine." Adviser: Robert Veatch.

AARON LEONARD MACKLER, "Cases and Judgments in Ethical Reasoning: An Appraisal of Contemporary Casuistry and Holistic Model for the Mutual Support of Norms and Case Judgments." Adviser: Tom Beauchamp.

ROBERT A. MAYHEW, "Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's *Republic*: A Philosophical Commentary on *Politics* II.1-5." Adviser: Alfonso Gomez-Lobo.

REGINA ORTIZ-MENA, "From Existence to the Ideal: Continuity and Development in Kant's Theology." Adviser: John Reuscher.

MINERVA SAN JUAN, "On Being Moved by Reasons: The Superiority of Kant's Internalism." Adviser: Henry Richardson.

The University of Georgia

(32) (23) (11)

MICHAEL POTTS, "Individuality, Metaphor, and God." Adviser: Frederick Ferré.

The University of Guelph

(50) (40) (19)

ANDRÉ AUGEN, "Getting Beyond the Impasse in Theories of Moral Education: The Contribution of a Phenomenology of Moral Life." Adviser: Jeffrey Mitscherling.

PAUL GALLINA, "Freedom and Necessity: Antonio Gramsci's Philosophy of Praxis." Adviser: John McMurtry.

CALVIN HAYES, "Alasdair MacIntyre's Critique of Liberal Individualism." Adviser: William Hughes.

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GUY S. AXTELL, "Cognitive Values, Theory Choice, and Pluralism: On the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical Diversity." Adviser: Lenn E. Goodman. Awarded in 1991.

ROBIN H. FUJIKAWA, "Dōgen and a Dimensionality Interpretation of Enlightenment." Adviser: Roger T. Ames.

SEUNG-HWAN LEE, "Virtues and Rights: Reconstruction of Confucianism as a Rational Communitarianism." Adviser: Chung-ying Cheng. Awarded in 1991.

ASANGA TILAKARATNE, "Transcendence, Ineffability and Nirvana: An Analysis of the Relation Between Religious Experience and Language According to Early Buddhism." Adviser: David J. Kalupahana.

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JOYCE CARPENTER, "Kant's Aesthetics." Adviser: G. Dickie.
JERRY KAPUS, "Truth and Explanation." Adviser: A. Gupta.

The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(39) (27) (19)

TOBY CASTLETON, "Logical Determinism, Causal Determinism, and Free Will." Adviser: Arthur Melnick.

KEVIN MACNEIL, "The Grammar of Obligation: An Investigation of the Views of Four British Moralists." Adviser: Peter Winch.

Indiana University
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IN TAK LEE, "A Critique of the Universalist Theory of Ethical Justification: Habermas vs. The Contextual Point of View." Adviser: Milton Fisk.

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(40) (40) (11)

PRAJIT BASU, "Scientific Explanation in the History of Chemistry: The Priestly-Lavoisier Debate." Adviser: Evan Fales.

GRANT C. STERLING, "Objectivism and Rational Action." Adviser: Richard Fumerton.

Johns Hopkins University
(41) (28) (9)

WILLIAM DOUGLAS EVANS, "The Contextual Basis of Rationality." Advisers: Stephen Barker, Dennis Des Chene.

JOSE G. LOPEZ-GONZALEZ, "John Maynard Keynes on Rationality and Uncertainty: A Philosophical Essay." Advisers: Stephen Barker, Edward Minar.

WENDELL MARK O'BRIEN, "Essays Toward an Interpretation of Butler's Ethics." Advisers: J. B. Schneewind, Susan Wolf.

The University of Kansas

(52) (45) (17)

RICHARD D. BOTKIN, "Epistemological Skepticism and Its Challenge to Naturalized Epistemology." Adviser: A. C. Genova.

MICHAEL R. HINZ, "Self-Creation and History: Collingwood and Nietzsche on Conceptual Change." Adviser: Rex Martin.

The University of Kentucky

(32) (25) (17)

EUGENE D. KLEPPINGER, "Explanations of Science: The Use of Case Studies in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge." Adviser: D. M. High.

JAN W. WOJCIK, "Robert Boyle and the Limits of Reason: A Study of the Relationship Between Science and Religion in 17th-Century England." Advisers: H. A. S. Schankula, J. E. Force.

Loyola University of Chicago

(99) (46) (33)

MIGUEL DEBEISTEGUI, "Heidegger and the Question of the Political." Adviser: John Sallis.

RICHARD FINDLER, "Heidegger and Kant: Displacement." Adviser: John Sallis.

JOHN PROTEVI, "Heidegger and Derrida on Time." Adviser: John Sallis.

ATSUSHI SUMI, "The One's Knowledge in Plotinus." Adviser: Gary Gurtler.

SHARON SYTSMA, "Internalism and Externalism in Ethics." Adviser: David Ozar.

Marquette University

(67) (49) (29)

LISELOTTE CHAMBERLAIN, "The Value of Human Life and Bioethics: A Philosophical Assessment." Adviser: Patrick J. Coffey.

MARGARET MONAHAN HOGAN, "Finality and Marriage." Adviser: Andrew F. Tallon.

WENDY LEE-LAMPSHIRE, "The Grammar of Subjecthood: Wittgenstein, Deconstruction and Dennett's Intentional Stance." Adviser: T. Michael McNulty.

The University of Massachusetts

(55) (55) (16)

DAVID COWLES, "Identity and Indeterminacy." Adviser: Fred Feldman.

KEVIN DODSON, "Kant's Theory of the Social Contract." Adviser: Robert Paul Wolff.

GITA VAN HEERDEN, "The Shift from Rationality to Irrationality in German Aesthetic Theory: Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer." Adviser: Gareth Matthews.

ANGELA CURRAN, "Issues in Aristotelian Essentialism." Adviser: Gareth Matthews.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(26) (20) (12)

TRACY ISAACS, "Actions and Events: A Study in Ontology and Ethics." Adviser: Judith Thomson.

MARGARET REIMER, "The Semantic Significance of Referential Intentions." Adviser: Richard Cartwright.

EDWARD STEIN, "Rationality and the Limits of Cognitive Science." Adviser: Ned Block.

McGill University

(33) (17) (17)

DAVID JOHNSTON, "J. L. Austin on Truth and Meaning." Adviser: David Davies.

IDDO LANDAU, "The Role of Reflexivity in the Western Philosophical Systems." Adviser: Charles Taylor.

McMaster University

(53) (32) (17)

ANTHONY COUTURE, "Social Criticism After Rawls: An Analysis of Interpretation and Justification." Adviser: Evan Simpson.

PREBEN MORTENSEN, "The Development of the Modern Conception of Art in Britain in the 18th Century, etc." Adviser: Barry Allen.

The University of Miami

(32) (20) (10)

The University of Michigan

(52) (52) (20)

STEPHAN BURTON, "Aesthetic Sensualism Defended." Adviser: Kendall Walton.

JOHN JAMES ECONOMOS, "A Non-Reductive Account of Function Statements in the Life Sciences." Adviser: Lawrence Sklar. Awarded in 1991.

ERIC H. GAMPEL, "Naturalizing the Normative." Adviser: Stephen Darwall. Awarded in 1991.

JEFFREY GAUTHIER, "Hegel's Ethical Thought and Feminist Social Criticism." Adviser: Frithjof Bergmann.

JAMES JOYCE, "The Axomastic Foundations of Boyefian Decision Theory." Advisers: Lawrence Sklar, Allan Gibbard.

JOEL RICHEIMER, "Perceptual Expertise and the Autonomy of Perception." Adviser: Eric Lormand.

DARRYL FRANCIS WRIGHT, "Refuting Idealism: G. E. Moore's Metaethics in Historical Context." Adviser: Donald Regan. Awarded in 1991.

Michigan State University

(65) (56) (24)

CYNTHIA BOLTON, "Necessary A Posteriori Truth." Adviser: Richard Hall.

BRUCE OMUNDSON, "Moral Pluralism, Nonsentient Nature, and Sustainable Ways of Life." Adviser: Martin Benjamin.

PAUL REITEMEIR, "Physician Integrity and the Role of Gatekeeper." Adviser: Martin Benjamin.

The University of Minnesota

(87) (87) (21)

JOSEPH BESSIE, "Theories of Probabilistic Causality." Adviser: C. Anthony Anderson.

The University of Missouri at Columbia

(30) (25) (9)

TIMOTHY PATRICK, "Lewis-Style Semantic for Conditional Logic of Obligation." Adviser: Paul Weirich.

Université de Montréal

(96) (33) (22)

JEAN-FRANCOIS BERNIER, "Proximité, signification, langage. Emmanuel Lévinas et la possibilité du discours." Adviser: Claude Lévesque.

ERIC BOURNEUF, "Les limites du réalisme scientifique en physique." Adviser: Yvon Gauthier.

JOSEPH CHBAT, "De la philosophie du sujet à la philosophie pratique chez Jean-Paul Sartre." Adviser: Gilles Lane.

JEAN ROY, "Instrumentalité et substantialité." Adviser: Garbis Kortian.

The University of Nebraska

(31) (25) (11)

The University of New Mexico

(40) (31) (10)

VIOLA CORDOVA, "The Concept of Monism in Navajo Thought." Adviser: Fred G. Sturm.

New School for Social Research
(154) (60) (12)

JOHN F. HUMPHREY, "Friedrich Nietzsche's *Aristen-Metaphysik*." Adviser: Reiner Schurmann.

New York University
(37) (19) (11)

State University of New York at Binghamton
(30) (29) (20)

The State University of New York at Buffalo
(49) (40) (16)

MARGARET HOLLAND, "The Quality of Moral Consciousness: Ethics in the Writing of Iris Murdoch and Martha Nussbaum." Adviser: Carolyn Korsmeyer.

ARLEEN SALLES, "Emotions and Moral Character: A Defense of the Role of Emotion in a Moral Life." Adviser: Carolyn Korsmeyer.

JOEL TIerno, "Descartes and the Theodicean Consequences of Human Error." Adviser: Richard Hull.

XIANGLONG ZHANG, "Heidegger and Taoism." Adviser: Kenneth Inada.

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
(44) (44) (19)

ELLEN L. FOX, "Moral Issues in Friendship." Adviser: Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

AMY ISLER, "The Self in the Moral Philosophy of Iris Murdoch." Adviser: Douglas C. Long.

Northwestern University
(40) (40) (15)

CIARAN PATRICK CRONIN, "Towards a Theory of Rationality in Moral Discourse: Wittgenstein and Habermas on Practical Reason." Adviser: Thomas McCarthy. Awarded in 1991.

MARGARET ANN McLAREN, "Complex Identity." Adviser: Nancy Fraser. Awarded in 1991.

ANDREW PETER NORMAN, "Justification and Context: The Rational Rejection of Demands for Evidence." Adviser: Arthur Fine.

WILLIAM R. REHG, "Insight and Solidarity: The Idea of a Discourse Ethics." Adviser: Thomas McCarthy. Awarded in 1991.

The University of Notre Dame
(69) (69) (35)

GREGORY H. BASSHAM, "Original Intent in Constitutional Theory: A Philosophical Study." Adviser: John H. Robinson. Awarded in 1991.

- VICTOR J. KREBS, "The Later Wittgenstein's Transcendentalism." Adviser: Karl Ameriks.
- MARK M. MOES, "Plato's Dialogue Form and the Cure of the Soul." Adviser: Kenneth Sayre. Awarded in 1991.
- BRIAN D. SIMBOLI, "Motivation, Objectivity, and Basic Goods in John Finnis's Natural Law Theory." Adviser: David Solomon.
- E. LANCE SIMMONS, "What Incommensurability Claims Mean: A Study of Lugwik Fleck's Contribution to the Incommensurability Debate." Adviser: Alasdair MacIntyre. Awarded in 1991.
- WILLIAM M. SMILLIE, "*Phantasia*: In Defense of Thomas' Account of Imagination." Adviser: Ralph McInerny.
- WILLIAM C. STEWART, "Social and Economic Aspects of Charles Sanders Peirce's Conception of Science." Adviser: Cornelius F. Delaney.
- JONATHAN M. STRAND, "The Semantics of Conditionals." Adviser: Alvin Plantinga.
- WILLIAM E. YOUNG, "Rationality and the Ends of Humean Action." Adviser: Richard Foley.

The Ohio State University

(81) (71) (25)

- JOSEPH OSEL, "Contemporary African Philosophy: An Asset or a Liability for Africa's Development?" Adviser: Andrew Oldenquist.

The University of Oregon

(31) (26) (8)

- JOHN A. CRABTREE, "Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology: Clarification and Critique." Adviser: Robert Herbert.
- PHILIP D. SMITH, "Learning to Love: Philosophy and Moral Progress." Adviser: William Davie.

The University of Pennsylvania

(33) (30) (10)

- PATRICIA CARROLL, "Interests and Autonomy." Adviser: Jay Wallace.
- TIMOTHY MAHONEY, "Plato's Moral Psychology: Beyond Egoism and Altruism." Adviser: Charles Kahn.
- MARIA MORALES, "Equality as Reciprocity: John Stuart Mill's *The Subjection of Women*." Adviser: Samuel Freeman.
- BERNARD REGINSTER, "Of Knowing and Willing, and of Willing to Know." Adviser: Alexander Nehamas.
- LAWRENCE SHAPIRO, "Representational Content in Cognitive Psychology." Adviser: Gary Hatfield.

The Pennsylvania State University

(56) (31) (17)

- LINDA J. FISHER, "Circularity and Philosophical Reflection: A Methodological Investigation into Hermeneutics, Gadamer, and Kant." Adviser: Carl G. Vaught.

PAUL J. GALLAGHER, "The Origins of Nietzsche's Artistic Metaphysics: An Approach to the Birth of Tragedy." Adviser: Stanley H. Rosen.

The University of Pittsburgh
(47) (41) (20)

GIAN ALDO ANTONELLI, "Revision Rules: An Investigation into Nonmonotonic Inductive Definitions." Adviser: Nuel D. Belnap.
DAVID BOONIN-VAIL, "Motions of the Mind: Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue." Adviser: David Gauthier.
JOYCE JENKINS, "Friendship and Alienation." Adviser: Annette Baier.
BRIAN LUKE, "From Animal Rights to Animal Liberation: An Anarchistic Approach to Inter-species Morality." Adviser: Jennifer Whiting.
SONIA SEDIVY, "The Determinate Character of Perceptual Experience." Adviser: John McDowell.

Princeton University
(38) (38) (19)

JOHN D. COLLINS, "Belief Revision." Adviser: David Lewis.
ZLATAN DAMNJANOVIĆ, "Facets of Infinity: A Theory of Finitistic Truth." Adviser: Paul Benacerraf.
MARIA C. DIMAIO, "Inductive Logic and the Foundations of Probability Theory: A Revaluation of Carnap's Program." Adviser: Richard Jeffrey.
LISA J. DOWNING, "Berkeley's Dynamical Instrumentalism." Adviser: Margaret Wilson.
BERYS NIGEL GAUT, "Moral and Aesthetic Evaluation." Adviser: Gilbert Harman.
CLAUDIA J. MILLS, "Influence: Coercion, Manipulation, and Persuasion." Adviser: Thomas Scanlon.
PAULINE M. O'CONNOR, "Mattering Equally." Adviser: Gilbert Harman.
GIDEON A. ROSEN, "Remarks on Modern Nominalism." Adviser: Paul Benacerraf.
JAMIE TAPPENDEN, "Vagueness and Truth." Adviser: Saul Kripke.

Purdue University
(34) (26) (18)

JOHN FRITZMAN, "The Consequences of Antifoundationalism: The Intersection of Dialectic and Rhetoric." Adviser: Calvin O. Schrag.
DAVID MILLER, "Husserl and the (Im)possibility of Communication; A Prolegomenon to a Philosophy of Communication." Advisers: Calvin O. Schrag, Brant Burleson.
JULIE PEDERSON, "Consciousness, Emotion, and the Problem of the 'Other'." Adviser: William L. McBride.
ANNE WATERS, "Law, Morality, and Politics: Reproduction and Surrogacy." Adviser: William L. McBride.

Queens University
(36) (30) (15)

STEPHEN J. MAGUIRE, "Gadamer's Hermeneutics: Criticism and Community." Adviser: Albert P. Fell.

Rice University
(20) (20) (11)

MICHAEL D. CAPISTRAN, "Analysis: Descartes' Mathematics as a Paradigmatic Model for an Elucidation of His Method in the Natural Sciences." Adviser: Mark A. Kulstad.

SUSANNA GOODIN, "Locke's Scepticism About Natural Science." Adviser: Mark A. Kulstad.

BECKY WHITE, "Competency to Consent." Adviser: Baruch A. Brody.

The University of Rochester
(33) (33) (7)

YOEN-KYO JUNG, "John Locke's Contractarian Theory of Political Obligation." Adviser: Randall Curren.

SHARON RYAN, "Rational Belief in the Impossible." Adviser: Richard Feldman.

STEFAN SENCERZ, "Moral Intuitions, Moral Facts, and Justification of Ethics." Adviser: Earl Conee.

Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
(51) (44) (30)

MICHAEL DAHLEM, "Self-Identity and the Social Contract." Adviser: Mary Gibson. Awarded in 1991.

GREGG HOROWITZ, "Looking at Pictures: On the Pragmatics of Visual Representation." Adviser: Peter Kivy.

Saint Louis University
(40) (24) (17)

THOMAS P. HANLON, "Aristotle's Response to Socratic Intellectualism." Adviser: Richard Blackwell.

THOMAS M. JEANNOT, "On the Road to Historical Materialism: Marx's Earliest Philosophical Writings." Adviser: James L. Marsh.

JOHN MESSERLY, "Piaget's Conception of Evolution." Adviser: Richard Blackwell.

KEVIN P. O'HIGGINS, "From the Other Side of Being: The Analectical Philosophy of Enrique Dussel." Adviser: John F. Kavanaugh.

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
(40) (36) (12)

KENNETH COOLEY, "Sir David Ross's Pluralistic Theory of Duty." Adviser: Lewis E. Hahn.

- WEI-MING GU, "Habermas's Theory of Modernity and Rationality." Adviser: Garth Gillan.
- DONALD MAIER, "The Hermeneutic Response to Deconstruction: Gadamer's Encounter with Derrida." Adviser: Stephen Tyman.
- YU-JEN TENG, "An Inquiry Into Thought Experiment." Adviser: Mark Johnson.
- XIAO-YANG YU, "Democracy and Culture." Adviser: Thomas Alexander.

Stanford University
(51) (51) (26)

- PATRICIA BLANCHETTE, "Logicism Reconsidered." Adviser: John Etchemendy. Awarded in 1990.
- FRANK THOMAS BURKE, "Dewey's New Logic: A Reply to Russell." Adviser: Denis Phillips.
- MARY CAIN, "The Notion of the Supersensible in Kant's Three Critiques." Adviser: Marleen Rozemond.
- DAVID CHAN, "The Nature of Action: A Causal Account." Adviser: Michael Bratman.
- CHARLES DRESSER, "Contemporary Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory." Adviser: Michael Bratman. Awarded in 1990.
- CARL HOEFER, "General Relativity and Space-time Relationism." Advisers: Nancy Cartwright, Peter Galison. Awarded in 1991.
- MARTIN JONES, "Locality and Holism: The Metaphysics of Quantum Theory." Advisers: Nancy Cartwright, Peter Galison. Awarded in 1991.
- SUN-JOO SHIN, "Valid Reasoning and Visual Representation." Adviser: John Etchemendy. Awarded in 1991.
- PAUL SKOKOWSKI, "From Neural Networks to Human Agents: Structural Content in Learned Behavior." Adviser: Fred Dretske.
- BRYAN VAN NORDEN, "Mencian Philosophic Psychology." Adviser: David Nivison. Awarded in 1991.
- BRAD WILBURN, "Moral Improvement." Adviser: Rachel Cohon.

Syracuse University
(46) (36) (21)

- EVA DADLEZ, "What's Hecuba to Him? Fictional Events and Actual Emotions." Adviser: Catherine Lord.
- FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER, "An Analysis and Defense of an Ethics of Love." Adviser: Jonathan Bennett.
- PAUL SAUER, "The Incompatibility of Foreknowledge and Freedom." Adviser: Peter van Inwagen.
- MARK OWEN WEBB, "Religious Experience, Natural Theology and the Reference of 'God'." Adviser: William P. Alston.

Temple University
(42) (30) (14)

- CAROL COVENY, "Kant's Antinomies of Pure Reason." Adviser: John Atwell.

- BRIDGET NEWELL, "The Norms of Science and the Norms of Scientists." Adviser: John Atwell.
 JAMES SNOW, "Patterns of Vulnerability: Aristotle, Kant, and the Good Life." Adviser: David Welker.
 MSOSA WATSON, "Aesthetics of Selfhood." Adviser: David Welker.
 HAROLD WEISS, "The Concept of Justice in Nietzsche's Philosophy." Adviser: David Welker.

The University of Tennessee
 (45) (33) (14)

- BRIAN ELWOOD, "A Comparative Analysis of Nishida and Sartre with Special Reference to Their Ontologies." Adviser: Richard E. Aquila.
 BRYAN HILLIARD, "Nietzsche's *Übermensch*: A Philosophical Analysis." Adviser: L. B. Cebik.
 SHEILA HOLLANDER, "Values and Disvalues Underlying Mandatory Screening." Adviser: Glenn C. Graber.
 MIN-SOO LEE, "Military Virtues and Superior Orders." Adviser: Sheldon M. Cohen.
 KENNETH SCHMITT, "*Cura Animarum* in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: Toward the Development of an Ethical Framework for the Practice of Pastoral Counseling." Adviser: Rem B. Edwards.

The University of Texas at Austin
 (100) (75) (26)

- VICTOR M. CASTON, "Aristotle on Intentionality." Adviser: Alex Mourelatos.
 ANNE COLLINS-SMITH, "A Translation and Analysis of Thomas Aquinas' *Expositio super Librum de Causis*." Adviser: Louis Mackey.
 JILL GORDON, "Is Virtue Teachable? A Socratic View of Moral Education." Adviser: Louis Mackey.
 RUSSELL HOVERMAN, "Biological Basis of Moral Behavior." Adviser: Robert Causey.
 JOSEPH ROGERS, "Plato on the Need for Legislation." Adviser: Paul Woodruff.

The University of Toronto
 (131) (127) (70)

- MICHAEL JOHN BAUR, "Hegel and Heidegger as Transcendental Philosophers." Adviser: G. A. Nicholson.
 JONATHAN BREMER, "Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Intentionality in the Phenomenology of Perception and its Logical Development from Husserl and Heidegger." Adviser: C. Normore.
 FRANK H. W. EDLER, "The Significance of Hölderlin for Heidegger's Political Involvement with Nazism." Adviser: G. A. Nicholson.
 FRANCISCO JOSÉ GONZALEZ, "The Tension Between the Means and End of Philosophical Inquiry: Dialectic in Plato's Early and Middle Dialogues." Adviser: J. Rist.

- JAMES PAUL ANTHONY KOW, "The Religious Basis of Hegel's Ethical Theory." Adviser: H. Harris.
- JILL LEBLANC, "Ineffability Claims in the Mystical Theology of St. John of the Cross." Adviser: H. G. Herzberger.
- MARK DOUGLAS MERCER, "On the Possibility and Nature of Interpretation." Adviser: L. W. Forgyson.
- KENT ALAN PEACOCK, "Peaceful Coexistence or Armed Truce? Quantum Nonlocality and the World." Adviser: J. R. Brown.
- ROBERT J. PEPPER-SMITH, "Self and World: A Conception of Personal Autonomy Based upon Heidegger's Phenomenological Ontology." Adviser: T. D. Langan.
- GREGORY LAWRENCE SCOTT, "Unearthing Aristotle's Dramatics: Why There is No Theory of Literature." Adviser: F. E. Sparshott.
- CATHERINE JANE LOUISA TALMAGE, "The Publicity and Privacy of Languages: On Davidson's Conception of Linguistic Meaning." Adviser: B. D. Katz.

Tulane University
(44) (44) (11)

- JULIUS A. CIAFFA III, "Max Weber and the Problems of Value-Free Social Science: A Critical Examination of the *Werturteilsstreit*." Adviser: Michael Zimmerman.
- JOHN HOWARD, "Imagination, Mental Imagery, and Naturalism." Adviser: Donald S. Lee.
- PAULA SMITHKA, "The Compatibility of Aristotelian Teleology With Functional Explanations and Contemporary Genetic Theory." Adviser: Graeme Forbes.
- XIAOPING WANG, "An Investigation of the Properties of the McKinsy Axiom." Adviser: Graeme Forbes.

Vanderbilt University
(45) (45) (15)

- MARINA CONSTANCE BEAR, "Maturity." Adviser: John Lachs.
- KENNETH STEWARD CASEY, "The Quarrel Between Rhetoric and Philosophy: Ethos and the Ethics of Rhetoric." Adviser: Henry Teloh.
- THOMAS EDWARD GASKILL, "Ibn Sina's Ontology in his *Dānishnāma-i Alāi*." Adviser: Idit Dobbs-Weinstein.
- ELIZABETH ALICE LYONS, "Assessing Decision Making and Dispute Resolution in Environmental Policy: Regulatory Negotiations at the Environmental Protection Agency." Adviser: John Compton.
- TIMOTHY JOEL MCGREW, "An Essay in the Possibility of Knowledge." Adviser: Jeffrey Tlumak.
- KELLY ANDREW PARKER, "The Principle of Continuity in Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology and Semeiotic." Adviser: John Lachs.
- SUSAN MARIE SCHOENBOHM, "Touching Loss: Thinking of Determination and Excess." Adviser: John Lachs.
- MARCIA ANITA THOMAS-RITTENHOUSE, "Unitary and Binary Conceptions of Sex: A Defense of the Unitary Perspective." Adviser: John Compton.

Washington University
(30) (30) (15)

JAY CAMPBELL, "A Critical Survey of Recent Philosophical Theories of Metaphor." Adviser: Roger F. Gibson.

The University of Washington
(42) (26) (13)

ANN O. FORSTER, "Verificationism Reconsidered." Adviser: Laurence BonJour.

The University of Waterloo
(39) (26) (17)

MANOHARAN S. DANIEL, "Relating *Vita Activa* and *Vita Contemplativa*: Hannah Arendt on the Human Condition." Adviser: Richard H. Holmes.

BRUCE BENJAMIN JANZ, "Jacob Boehme's Theory of Knowledge in *Mysterium Magnum*." Adviser: James R. Horne.

RICHARD MAUNDRELL, "Sartre and Liberalism." Adviser: Richard H. Holmes.

ROBERT SCOTT STEWART, "Poetry and Politics: The Influence of Aesthetics in the Thought of John Stuart Mill." Adviser: Bernard H. Suits.

Wayne State University
(22) (21) (10)

The University of Western Ontario
(60) (56) (22)

ROBERT G. HUDSON, "Why is Observation Important to Science?" Adviser: R. E. Butts.

JOHN F. METCALFE, "Aspects of Victorian Psychologism." Adviser: R. E. Butts. Awarded in 1991.

HENDRIK OVERDUIN, "Assertoric Validity in Journalistic News Judgment." Adviser: R. W. Binkley. Awarded in 1991.

The University of Wisconsin
(88) (74) (24)

KEITH BUTLER, "Connectionism, Classical Cognitivism and Reduction: A Case for PDP." Adviser: Berent Enc. Awarded in 1991.

DAVID WERTHER, "Necessity, Contingency, and Certainty: The Cartesian Consequences of Leibniz's Modal Views." Adviser: Keith Yandell.

Yale University
(35) (35) (14)

CHRISTOPHER DUSTIN, "Ethics and the Possibility of Objectivity." Adviser: Jonathan Lear.

- MARK KIGHTLINGER, "The Philosopher as Professor in Hegel's Philosophy of Right." Adviser: John E. Smith.
- MARK KINGWELL, "Just Talking: Dialogic Models in Contemporary Justice Theory." Adviser: Georgia Warnke.
- THOMAS LEVIN, "Ciphers of Utopia Critical Theory and the Dialectics of Technological Inscription." Adviser: Karsten Harries.
- MICHAEL MCDUFFIE, "World and Life-World: A Study in Husserl's Phenomenology." Adviser: Maurice Natanson.
- MARK H. C. MIGOTTI, "The Early Nietzsche and the Question of Redemption." Adviser: Karsten Harries.
- VICTORIA MORA, "Gender Expression and Analogy: A Reproach to the Problem of the Other." Adviser: Maurice Natanson.
- MARK RAVIZZA, "Moral Responsibility and Control: An Actual Sequence Approach." Adviser: Jonathan Lear.
- GARY STEINER, "The Idea of a Ground for Ethical Commitment in Descartes and Heidegger." Adviser: Karsten Harries.
- GAIL D. WEISS, "The Hermeneutics of Gesture." Adviser: Maurice Natanson.

York University
(60) (50) (32)

- LASZLO BODNAR, "Professional Ethics in Modern Society." Adviser: H. S. Bassford.
- LANCE ODLAND, "F. W. J. von Schelling's Conception of Freedom." Adviser: M. B. Bakan.

VISITING PROFESSORS FROM ABROAD, 1992-93

David Armstrong University of Sydney, Australia	The University of California, Irvine Fall 1992
Myles Burnyeat Cambridge University	The University of Pittsburgh September 1992–October 1992
George Carew The University of Sierra Leone	The University of Connecticut June 1992–September 1993
Max J. Cresswell Victoria University of Wellington	The University of Massachusetts Fall 1992
Dirk-Martin Grube Humboldt Foundation	Duquesne University April 1992–March 1993
Rom Harré Oxford University	State University of New York at Binghamton August 1992–September 1992
Richard Kearney University College, Dublin	Boston College Spring 1993
Christopher Kirwan Oxford University	Rice University Fall 1992
Job Kozhamthadam De Nobili College, India	Loyola University of Chicago Fall 1992
Jean-Louis Labrière C.N.R.S.	The Université de Montréal September 1992–October 1992
Matthias Lutz-Bachmann Freie Universität Berlin	Saint Louis University Fall 1992
Jean-François Malherbe Université Catholique de Louvain	The Université de Montréal Fall 1992
Krzysztof Michalski Institut für Wissenschaften vom Menschen	Boston University Fall 1992

Barry Miller
University of New England,
Australia

The University of Notre Dame
Fall 1992

Philippe Mongin
C.N.R.S.

The Université de Montréal
September 1992–October 1992

Kevin Mulligan
Université de Genève

The University of California,
Irvine
Winter 1993

David Pears
Oxford University

The University of California,
Los Angeles
January 1992–June 1993

Itamar Pitowsky
Hebrew University, Jerusalem

The University of Western Ontario
Fall 1992

Tanya Reinhart
Tel Aviv University

The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
September 1992–January 1993

José Sagüillo
University of Santiago de
Compostelo

The State University of New York
at Buffalo
February 1993–May 1993

Svetozar Stojanovic
Univerzitet U Beogradu

The University of Kansas
Fall 1992

J. van Benthem
Universiteit van Amsterdam

Stanford University
April 1993–June 1993

René van Woudenberg
Free University, Amsterdam

The University of Notre Dame
Fall 1992

Yirmiyahu Yovel
Hebrew University, Jerusalem

New School for Social Research
Spring 1993

Eddy Zemach
Hebrew University, Jerusalem

The University of Miami
January 1993–June 1993

NORTH AMERICAN PROFESSORS ABROAD, 1992-93

James Allen The University of Pittsburgh	Cambridge University September 1992–December 1992
Roger T. Ames The University of Hawaii	Chinese University of Hong Kong Spring 1993
Nicholas Asher The University of Texas at Austin	Toulouse Spring 1993
E. J. Bond Queens University	St. Andrews University January 1993–June 1993
Chung-ying Cheng The University of Hawaii	International Christian University, Tokyo Spring 1993
David S. Clarke, Jr. Southern Illinois University at Carbondale	Southern Illinois University, Nakajo, Japan Summer 1992
Norman Dahl The University of Minnesota	University of Oslo, Center for Medical Ethics Fall 1992
Lynd Forguson The University of Toronto	England Fall 1992–Spring 1993
Michael Friedman The University of Illinois at Chicago	Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Bielefeld, Germany Spring 1993
David Gauthier The University of Pittsburgh	Oxford University September 1992–April 1993
Russell B. Goodman The University of New Mexico	Universidad de Barcelona, and Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona Spring 1993

- | | |
|---|---|
| James R. Griesemer
The University of California, Davis | Institute for Advanced Study,
Berlin
Fall 1992–Spring 1993 |
| Thomas M. Hurka
The University of Calgary | Corpus Christi College, Oxford
January 1993–June 1993 |
| David J. Kalupahana
The University of Hawaii | Sri Lanka and Thailand
Fall 1992 |
| Erazim Kohák
Boston University | Charles' University, Prague
Spring 1993 |
| Karel Lambert
The University of California,
Irvine | Universität Salzburg
Fall 1992
Universität Bielefeld
Fall 1992 |
| Charles Landsman
The City University of New York | Ben Gurion University, Israel
Fall 1992–Spring 1993 |
| Ernie LePore
Rutgers, The State University of
New Jersey | Florence
1992–1993 |
| Rex Martin
The University of Kansas | University of Sydney, Australia
Fall 1992 |
| Charles McCracken
Michigan State University | Paris
1992–1993 |
| Pierre Pellegrin
Princeton University | Paris
February 1993–June 1993 |
| Jean Roy
Université de Montréal | Centre d'étude de la vie politique
française
Winter 1993 |
| John Sallis
Vanderbilt University | Hegel Archive, Ruhr-Universität
Bochum
1992–1993 |
| Dominic Scott
Princeton University | Cambridge University
September 1992–June 1993 |
| Harvey Siegel
The University of Miami | Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Summer 1992 |

Dan Sperber
Princeton University

Paris
February 1993–June 1993

Alastair Urquhart
The University of Toronto

Canberra, Australia
Fall 1992–Spring 1993

Roger Woolhouse
Princeton University

University of York
September 1992–February 1993

PROFESSORS ENTERING RETIREMENT IN 1992

Henry A. Alexander, Jr.
The University of Oregon

June 1992

Philip Bashor
The University of Arkansas

July 1992

Francis J. Collingwood
Marquette University

June 1992

Susan Coval
The University of British
Columbia

December 1992

Clement Dore
Vanderbilt University

May 1992

Julius Elias
The University of Connecticut

June 1992

Charles Ermatinger
Saint Louis University

May 1992

Howard Friedman
The University of Connecticut

June 1992

Manfred S. Frings
DePaul University

December 1992

Robert Johann
Fordham University

May 1992

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

Philosophical Inquiry announces a series of special issues and single monographs on general philosophical themes. Scholars are invited to submit papers for special issues dedicated to the following topics: Presocratics, Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Skeptics, Epicureans, Plotinus, Modern skepticism, causality, art and technology, aesthetic criteria, philosophy of language, and Chinese philosophy. Papers may be submitted to D. Z. Andriopoulos, Editor, *Philosophical Inquiry*, Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki, P.O. Box 84, Thessaloniki, Greece.

The Sartre Society of North America announces a call for papers for its sixth biennial meeting to be held May 7-9, 1993, at Trent University in Petersborough, Ontario. Among suggested paper topics are Sartre and postmodernism, Sartre and the collapse of Communism, and, What is left of Sartre's thought and politics? A paper of no more than 30 minutes reading time, or an abstract, should be sent by November 15 to William McBride, Philosophy Department, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907; or to Adrian van den Hoven, French Department, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P4.

The North American Association for the Study of Jean-Jacques Rousseau invites papers for an interdisciplinary conference entitled "Rousseau and Criticism," to be held May 27-30 at Trent University in Ontario. Especially encouraged are papers on Rousseau and Romanticism, Rousseau and contemporary feminism, and Rousseau's influence on contemporary literary theories. Abstracts of one or two pages should be sent by December 1 to Jim MacAdam, Department of Philosophy, Champlain College, Trent University, Petersborough, Ontario, Canada K9J 7B8.

The Twenty-Eighth International Congress of Medieval Studies, sponsored by The Center for Thomistic Studies, will be held May 6-9, 1993, at Western Michigan University. The conference's three sessions will be devoted to all areas of the thought of Aquinas. For more information contact R. E. Houser, Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas, 3800 Montrose, Houston, Texas 77006-4696.

The International Conference on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas will be held May 21-23 at Loyola University of Chicago, Lake Shore Campus. The theme is "Ethics as First Philosophy? Levinas's Renewal of Philosophy and its Significance for Literature, Philosophy, and Religion." For information write to Adriaan Peperzak, Arthur J. Schmitt Chair of Philosophy, Loyola University, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60626.

Emory University announces a National Endowment for the Humanities interdisciplinary summer institute for college and university faculty, "Giambattista Vico and Humanistic Knowledge," to be held at Emory University, June 13-24, 1993. Institute faculty include Andrea Battistini (University of Bologna), John Bishop (University of California, Berkeley), Gustavo Costa (University of Rome), Marcel Danesi (Victoria College, University of Toronto), Donald R. Kelley (Rutgers, The University of New Jersey), Giuseppe F. Mazzotta (Yale University), John O'Neill (York University), Nancy S. Struever (Johns Hopkins University), Giorgio Tagliacozzo (Institute for Vico Studies), and Donald Phillip Verene (Emory University). Twenty-five participants will be selected. Applicants must be full-time faculty at a U.S. college or university. A stipend, and support for room, board, and travel, will be provided. Information may be obtained from Donald Phillip Verene, Director, Institute for Vico Studies, Department of Philosophy, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322; telephone 404-727-4340.

The ninth annual issue of *New Vico Studies* (1991) has been recently published. The issue includes articles on "The Aesthetic in Vico and Nietzsche," by David Parry; "Vattimo's 'weak' thought and Vico's 'new' science," by Hayden White; "*Sensus communis* and Rhetoric in Vico," by Nancy Streuver; "Vico and Rorty," by John D. Schaeffer; and "Giambattista Vico's *Institutiones Oratoriae*," by Gustavo Costa. Subscriptions may be ordered from Humanities Press International, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 07716; telephone 908-872-1441.

The international publisher Rodopi announces the Value Inquiry Book Series, a publishing program for scholarly works in philosophy. Monographs, thematic volumes, special series, well-edited conference proceedings, and translations into English will be considered in all areas of value inquiry, including social and political thought, values in higher education, applied philosophy, ethics, medical humanities, religious values, values in science and technology, formal axiology, history of ideas, law and society, and theory of culture. More information may be obtained from Robert Ginsberg, Executive Editor, Value Inquiry Book Series, The Pennsylvania State University, Delaware County Campus, Media, Pennsylvania 19063-5596.

The Planning Committee for the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy invites suggestions regarding (1) potential sources of financial support for the Congress, and (2) the overall theme of the Congress, which is expected to be held in Boston, August 10-16, 1998. The theme must be specified in the Committee's formal proposal to host the World Congress; the proposal will be considered at the Nineteenth World Congress in Moscow, August 1993. The topic should be of broad interest to philosophers in the United States and abroad. Send suggestions to Richard De George, Chair of the Planning Committee, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.

DOCUMENTATION

On March 14, 1992, at the forty-third meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, the Founder's Medal, named in honor of Paul Weiss, was conferred on Edward Pols. The citation, prepared by George L. Kline and read by Mary T. Clark, was as follows:

Edward Pols, Research Professor and former Professor of Philosophy and Kenan Professor of the Humanities, Bowdoin College, and Past President of this Society: we the officers and members of the Metaphysical Society of America take pleasure in honoring you with the presentation of the Founder's Medal—the Paul Weiss Medal—for distinguished contributions to metaphysics.

In a long and admirable career as teacher, scholar, and thinker, you have inspired the respect and loyalty of your students—some of whom are now members of this Society—at Harvard, Princeton, and, for more than forty years, at Bowdoin, as well as Santa Clara University, where you have served as visiting professor.

You have shown unusual sensitivity to the concerns of the natural sciences as well as those of the arts and literature, and have yourself composed a dignified and moving elegy for your Harvard classmate, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. In your many writings on questions of ontology and epistemology you have persuasively opposed reductionism of every kind, including that of the fashionable “linguistic consensus,” defending a radical realism which stresses the spontaneity and creative autonomy of reason, as “radically originative reflection.” Your own persistent reflections have illuminated a series of deep and difficult questions, among them the relation of Being to the plurality of beings; the nature of human experience and knowledge; the character of persons and of the self; the nature and varieties of agency, act, responsibility, authenticity, and freedom.

In making this award, the officers and members of this Society pay honor both to your notable achievements as a speculative thinker and to you yourself as a person of rare breadth, cultivation, and humanity.

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
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ARTICLES

THE SUPPLEMENT OF THE COPULA: LINGUISTIC LIGHT ON AN OLD LOGICAL PROBLEM

JOHN DEELY

I

ASSERTIONS ARE A SYMBOLIC FORM that exists only within species-specifically human language. Language, of course, allows for many other conventions of symbolic expression: greetings, exclamations, commands, exhortations, imprecations, interrogatives, and so forth. But assertions are unique in possessing, of themselves, a truth-value—that is to say, in being adjudicable as true or false. All other varieties of discourse are adjudicable as true or false by reason of assertions they presuppose, contain, or imply. But the assertion as such is what is directly so adjudicable.

A. Choosing Terminology: New Bottles for Old Wine. An assertion, in traditional logic, is commonly called a “proposition.” The status of the proposition as such, as distinct from its particular linguistic expression, has led to many debates over the centuries. Among recent philosophers who call themselves “linguistic,” some have preferred to speak rather of “statements” or “sentences” (“sentences in the indicative mood,” “declarative sentences with tenseless verbs,” and so forth¹) than propositions, in order to evade debate over the objective status of propositions. But this preference amounts to little more than a verbal dodge. The irreducible fact is that, whatever it be called, there is a unit of discourse which of itself

¹ Cf. W. V. O. Quine, *Elementary Logic*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 5-6. The term “proposition” does not appear in the index to this work.

is adjudicable as true or false; and this unit, whatever it be called, is the focal point of logical concern—both as to what are the linguistic factors necessary to constitute it, and as to what are the further linguistic constructs that can be made from it in the line of truth and falsity—when we say of a position that it is incomplete, inconsistent, “full of holes,” well-reasoned, and so on.

It is important to note that although some linguistic units of discourse are adjudicable as true or false, these linguistic units are far from the only elements of our experience that exhibit that quality. While debates among logicians, particularly within the framework of so-called linguistic philosophy, have been cast in a decidedly glottocentric mold over the past fifty years, introduction of the semiotic point of view into the debate immediately indicates ways of breaking this mold and giving new life to the concerns of logic, which was originally conceived as providing an interpretive instrument useful across the range of human concerns, at least insofar as these concerns involve or are brought to expression in the peculiar symbolic form of linguistic discourse.

As in so many other areas of semiotic inquiry, the principal clues in this area of “logical language,” so to say, have been provided by the seminal work of Charles Sanders Peirce, the first, and so far the only, logician who attempted to rethink the concerns of logical tradition from the perspective of the sign. It is true that a long line of Latin philosophers, in the Iberian world of Renaissance times particularly, from Domingo de Soto² to John Poincot³ and Comas del Brugar,⁴ explicitly recognized well before Peirce that the doctrine of signs provides the foundation for any inquiry, including inquiry within logic. Before Peirce, however, no one attempted to rebuild

² Domingo de Soto, *Summulae* 1st ed. (Burgos, 1529). A facsimile of the third revised edition (Salamánca, 1554) is published as *Dominicus Soto Summulae* (Hildesheim, N.Y.: Georg Olms Verlag, 1980).

³ John Poincot, *Tractatus de signis: The Semiotic of John Poincot*, translated and presented in bilingual format by John Deely in consultation with Ralph A. Powell, 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). This first independent edition of Poincot's treatise on signs has been extracted from Poincot's *Ars logica*, as reprinted in Joannes a Sancto Thoma, *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*, ed. Beato Reiser, vol. 1 (Turin: Marietti, 1930), 1-247, 249-839.

⁴ Miguel Comas del Brugar, *Quaestiones minoris dialecticae* (Barcelona: Antonius Lacavalleria, 1661). This is available at the Lilly Library of Indiana University, Bloomington, and on microfilm at the Loras College Library, Dubuque, Iowa.

the whole logical edifice, so to speak, with an eye to demonstrating at each step the reliance on semiotic foundations.

New ways of thinking require, inevitably, new ways of speaking. Thus, among Peirce's first moves toward reconstituting logic as semiotic was the attempt to settle upon a suitable vocabulary. Having already in play the basic trichotomy of sign as icon, index, and symbol, with species-specifically human language located as a principally symbolic function, Peirce soon proposed a trichotomic subdivision of symbols specifically applicable to the concerns of logic. The centerpiece in this subdivision was what Peirce called the "dicisign," that is, a sign which "says something" (from the Latin *dicere*, to speak or to say), which makes an assertion, and by so doing conveys information in the manner adjudicable as true or false.

Just as there are symbols which are not linguistic symbols—some of which, like flags and monuments, presuppose language (postlinguistic symbols, the structures of human culture generally); and others of which, like the balloon of balloon flies or the dance of bees, are prelinguistic—so also there are dicisigns which are not linguistic, such as weathervanes, the trail indicating an animal's direction of passage, and so forth. Of course, dicisigns which are linguistic, no less than those which are not, involve iconic and indexical dimensions.⁵

Here we are concerned only with linguistic dicisigns as such. At the same time we must keep in mind the important reservation that linguistic dicisigns are part of a much larger class within experience as a whole, and retain their semiotic connections with that larger class and with the whole of experience within which they occur and function (which is why logic, properly developed and conceived, like semiotics of which it is a part, can be a tool useful for natural as well as cultural investigations).

Within language, then, dicisigns contrast with the other modalities of discourse in always having an assertion as their essential and immediate content. Thus linguistic dicisigns are always indicative sentences or statements considered on the side of their sensible

⁵ For discussion of the trichotomous division of symbols as prelinguistic, linguistic, and postlinguistic, see John Deely, "The Nonverbal Inlay in Linguistic Communication," in *The Signifying Animal*, ed. Irmengard Rauch and Gerald F. Carr (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 201-17; and John Deely, *Introducing Semiotic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pt. 2.

(that is, sensorially accessible) expression, and are propositions considered on the side of their expressed objective content as intelligibly accessible. Dicensigns may be used to lie, but their character as adjudicable makes the lie always at risk and subject to disclosure. They may be used to express a truth, but even then the fallible character of human knowledge always leaves the dicensign at risk of being false as well. In addition, of course, a dicensign may be false, but mistaken for true in a community of common belief.

The dicensign, logically considered, always has parts, even when, as sometimes happens, it is linguistically simple. Thus, a statement may be made using but a single word: as such, that is, as made up from but one lexical item, it is simple.⁶ But inasmuch as a lexical

⁶ Émile Benveniste, in his "The Nominal Sentence," in *Problems in General Linguistics*, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1974), 134-5, makes the following remarks, which are extremely illuminating on this point in view of our discussion to follow: "It is necessary to distinguish here between the dimension of forms and their nature. A minimum assertive utterance can have the same dimension as a minimum syntactic element, but that minimum syntactic element is not specified in advance as to its nature. In Latin, the assertive utterance *dixi* can be considered as minimum. On the other hand, *dixi* is a minimum syntactic element, in the sense that there can be no smaller syntactic unit in a syntagm containing *dixi*. As a result of this the minimum utterance *dixi* is identical to the minimum syntactic element *dixi*. Now in Latin, the assertion *dixi*, which is equidimensional with the syntactic unit *dixi*, is found at the same time to coincide with the verbal form *dixi*. But for the construction of an assertive utterance with only one term, it is not necessary that this term coincide with a form of a verbal nature, as in the example cited. In other languages it could coincide with a nominal form.

"First of all, let us develop this point specifically. In Ilocano (Philippines), there is the adjective *mabisin* 'hungry'. It so happens that an assertive utterance in the first two persons can consist of a nominal form with a pronominal affix: *ari'-ak* 'king-I' (=I am king); *mabisin-ak* 'hungry-I' (=I am hungry). Now, in the third person, which has a zero pronominal sign, this same utterance will be expressed: *mabisin* 'he is hungry'. Here we have the minimal assertion, *mabisin* 'he is hungry'; no longer identical to a verbal form but to a nominal form, the adjective *mabisin* 'hungry'. Similarly, in Tbatulabal, the nominal form *tá · twál* 'the man' is capable of functioning as an assertive utterance in an opposition in which only the indication of person varies: *tá-twál-gi* 'the man-I' (=I am the man), *tá-twál* 'the man [-he]' (=he is the man). Or with a nominal form including a past suffix: *tikapíganán-gi* 'eater past-I' (=I am the one who ate); *tikapigan n* 'eater past [-he]' (=he is the one who ate). Here also the minimum assertive utterance coincides with a syntactic element that, from the morphological point of view, is of the noun class. A form characterized morphologically as nominal assumes a syntactically verbal function.

"This leads us to the heart of the problem of the nominal sentence."

unit functions dicisignificatively, as we will see, it is perforce always complex, identificatory of some object about which object something further (something beyond the mere identification) is said. The object of discourse is both identified (first aspect) and characterized in some definite further way (second aspect).

In the usual case, the dicisign is lexically complex as well as dicisignificatively so. "Clarence Thomas was confirmed to the Supreme Court" is a dicisign, that is, a linguistic whole adjudicable as true or false by reason of the content asserted. The lexical complexity here is not identical with the dicisignificative complexity. Nonetheless, regarding the lexical complexity in its own right, we have eight distinct words employed to make up the assertion, no one of which taken separately retains the quality of being adjudicable as true or false. Any linguistic element, as such, identifies an object. That is to say, any linguistic element is a sign which signifies something, be that something real or unreal, static or active, substance or operation, and so forth. But when a sign within language signifies its object without also making an assertion about what it identifies, Peirce suggested that we call it a "rheme," in contrast to a dicisign.

One dicisign may also be combined with one or more other dicisigns so as to give a reason for what yet another dicisign asserts. This is the case of the suadisign or argument (from the Latin *suadere*: to support, to persuade), which Peirce also called a "delome."

At this point, we can see, the new terminology is at risk of getting out of hand. Some of the new terms are derivative from Latin, and others from Greek, with no consistent principle for the derivation apparent. Struggling with new ideas necessarily leads to struggles with new terminology and the risk of tangles. I think at this point the risk of tangles is best reduced by settling on a consistent principle of derivation for the requisite novel terms.

I suggest first that Latin derivatives in this matter are to be preferred over Greek derivatives. My reason for so suggesting has a threefold basis. First, the unified notion of *signum* as applying equally to natural events and cultural occurrences was, so far as we know, an indigenous Latin creation. According to Umberto Eco and his collaborators, prior to Augustine no such unified notion of the sign existed.⁷ Second, the explicit recognition that the sign is

⁷ Umberto Eco et al., "Latratu's Canis, or: The Dog's Barking," in *Frontiers in Semiotics*, ed. John Deely, Brooke Williams, and Felicia E. Kruse (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 63-73.

the universal instrument of interpretation, coextensive not only with the activity of mind but also with the variety of biological forms and the inanimate manifestations of nature, was also an expressly Latin accomplishment. Third, it is the Latin authors, as mentioned above, who first gave explicit recognition to the semiotic foundations of logic as a whole. In these regards, the foundations of semiotic consciousness are more Latin than they are Greek.

With sign as the generic term, then, *dicisign* and *suadisign* within Peirce's family of terms are excellent cognate derivatives specific to the enterprise of logic. But what are we to say of the *rheme*? Here it would be better to follow Peirce's example in principle rather than in practice: we need a new term, derived from Latin, to stand alongside *dicisign* and *suadisign*. To suit this purpose I suggest the term "*represign*."

Like all signs, the *represign*, in order to be a sign at all, performs the minimal sign function of standing for something other than itself. Unlike the *dicisign*, which goes on to say something about what it represents, the *represign* only presents its object and nothing more; it is a *represign*. The *represign* is a simple representation, as the *dicisign* is a complex one. The *dicisign* is a linguistic sign which, besides representing its object, presents that object as existing in a definite way. The *dicisign* not only identifies something as represented, but gives further information about what is represented. The *represign* merely represents; the *dicisign* represents and says something about what is represented. In addition, when, as frequently happens, a complex of *dicisigns* goes so far as to give a reason for what is said about what is represented, that complex ceases to be a mere *dicisignificative* linguistic unit and becomes rather a *suadisignificative* one.

B. Filling the Bottles, or, Does the Terminology Hold? The distinction between logical signs as *represignificative*, *dicisignificative*, and *suadisignificative*, while it may, and normally will, involve morphological elements, is in itself a functional rather than a morphological distinction. Hence, not surprisingly, the morphological diversity of single linguistic elements (I am thinking of the division of words into nouns and verbs, common and proper names, abstract and concrete terms, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs, interjections, and so forth) is subsumed, from a logical point of view, entirely under the *represign* as such.

This point has broad theoretical significance: it means that the morphological diversity of particular languages, and the differences between languages from a morphological point of view (whether a given language is inflected or not, whether it relies on marked accents or not, whether it has this or that specific phoneme or morpheme, and so forth), is of itself not directly relevant to the formation of dicisigns. The dicisign as such requires only that it combine in a functional unity of assertion at least two formally ressignificative elements. The first identifies what is being talked about, and the second adds to that identification a specific point of further information.

There may be, and indeed are, dicisigns which have a formation going beyond this minimum structure, but such higher order formations, as dicisignificative, already presuppose fully formed dicisigns as their minimal parts. In the present context I want to examine precisely this presupposed structure and its requirements. Peirce describes the minimal structure constituting a dicisign thus:

It must, in order to be understood, be considered as containing two parts. Of these, the one, *which may be called the Subject*, is or represents an Index of a Second existing independently of its being represented, while the other, *which may be called the Predicate*, is or represents an Icon of a Firstness [or quality of an essence]. Second: These two parts must be represented as connected; and that in such a way that if the Dicisign has any object, it must be an Index of a Secondness subsisting between the Real Object represented in one represented part of the Dicisign to be indicated and a Firstness represented in the other represented part of the Dicisign to be Iconized.⁸

The quotation is less complicated than it seems. It also exhibits a distinctive virtue of Peirce's writings in most areas of philosophy: the achievement of essential advances (inseparable from terminological novelties, as noted above) without betraying the substantial insights and achievements of earlier workers who developed the same problem areas in other times, lands, and manners of emphasis. In particular, the above characterization of the minimal essence of

⁸ Charles Sanders Peirce, "Syllabus," in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 1-6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-35), vol. 2, para. 312; vol. 7-8, ed. Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). Hereafter this collection will be cited as "CP," followed by the volume and paragraph number.

dicisigns is fully consonant with the main strains of presemiotic logical tradition.

This being the case, there is yet a morphological problem of language which needs to be specifically addressed and brought, so to speak, to a specifically logical resolution. The repesign as such, in its symbolic content, functions primarily indexically, that is to say, by pointing out or simply identifying, and this is clearly the function of a dicisignificative subject term. For a term to be dicisignificative as a predicate term, however, indexical identification is not enough. The indexical identification consequent on a predicate term's repesignification needs, on the contrary, to be somehow applied to and added to or made part of the repesignificative identification of the subject term.

This application, indeed, is the heart of the dicisign: it does not leave its virtually repesignificative dual elements to stand merely as representing, but it makes them together say something; it makes them speak (*dicere*) not one about the other but both together about one object *as* interpreted specifically this way. The object is not simply represented; it is determinately represented. It is represented, that is, along with an assertion determining it to belong to, and actually placing it within, a universe of discourse. The elephant, let us say, is not simply called to mind; it is called to mind by way of an assertion: "The elephant is hungry" or "able to fly" or "able to count" or "fictitious though colored pink," and so forth. As soon as a dicisign is formed, and by the very forming, a verbal element seems to be necessarily introduced into the predicate term in order for that term to attach itself to the subject in the manner of representation required for assertion.

Morphologically Verbal Forms and Predicate Terms. Here we are brought face to face with a morphological problem of language. Since ancient times, linguists have recognized the distinction between nouns and verbs. Indeed, as Stankiewicz has shown in a fascinating survey, they have spent recent centuries wrangling over the priority of the one over the other on grounds that were in fact ideological, though unrecognized as such by the protagonists:

The question of the ranking of the parts of speech, which had been introduced by the Greek and Roman grammarians, was given a new direction and impetus in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe when the relation of the principal parts of speech, the noun and the verb, was explicitly formulated as a genetic, rather than a logical, problem, with the priority being assigned at first to the noun. But

the most interesting chapter in the history of our problem opened up at the end of the eighteenth century, when the genetic and functional priority was decided in favor of the verb. The primary factor responsible for this change of attitude was obviously the philosophical swing from realism to idealism.⁹

In particular, Stankiewicz cites the Idea of Progress (or "evolution") as "the main idea that was responsible for the reversal of the chronology of the parts of speech"; for the idea of genesis is an idea of action, which, as Benveniste notes, is one of the two classical ways of dividing verbs from nouns: "The verb indicates a process, the noun an object."¹⁰

The other classical way of dividing nouns from verbs comes from Aristotle: the verb involves time, and the noun does not. This way of characterizing the difference had its principal effect upon logic, both because Aristotle was the first one to systematize formal logic's central problematic, and because, logically considered, the noun, in its most general character as a *nomen* or name identifying something, quite clearly is simpler than the verb in its most general character as identifying something acting or the action of something. The verb adds to the nominal representation a movement, and hence a time, a dimension of temporality.

It is easy to see how closely linguistic and logical considerations here come to one another. "As soon as one probes further into the problem," remarks Benveniste, "one is forced to envisage the relationships of the verb and noun as a whole, and then the particular nature of the verb 'to be'."¹¹ The so-called verb in any form, while still a *reprezign* ("runs" does not alone assert, but only represents an action to a native speaker of English), is yet closer to an assertion than a noun, whether abstract ("a man") or concrete ("Terry Prewitt"). Moreover, it is the addition of a verb to a noun that precisely constitutes, normally speaking, an assertion: "Terry Prewitt runs."

In the Aristotelian tradition, and in the mainstream of logical development throughout Latin and early modern times, as indeed throughout classical Latin grammar, this juxtaposition, or rather,

⁹ Edward Stankiewicz, "The Dithyramb to the Verb in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Linguistics," in *Studies in the History of Linguistics, Traditions and Paradigms*, ed. Del Hymes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 157.

¹⁰ Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 132.

¹¹ Ibid.

accidental coincidence of linguistic and logical concern, led to some actual confusion between the two. A statement or proposition, it was said, requires a verb, stated or implied, as the predicate of the sentence.

But this appears not to be true. There are so-called nominal sentences, that is to say, sentences which consist of a predicate nominative without a verb or copula, and it is insufficient to interpret the predicate nominative in such cases as an implied verb. *Amicus amico amicus*, to cite a Latin example of the nominal sentence, simply has no verb as such, even though it makes an assertion which would translate into English with a verb: "The friend of my friend is a friend to me also," or some such. This accords with Benveniste's formula: "The nominal sentence consists of a predicate nominative, without a verb or copula; and it is considered the normal expression in Indo-European where a possible verbal form would have been the third person of the present indicative of 'to be'."¹²

¹² Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 131. In a note Benveniste emphasizes the point, citing the work of Louis Hjelmslev, which veers in the traditional direction set by Aristotle's early discussions: "Hjelmslev maintains that there is a difference only of emphasis or stress between the nominal sentence *omnia praeclara rara* and a verbal sentence such as *omnia praeclara sunt rara*. We, on the contrary, have attempted to establish that these are two types with distinct functions. As a consequence, there is no possible commutation from one to the other, and it is not legitimate to seek an implicit expression of tense, mood, and aspect in a nominal utterance which is by nature nontemporal, nonmodal, and non-aspectual" (p. 303, n. 13). Cf. Louis Hjelmslev, "Le verbe et la phrase nominale," in *Mélanges de Philologie, de Littérature et d'Histoire Anciennes offerts à J. Marouzeau par ses collègues et élèves étrangers* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1948), 253-81, esp. p. 265.

From the point of view of logic, a nominal sentence verbally restated or translated into another language using a verb, if done correctly, conveys the same proposition. The verbal and nominal forms can be equivalent from the standpoint of their logical content. From the standpoint of linguistics, however, such logical equivalation would obscure the issue. Indeed, as we have seen, it has: "If one wishes to dissipate the obscurities that have accumulated around the problem, it is important to separate the study of the nominal sentence from that of the sentence with the verb 'to be'. They are two distinct expressions that come together in certain languages, but not everywhere and not necessarily. A sentence with the verb 'to be' is a verbal sentence, similar to all verbal sentences. It cannot, without risking contradiction, be taken as a variety of the nominal sentence"; Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 135. (Cf. Thomas A. Sebeok, "The Equational Sentence in Hungarian," *Language* 19 [1943], 320-7.) "An utterance," Benveniste concludes, "is either nominal or verbal"; a proposition is neither

Sentences of this type turn out to be widespread, a fact entirely hidden to speakers familiar only with, say, modern European languages, or American English. Benveniste goes so far as to say that the nominal sentence "is indeed so general that in measuring its range statistically or geographically, one could more quickly enumerate the inflected languages that do not have it (like the Western European languages of today) than those in which it appears."¹³ He later adds that "as long as this type of utterance was considered a verbal sentence lacking a verb, its specific nature could not be brought out."¹⁴ This specific nature is a "nonvariability of the relationship implied between the linguistic utterance and the nature of things."¹⁵ Benveniste cites as "a very just account of the special value of the nominal sentence"¹⁶ the summary of Sjoestedt-Jonval:

The value of the nominal sentence appears when one contrasts it with the sentence containing a verb of existence. The nominal sentence is a qualitative equation establishing an equivalence (total or partial, depending on the relative extent of the subject and predicate) between two nominal elements. . . . Thus the predicate of the nominal sentence, even when it is an adjective, has an essential value and expresses an integral part of the being of the subject, while the complement of the verb of existence has only a circumstantial value and expresses a contingent feature (even if permanent) of the manner of being of the subject.¹⁷

Nominal sentences are thus especially suited to the expression of so-called permanent or timeless, perhaps even eternal, truths, though indeed such conceptions can *also* be expressed verbally.¹⁸

(p. 135). Nothing could more clearly make the point that those philosophers who think that propositions and sentences are equivalent are objectively mistaken.

¹³ Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 131.

¹⁴ Ibid., 143.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Marie Louise Sjoestedt-Jonval, *Description d'un parler irlandais du Kerry* (Paris: F. Champion, 1938), p. 116, sec. 154.

¹⁸ Thus Benveniste notes that "even in a modern language in which the nominal sentence has been supplanted by the verbal sentence, a differentiation is sometimes introduced into the very expression of the verb 'to be'. This is the case in Spanish with its classical distinction between *ser*, to be essentially, and *estar*, to be existentially or circumstantially, coincides to a great extent with the distinction we have suggested between the nominal sentence and the verbal sentence at an earlier stage. Even if there is no historical continuity between the two expressions, we can see

Many lengthy medieval and Renaissance discussions among logicians of "whether and how a verb can be absolved from time" so as to express timeless truths would have been obviated by a more detailed knowledge of languages such as scientific linguistics has provided. These discussions arose from logicians confusing a logical point with a linguistic one. There is the logical fact that an assertion must always be understood with relation to the present of the one understanding it, whether as asserting something that occurred prior to the present, contemporaneous with it, posterior to it, or all three together. Quite distinct from this logical requirement is the linguistic fact that Greek and Latin express this relation normally through verbal rather than nominal forms. Additionally, "even in cases in which there is a verb, it may have no temporal function, and time can be expressed otherwise than by a verb."¹⁹ It follows that "in order to characterize the opposition of the verb and the noun in its own right and regardless of the linguistic type, we cannot use notions like those of object and process or categories like that of time or morphological differences."²⁰

We may say, then, that—exactly as the ancients thought—the noun (let us say, rather, the *represign* in its minimal nominal form) has a *logical* priority over the verb, in that the verbal *represign* as verbal requires an added emphasis, shifting the foreground emphasis of the representation from the identificatory indexical dimension to the informational iconic content of the *represign* as conveying an applicability beyond its bare representation. But it was a mistake on the part of the ancients to think this added verbal element constituted directly an essential difference within the order of the *represign* as such. Rather, the difference is one that accrues to *represigns* only through and after (or with an eye to, as we might also say) their use as predicate terms—that is, to fulfill the predicate function within a *dicisign*.

We must speak rather of the verbal function than of the verbal form. All *represigns* as such; all "parts of speech" taken precisely

in this phenomenon in Spanish the renewed manifestation of a feature that has deeply marked Indo-European syntax. The concurrent use of two types of assertion, in different forms, constitutes one of the most instructive solutions to a problem that arises in many languages and sometimes at several points in their evolution"; Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 144. These same remarks apply to the verb "to be" in Portuguese.

¹⁹ Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 133.

²⁰ Ibid.

in their partial character, signify fundamentally as names; and any name without restriction can be made to function as subject or predicate within an assertion.

Thus the difference between nouns and verbs is not a function of represigns considered within their own order but a function of dicisigns as modifying represigns according to the requirements of assertion. What makes a represign be verbal is its employment as a predicate term in the logical sense. Any represign can be so employed.

Thus the logical priority of names over verbs cannot be translated into a temporal or genetic one, nor can the dynamic quality of verbs be translated into a genetic or temporal priority. That is why any noun can be made into a verb, and any verb can be nominalized: this commutability is an expression of what logical analysis reveals to be their common character as represigns. The verbal function thus must be sharply distinguished from verbal forms. The latter, as specific parts of speech, since they represent without asserting, belong, like all parts of speech, to the order of represigns. The former (which is the cause of verbal forms, in that verbal forms as represignificative exist precisely as traces of having been predicatively employed, or through modifications with an eye to being predicatively employed), belongs strictly speaking to the dicisign in its difference of order from the represign. It is the syntax proper to the dicisign as requiring one of its parts to be predicate that creates the verb functionally considered, and also, subsequently, as morphologically considered. Any represign without exception may be functionally appropriated in this way.²¹

²¹ Here, as Benveniste says, it is important to stress that what we are looking at is "the essential syntactic function of the verb, not its material form [its morphological manifestations in the order of represigns, let us say]. The function of the verb is firmly fixed, no matter what the morphological characteristics of the verbal form may be. For example, the fact that in Hungarian the form of the objective conjugation, *varo-m* 'I expect him', coincides with the nominal possessive form, *karo-m* 'my arm', and *kere-d* 'you pray him' with *vere-d* 'your blood', is a feature remarkable in itself, but the similarity of the objective verbal form and the nominal possessive form should not obscure the fact that only *varom* and *kered* can construct finite assertions, and not *karom* or *vered*, and that this is enough to distinguish forms that are verbal from those which are not. Furthermore, it is not necessary that an idiom make use of a verb that is morphologically differentiated in order for this verbal function to be accomplished, since every language, no matter what its structure, is capable of

Here the results of logical analysis and the conclusions of scientific linguistics come together without confusion:

The verbal function, as we posit it, remains independent to a certain degree of the verbal form, although the two often coincide. The point is precisely to reestablish this function and this form in their true relationship. Within the assertive utterance, the verbal function is twofold: there is the cohesive function, which is to organize the elements of the utterance into a complete structure; and there is the assertive function, which consists in endowing the utterance with a predicate of reality. The first function need not be otherwise defined. Just as important, though on another plane, is the assertive function. A finite assertion, precisely because it is an assertion, implies the reference of the utterance to a different order, and this is the order of reality. Added implicitly to the grammatical relationship that unites the members of the utterance is a 'this is!' that links the linguistic arrangement to the system of reality. The content of the utterance is given as consistent with the nature of things. Thus the syntactic structure of the finite assertion helps to distinguish two planes: the plane of grammatical cohesion, on which the verb serves as the cohering element, and the plane of the assertion of reality, from which the verb receives its functions as the assertive element. In a finite assertive utterance the verb possesses this double capacity.²²

The function of the *dicisign* is to assert. In order to achieve this level of discursive organization, the *dicisign* must subsume to its own order two otherwise merely *represignificative* factors which thus subsumed are made to cohere, the one as identifying what is being talked about (the subject) and the other as informing that subject iconically so that it is not merely seen for what it is but seen to exist in a certain way. This "link to the system of reality" is what has been called in logic the "supposition" of the *dicisign*, for it attaches to terms only in and through their subsumption as *dicisignificative* parts. Of course, the "system of reality" is not the

producing finite assertions. It follows that the morphological distinction between the noun and the verb is secondary in comparison with the syntactic distinction. In the hierarchy of functions, the primary fact is that only certain forms are suited for establishing finite assertions. It can happen, and it happens frequently, that these forms are further characterized by morphological indices. The distinction between verb and noun accordingly emerges on the formal plane, and the verbal form becomes susceptible of a strictly morphological definition. This is the situation in languages in which the verb and noun have different structures; and in which the verbal function as we understand it has a verbal form to support it. But this function does not need a specifically verbal form to be manifested in the utterance"; Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 134.

²² Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 133.

realm of mind-independent being as such, but rather the *Umwelt* and universe of discourse within which the assertion is made.²³

Confusion Over the Role of a Copula in the Representation of Minimal Dicisigns. In this light we can address a confusion of logical and linguistic points in Western tradition closely related to the confusion of morphologically verbal forms with predicate terms: the role of the so-called verb "to be" in the reduction of minimal dicisigns to the standard logical form of "Subject > copula < Predicate." What needs to be recognized is that the "verb" used in this capacity is, in fact, not the verb "to be," appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. To see what is involved here, it is necessary to untangle a number of distinct functions which intersect within the minimal dicisign (in the making of an assertion) at precisely the point where one repesignificative element is applied to another as predicate to subject.

A distinct use of a linguistic element such as "is" to signify predication is by no means found in all languages. Benveniste remarks the following:

In a number of languages at different periods of history, the junctive function, usually established by a pause between the terms, as in Russian, has tended to be realized in a positive sign, in a morpheme. But this is not the sole and necessary solution. Several other processes have been employed; the creation or adaptation of a [distinct] verbal form is only one of these processes.²⁴

What needs to be remarked is that in every language there is predication, that is to say, there is the minimal formation of dicisigns necessary to convey an assertion. In addition, every predication, inasmuch as it employs a repesignificative element, always admits of the possibility of being distinguished into two parts: a predicate term nominally taken, and the predicative function as such separately signified in its own right. This possibility is a linguistic inevitability, for it is a necessary consequence of the formation of an assertion. What is not a linguistic inevitability is the actual making of the distinction by some user of a given language. Only when the distinction comes actually to be made do we have the grammatical and syntactical notion of "to be" as copula.

²³ See John Deely, *Basics of Semiotics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), chap. 5, esp. pp. 50-71.

²⁴ Émile Benveniste, "The Linguistic Functions of 'To Be' and 'To Have'," in *Problems in General Linguistics*, 164.

Completely different from this grammatical and syntactical notion of "to be" as copula is the lexical and morphological notion of "to be" as having (especially mind-independent) existence. Benveniste says,

"To be" actually does have a lexical notion whose verbal expression is just as authentic and just as ancient as that of any other verb, and it can exercise its full functions without ever encroaching upon the function of the "copula." . . . In Indo-European, this lexeme is represented by *es-, which it would be best to avoid translating as "to be" in order not to perpetuate the confusion we are attempting to avoid. The sense is "to have existence, to occur in reality," and this "existence" and this "reality" are defined as what is authentic, consistent, and true.²⁵

Benveniste concludes that, from a linguistic point of view, "it is necessary to set up two distinct terms that are confused in speaking of 'to be': one is the 'copula', the grammatical mark of equivalence; the other, a full-fledged verb."²⁶

Here we need to note yet one further difference which Benveniste himself glosses over without seeming to notice, namely, the difference between what he here calls "the grammatical mark of equivalence," and what he ten years earlier called "the cohesive function,"²⁷ which belongs to the verbal function as such. Benveniste conflates the two, but they are not the same. Strictly speaking, therefore, we need to distinguish three distinct terms in speaking of "to be." One is the copula as performing the cohesive function: "John is running," where no bi-equivalence of subject and predicate is implied. Another is the copula as a grammatical mark of equivalence: "A plane triangle is the figure enclosed by three straight lines intersecting at three distinct points," as occurs in definitions, for example, or in any assertion where subject and predicate are taken to be strictly coextensive. A third is the verb "to be" as a lexical item (a "categorematic term") in its own right with its proper significate, "God is." The first two senses of "to be" are, logically speaking, syncategorematic; that is, they presuppose other representations to complete their signification in any given case. Only the last sense of "to be" is categorematic, that is, has a nominally com-

²⁵ Benveniste, "The Linguistic Functions of 'To Be'," 164.

²⁶ Ibid., 163.

²⁷ Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 133.

plete signification in its own right. This complex of linguistic functions can be represented schematically (Figure 1).




Figure 1. *Linguistic schema of "to be"*

Thus not two but three distinct terms have materially merged in many languages. All three of these distinct uses are casually subsumed in the informal notion of the English (and Indo-European) verb "to be." The merger is material, not formal, since formally it is a question of three distinct types of performance within an assertion: there is the function of explicitating the grammatical cohesion of two represigns within the assertion (the copula); there is the adding to this notion of cohesion the further notion of equivalence or convertibility between the represigns joined in the assertion; and, quite distinct from these signalling functions, there is the verb "to be" as a distinct categorematic represignificative element or categorematic name in its own right. This verbal form does not pertain to the verbal function within the dicisign as such (in contrast with the two prior syncategorematic linguistic elements), but rather adds to the language a represignificative element objectifying existence itself as something signified (*existentia ut significata*), often intending the so-called "real" existence of a physical or mind-independent being (*existentia ut exercita*). In speaking of Subject > copula < Predicate as the "standard logical form" to which minimal dici-signs are best reduced for purposes of clarity, we see now that the formula is anything but clear; for of the three distinct senses of "to be," which one, if any, or which combination of them, is intended, in the logical formula, under the rubric "copula"?

As far as I am aware, this question has never been clearly stated or squarely faced in the logical literature. The contemporary preference for abandoning the classical notion of standard logical form

for minimal disjuncts in favor of quantificational formulae can in part be traced to this analytical failure. At the same time, where it is a question of the function of logical forms within natural language, the traditional formula has decisive advantages over quantificational formulae, inasmuch as these formulae, we now realize, in fact generally fail to translate the actual sense of assertions within natural language.²⁸

The Need for Explicitly Specifying a Copula in the Logical Role.

From a logical point of view, the traditional formula for expressing a minimal disjunct ($S > c < P$) can be brought into its own as a logical counterpart-schema for assertion in natural languages only if we introduce a fourth distinction. Let us call it the "logical copula," as distinct both from the grammatical copula, whether taken cohesively or equivalently, and from the verb "to be," although these are all materially identical (that is, as a character string, or in certain contexts of usage).

The logical copula as a specific notion is designed explicitly to signify precisely and only "the verbal function," as Benveniste terms it, of coherent assertion. This function, as we have seen, even in the absence of all verbal forms (as in the nominal sentence), is two-

²⁸ See, for example, Benson Mates, *Elementary Logic*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). Regarding the "problems involved in 'symbolizing' English sentences by means of the artificial language," Mates observes, "although to some extent we can translate natural-language sentences into our formal notation there is frequently a serious amount of slippage in the process. Not only is it possible for a translated argument to be formally unsound while the original is intuitively sound, but also there are cases in which the translated version is formally sound while the original is intuitively unsound. The price of drawing explicit attention to this fact is, I suppose, loss of the gratifying and perhaps pedagogically useful impression that logicians possess an esoteric apparatus for testing the soundness of arguments framed in the natural language" (pp. vi-vii). The problem is not that there are no logical means for testing the soundness of arguments framed in natural language, but that the logical tradition in modern times has tended to develop a mainstream of concerns that is not up to the task. A logical system that looks to the means of determining soundness precisely in the context of actual natural language discourse, however, was precisely the objective of the Latin tradition and of Aristotle's *Organon*. Nothing prevents us from taking up this task again as the foundational task of logical research, as I have tried to outline elsewhere. See John Deely, "Logic within Semiotics," in *Symbolicity*, festschrift in honor of the 70th birthday of Thomas A. Sebeok, ed. Jeff Bernard et al. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992), 77-86; a monograph of the same title, *Logic Within Semiotics*, is forthcoming from Indiana University Press.

fold. The verbal function is the channeling or conveying of the supposition of the determinate order of reality—the type of existence—according to which an assertion is made, and the coherent joining of the fundamental elements of the assertion (the predicate and the subject) in accordance with that supposition. To say that the logical copula is designed “precisely” to perform this biaspectual function is to say that, as a distinct element of symbolic representation within the *dicisign*, the logical copula is designed to separate or detach the verbal function *as such* in its inherently twofold character from the predicate element as *represignificative*, and, in doing that, to signal the fact of an assertion being made of the subject *represignificative* element via the predicate *represignificative* element as joined thereto.

In other words, in speaking of a *logical* copula as such, confusion is inevitable unless we realize that we are perforce specifying a technical linguistic item in its own right. This specification has generally not been made as an explicit part of logical discussions heretofore. The logical copula strictly so called is a syntactical form of “to be” used in a scientifically specific, twofold manner: *to signal an assertion*, as Peirce put it,²⁹ and, therefore, at the same time—in order to achieve the assertion as something accomplished—*to posit the dicisignificative union of two terms* as, respectively, predicate and subject, iconic and indexical dimensions, within the symbolic structure of that assertion.³⁰

²⁹ “Neither the predicate, nor the subjects, nor both together, can make an *assertion*. The assertion represents a compulsion which experience, meaning the course of life, brings upon the deliverer to attach the predicate to the subjects in a particular way. . . . The deliverer thus requires a kind of sign which shall signify a law that to objects of indices an icon appertains as a sign of them in a given way. Such a sign has been called a *symbol*. It is the *copula* of assertion”; Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Regenerated Logic,” in *CP* 3.435. Cf. Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Critic of Arguments II. The Reader is Introduced to Relatives,” in *CP* 3.415–24, esp. para. 420, where the copula is called the “signal of assertion.”

³⁰ “The functional structure of the verbal form in the assertive utterance,” Benveniste writes, “comprises two elements, one explicit and variable, the other implicit and invariable. The variable is the verbal form as a material datum: variable in the semantic expression, variable in the number and nature of the modalities it conveys—time, person, aspect, etc. This variable is the seat of an invariable inherent in the assertive utterance: the statement of correspondence between the grammatical assertion and the fact asserted. It is the union of a variable and an invariable that establishes the verbal form in its function as the declarative form of a finite utterance”; Benveniste, “The Nominal Sentence,” 134.

As signaling an assertion, the logical copula conveys and channels the supposition of the assertion according to the universe of discourse and experience within which the assertion is made. The logical copula signals a definite channel along which is to be construed the implication of reference of the symbolic structure as sign-vehicle to the content signified of whatever order, linguistic or non-linguistic, depending on the assertion.

As positing a dicisignificative union of two represigns, the logical copula not only signifies the coherence of subject and predicate in a grammatical sense within the unity of the dicisign, but signifies their coherence in relation to the object identified by the subject of the dicisign signified as existing in the way that the predicate of the dicisign informs us that it exists. The comprehension of the predicate term enters into and informs the comprehension of the subject term within the proposition, as traditional logic always held.

Thus the logical copula as such is not a lexical notion or morpheme in its own right (it is not a categorematic term), but functions only in relation to the predicate it copulates to the subject within the dicisign. "It always signifies existence," as Poinset said.³¹ But the existence signified by the logical copula is not the metaphysical existence exercised by things independently of finite consciousness—unless, of course, that is precisely either the predicated notion within the assertion, or the supposition of the dicisign, which need not be the case.

Thus the lexical notion and the copulative notion of "to be" *sometimes* come together in the logical copula as such. But, as such, the logical copula *always* signifies the performance of two tasks: the grammatical copulative function, and (or combined with) the assertive function, which is normally broader than the categorematic and lexical notion of "to be"—especially in its metaphysical sense of "exercising real existence," which is distinctively Greek and Latin and, in a word, Western. The "metaphysical verb," as Monboddo

³¹ "Et ipsum verbum 'est', sive sit de secundo adiacente, ut quando dico: 'Petrus est', sive de tertio adiacente, ut cum dico: 'Petrus est albus', addendo tertiam vocem ut praedicatum, semper significat idem, scilicet, esse, quia ut dicit S. Thomas 1. Periherm. lect. 5. in fine, ista actualitas est communiter omnis formae, sive substantialis sive accidentalis, et inde est, quod quando volumus significare quamcumque formam inesse alicui, significamus per verbum 'est', unde ex consequenti significat compositionem. Ita D. Thomas"; Poinset, *Ars logica* 15b35-16a5.

considered the verb "to be" to be,³² is indeed a philosophical notion, as especially Thomists today are wont to emphasize. But that metaphysical verb is a specifically philosophical creation, which logic may be used to defend or dispute, but to which logic as logic can never be tied outside the specific context of a metaphysical assertion logically evaluated. Similarly, this metaphysical verb is at best a cousin of the lexical notion of "to be" in natural language; it has little or no relation to the copulative notion of "to be" which is present as a function but morphologically absent in the nominal sentence.

Furthermore, even apart from the equivalating sense of "to be," none of these three—the simple grammatical copula, the verb "to be" as a lexical item or morpheme within various natural languages, or the verb *esse* as a metaphysical representation—is identical with the logical copula as such. The grammatical copula in its minimal copulative sense (not in its further equivalating sense) is but a part of the logical copula. This logical copula signifies something (to wit, a function) with which the lexical and/or the metaphysical notion may or may not happen to coincide, depending on the context of a given assertion—its supposition, according to which a given dicisign belongs to a universe of discourse within which it must pretend as such to bear some truth, but at the risk of eventually exposing itself to be instead a false witness.

The verbal function, as distinct from the verbal form, exists only within the dicisign as its—the dicisign's—form. As the form of the dicisign, the verbal function exists as a linguistic inevitability which is only sometimes expressed in the difference between predicate term as verb and subject term as noun, namely, in those cases where the verbal function is not morphologically separated from the predicate term as represignificative or symbolically represented in its own right. Such a separate representation for the verbal function as form of the dicisign is achieved partially whenever a copula is used in joining the parts of an assertion to signify (as we saw above) "the cohesive function, which is to organize the elements of the utterance into a complete structure." To make the

³² See James B. Monboddo, *Of the Origin and Progress of Language*, vol. 1, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: J. Balfour, 1774). (An abridged German edition of volumes 1-3, with an introduction by Johann Gottfried Herder and translation by E. A. Schmid, appeared in 1784 [Riga: J. F. Hartknoch].)

representation of the verbal function as such complete, however, we need to add a convention which stipulates that, besides this cohesive function, the assertive function which "implies the reference of the utterance to a different order" is also conveyed in the use of the copula. This function, in Benveniste's words, "added implicitly to the grammatical relationship that unites the members of the utterance" whenever a finite assertion is made,³³ is indeed, from the point of view of logic, on a distinct plane from the grammatical; but it is hardly something "added." The function in question, rather, is the function principally constitutive of the *dicisign* as a distinct logical type of symbolization, to wit, the type of symbolization adjudicable as true or false. The single verbal function logically considered is inherently twofold, or biaspectual.

Hence, from the point of view of logic, to treat the assertive aspect of the function as something implied along with the grammatical copula is not merely insufficient, but incorrect. Presupposition is different from implication, and the assertive function is, from the linguistic point of view, presupposed by and for any use of any ressignificative element as predicate (and *a fortiori* by any verb used predicatively, since it is the predicative use of a ressignificative element that, under the influence of the verbal function, gives rise to verbal forms to begin with). It follows that if, for reasons of clarity of representation of the necessary minimal structure of the *dicisign* ($S > c < P$), we wish to give the constitutive syntax or form of assertion (in its contrast with the roles of subject and predicate terms which the form of assertion governs) its own distinctive representation within the minimal *dicisign*, then we must make clear that the verbal function, inasmuch as it is distinct from the verbal form, needs not only to be signified by a logical component which separates the predicate term as such from the verb, as does the grammatical copula, but also to be signified as constituting an assertion. Both planes are essential to the verbal function: the plane of grammatical cohesion and the plane of reference to a content signified as obtaining in this or that way (that is, as signified adjudicably, and not simply—represented in a way susceptible of judgment as true or false, not simply represented). Hence a distinct symbol instituted to represent this function requires a twofold representation.

³³ Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 133.

In identifying the character string "to be" with the verbal function, in contrast to any verbal form (including the "is" signifying the representation of existence exercised), we are, then, identifying it not merely with the grammatical copula but also, and more fundamentally, with "the reference of the utterance to a different order," a content signified. The plane of grammatical cohesion and the plane of finite assertion must intersect in order for there to be a *dicisign*, a grammatically correct statement of the sort that logic can treat. Indeed, we may say that if the grammatical copula signifies primarily that part of the total verbal function which imparts grammatical cohesion to a string of symbols and only secondarily implies "assertion of reality," the logical copula primarily signifies rather the verbal function as such in its totality. The logical copula hence primarily conveys the supposition of some kind of existence, namely, the kind clarified and conveyed by the grammatically cohering unit according to the context which the assertion needs in order to be understood. Not only are the priorities of primary and secondary signification reversed in the logical copula, but both priorities are explicitly constitutive of the logical copula's sense. Neither the plane of assertion nor the plane of cohesion is implicit in the logical copula. Both are explicit, for what the logical copula as such signifies is the intersection of these two planes in the exercise of the verbal function as constituting a *dicisign* in its minimal formation.

In the Latins' treatment of logic, long discussions were devoted to the "supposition of terms" within the proposition. By treating of supposition as a property of terms, the discussion was already off on something of a wrong foot;³⁴ for in fact, supposition is not a property of terms as such, that is to say, as repesignificative elements of language. Supposition is, rather, a property first of all of the *dicisign* as such, through and according to which it affects or

³⁴ "Suppositio definitur, quod est 'acceptio termini pro aliquo, de quo verificatur'. Multi ex recentioribus hanc definitionem non admittunt existimantes, quod suppositio solum est acceptio nominis pro re, quam significat, nec distinguunt suppositionem a significatione seu exercitio significationis, qua vox substituitur in significando loco rei. Unde illud antiquum et acceptatum principium, quod aliquae propositiones sunt de subiecto non supponente, et ideo, si sint affirmativae, falsae sunt, ab ipsis reicitur, quia omne nomen, sive intra sive extra propositionem, supponit, hoc ipso quod substituitur pro aliquo apud intellectum"; Poinset, *Ars logica*, 29a10-27.

attaches to repesignificative linguistic elements only as and insofar as they are subsumed within the dicisign in the role of subject or predicate term. Logic deals with symbolic expressions of assertion, and symbolic expressions of this sort impart to their terms a determinate supposition on the basis of which the assertions comprised from the terms become adjudicable as true or false only insofar as the expressions constitute or implicate assertions.

We see then that the verbal form "to be" is something quite distinct from the verbal function, as the contingent differs from the necessary. The verb "to be" as a morpheme in any particular language is far from a linguistic inevitability, although the possibility of its establishment is present in every language, thanks to the difference between repesigns as such and dicisigns as such. The verbal function as such belongs only to the dicisign, being the form of assertion constitutive of dicisignification in what is peculiar to it. This function is exercised when the plane of assertion and the plane of grammatical cohesion intersect in the constitution of a symbolic structure, and the logical copula is designed to signify this function of intersection. Hence the copula, logically speaking, signifies the twofold function of *relating* two repesigns (simple or complex) as predicate and subject terms within an assertion and *supposing* some kind of existence relative to the unity of the dicisign.

The verbal function is a linguistic inevitability. It goes with assertion as such. The logical copula, distinct from all other verbal forms expressed by variations on the materially same character string "to be," is a convenient symbol for this function in its distinctness and in its integrity as constituting the bidimensional form regulative of the dicisign in its difference both from the repesigns respecting which it is superordinate and from the suadisigns respecting which it is subordinate. The logical copula, in short, is a convenient contingent expression of (an "arbitrary sign for," in Saussurean terms) a linguistic and logical necessity: the verbal function constitutive of the dicisign in its twofold character as coherently expressing a content signified in an adjudicable manner. Peirce's analysis on this point can now be seen to be somewhat simplified, but it provides even so a convenient summary of the situation as far as the traditional notion of a "standard logical form" for minimal dicisigns is concerned:

The proposition should have an actual *Syntax*, which is represented to be the Index of those elements of the fact represented that

correspond to the Subject and the Predicate. This is apparent in all propositions. Since Abelard it has been usual to make this Syntax a third part of the proposition, under the name of the Copula. The historical cause of the emergence of this conception of the twelfth century was, of course, that the Latin of that day did not permit the omission of the verb *est*, which was familiarly, though not unvariably, omitted in Greek, and not very uncommonly in classical Latin. In most languages there is no such verb. But it is plain that one does not escape the need of a Syntax by regarding the Copula as a third part of the proposition; and it is simpler to say that it is merely the accidental form that Syntax may take.³⁵

Like all linguistic forms in their character as symbolic, then, the logical copula is an accidental form, not a linguistic inevitability. As a logical convention, however, it is adopted for the purpose of signifying not something contingent and accidental, but something necessary; in this case, it signifies the verbal function constitutive of the dicisign superordinate to morphological distinctions of whatever type within the order of repesignification. If we add this new—or, more exactly, this now fully developed, explicit—convention to our scheme of “to be” as a verbal form, we get a third syncategorematic sense (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Logical schema of “to be”

The supplement of the copula, in the context of the specifically logical analysis of dicisigns according to their implications within and for their context of discourse, is to make clear and explicit that something is asserted and something supposed whenever a claim to truth is made, in order to facilitate the adjudication of whatever is adjudicable in the discourse.

³⁵ Peirce, “Syllabus,” in CP 2.319.

II

Recasting consideration of the parts of speech in light of the above, we would have to say that, logically considered, the opposition of nouns and verbs as lexical forms is by no means a fundamental division of the order of represigns as such, but one derivative from the context of assertions. Of the two, the noun as name is logically prior, with all other parts of speech posterior to both. The reason is that verbs exist as soon as and only as an assertion is made, as virtually distinct from names. In logic, this distinction can and ought best to be absorbed to its proper level, which is that of the dicisign, and set out in the distinct sign of the logical copula, thereby reducing the subject and predicate terms as such to their common represignificative denominator.

If it be true that assertion is the fundamental linguistic act, then it must also be true that von Humboldt was right in holding that language was given all at once, *in toto*.³⁶ This is a consequence of the dialectical nature of the dicisign which carries assertion, and through which assertion (and with it the derivative contrast of verbs and the other parts of speech to names as nouns) comes into the world of symbolic forms. Names and verbs exist as two only in their opposition. This opposition is a consequence of the fact well summarized by Sapir: "It is well to remember that speech consists of . . . propositions. There must be something to talk about and something must be said about the subject of discourse once it is selected."³⁷ As a result,

No language wholly fails to distinguish the noun and verb, though in particular cases the nature of the distinction may be an elusive one. It is different with other parts of speech. Not one of them is imperatively required for the life of the language.³⁸

All these considerations leave Peirce alone in yet one other respect. Of all the thinkers who argued the priority of nouns over verbs or verbs over nouns, he was but a man of his era in arguing

³⁶ Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts*, Gesammelte Werke 4 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1843), 62.

³⁷ Edward Sapir, *Language* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1921), 126.

³⁸ Ibid.

for the priority of the verb, and especially the metaphysical verb in an old Egyptian incarnation.³⁹ In all this he was one among many. But in his extraordinary argument that pronouns are prior to nouns, at least, he seems both to have something of truth and to stand alone, although the reasons comprising this argument concern psychology and epistemology rather than logical theory as such.

From the point of view of logical theory, we can now answer Benveniste's question: "How does it happen that the verb of existence, out of all the other verbs, has this privilege of being present in an utterance in which it does not appear?"⁴⁰ The answer is that it does not, unless by "verb of existence" is meant the logical copula as a virtual form in the sense actually stipulated in the pages of this essay.

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³⁹ See Charles Sanders Peirce, *Grand Logic*, in *CP* 4.49; and Charles Sanders Peirce, "That Categorical and Hypothetical Propositions Are One in Essence," in *CP* 2.354.

⁴⁰ Benveniste, "The Nominal Sentence," 131-2.

WHAT DID SOCRATES TEACH AND TO WHOM DID HE TEACH IT?

ALEXANDER NEHAMAS

I

A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE, ancient and modern alike, have always found in Socrates what seemed to them a suspicious, if not actually repugnant, aspect. This aspect, to put the point first in crude terms, is his devotion to philosophy, which presupposes an apparently unshakable faith in reason, in the power of understanding to secure goodness, and in the power of goodness to provide us with happiness.

But philosophy, Plato has Callicles say in the *Gorgias*, emasculates even those who may possess great talents: it makes them avoid public life, where serious matters are decided and real reputations are established; instead, philosophers "live out their lives skulking in some corner whispering with three or four boys, never saying anything grand, great or important."¹ Seen from the outside, this is not a totally inaccurate description of the picture which Socrates' life, as Plato depicts it in his dialogues, may have presented to many of his contemporaries.

For Nietzsche, whose repugnance for Socrates was indissolubly mixed with admiration, Socrates' trust in reason was one of his most despicable features. Socrates, Nietzsche sneered early on in his writings, "is the prototype of the theoretical optimist who, with his faith that the nature of things can be fathomed, ascribes to knowledge and insight the power of a panacea, while understanding error as the evil par excellence."² The sneer only becomes more pronounced in the later works:

¹ *Gorgias* 485d3-e2. Unless otherwise noted, translations from the Greek are my own.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* (New York: Random House, 1966), sec. 15, p. 97.

One chooses dialectic only when one has no other means. One knows that one arouses mistrust with it, that it is not very persuasive. Nothing is easier to erase than a dialectical effect: the experience of every meeting at which there are speeches proves this. It can only be *self-defense* for those who no longer have other weapons.³

Nietzsche's remark about dialectic's inability to convince is worth thinking about further, and we shall return to it. For the moment, I am concerned to specify exactly what in Socrates has provoked such criticism, both traditional and contemporary.⁴ As a first approximation, we may say that this is the element in his philosophy and in his personality that has come to be known as his intellectualism.

Intellectualism involves a number of features. First, it seems to identify virtue with knowledge and therefore appears to consider the affective side of our nature irrelevant to our virtue, to what counts as a good human life. Just for this reason, intellectualists pay no heed to the necessity of socialization and habituation, to the importance of the careful, long-term attention to our noncognitive side which, it seems plausible to claim, is at least as necessary for becoming good as is the knowledge of the nature of goodness.⁵

Second, intellectualism as we find it in Socrates seems to be a view that considers virtue not only necessary but also sufficient for the good life and for happiness: being good, in some way, is the essence of being happy—nothing else matters. To quote one of the most recent criticisms of Socrates on this issue, it may seem that, unconcerned with anything but virtue, especially with the things that luck or chance might give us or take away without any responsibility on our part, Socrates "can't lose" in the game of life,

because he does not care so deeply for the things that are subject to risk that their loss would be a serious loss to him. *There* is his

³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in *The Viking Portable Nietzsche* (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 476.

⁴ For examples of the latter, see, among others, Myles F. Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to be Good," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 60–92; and Martha C. Nussbaum, "Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wisdom," *Yale Classical Studies* 26 (1980): 43–97.

⁵ An extensive discussion of habituation in the formation of character and in the attainment of the good life, as Aristotle conceives them, can be found in Nancy Sherman, *The Fabric of Character* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1989), esp. chap. 5.

strangeness, awe-inspiring and alarming. And it leaves the question: Is this a good way for a human being to live?⁶

The third feature of intellectualism is the following. Since Socrates believed that only knowledge and argument,⁷ not the whole nature of one's personality, can lead us to virtue, and since reason seems to be the most universal human capacity, he made it his business to address his questions to everyone indiscriminately. Not caring whether those he engaged in discussion, particularly the young among them, had the character appropriate for philosophy, he encouraged the wrong people—like Critias, Charmides and Alcibiades—to engage in philosophy to the detriment both of the youths and of philosophy. Gregory Vlastos, who does not find fault with Socrates on this issue, promotes this conception of Socrates' indiscriminate approach to his audience when he describes him as a "street-philosopher," a "missionary to the unwashed"⁸: "not only does he allow question-breeding argument about good and evil to all and sundry, he positively thrusts it upon them."⁹

Socrates, then, wrongly equates knowledge with virtue, inhumanly identifies virtue with happiness, and imprudently encourages everyone, whatever their moral fiber, to become well versed in the sort of argument that can as easily destroy as establish moral value.¹⁰ These are serious charges, not obviously compatible with his canonical status as moral exemplar.

It is deeply ironic that one of the earliest versions of these charges was made by none other than Plato himself.¹¹ The criticism

⁶ Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Chill of Virtue," a review of Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, in *The New Republic*, September 16 and 23, 1991: 40.

⁷ In what follows, I shall mainly use "argument" as a translation of the Greek *logos* when the latter refers to Socratic conversation and dialectic. This is sometimes too narrow, since Socrates' discussions often are informal and do not always involve logical demonstration. But I still think that "argument," broadly construed as dialectical give and take, is the best we can do. An alternative would be "discussion" (a suggestion made to me by Paul Woodruff), but I find this term too general; and it fails to suggest the sharpness which characterizes the edges of Socrates' particular method of conversation. Occasionally, however, context will demand the use of this broader term.

⁸ Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 253.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁰ Cf., however, Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.4.11.

¹¹ That in his middle and late works Plato is willing to criticize So-

appears at *Republic* 539b-d. The charge is that argument (*logos*) should not be taught to very young men, who are likely to indulge in it only for the pleasure of contradicting others. Their constant refutation of other people's views, whatever they happen to be, results in their "believing nothing of what they earlier believed," thus being bereft of new ideals with which to replace their former values. It produces an agnosticism or even cynicism which may, under some circumstances, be correctly described as "corruption."¹² This gives them a bad name, and harms the very cause of philosophy. Older men, by contrast, who deal with dialectic conversation (*dialegesthai*) seriously, for the sake of finding the truth and not just for contradiction, will become themselves more measured (*metriōteroi* [539c8], in contrast to the impetuous, puppy-like young at 539b4-6), and will bring honor to philosophy. Plato finally sums up all these points concerning age and connects them with one's character:

Indeed, all that we said before this was said for the sake of caution, that those whom one allows to partake in reasoned discourse [*hoi logoi*] should by nature be orderly and steady [*tas phuseis kosmioi kai stasimoi*] not as now when anyone engages in it, even if he is quite unfit. (539d3-6)¹³

With the exception of the charge that Socrates discoursed about natural phenomena and the gods, and with the addition of the view that philosophy, when properly practiced, does lead to the greatest goods, Plato's criticism is not so distant, after all, from the picture of Socrates Aristophanes presented in the *Clouds* some forty to fifty years before the composition of the *Republic*.

To this charge that Socrates was a serious failure as a teacher, we can add another, more personal accusation. If virtue is knowl-

crates, often through the persona of Socrates himself, is one indication that in his earlier works he *does* try to represent Socrates as he genuinely sees him to be, whether or not we can trust his representation to be accurate.

¹² The irony is compounded by the fact that Gregory Vlastos, in his discussion of this passage of the *Republic*, writes that if young men were to come to philosophy unprepared, "they would be sure to be corrupted"; Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 110. Though he does not explicitly endorse Plato's criticism, Vlastos uses the very term Socrates' own accusers used in their indictment, despite the fact that Plato himself (very carefully, in my opinion) consistently avoids the word *diaphtheirein* ("to corrupt") throughout the criticism of Socrates' approach at hand.

¹³ This translation is taken from G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's Republic* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1974).

edge, if it is necessary to know the good in order to do it, then is not it after all the case that Socrates, who consistently admits that he does not know what virtue is, also failed as an individual? How can he claim, or how can anyone else claim on his behalf, that he had led a virtuous and happy life? His shortcomings seem to keep proliferating.

II

In order to defuse the seriousness of the first set of charges against Socrates, I tried on a number of earlier occasions to construct an interpretation of his character as we find it in Plato's early works according to which Socrates, no matter how intellectualist, is totally unconcerned with the moral improvement of others. I argued that Plato's Socrates believes sincerely, not at all ironically, that he had nothing of his own, no positive ethical views, to impart to the world. If Socrates was not a teacher; if he did not have, even in its most rudimentary form, the sort of program for moral education that Plato and Aristotle developed after him; if all he was concerned about was the salvation of his own and not of any other soul, then, I thought, the charge of intellectualism, as amplified in the passage from the *Republic*, would lose much of its point.¹⁴

I still believe that this hypothesis is true. I am, however, less confident about the truth of its antecedent, the point about Socrates' teaching and positive views. I now believe that I ran together a number of different ideas, and that separating them from one another will be a good thing both for me personally (one can always safely be that much of an intellectualist) and for the discussion of the problem generally, since the differences between these ideas are not always clearly marked when they are discussed in the secondary literature.

One point that needs to be stated clearly and distinguished from others concerns the question whether Socrates was or was not a

¹⁴ These essays are my "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1985): 1-30; "Socratic Intellectualism," in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 2, ed. John J. Cleary (1987), 275-316; and "Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic, Dialectic," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 5 (1990): 3-16.

teacher. I still believe that he was not—that he was not, that is, a teacher of *aretē*; I will argue for the claim in what follows. But I do not want to claim that Socrates was not *perceived* as a teacher—he certainly was, by Plato as well as by Xenophon (for their different reasons), and also by a number of other Athenians, both friends and enemies. I believe, however, that Socrates, at least as he is depicted in Plato's early dialogues, did not see himself as such a teacher, and that—whatever Plato's actual intentions may have been—his moral stature derives directly from his refusal to accept that role. In other words, we must not distinguish only between what Socrates took himself to be and what others thought of him, but also between the way he is represented in Plato's dialogues and whatever we believe Plato's own attitude toward his representation to have been.

What is it, then, to be a teacher of *aretē*, an ethical teacher who can show others how to live a good and successful life? One can try to do this in at least two ways. One may in fact know (or claim to know) what the good and successful life is, and one may be able (or claim to be able) to transmit that knowledge to others. Or one can set oneself up as an example, perhaps as the only example, of what it is to lead a good and successful life. I am quite sure that Socrates was not a teacher in the first sense. With the exception of some passages in Plato's *Apology*, which I will discuss a little later, I also believe we have no evidence for thinking that Plato's Socrates set his life up as a model of what the good life is, even if Plato may have seen and presented him as the best human being of his time.

In contrast to Plato's version, Xenophon definitely portrays Socrates as someone constantly involved in giving explicit advice to his companions. The trouble with this representation of Socrates, however, is that Xenophon's refrain, "So saying and doing such things himself, he made his companions more pious and prudent,"¹⁵ consistently closes conversations which it is hard to imagine as having had *any* effect, especially one that was serious and lasting, on anyone. In any case, Xenophon's most general statement about Socrates' teaching (at *Memorabilia* 1.2.3) is profoundly equivocal: at best, it attributes to him the status of moral exemplar and not that of systematic teacher.¹⁶

¹⁵ Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.3.8; cf. 4.3.25.

¹⁶ Vlastos argues that I take Xenophon's statement as evidence "that

In trying to avoid portraying Socrates as any sort of teacher, I argued at one point that unless Socrates renounced *all* claims to any positive views whatever regarding virtue, he would have had to present himself as having the knowledge professed by the teachers of *aretē* with whom he did not want to be identified—precisely those people from whom Plato took such pains to distinguish him, the people we call sophists today. Accordingly, I tried to interpret what seemed to be one of his most substantive claims in a way which would make it turn out to be a very weak, almost trivial, claim indeed.¹⁷ This is the famous passage of the *Apology*: “To do injustice and to disobey a superior, whether divine or human: that I know to be bad and shameful” (29b6–7).

My argument was that the Greek word for “disobey,” *apeithein*, should be translated, as it certainly can be, as “to fail to be persuaded by”; and the Greek word for “superior,” *beltiōn*, translated as “a better person.” And since, because of Socrates’ very intellectualism, one cannot recognize a better person independently of being persuaded of that person’s moral views, I argued that all that the statement comes down to is the commonplace that injustice is wrong. I now think that this was an overstatement, especially since a few lines before making the statement quoted above Socrates refers to his military commanders at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium as his superiors, though he does not use the word *beltiōn* to describe them; and there is no reason to think that he would have thought of them as better human beings than he.¹⁸

Socrates not only did not *promise* to teach virtue, but *did not teach it*, and did not even *try* to teach it, which Xenophon does not say and certainly does not mean; cf. *Mem.* 4.7.1”; Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 241, n. 26. This reply, however, conflates the two senses of teaching, by communication of doctrine on the one hand and by setting a moral example on the other, which I have argued we must keep distinct. My point in “Socratic Intellectualism” (see note 14 above) was that Xenophon, in the statement we are discussing here, does not attribute to Socrates any version of the former approach. It is true that at many other points in the *Memorabilia* Xenophon lavishly attributes to Socrates the desire (and, ineffectively, the ability) to teach. But Xenophon’s not always consistent evidence does not affect the interpretation of this text, which appears so early and so prominently in his account. For another criticism of my view, see Donald Morrison, “Xenophon’s Socrates as Teacher,” forthcoming in *The Socratic Movement*, ed. Paul A. Vander Waerdt (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

¹⁷ See Nehamas, “Socratic Intellectualism,” 305–8.

¹⁸ See *Apology* 28d10–29a1. The point is well argued in C. D. C. Reeve,

The word *beltiōn*, then, should be interpreted as “superior” in a broad sense. In the *Apology*, Plato has Socrates make the sensible point that in some particular cases there are people who are superior to oneself. For example, in time of war, generals are the relevant experts who know what is good and bad in military affairs, and one should perform the tasks which they assign. In other cases, we assign ourselves tasks which we consider the best in the circumstances (*hēgēsamenos beltiston einai*) (28d6). In both types of cases—including of course the most important type, the case of the god’s command to Socrates to practice philosophy, which is what is really at issue here—someone, either oneself or an acknowledged expert, has set one a task. Socrates claims that he knows that it is bad and shameful to refuse to perform this task, especially if one is motivated by a fear of death (28d9, 28e6) or of anything else (29e1) greater than the fear of what is shameful (28d9–10; cf. *Crito* 48d3–5).

Socrates’ claim is not trivial. The idea that injustice is shameful, however, is not in fact terribly controversial: Polus readily concedes it,¹⁹ and it takes a person of views as extreme as those Callicles holds to defend it. Moreover, though the thesis that it is wrong to consider death worse than disgrace can be debated at length, it is still a proposition which, in general, is not especially easy to reject. Accordingly, I would like to suggest that Socrates relies on substantive though not particularly controversial premises in his argument that he will not abandon philosophy.

It seems to me that we can attribute such ideas to him, because having some moral views about the world is not sufficient to qualify one as a teacher of *aretē*, as I earlier thought. What Socrates considers necessary for being able to claim that role is a very specific kind of knowledge, not simply the conviction that some moral positions, which may in fact be very important to him, have so far survived all dialectical attacks. To be a teacher, you need not only this conviction, which is compatible with the possibility of your ideas turning out to be false upon their next examination,²⁰ but also a

Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 109–11. See also Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 141–2.

¹⁹ *Gorgias* 474c.

²⁰ The fact that a particular thesis “has always proved true [that is, has survived the elenchus] in the past offers absolutely no certainty that

certainty that the views you are claiming to teach are true. So, at least, Socrates seems to have believed: in *Gorgias* (506a) he claims for himself the role of seeker and nothing more precisely because he lacks that certainty (cf. 509a). In addition, you must be in a position to explain the truth of these ideas: if not to all and sundry, at least to those who, like apprentices to a master craftsman, gradually become habituated into a craft.²¹ This is just the sort of knowledge which, all scholars agree, Socrates lacks, and, moreover, believes he lacks.

Socrates does, however, sometimes depend on more controversial ideas in his discussions. Most famous among these ideas is his claim in the *Crito* that "one should never return an injustice nor harm another human being, no matter what one suffers at their hands" (49c10-11). Still, we must ask how substantive a commitment on his part this view constitutes; and is it a proposition which he can be said to teach to others? In order to answer these questions, we must first note that Socrates introduces his principle in terms that show that he himself considers it terribly controversial and subject to irresolvable disagreement:

For I know that this seems and will seem so to few people. Now, between those who think so and those who don't, there is no common counsel—necessarily they have nothing but contempt for one another when they observe what those of the other group decide. (49d2-5)

We do not know how Socrates reaches his conclusion about returning injustice, a view "which still now seems to him as it has always seemed" (49c1). There is a strong implication, however, that it is an idea the maintaining of which has never caused him to lose a dialectical bout, an elenchus (49b3-c6). Now, in view of how controversial Socrates takes the view to be, of the fallibility of the method by which he has been brought to believe it, and of his constant pressure on Crito to consider for himself whether he does or does not accept it (49d5-e2), it is difficult to believe that this is the sort of idea of which Socrates can claim (or be claimed, by Plato) to be a teacher. Though everything here is morally robust, it is

it always will in the future: it may have been vindicated in a thousand elenchi in the past and prove false in the very next one after that"; Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 114.

²¹ On the idea that technical or "expert" knowledge involves the ability to explain that which one knows, see Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology*, 37-45.

dialectically light and tentative. Socrates makes it perfectly clear to Crito that he is willing to take up the argument for this position from the beginning, if that is what Crito wants. He seems to lack just the sort of confidence that would allow him to present himself as a teacher of this view to anyone else.

Ironically, today we often refer to "Socratic teaching" as a method which is tentative in that it depends essentially on questions, though we always presume that teachers—usually law professors but sometimes Socrates himself—secretly know the truth and are not at all tentative in their conviction regarding it. In fact, no mode of teaching is more dogmatic than what goes by the name of "the Socratic method" today. In this we are completely untrue to the Socrates who appears in Plato's early dialogues, for reasons I will mention later on. Socrates is light and tentative all the way down. Though he insists on following his own dialectical method, he is constantly expressing the willingness to reexamine his views and to review his arguments. He does not believe that such tentativeness is compatible with teaching.

There is a remarkable difference between the way Socrates presents his "rejection of retaliation" in the *Crito* and his attitude toward the same principle in the *Gorgias*. In the latter we find him saying to Polus, "I and you and [all] other people think that committing injustice is worse than being treated unjustly and that avoiding punishment is worse than being punished" (474b3-5; cf. 475e2-6). Though he still presents the idea as controversial, Socrates now claims that everybody in fact already believes it: the sharp line he draws in the *Crito* between those who do and those who do not accept the rejection of retaliation is gone. It is true that in strictly logical terms his views in the two dialogues are mutually compatible. It is possible, after all, for people who share the same beliefs but are not in fact aware of this fact to have only contempt for one another on the basis of what they *think* the others believe, and not to be able to "deliberate" (*bouleuesthai*) together. But the idea that underneath our apparent disagreements there exists a fundamentally similar approach to the world, and that dialectical discussion may actually be capable of revealing it, seems to me totally absent from the *Crito*. I believe that this constitutes a very significant difference between the two dialogues.

The difference is significant because it suggests that it was only between the time when he wrote the *Crito* and the date when he

composed the *Gorgias*, and not throughout his early period, as Gregory Vlastos has so forcefully argued, that Plato came to the view that everyone possesses a stock of true moral beliefs which entail the negation of any false moral belief they may also hold.²² Furthermore, it is of course not only perfectly consistent with this idea, but evidence in its support, that only in the *Gorgias* does Plato have Socrates, for the first time, commit himself to the truth of the results of elenctic investigation (486e5-6; cf. 478e8, 487e6-7). If everyone does indeed possess a sufficient stock of true beliefs "within," then the results of the elenchus are not simply dialectically but also epistemically secure. The very idea of our having beliefs "within," however, which is introduced without explanation in the *Gorgias*, is a later Platonic innovation and not a Socratic thesis. It receives its first explanation through the theory of recollection presented in the *Gorgias*'s companion piece, the *Meno*, which Vlastos acknowledges as a work belonging to the beginnings of Plato's post-Socratic middle period.²³

If the results of the elenchus, which are reached on the basis of views asserted by an interlocutor, are to be true, then they must be reached on the basis of beliefs which are not only sincerely held but which are also themselves true. But how do we acquire such beliefs? The answer to this question is one of the great intellectual contributions of the *Meno*, in which, from some true mathematical beliefs of a slave, Socrates derives a further, much less obvious, view. Moreover, the theory of recollection is introduced right here precisely in order to explain how those true beliefs can be in the slave's (or in anyone else's) soul in the first place. The question the *Gorgias* raises implicitly, then, is answered explicitly in the *Meno*. The two dialogues go hand in hand. Both begin as traditional Socratic dialogues. At the point where Socratic dialogues reach an impasse, however, both these works literally explode into the presentation of extremely radical substantive theses: the *Gorgias* produces new ideas in ethics and politics; and the *Meno* inaugurates a new attitude toward dialectical method, metaphysics, and

²² See Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 113-15. Vlastos presents and defends his view more extensively in "The Socratic Elenchus," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983): 27-58, esp. 52-3, and 74, with n. 8.

²³ See Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 47, with n. 8; 117-26.

epistemology. Both works constitute Plato's first attempts to explain what underwrites Socrates' practice of the elenchus and his ethical views. Both, of course, need serious expansion and revision. This is exactly what they receive in what we now call Plato's middle dialogues, to which they provide a tight and intelligible transition.

It is important to note that despite his positive claims for the truth of the results of the elenchus in the *Gorgias* (cf. 508e6-509a3), Socrates, as Vlastos has also shown, adds an explicit disclaimer regarding his knowledge of these matters: "But as for me, my position [*logos*] is always the same: I do not know how these things are" (509a4-6). In other words, the elenchus, as practiced by Socrates, even if it reaches a conclusion that Socrates regards as true, does not constitute teaching, and Socrates can still claim that he does not have knowledge concerning the conclusion in question. Truth, as we have seen, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for knowledge which can be taught; the ability to explain the views in question is also needed.²⁴ This distinction is captured by the contrast between knowledge, which is accompanied by the ability to offer an explanation, and true belief, which is not. This contrast, in turn, which is centrally important to the *Meno* (85b-86a, 97a-98b) and to all of Plato's subsequent works, is first introduced in the *Gorgias* (454d-e)—a further indication that these two dialogues are to be read as companion pieces, summing up and extending Socratic ethics and dialectic.

The question we now need to ask, then, is what the knowledge is which Socrates lacks and which therefore prevents him from being a teacher of the good life. Vlastos has argued that though Socrates possesses a sort of dialectical, fallible knowledge reached by means of the elenchus, and is willing to avow possessing it, he is also aware that he lacks a kind of knowledge which is philosophical, deductive, and certain.²⁵ It is just the possession of this second sort of knowledge which Socrates disavows, and which might have made him a teacher if he only had it.

A problem with this interpretation, however, is that such a notion of "philosophical" knowledge is systematically articulated only in the middle and later writings of Plato and in the texts of

²⁴ See Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology*, 52.

²⁵ Gregory Vlastos, "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge," *Philosophical Quarterly* 35 (1981): 1-35.

Aristotle.²⁶ There is very little evidence for thinking that this notion constituted an idea disseminated widely enough—or, for that matter, articulated sufficiently—by Socrates' time (or even by the time of Plato's early works) to provide a sensible term of contrast with Socrates' elenctic method of dialectic. Unless such a concept was current at the time, Socrates could not reasonably deny possessing it; and the evidence that it was current is very weak indeed. Vlastos provides only two passages from Democritus, and appeals to Parmenides' strong claims for his view of the world.²⁷ But the passages of Democritus do not seem to me to be enough to show that a systematic conception of philosophical knowledge which entailed certainty was available, and the Eleatics' reliance on deductive proof was used almost exclusively for the refutation of commonsense views rather than for the establishment of positive conclusions.

General considerations of this sort, however, are unlikely to resolve the problem. Let us, instead, look at our texts. In *Apology* 20d6–e2 Socrates claims to possess only what he calls “human wisdom,” in contrast to what some other people to whom he claims to have just referred may profess. Who are these people, and what knowledge do they believe they have? According to Vlastos, they are the natural philosophers (referred to at 19a–20d) and the sophists (19d–20c). On his view, therefore, Socrates disavows the “philosophical” knowledge he must be attributing to the natural philosophers, and uses a single term “to refer to two radically different cognitive achievements, one of which [he] dares claim to have while disclaiming the other.”²⁸

The situation, however, is considerably more complicated than this suggests. First, Socrates, in repeating the “ancient” accusation which he claims is behind Meletus's writ, considers that it describes him both as a natural philosopher and as a teacher of rhetoric, since it is supposed to refer both to his investigations of natural phenomena and to his teaching how to “make the weaker argument stronger” (19b4–c1). Accordingly, when he denies having an interest in these topics, he cannot be thinking simply of natural philosophy: he must

²⁶ Vlastos' evidence from these authors is collected in “Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge,” 13–16.

²⁷ Democritus Frag. DK B117 and B9 Diels-Kranz; cited in “Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge,” 17.

²⁸ Vlastos, “Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge,” 27, with n. 68; cf. Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 238–9.

be thinking of rhetoric as well. But it is quite unlikely that Socrates would have attributed "philosophical" or certain knowledge to the rhetoricians if his notion of this knowledge was supposed to be derived from natural philosophy.

Second, Socrates remains explicitly agnostic about what it is, if anything, that natural philosophers and rhetoricians know: "I do not speak of this sort of knowledge in order to put it down—if indeed someone is wise concerning such matters . . . , but, really, Athenians, I take no part whatsoever in such affairs" (19c5–8). Since he considers that natural philosophy and rhetoric are totally beyond his concerns, and since he expresses serious reservations about what is known in their regard, it is very difficult to believe that Socrates contrasts his own knowledge with the knowledge those people may have claimed for themselves. Moreover, it is equally implausible to believe that he considers the knowledge of the natural philosophers and the rhetoricians—if indeed they have any knowledge in the first place—to be superior to his own.

Of course, Socrates may well be being ironical in attributing wisdom and knowledge to the philosophers and to the rhetoricians. His real view may be that knowledge is god's prerogative (23a). In that case, however, we cannot appeal to the deductive features of the knowledge the philosophers allegedly possess in order to establish a notion of knowledge with which Socrates can be contrasting his own: either Socrates seriously accepts the philosophical concept of knowledge which he claims to lack, or he doubts it exists, in which case he cannot be contrasting *his* kind of knowledge with it.

For these reasons, it seems to me much more likely to suppose that the people of whom Socrates says he was just speaking (20d9–e1) and with whom he contrasts himself are just the sophists who are concerned with rhetoric, grammar, or virtue: Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, and Evenus. Two reasons make this supposition plausible. First, these are in fact the people about whom Socrates has been speaking for the past whole Stephanus page (19d–20d); the natural philosophers have been left far behind. Second, since Socrates does discuss virtue incessantly and uses dialectical approaches not dissimilar from theirs,²⁹ it might seem obvious to the people of

²⁹ The argument for the methodological similarities between Socrates and the "sophists" can be found in my "Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic, Dialectic."

Athens that he is part of their group. It is therefore important to him to distinguish his position from theirs as clearly as possible. He claims that if, like them and like Evenus in particular, he himself possesses the knowledge (*epistēmē*) of *aretē* and the craft (*technē*) of teaching it, then he would indeed be “puffed up with vanity and pride” (20c1–2).

If so, then the domain with which Socrates is concerned is exclusively ethical, and the knowledge he claims to lack is the knowledge which the sophists—not the natural philosophers—claim to possess. More accurately put, he says he lacks the knowledge he believes these people must lay claim to if they can be teachers of anything. His concern, as David Reeve writes, is to try “to explain how his wisdom differs from that of Gorgias and the other sophists and how, despite the fact that he knows nothing of the things they claim to know (20c1–3), his wisdom got confused with theirs (20c4–24b2).³⁰ But the sophists’ wisdom cannot have been the philosophical, deductive knowledge which may have been in the process of being articulated by Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. If anything, the sophists represented, to a great extent, a repudiation of traditional natural philosophy.

The knowledge the sophists claim for themselves does not have anything to do with certainty and deduction. Rather, what they claim to have is what we might call technical or expert knowledge of *aretē*, knowledge which they can articulate and transmit to others with a reasonable assurance of success.³¹ Perhaps it is not even the case that all of them make that strong a claim. Protagoras, for example, may be unwilling to identify his teaching too closely with what occurs in other *technai*.³² Socrates is convinced, however, that

³⁰ Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology*, 10–11. I am particularly indebted to Reeve’s clear analysis of the “ancient” accusation against Socrates and of his manner of responding to it.

³¹ On “expert” knowledge, see Paul Woodruff, *Plato: Hippias Major* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), 79–112; and Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology*, 37–53.

³² On this hypothesis, see Paul Woodruff, “Socrates’ Debt to Protagoras” (unpublished manuscript, 1992). He writes that in the *Protagoras*, “Protagoras uses the analogy of virtue to *technē* delicately, recognizing—and showing—that it does not hold in every respect; and he draws encouragement from it for the teaching of virtue (as flutists can teach music to their sons to varying degrees, depending on their natural talents). Socrates, on the other hand, drives the analogy hard in order to undermine

if some people can teach virtue (or any other subject), then they must possess what he would consider technical knowledge, and he interprets their claim in this manner. This is a knowledge he disavows, while he is willing to claim for himself what we might call common, nontechnical, or nonexpert knowledge of *aretē*: he was convinced about some of its features, perhaps features that were quite controversial, by means of the fallible method provided by the elenchus. In addition, he was able to do with the greatest consistency the right thing on all occasions; this, I believe, must have been the greatest problem Plato faced regarding his "teacher": How could Socrates always do what is right without the knowledge he himself seemed to consider necessary for doing it? But Socrates' knowledge can neither explain why the truths it captures are true ("I do not know how it is [*hopōs echei*] that these things are so," he says at *Gorgias* 509a5), nor can it be transmitted from one person to another, as the artisans can transmit their knowledge in virtue of being able to explain the reasons for proceeding as they do in their work. The contrast is not between dialectical and apodeictic knowledge; it is, rather, between dialectic and craft—between pure persuasion by means of argument on the one hand, and an authority which can justify itself by its tried and true accomplishments on the other.

III

The most common approach to Socrates' disclaiming of the role of teacher is to consider it ironical. The most recent and most sophisticated expression of this approach is found in Gregory Vlastos's concept of "complex irony." In complex irony, a word is used in two senses, denied in one while it is being asserted in the other. Many of Socrates' most paradoxical positions, including his attitude toward his teaching, turn out to be instances of this trope:

In the conventional sense, where to "teach" is simply to transfer knowledge from a teacher's to a learner's mind, Socrates means what

it and so to cast suspicion on claims that Sophists teach virtue" (p. 12). The issue is complex, and needs further discussion in which, unfortunately, I cannot engage on this occasion. Woodruff's own position is well presented in "Plato's Early Theory of Knowledge," in *Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 60–84.

he says. But in the sense which *he* would give to "teaching"—engaging would-be learners in elenctic argument to make them aware of their own ignorance and enable them to discover for themselves *the truth the teacher had held back*—in that sense of "teaching" Socrates would want to say that he *is* a teacher, the only true teacher: his dialogue with his fellows is meant to have, and does have, the effect of evoking and assisting their efforts at moral self-improvement.³³

This Socrates is, in the ancient sense of the term, a dogmatist: he knows the truth as certainly as anyone ever did. His ironic insistence that he neither knows nor teaches it, once interpreted in this manner, disappears into a protreptic device. This is the heart of Vlastos's controversial new interpretation of Socrates. But should we allow Socratic irony to transform itself so readily into an educational ploy? Is this irony at all?

I believe that it is not and that we should, instead, leave Socrates' irony intact, for a number of reasons. One is that this interpretation of Socratic irony seems tailor-made for the *Gorgias* (521d, 515a), a dialogue in which Plato's Socrates does reveal a newly found dogmatic streak. As I have already argued, however, the *Gorgias* should be seen as a text in which Plato goes beyond his previous understanding of Socrates. In fact, the *Gorgias* is the earliest in a long series of efforts to come to terms with Socrates' irony, to disarm it, and to claim Socrates as the first in a venerable tradition of moral teachers. In other words, I believe that the evidence of the *Gorgias*, like that of the *Meno*, is evidence for Plato's own controversial interpretation of what he had up to that point presented as Socratic philosophy.

Another reason for not reading Socrates' disavowal of teaching as a complex irony is the perhaps unfortunate fact that it is far from clear that Socrates' dialogue with his fellows, as depicted in Plato's early works, "does have" the beneficial effect Vlastos so confidently attributes to it. Protagoras, Gorgias, Polus, Callicles, Hippias, Euthydemus, and Dionysiodorus remain unmoved. So do Euthyphro, Ion, and Meno. "Moral improvement" simply misdescribes the direction toward which Critias's and Charmides' lives tend. The *Laches* and the *Lysis* end with a promise to continue the efforts

³³ Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 32; the second set of italics is mine. Other Socratic statements which Vlastos interprets as complex ironies are Socrates' disavowal of knowledge and his disavowal of being engaged in politics; see chap. 1, and pp. 236-42.

begun in these works, but they still leave the question of Socrates' long-term effects completely unresolved. As to his influence on Alcibiades, we have, apart from his the testimony of history, the confession Plato himself attributes to Alcibiades in the *Symposium*: "I know perfectly well that I can't prove him wrong when he tells me what I should do; yet, the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I cave in to my desire to please the crowd" (216b).

As a description of Socrates' efforts and effects as they are depicted in Plato's early dialogues, Nietzsche's point that dialectic "arouses mistrust," "that it is not very persuasive," "that nothing is easier to erase than a dialectical effect,"³⁴ seems to me to be exactly right. Though we know, through the existence of the various Socratic *logoi*, that some people at least were converted by him and tried to continue what they each took his mission to be, the fact remains that Socrates' direct, immediate effect on his contemporaries' morality was minimal.

It is true that both his enemies and his friends considered Socrates a teacher, but that is no reason to refuse to take his own disavowal of that role at face value. There is little ground for supposing that Socrates' contemporaries and near contemporaries—the authors of the Socratic *logoi* which contained such incredibly different pictures of him—must have understood him better than we do. Kierkegaard was right: "Even if I were to imagine myself his contemporary," he writes, "he would still always be difficult to comprehend."³⁵

Taking Socrates' attitude toward his teaching as ironical robs him of his much of his strangeness. Taking it as sincere supplies him, paradoxically, with a much more profound ironical mask—a mask that is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to remove. For here we have someone who, precisely in disavowing ethical knowledge and the ability to supply it to others, succeeded in living as moral (if not necessarily as perfectly human) a life as anyone ever did who belonged in a tradition he himself initiated. And he does not let us know how.

³⁴ See note 3 above.

³⁵ Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Irony (With Continual Reference to Socrates)*, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 12.

This—we must be very clear—is a profound instance of irony. For irony cannot simply be defined (as Vlastos, following the tradition begun by Quintilian, defines it) as saying one thing and meaning the opposite. The idea that ironists are always in clear possession of a truth they are holding back is itself part of the trope, part of what irony represents itself as, but not necessarily a part it communicates. To believe this idea is in many cases to miss the irony, to fail to notice that ironists can be ironical toward themselves as well. Often, irony consists simply in letting your audience know that something is taking place inside you that they are not allowed to see—but it also leaves open the question whether you are seeing it yourself. Irony often communicates that we are not seeing the whole picture, but it does not imply that the speaker is; in fact, it does not always imply that there is a whole picture to be seen in the first place.³⁶

Irony, as I have been saying, provides a mask. It does not show what, if anything, is masked. It suggests depth, but it does not guarantee it. Furthermore, I believe, the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues has no depth; no underlying story distinct from what we are given in the texts. Intimations that his practice is underwritten by a set of views and theories different from those he expresses appear only in the *Gorgias* and in the *Meno*; and the first effort to display his depth explicitly is made when Plato composes Alcibiades' speech in the *Symposium*. These works are the beginning of Plato's attempt to endow Socrates with a depth which can explain his paradoxical life.

In our many discussions of Socratic irony we often forget that Socrates is after all Plato's literary creature and that the issue of Platonic irony, of the irony of the author, is at least as important as the irony of his character. Plato's irony, I believe, is more disturbing than Socrates': it is deep, dark, and disdainful. It expresses

³⁶ This can be seen even through one of Vlastos's simplest examples of irony, the response of Mae West to an invitation to dinner at the Ford White House: "It's an awful long way to go for just one meal"; Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 21-2. Vlastos acknowledges that there is a "riddling" element in this statement. The case, however, is more complex—not perhaps as irony itself, but as an instance to be explained by the traditional interpretation of irony. What we learn from Mae West is that she is not going to dinner with the President. But I can think of no function that takes us from her uttered words to their "opposite," whatever that might be.

deep contempt, especially since Plato never engages in it directly in his own person, but only through the effect of his works.

Consider, for example, the way the *Euthyphro* manipulates its readers. By and large, even if we do not agree with all of Socrates' arguments, we finish the dialogue convinced that whether Euthyphro knows it or not, he has lost the day. We are put in the position of taking Socrates' side, of believing that he is absolutely right in thinking that Euthyphro does not know what piety is while yet he is determined to proceed with his astounding suit against his own father. Euthyphro's last words—"Some other time, Socrates; for, right now, I am in a hurry to get somewhere, and it's time for me to leave" (15e3-4)—with which he avoids a discussion which he had taken such pains to initiate, show that he has missed Socrates' point completely: the argument must go on if he is to go on with his suit. Having taken Socrates' side, however, we ourselves close the book. Just like Euthyphro himself, we turn to our previous engagements instead of doing what agreement with Socrates entails: devoting ourselves, just like him, to the search for the good life—and this not simply in a metaphorical sense. What Socrates and Plato ask their respective audiences to do is neither uncontroversial nor easy. But agreeing that it is the right thing to do and not doing it, knowing the better but choosing the worse, places us, as Plato's readers and Socrates' admirers, in a very peculiar situation indeed.³⁷ To believe that Socrates' effect, either on his own interlocutors or on the readers of the dialogues, is generally beneficial is to be taken in by Platonic irony and to show ourselves to be missing the point in our very claim to see it. It is nothing other than displaying our ignorance of our ignorance.

Another reason for taking Socrates at face value when he denies being a teacher is the contrast between *Apology* 33a-b and *Gorgias* 456c-461b.³⁸ In the latter passage, Gorgias, having claimed to be a teacher of rhetoric, disclaims any responsibility for the use to which his students might put the knowledge he gives them. Socrates then argues that since Gorgias has claimed that the nature of justice is

³⁷ Diogenes Laertius claims that Socrates actually diverted Euthyphro from his course of action as a result of their conversation on piety; Diogenes Laertius 2.5.29.

³⁸ Cf., however, Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.19, 1.2.23, 1.2.27. For the distinction between the two stages of Socrates' elenctic enterprise, though not for this use of it, see Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology*, p. 45.

part of what his course on rhetoric reveals, his students should never be unjust. Gorgias accepts this conclusion, but the contradiction is left unresolved. The implication is that either rhetoric does not concern justice (for then the orator would never be unjust), or that Gorgias does not after all teach his students what he professes. In the *Apology*, however, Socrates claims for himself just the position he refuses to allow Gorgias to occupy. In very strong terms he says that since he never was the teacher of anyone, he cannot be held in any way responsible for the character and behavior of those who made it *their* business to listen to his discussions. I think that if there ever was a sense, any sense, in which Socrates did think of himself as a teacher of *aretē*, he would never have disavowed this central responsibility.

Who were the people who wanted to listen while he was discussing and minding his own business (*ta emautou prattontos*)? To whom did Socrates turn in order both to interpret and, once interpreted, to obey, the Delphic oracle? What did he tell them?

In Plato's Socratic dialogues, Socrates addresses a very small class of people (Crito, his closest friend, constitutes a very special case). This class includes acknowledged experts (Protagoras, Hippias, Gorgias and his companions, Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus, Ion, Laches, and Nicias), self-professed experts (Euthyphro, perhaps Critias [*Charmides* 162b-c], Meno, and Anytus), or handsome young men (Charmides, Lysis, Menexenus, and Alcibiades). Very often it is not Socrates who initiates the conversation, but it is his interlocutors who invite him into their discussion; consider, for example, how long it takes him to engage in the discussion of the *Laches*, or the pressure Hippocrates exerts on him, in the opening pages of the *Protagoras*, to introduce him to the sophist.

These are, however, all special people. How can their exclusive presence in their dialogues fit with Socrates' repeated claims in the *Apology* that he addresses absolutely everyone he meets? (29d6, 31b3-4; cf. 36c4-5). One possible answer to this question would be that these dialogues depict Socrates at the early stage of his elenctic career, before the incidents described in the *Apology* occur. They represent the set of disputations that provoked Chairephon to send to Delphi for the oracle, the time before Socrates took it upon himself to do the god's work in Athens and approach every ordinary person there. But the response fails. In the *Apology* Socrates says explicitly that he approached the experts after he received the oracle;

and the examination of Euthyphro occurs just before his trial, well after the oracle was received.³⁹

Let us now look at the passages of the *Apology* a little more closely. How strongly do they testify to Socrates' "universalism," to his being the popular figure of the "street philosopher" he is regularly taken to be? I am not sure we can answer this question unequivocally; but I do believe that the *Apology* presents a more complex picture of Socrates' activities than we often suppose.

Consider, first, Socrates' response to the oracle. Puzzled by its declaration, he approaches the three classes of people who had a reputation for wisdom: politicians, poets, and craftsmen. Moreover, Socrates describes his examination of the "wise," which was part of his effort at the elenchus of the oracle, as an activity "in accordance with the god's wish" (*kata ton theon*; 22a4)—an expression that suggests that his very attempt to interpret, perhaps even to refute, the oracle, was also part of his divine mission. That is, Socrates' mission does not begin *only* after he has determined the meaning of the oracle and has established the worth of his "human wisdom."

He comes to this interpretation after he has examined these people.⁴⁰ That is, he finally understands that the message of the oracle was that human wisdom is of little value and that he was chosen as an example of someone, perhaps the only person, aware of this. He then describes what he did next, characterizing it three times as divinely ordained: *kata ton theon* (23b5), *tōi theōi boēthōn* (23b7), *dia tēn tou theou latreian* (23c1). What is crucial here is the fact that Socrates consistently identifies his divine mission as a search for someone wise and a demonstration that no one with that

³⁹ David Blank, in "Socratics vs. Sophists on Payment for Teaching," *California Studies in Classical Philology* 48 (1985): 1–49, has argued that the evidence of the *Apology* should be discounted. It is a work, he writes, "with a strong apologetic tendency [and] the only Platonic work containing such a statement. Any elitism on Socrates' part might have lent support to the charge, unspoken at his trial, that he had been involved in the preparation of young men for the oligarchy of the Thirty. . . . Plato's *Apology* is . . . concerned to bring out Socrates' civic-mindedness" (p. 20). There is something to this idea, but taken by itself it does not remove a sense of deep uneasiness about Plato's practice.

⁴⁰ Note, incidentally, Socrates' subtle suggestion that there *are* some people in Athens who, without having that reputation, do know something about the good; *Apology* 22a4. It is an interesting question whom as to he had in mind.

reputation really deserves it. He does not depict his task as an effort to teach anyone the truth about virtue. In addition, he claims that the rich young men who have the leisure to "follow him around" do so purely on their own initiative (*automatoi*; 23c2-3). He does not offer himself as their teacher.

Plato is writing carefully here, and we should read him in the same way. He is equally careful later, when, beginning again with Socrates' effect on the young, he makes him expand on the content of the divine command:

They enjoy listening to the examination of those who think they are wise but actually are not, for this is not without its pleasure. Just this, I claim, has been set to me as my task by the god both through oracles and dreams and in every way in which any other divine arrangement ever set a human being to doing something. (33c2-7)

This famous passage, which asserts in the strongest terms that Socrates is obeying a divine command, tells us that he was ordered not to approach "all and sundry," but to examine those who believe they are wise, but in fact are not, and to expose their arrogance. The scope of Socrates' mission once again appears considerably more narrow than we often take it to be.

What of his long speech to the jury in the hypothetical case they might allow him to live if he did not do philosophy? (29d2-30c1). Does not Socrates clearly say here that he will still say to *anyone he happens upon* that what really matters is not wealth, fame, or honor, but the care of the soul? To answer this question correctly we must recall that this speech is addressed directly to the jury, which, on hypothesis, might allow Socrates to live if he were to abandon philosophy and—what comes to the same for him—the pursuit of virtue. What he tells *these members of the jury* is that he will not stop philosophizing. On the contrary, he will miss no opportunity of addressing them—that is, the very people who think, after all, that a life not lived in search of virtue is still worth living—on that very subject. For their hypothetical decision to let him live without philosophy would amount precisely to such an evaluation of life. So, even in this case, Socrates' audience is not unlimited. He begins his hypothetical speech by addressing it to an unnamed Athenian citizen (29d7-8), but he is speaking to the jurors, to whom he has been referring consistently as "Athenians," and who have expressed an explicit and controversial view on the value

of life.⁴¹ If any one of them (*ean tis humōn*), he continues, replies that he does care for what is worth caring for, Socrates will attach himself to him and will examine him in detail, showing him up as a hypocrite, if that is what he is.

What Socrates promises he will do to the members of the jury is in fact the point of the elenchus, as practiced on those who claim to be wise. Socrates now focuses on this point and says that he will engage in discussion of it "whomever I happen upon, young or old, citizen or foreigner, though preferably a citizen" (30a2-4). Given the context, however, which concerns the practice of the elenchus on those who think they are wise, "whomever I happen upon" need not refer to everyone indiscriminately, but only to those for whom Socrates considers the elenchus appropriate, wherever they are from. That is, Socrates need not be saying, "I will walk about town and I will practice the elenchus on everyone I meet." Instead he may be saying, "Having determined that someone needs to be subjected to the elenchus, I will do so, whoever he is, young or old, citizen or foreigner."

A final point needs to be addressed now. When Socrates announces what he will say to the people he approaches, he does not rest content with the specifications of the elenchus he has given so far. He offers a much more general statement about the fundamentally greater importance of the care of the soul over concern with other goods (30a-b). This is true. But we are not obligated to take his words to specify the surface content of his interaction with these people. His statement, rather, describes the covert point of the elenchus, which is in fact to show that the care of the soul is the most important activity in life, and which is established by the demonstration that people who believe they are wise actually are not.⁴²

This speculation, about which I am far from certain, contains two parts. The first is that Socrates does not say that he addresses everyone he meets—though those he addresses are often to be found in public, in the streets. The second is that his "protreptic" description of what he will tell those he encounters is not an exact

⁴¹ On the possible significance of Socrates' addressing the jury only as "Athenians" and not as "judges" (*dikastai*), see Brickhouse and Smith, *Socrates on Trial*, 210-11, with references.

⁴² This, I believe, is also the point Socrates makes at *Apology* 36c.

description of his words, but an explanation of the elenchus's point. Nothing prevents him, however, from thinking that by addressing elenctically the particular people who invite his intervention he is also improving not only their own personal fortune but the lot of the city as a whole.

If this is right, then Socrates can in all seriousness disclaim the role of teacher, though not on the grounds that he holds absolutely no positive views of his own. If he can disclaim that role, then the charge of intellectualism cannot show that his project is fundamentally flawed. Why shouldn't he concentrate on the intellectual aspects of his interlocutors if those interlocutors claim on their own accord to know the nature of virtue and of the good life and, knowing it, to live it?

IV

Socrates may well have believed that the unexamined life is not worth living, and that his life, to the extent that it was examined, was the best a human being could have. But he came to this belief because he realized that it was the god's command (37e-38a). How did he come to this realization? What enabled him to heed the god's desire to care for his own soul? What enabled the god to communicate that message to Socrates in the first place? The problem is one both for Socrates and for the god. As Vlastos writes,

How could the god make the Athenians care for their soul? He could send them signs to that effect, dreams and oracles galore. But unless they brought the right beliefs to the interpretation of those signs, they would not be able to read them correctly. And they could not have come by those right beliefs unless they had already engaged in the quest for moral truth. So the god is stuck. . . . He must depend on someone who does have the right beliefs and can read signs correctly to assist the god.⁴³

The god is in a quandary, indeed, in a quandary worse than this. As C. C. W. Taylor put the problem,

There is one good product which [the gods] can't produce without human assistance, namely, good human souls. For a good human soul is a self-directed soul."⁴⁴

⁴³ Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 173.

⁴⁴ C. C. W. Taylor, "The End of the *Euthyphro*," *Phronesis* 27 (1982):

Unless one wants to be good, the gods are powerless to help. But how can one want to be good if one is ignorant of what goodness is and, worse, ignorant of that very ignorance? In the case of Socrates, the god, if we may put the point as a near oxymoron, was lucky. *There was no reason* why Socrates was correctly motivated to inquire into virtue so as to be able to interpret the god's command correctly.⁴⁵

In addition, the problem for which Socrates provides a solution on behalf of the god is at least as much of a problem for Socrates himself: how is *he* to make himself understood to his fellows? The situation, for the god and for Socrates, is strictly parallel: only one good agent can recognize another. What Socrates does, during the whole of his life, is look for a good agent: he is convinced that if he recognizes one, he will thereby show himself to be good as well, and will be recognized as good by that other good human being. Far from having anything to teach, Socrates is engaged in a search in the most literal sense of the term.⁴⁶

It could well be, however, that someone, having somehow recognized Socrates as a good man, wanted Socrates' motivation, character, and activity to be not simply a matter of luck, of a "divine accident,"⁴⁷ but rather to be the product of a *technē*. One may have wanted to make sure that there will always be people like him in society and that they will always be honored for what they are; that *aretē* in the sense of having a good soul and *aretē* in the sense of having a great reputation will never again diverge as they did so tragically in Socrates' case. One will then turn to education in a most profound and systematic way: education, if we know what we want, will produce good people and the ability, in those who are not so good, to recognize them. This turn, which did occur, was profound and systematic enough to convince most of us that philosophy necessarily involves showing others what the good life is. This is a view which, though inspired by Socrates, was not, I believe, his own.

⁴⁵ Vlastos's solution to this problem (see *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 173-4) is that Socrates had the "right beliefs" which enabled him to understand the god's good wish. This does not, however, answer the question, because we must now determine how Socrates came to have those true beliefs. Vlastos seems to suggest that Socrates may have come to them as a result of his "street-philosophizing," but this does not explain why Socrates engaged in such "street-philosophizing" in the first place.

⁴⁶ A more complete version of this case is made in my "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," 12-14.

⁴⁷ Cf. *Republic* 492a.

It is also a view which radically separates the ability to lead a good life from the ability to recognize one who does.

If one, in addition, has just learned, and has become rapt with, a method of learning which itself does not depend on luck and good will, but only on ability and persistence—a method which offers no choice, but imposes the obligation to accept its conclusions once you begin to follow it—then that one will devise a system for the direct education of the souls of one and all. That one's name, as it happens, is Plato. His method will be in its higher reaches mathematical, and his attention will focus on the affective side of his pupils. For it will now be necessary to start when they are young and to get them to *want* to have the right beliefs. It will also be necessary to ensure that those with talent will in fact develop the systematic ability to do the right thing which Socrates possessed without ever knowing how he had learned it.

It is deeply ironical that Socrates' paradoxical ignorance gave rise to Plato's systematic effort to articulate the notion that the life of knowledge and, in particular, of philosophy, is the best life for all human beings. It also gave rise to Plato's conviction that philosophers can tell the rest of the people how they can live best. These two ideas go together. As long as we identify the life of philosophy as the best life, it seems reasonable to expect philosophers also to know how others should live. It seems to me, however, that the first of these two ideas is now lost. Far from constituting the best mode of life, philosophy is often not even seen as such a thing at all: it no longer represents, in Aristotle's words, a *prohairesis tou biou*—a choice of life—but has itself become a *technē*. In that case, however, the second idea, that philosophers are particularly qualified to understand the nature of the good life and to show it to others, also must lose some of its hold on our imagination. Socrates' suspicions about a *technē* which can teach us how to live well—suspicions we share while reading Plato's early dialogues—must remain with us after we close our books.

Separated from Plato's own systematic educational interests, Socrates constitutes a peculiar figure, concerned primarily if not exclusively with the improvement of his own soul. He therefore prompts us to reexamine our assumption that philosophy must be essentially directed toward public affairs. Perhaps his own private goals are enough; perhaps one can change the world, as Nietzsche would have said, only through changing oneself. Those who find

such narrower goals unacceptable and want to reclaim a public voice for philosophy must then try hard to find the proper modulation for that voice. In fact, they must go back to the Plato of the *Republic*: his grand claims for the value of philosophy can be made only on the basis of a conception of the discipline that is itself as grand as his own. Is Platonism, even understood in the broadest terms, a possible choice today? Or should we return to Socrates' superficially more modest approach, knowing, however, that once we engage in the care of the self we will never know when we can stop, that the limits of the self are also the limits of the world?⁴⁸

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⁴⁸ The earliest version of this paper was written when Gregory Vlastos invited me to speak at one of his National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminars for College Teachers in Berkeley, July 1989. I am grateful to the participants in that seminar for a lively and productive discussion. Vlastos and I disagreed about the essay, in a friendly though spirited manner, until his death. A later version was presented at the Leonard Conference held at the University of Nevada at Reno, October 1991, where it received a number of very valuable criticisms. Roslyn Weis corrected a number of my errors. I am also indebted to Paul Woodruff for his written comments on that version. The essay was extensively revised with the generous financial support, gratefully acknowledged here, of the Princeton University Center for Human Values.

THE METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE OF ARISTOTLE'S GENERATION OF ANIMALS AND ITS FEMINIST CRITICS

DARYL MCGOWAN TRESS

I

HOW DOES LIFE BEGIN? How is it and why is it that a child comes into being? To answer these questions about life and its origins requires a system of presuppositions about a great many metaphysical matters, such as causation and its modes of operation, relations of identity and difference, and, perhaps above all, the transition from not-being to actualized existence. In his treatise, *Generation of Animals* (GA), Aristotle takes up the theme of the origins of animal and human life. His treatment of the subject is both empirical, offering descriptions of how the process occurs in nature, and metaphysical, pursuing the deeper how and answering questions about why it is that offspring are generated and how this phenomenon is meaningfully connected to the cosmos as a whole.

In recent years, feminist critics of the history of philosophy have been severe in their condemnation of Aristotle as a chief spokesman, if not founder, of sexism in the philosophical tradition: "We have become accustomed to regarding Aristotle as the fountainhead of one long tradition of western misogyny."¹ The theory proposed in GA, which in outline reads that in generation the male parent contributes the form and the female parent contributes the matter, is adduced by some of Aristotle's critics to show that he regards females as inferior to males in the process of reproduction

¹ Eve Browning Cole, in a review of Page DuBois, *Sowing the Body*, in *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Feminism* 89 (Fall 1989): 88-9.

and that this view of female inferiority can be seen to be carried into other, if not all, areas of his philosophizing.²

Despite Aristotle's current status as *défectueux* from a feminist point of view, his treatise is worthy of renewed exposition for several reasons. First, his path to understanding how and why life begins—his very ability to ask how and why together—is richer and more fruitful than our modern view of reproduction, which is constructed for the most part on materialistic presuppositions. It is largely a modern materialist view of reproduction that feminism has inherited. From the start, the phenomenon Aristotle is studying is generation rather than reproduction, and the method he adopts for apprehending this expanded phenomenon is empirical-metaphysical rather than strictly mechanical or medical. Aristotle's ability to integrate metaphysical considerations with scientific ones offers modern readers a model for a rationally enlarged conception of generation.³ In anticipation, we may say at this point that the results of his analysis show generation to be entwined with multiple di-

² As evidence of Aristotle's sexism, Mary Mahowald offers, without comment, passages from *Generation of Animals* in her book, *The Philosophy of Woman* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 266-72. Caroline Whitbeck speaks of Aristotle's "flower-pot" theory of pregnancy in her article, "Theories of Sex Difference," in *Women and Philosophy*, ed. Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1976), 54-80. Lynda Lange holds that Aristotle's sexist views on sex difference are not separable from his general philosophical thought, that they are interwoven with and may, she proposes, be the basis for ideas he develops in his political, metaphysical, and logical writings; see her "Woman is Not a Rational Animal: On Aristotle's Biology of Reproduction," in *Discovering Reality*, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), 1-15. Prudence Allen's thesis in her book, *The Concept of Woman: the Aristotelian Revolution 750 B.C.-1250 A.D.* (Montreal: Eden Press, 1985), is that Aristotle systematically devalues women, with long term effects both for women and for the history of philosophy. Page DuBois offers a similar assessment of Aristotle in her book, *Sowing the Body* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). "Aristotle's Views on Women," by Rhoda Kotzin (in *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Feminism* 88 (1989): 21-5) lists Aristotle's offensive assertions in the biological and political treatises. Kotzin believes not only that "it is beyond dispute that Aristotle was wrong about women" (p. 21), but also that Aristotle is not entitled to make the claims that he does and that they are inconsistent with other elements of his philosophy.

³ The promotion of fertility goddess worship, for example, by some feminist writers must be regarded at best as an attempt to imaginatively infuse a desiccated modern notion of conception and pregnancy with some meaning.

mensions of the natural world, not merely the sexual partners who are the parents of the offspring.⁴

Second, one reason that the feminist critics fail to appreciate the virtues of Aristotle's metaphysical science of generation has to do with the differing aims of classical metaphysics and modern feminism: Aristotle's intentions in taking up generation are metaphysical; he asks, What is generation? and looks to see how the phenomenon accords with the principles he has laid down in the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics*. The feminist, on the other hand, asks about reproduction, Who controls it? That is, the question is one of power and the aim is political: the altering of perceived unfair power relations. Because feminism is centrally concerned with power and politics, it tends to have little use for metaphysics and little patience with it. This impatience is apparent in the methodology of some feminist criticism of Aristotle, in the quoting of offensive sentences out of their context as evidence in the sexism case against him. This practice neglects the overall form and much of the content of Aristotle's treatises, and inevitably leads to misreadings of these complex and difficult texts, in particular to misconstruals of the very gender issues to which Aristotle's feminist critics wish to draw attention.

Third, when reading Aristotle's offensive comments without the benefit of a knowledge of his historical context, his feminist critics generally have failed to notice the ways in which Aristotle's theory of generation has the effect of elevating the female role in generation, when compared to another view that prevailed in his day. "Pre-formation," according to which the mother does not significantly contribute to generation, had wide currency in Aristotle's time (and was still holding its own into the nineteenth century). Aristotle argues against this approach on metaphysical grounds and states emphatically from the beginning of *GA* that male and female together are the principles of generation. In this respect, his treatise

⁴ As Peck remarks in the Preface to his translation of *Generation of Animals*: "... for in reproduction, as understood by Aristotle, not only the individual is concerned but the cosmos at large: it is a business in which the powers of the universe are concentrated and united."; (Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*, translation and introduction by A. L. Peck (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. v. Translations of *Generation of Animals* in this article are for the most part those of Peck, although occasionally I make modifications.

is worthy of our attention because it represents an advance in biology and, contrary to the usual feminist interpretation, an advance also in the appreciation of the maternal contribution to generation. As this exposition of *GA* proceeds, the three foregoing points will be shown in greater detail.

This is not to say, however, that the feminist criticism is simply to be dismissed. To begin with, there appears to be a long history of the use of Aristotle's treatise against women.⁵ The text is complex and is liable to be misunderstood and misused. In *GA* Aristotle devotes greater attention to the male contribution to generation, and it may appear to modern readers that the female contribution is less active and important than that of the male. The association of the male contribution with the superior "form" and the female contribution with "matter," along with the appearance of a preponderance of causal power in the male, is what feminists have noticed and is what has led, in part, to their objections against Aristotle's unfairness. A feminist critic, whose aim is to avoid any devaluation of the maternal contribution to reproduction, might insist that Aristotle be judged by a standard which at the very least makes the female and male equally active, and which guarantees that their contributions are of equal value by seeing them as the same in kind.⁶ This implicit or explicit demand is, however, another instance of feminism's inattention to Aristotle's metaphysical aims. In fact, what imbalance there is in his treatment arises not from misogyny or sexism, but from particular philosophical problems Aristotle is addressing in the treatise.⁷

⁵ See Maryanne Cline Horowitz, "Aristotle and Woman," *Journal of the History of Biology* 9 (1976): 183-213.

⁶ The demand that male and female contributions be the same in kind follows along the lines of ancient theories such as those of Empedocles and Hippocrates (as will be seen later in this essay), as well as of modern genetic views of reproduction. In both the ancient theories cited and the modern scientific one, strong materialist assumptions are at work. Feminist critics (for example, Allen) who endorse this criterion of acceptability may, wittingly or not, adopt a materialist framework along with it.

⁷ Other commentators have responded to the apparent sexism in *GA*. Johannes Morsink sees Aristotle not as a sexist but as a scientist involved in a battle of scientific theory with Hippocrates and his school; see his "Was Aristotle's Biology Sexist?" *Journal of the History of Biology* 12 (1979): 87-8. Anthony Preus sees Aristotle making the mistake of linking matter and form exclusively with female and male respectively; see his "Science and Philosophy in Aristotle's *Generation of Animals*," *Journal of the History*

Examination of the philosophical problems involved in the subject of generation is what is required to move beyond accusation toward understanding the extent and the source of the perceived sexual imbalance that develops in this work. Let us now consider what those philosophical problems are and how they emerge within the original thinking that Aristotle brings to bear on the phenomenon of generation.

II

The work whose title is translated *Generation of Animals* is in the Greek *peri zōiōn geneseōs*, "on the coming into being of living creatures." *Geneseōs*, from the verb *gignomai*, is used primarily to refer to the "origin" or "source" or "beginning" of a natural entity. The root *gen-* concerns family, offspring, creation, birth, descent. What should be noted from the outset is the contrast between modern concepts of "reproduction," leaning on metaphors of production and manufacture of artifacts, and the ancient focus on procreation and begetting of living things as a process which occurs in a larger natural nexus.⁸

The expanded meaning available in the Greek title serves as a reminder that Aristotle raises his scientific questions regarding generation in a philosophical context; that is, his scientific questions are metaphysically informed and they are raised within a long lineage of attempts at understanding *genesis*, the transition from not-being to being.

It is worth paying particular attention to the opening of *GA* to determine what Aristotle's own aims are in this treatise. The subject, announced in the title, is the generation of animals. But how does this subject itself arise? The very first lines of the treatise answer this question. Aristotle explains that with one exception,

of *Biology* 3 (1970): 4. Montgomery Furth sees the source of the sexism in Aristotle's reluctance to divide form; see his *Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelian Metaphysics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137-41.

⁸ Aristotle explains the distinction between natural generation (*genesis*) and artificial production (*poiesis*) in *Metaphysics* 7.7. He distinguishes nature and things natural from art and things humanly produced in *Physics* 2.1.

he has already spoken of all the parts of animals, and of the various causes of these parts. Thus, in respect to generation of animals, a part remains to be described and a cause explained. He does not make it plain why this subject was saved for a separate work. It is, however, the final, culminating treatise of his zoological works. This is a series of books which, according to traditional dating, begins with *History of Animals*—Aristotle's general observations and descriptions of animal life—and proceeds thence to consider, first, the material parts and functions (*Parts of Animals*), and then those parts and functions which involve both matter and *psyche* (*Movement of Animals*, *Progression of Animals*, and ultimately *Generation of Animals*).⁹ The progression of this series of investigations follows Aristotle's general principle of learning: We first study that which is closest or most available in our experience (thus, in this case, the initial record of observations of nature and inquiries into the material parts) and work from there toward that which is first in the order of being. So at the start of *GA* we have with Aristotle, as it were, already gone through virtually every other part and principle of these creatures as preparation for the investigation of generation. Those studies lead to the present one, that is, back to the source of the "coming to be" of animal life.

From the first lines of the treatise Aristotle speaks of causes, indicating that generation, governed by causes, is an ordered, intelligible process. By contrast, generation is not to be viewed as mere effluence, nor as a mere rearrangement of parts, nor as a divine dispensation. That is, generation is not to be understood poetically, or artistically, or religiously. He delineates the four basic causes: (1) the final cause, "that for the sake of which" a thing exists, considered as its 'end'; (2) the formal cause, "the *logos* of the thing's essence" (715a4-5). Together, the final and formal causes determine a distinctively metaphysical trajectory for the discussion of generation, involving universal characterization of nature's mode of operation and a vision of nature working not only in accord with the forces of necessity but also for the good.¹⁰ (3) The material

⁹ Peck, *Generation of Animals*, p. vii.

¹⁰ This line of thought is termed "metaphysical" here because in the *Physics* Aristotle declares that the formal cause and its nature is the work of first philosophy, or metaphysics, to determine (192a34-36). In the *Metaphysics* he says that the form is a cause because "the question 'why'

cause is "the matter for the thing" (715a6). As Aristotle says in the *Physics*, it is "material for the generating process to start from" (194b24). In *GA*, the female parent provides the material cause. (4) The moving cause is "that from which comes the principle of the thing's movement" (715a6). In speaking of the moving cause in the *Physics* he says, "There must be something to initiate the process of the change or its cessation" (194b30). In *GA* Aristotle singles out the moving cause as most germane to the phenomenon of generation; he is particularly interested in determining how life or the principle of motion arises.

The inclusion of formal and final causes in a scheme explaining the origination of an organism presents a chief point of difference between classical and modern scientific outlooks. Eliminating formal and final causes from scientific explanation proper was an explicit goal of some early modern empiricist philosophers, such as Francis Bacon and John Locke.¹¹ In their battle with the Aristotelian outlook, they insisted that only the material and moving causes be used as instruments of scientific investigation. They intended, ultimately, to eliminate Aristotle's concept of substance altogether from scientific analysis and thereby, from their point of view, eliminate subjective elements from scientific study.

For different reasons, but with some similar results, contemporary feminists have targeted essentialism—in the relevant sense, the position that human beings possess an original nature which determines or structures development in significant ways prior to social conditions—as a concept which must be eradicated. Feminist theorists oppose above all essentialism's deterministic consequences. For example, feminist critics might point to some passages in *GA* itself as evidence of the way in which Aristotle conceives of a woman's nature as biologically determined and hence unchangeable, inescapable. It is true that in *GA* Aristotle defines female and male biologically, in terms of their differing generative roles. He says,

is ultimately reduced to the *logos*, and the primary 'why' is cause and principle" (983a28-29). Thus, the formal cause and the ultimate meaning of an entity should be regarded as metaphysical—or should be regarded metaphysically. Joseph Owens cites both of the above passages; see his *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978): 176-7.

¹¹ See Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1966): 33-4.

"By a 'male' animal we mean one which generates in another, by 'female' one which generates in itself" (716a14-15). Beyond this simple statement of fact, however, Aristotle presently does not venture. His essentialism has no necessary consequences here for differing valuations of the female and male roles in generation. Indeed, Aristotle makes the important declaration that "the male and the female are the principles of generation" (716a5-7).¹² Aristotle's statement at the opening of the treatise that male and female are the *archai* of generation functions as the principle thesis in his theory of generation. The remainder of his discussion is intended to display both how male and female function as *archai* and the physical and metaphysical considerations that derive from this basic thesis. Aristotle not only does not depart from this basic commitment, but the entirety of *GA* should be regarded as the working out, scientifically and philosophically, of the basic observation that male and female together are the principles of generation.¹³

As evidence that female and male are both principles of generation, Aristotle mentions that they both secrete *sperma*, generative fluid.¹⁴ Even when, several lines later, he asserts that female and

¹² See also the preliminary justification at 716a11-12. See also 716b10-12, 731b18, 732a1-3; and at 732a12: "Thus things are alive in virtue of having in them a share of the male and the female." We may note that in the *Metaphysics* too, in defining *archē* as a source from which come motion and change, Aristotle adds "as the child comes from the father and mother" (1013a8-9).

¹³ On this particular sort of structuring of the argumentation in Aristotle, where the thesis is stated first and the remainder of the discussion in a given Book secures that thesis, see Helen Lang, "Aristotelian Physics: Teleological Procedure in Aristotle, Thomas, and Buridan," *Review of Metaphysics* 42 (1989): 569-91. Lang demonstrates the teleological structure of argumentation in the *Physics*, where Aristotle posits his thesis at the start, and the discussion that follows in that book supports rather than extends or alters the initial thesis. Also see Joseph Owens' observation, regarding the first sentence of the *Metaphysics*, "All men by nature desire to learn." Owens writes, "This one short sentence, as will be seen . . . , contains the whole *motif* of the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*"; Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, 158, n. 5. On the philosophical importance of Aristotle's form of presentation see also Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 6; and Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, 72.

¹⁴ In the translation of *GA* by Peck in the Loeb edition, *sperma* is routinely translated as "semen." Platt also translates *sperma* as "semen" in the Oxford edition; A. Platt, *Generation of Animals*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Translating *sperma* in this way gives the wrong

male differ with respect to their *logos*, "in that the power or faculty possessed by the one differs from that possessed by the other" (716a18), Aristotle's explanation of the differing powers concerns, once again, the differing generative functions of the female and male and only those: the power to give rise to offspring either within oneself or within another. Clarifying further his understanding of the two sexes he states, "Male and female are indeed used as epithets of the whole of the animal, [but] it is not male or female in respect of the whole of itself, but only in respect of a particular faculty and a particular part" (716a28-31). That is, male and female do not differ substantially, but differ only with respect to their separate capacities to give rise to young, and with respect to the parts of their bodies which serve this function.¹⁵

Essentialism need not be a source of gender problems, as many feminist critics contend. Rather, conceived along Aristotle's lines it can provide the outline of a solution to a variety of practical and theoretical difficulties relating to the two sexes. As we will see in detail, Aristotle's understanding of the four causes permits the distinctions in female and male anatomy and physiology to be acknowledged as far as they go, and allows for him to retain a way of

impression that Aristotle regards only the male discharge as authentically generative, and completely obscures an important question raised in *GA* 1: whether the female parent contributes *sperma*, that is, generative fluid, to the process. It can be noted in advance that Aristotle's answer is that the female does contribute *sperma*, although it differs from that of the male parent, that is, it is not semen. Sexism here has its sources, not in Aristotle, but in his nineteenth- and early twentieth-century translators. In my discussion I will simply transliterate *sperma* when it appears in the text, rather than follow Peck's translation of the term.

¹⁵ See *Metaphysics* 10.9, where Aristotle states that male and female do not differ substantially. They possess the same human form and their differences are only with respect to matter. Also see *GA* 730b34-35, where he states that male and female "are identical in species"; and *GA* 741a6: "Granted that the female possesses the same soul [as the male] . . ."

Aristotle's view of female and male difference is not, however, a simple functionalist one. He recognizes the ways in which the generative parts have complex ties to other aspects of an entity's life. The extensiveness of these ties is what leads Aristotle to regard femaleness and maleness as each a "principle," rather than a natural variation on the order of hair or eye color. That is, he notes that in general it is when a principle changes, even in a small way, that numerous other dependent things are affected. He has observed, for example, that castrated animals undergo extensive changes after the generative organ alone has been destroyed. He concludes, based on the frequency of this observation, that femaleness and maleness are on the order of "principles."

indicating the dimensions, both physical and metaphysical, in which female and male are the same.

For the remainder of *GA* 1.1, Aristotle directs his attention to the phenomenon of two sexes. He observes, to begin with, that all the kinds of animals which possess two sexes come into being from the union of male and female. There is a regularity to the generative process which is productive of further regularity. After acknowledging the exceptions—such as some bloodless animals which originate not from a union of the sexes but from rotting earth and excrement, and whose offspring are neither male nor female (so that sexual generation is impossible)—Aristotle again observes that all animals produced by union of the male and female themselves generate offspring of their own kind. Animals that arise from decaying matter, in contrast, “generate, indeed, but produce another kind and the product is neither male nor female” (715b5). But production of another kind, generation after generation of different kinds, would amount to irregularity *ad infinitum*, and, Aristotle insists, “nature flies from the unbounded; the unbounded is imperfect and nature always seeks an end” (715b14–16). The way of infinite variation and novelty, as in a modern evolutionary model, a materialist view, is not nature’s way, according to him. What is striking and important to Aristotle is the ability of almost all animals almost all of the time to generate creatures of the same kind as themselves. This regularity among animal species has its sources in the *archai* of generation, namely, male and female.¹⁶

Natural regularity will serve as a generalized theme throughout the rest of the treatise, first as a phenomenon which itself requires an account (*GA* 1.2–*GA* 2), and then as a basis for and background against which Aristotle will investigate related matters: the regular development of the embryo, along with the species variations in embryonic development which are also apparent (*GA* 2.6–3.11). Aristotle then returns (in *GA* 4) to a further consideration of male and female, this time inquiring into the origination of these two

¹⁶ For Aristotle’s discussion of the regularity of nature see *Physics* 1. In *Physics* 2.5 he explains that things which always happen in the same way or do so for the most part cannot come about by chance. See also his comments in *Parts of Animals* 641b27–28: “For a given seed does not give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each springs from a definite parent”; *Parts of Animals*, trans. W. Ogle, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1.

regulating principles of genesis themselves, including in later sections of book 4 a discussion of various irregularities in generation (for example, the occurrence of monstrosities, superfetation, and miscarriage). He ends book 4 with brief discussions of some regular features of reproduction (for example, lactation and normal gestational periods). Book 5, which closes the treatise, examines regular natural variations (for example, eye and skin color, hair color and its changes over time) and their causes. In the closing lines of *GA* Aristotle speaks again about causes, just as he did at the opening of the treatise, reminding his readers once again of the physical and metaphysical lawfulness of generation. *GA* as a whole is an expression of Aristotle's philosophical concern with nature's regularity and order, that is, with intelligibility, and the physical and metaphysical lines of explanation that are required to make sense of this. He displays an open-minded awareness of the numerous variations and exceptions that nature produces as he moves back and forth between discussion of things that are so for the most part and things that are so only exceptionally. In Aristotle's vision of nature, regularity is supreme, but it is productive of degrees of difference—indeed, it requires sexual differentiation in order that productive sexual union can take place.

In *GA* 1, male and female are copinciples of generation and therefore stand as the principles of the orderly unfolding of nature. Aristotle supports this initial thesis first with descriptions of the generative anatomical parts of the two sexes in a variety of species, followed by a discussion of the more controversial subject, the generative fluids. So in *GA* 1.3–16 Aristotle examines the arrangement of the testicles or seminal ducts in fishes and serpents, lizards and tortoises, birds and dolphins and man; as well as the placement of the uterus or uterus-like organs in crustacea and cephalopods, insects and octopuses. He develops ideas regarding the variations in generative anatomy of different species of animals, which rest on nature's operating principles: what happens does so because it is necessary or because it is better. The anatomical forms serve the functions of copulation and of gestation, either because copulation and gestation must take place in a particular way for a class of animals, or because it is better that it occur that way.¹⁷ Then, having

¹⁷ For an example of the necessary anatomy-better anatomy distinction see 717a16–17.

described those anatomical parts that serve generation (that is, having shown that female and male are both principles of generation in this respect), in *GA* 1.17 Aristotle leaves behind the anatomy (or the "instrumental parts") and begins his discussion of the generative fluids, the *spermata*. The discussion of *sperma* bears crucially on the correct understanding of Aristotle's view of the role of female and male in generation.

III

Somewhat surprisingly, the question that first occupies Aristotle regarding *sperma* is, Is *sperma* drawn from the whole body? Two different theories had currency in his time: Hippocratic "pangenesis," the notion that *sperma* comes from all parts of the body and thereby provides the parts of the body for the offspring; and the "preformationist" or "homunculus" theory, that the *sperma* contains an animalcule or a little human already formed and waiting simply to grow.¹⁸ Aristotle is trying to contend with these on his way to establishing his own claims about the nature of the generative fluids. He presents a variety of reasons for objecting to pangenesis and preformation.¹⁹ All of his reasons argue against what he regards as the real problem: the materialistic reduction and oversimplification that those two theories represent. Both theories fail to explain what principle organizes the many parts of the body. Generation, after all, produces a substantial entity, a unified and coherent creature. In the case of pangenesis it would be absurd, of course, to suppose that the many parts of the body come together in their ordered, regular way merely by chance; nor can it be imagined that the parts actively arrange themselves. Something above and beyond the parts alone must be operative in order to explain the regular generation of animals. For Aristotle, this something is *psychē*, soul, "the first actuality of a natural body which potentially has life."²⁰ In his view, body is aimed at soul from the very begin-

¹⁸ Of interest on the subject of ancient embryological theories is chapter 1 of Joseph Needham, *A History of Embryology* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1959) (although Needham is not always a careful reader of Aristotle). Also see Preus, "Science and Philosophy," 5-7.

¹⁹ See the extended discussion which begins at 721b12.

²⁰ *De anima* 412a27.

ning. This is a principle which the materialisms, pangenesis and preformationism, do not comprehend. His conclusion to the problem at hand, then, is that pangenesis must be rejected; *sperma* is not drawn *from* all parts of the body but rather goes *to* all parts of the body. In this way, he emphasizes final causality over what he regards as ultimately unworkable mechanical explanations (725a23).²¹

Aristotle will have more arguments to offer in book 2 against preformationism, the view that an animalcule or homunculus is transferred from the father and planted in the mother's body, with her functions being strictly incubation and feeding.²² His mention of it at this point (722b5), however, permits us to note that preformationism had been employed in Greek cultural life to deny women any role in generation, and consequently to deny them any significant connection with their children and any connection of their children with them. A stunning example of this can be found in Aeschylus's *Eumenides*, when Apollo defends Orestes' murder of his mother in this way:

The mother of what is called her child is no parent of it, but nurse only of the young life that is sown in her. The parent is the male, and she but a stranger, a friend, who, if fate spares his plant, preserves it till it puts forth.²³

Aristotle's opposition to preformationism is not founded on the grounds that it demeans women's part in generation. Rather, it fails to make sense on its own terms because it cannot explain how female offspring could be produced: how could the female generative parts arise from a male body? (see also his arguments at 734a11-12). Against this historical background, Aristotle's alternative theory, by establishing the female as a principle of generation, represents an important elevation of the woman's role in generation.

²¹ See Preus, "Science and Philosophy," 7. Also of interest is the Hippocratic treatise, "The Seed," in *Hippocratic Writings*, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), 317-23; and Needham's comments on Hippocrates' "mechanical approach" to viewing generation in Needham, *A History of Embryology*, 33.

²² See Peck, *Generation of Animals*, 372-3, n. a; and Preus, "Science and Philosophy," 6, n. 6. Needham discusses "Denials of Maternity and Paternity," in Needham, *A History of Embryology*, 43-6.

²³ *Eumenides* 658-9; quoted from Needham, *A History of Embryology*, 43. (Peck and Preus also cite this passage from *Eumenides*.)

Furthermore, political assumptions and considerations are notably absent in Aristotle's treatment of this subject. That is, his aims at this point, in distinction from the feminist critique which itself is already directed toward the politicization of sexuality, do not include the demotion or the elevation of women and their role in the process of generation. Instead, arguments are assessed by him one by one, on theoretical grounds or on observational grounds or on both, and conclusions are drawn about the phenomenon itself.

Some of Aristotle's feminist critics have misread him on this fundamental issue, mistaking Aristotle's theory for a version of preformationism, and hence they have assigned to him the sexist consequences of that theory. The claim frequently made is that Aristotle reproduces and enlarges a model in which the female body serves only passively in generation as a source of warmth and nourishment for the growing embryo whose source is strictly the male parent.²⁴ But his effort in book 1 of *GA*, as we have begun to see, is to reject preformationism, which these critics confuse with Aristotle's own view, and to establish the validity of his own initial thesis that male and female are both *archai* of generation.²⁵

²⁴ Caroline Whitbeck, describing Aristotle's view as "the flower pot theory" of pregnancy, believes that Aristotle holds that "the woman supplies the container and the earth which nourishes the seed but the seed is solely the man's"; Whitbeck, "Theories of Sex Difference," 55. Page DuBois writes, "The great scientific work of Aristotle, read and accepted as truth for centuries, takes up the metaphorical system . . . that the female body is a container, like an oven, to be filled up with the semen, which provides soul and form to the material container"; DuBois, *Sowing the Body*, 126. Maryanne Cline Horowitz regards Aristotle's theory as "an extreme position in the process of the masculinization of procreation"; Horowitz "Aristotle and Woman," 186. She states, "Unlike the medical school of Hippocrates, Aristotle taught that *sperma*, in its narrow sense as the seed from which an embryo grows, is secreted only by males" (p. 192). Prudence Allen says, "Borrowing the use of hot and cold from Empedocles and Hippocrates, Aristotle developed a theory of sex identity that argued that the female provided no seed in generation because she was by nature colder than the male"; Allen, *The Concept of Woman*, 34.

²⁵ At 728a25, near the close of these considerations, he states, "Hence, plainly it is reasonable to hold that generation takes place from this process: for, as we see, the menstrual fluid is *sperma*, not indeed *sperma* in a pure condition, but needing still to be acted upon." In addition, at 730a35 he says, "The male and female both deposit together what they have to contribute in the female." Preus's careful reading of the text leads him, too, to the conclusion that for Aristotle the menstrual contribution of the female is *spermatic*: "Given Aristotle's notion that the 'menstrual fluid' is the

Other feminists criticize Aristotle's theory as inferior to the other of his rival theories, pangenesis.²⁶ Pangenesis, in Empedocles' version, holds that male and female both make contributions of the same sort,²⁷ and so this theory appears more acceptable by general feminist criteria. But proponents of pangenesis fail to take seriously Aristotle's stated objections to Empedocles' theory, namely, that

female *sperma* of the mammalia . . ."; Preus, "Science and Philosophy," 8. And also, "The menstrual fluid should be that spermatik contribution which serves as matter for generation" (p. 9).

Among Aristotle's feminist critics, the misinterpretation seems to arise from a failure to appreciate the importance of the material cause in Aristotle's metaphysics, and from reading "matter" in a post-seventeenth-century sense. This might be particularly the case in Whitbeck's criticism ("Theories of Sex Difference," 55-7). Horowitz, in "Aristotle and Woman," notices that Aristotle calls both semen and menstrual blood *sperma*, but she does not notice or find it significant that he also calls them both the principles of generation. Her attention is directed exclusively at the higher degree of concoction of the semen, and this leads her to exaggerate the subordination of the material principle in Aristotle's scheme, making that principle almost worthless.

Other commentators on *GA* have read the text in this way as well. John M. Cooper writes, "The menstrual fluid is also a 'seminal residue' (*spermatikon perittoma*), less concocted and less pure than sperm, and so not capable of generating anything, i.e. not capable of coming alive by itself or making anything else come alive (I.20.728a18, 26 [sic.]; II.3.737a27-30; II.7.746b26-9)"; John M. Cooper, "Metaphysics in Aristotle's Biology," in *Biologie, Logique et Méthaphysique Chez Aristote*, ed. Daniel Devereux and Pierre Pellegrin (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1990), 57. Nothing, for Aristotle, comes alive by itself ("nothing generates itself"; 735a14), so this is not a legitimate criterion for determining the spermatik status of menstrual fluid. The capacity "to make something come alive," which as a way of describing generation sounds a bit magical rather than Aristotelian, is a potential that can only be exercised in concert with specialized material which itself has a potential capacity to be formed as a particular kind of creature. See also Cooper's note on symmetry, where he explicitly denies that "there is any kind of interaction between the two factors, in the sense of a joint working together by two independent but proportionately coordinated agents with a view to a common product" (p. 59, n. 6). What Cooper eloquently denies is very much the same thesis that Aristotle is developing in *GA*.

²⁶ Allen, *The Concept of Woman*, 33-4, 84-6.

²⁷ Note that these contributions may not, in his theory, be equal ones. See 722b12-13, where Aristotle says that Empedocles postulates a tally, that is, broken pieces of a whole. The broken pieces fit together but need not be of the same size.

In a different vein, we might notice Empedocles' use of the word *symbolon*, "symbol," as Aristotle quotes him, and its connection with modern genetic theory which relies upon the interpretation of symbolic or coded information.

the parts torn apart from each other (in the female and male parents, prior to being fitted together) would be in such an incomplete and imperfect state that they could not stay alive and healthy. On the other hand, if each separate part of the body had a vital principle of its own to maintain its life and health, then it would remain to be shown what organizes or coordinates all these separate vital principles and how they merge to form one unified organism. Aristotle's objections to Empedocles here (and explicitly later in *GA* 764a1–765a4) are in keeping with the other arguments he has made against excessively materialistic theories of generation: these theories, Empedocles' included, which rely for their explanations exclusively on a thing's material constituents, simply cannot account fully for the regularity and ordered nature of generation. Thus, Aristotle's rejection of Empedocles' approach is not motivated by an unwillingness to allow the female a fuller share in generation, as these feminist critics believe. His end here is to establish a metaphysical point: the necessary inclusion of nonmaterial explanatory principles (in this case, the soul or form of the body as organized, and the whole, unified, mature animal as the *telos* or final cause of the process, along with the action of the eternal and divine).

Returning to the progress of the discussion in *GA*, we can, in fact, make some sense of why Aristotle's discussion of the generative fluids should begin as it does, with what sounds like a subordinate and somewhat technical question about whether or not *sperma* derives from the body as a whole. This question allows him at the outset to display the current rival theories of generation and to critique them in terms of their reliance on limited materialist presuppositions. Having explained the insufficiency of these approaches and stated in a preliminary way his own alternative—that is, a generative theory which fully includes physical causal components as well as nonmaterial organizing and directing principles whose aims and mode of operation differ from material causal principles—Aristotle can pursue his examination of the working of both physical (material and moving) causes and the metaphysical (formal and final) ones, along with the ways in which these causes cohere.

We might note, then, the way in which Aristotle's discussion is shaped by rival theories against which he defines his own. His determination to establish the metaphysical dimension of generation against both the Presocratic materialists and the Hippocratic medical establishment leads to special highlighting of form over matter

in books 1 and 2, perhaps in part to make form more readily evident to his opponents. In the treatise, the special attention to form, later to be identified as the male's contribution to generation, may seem to some modern readers to be one more instance of Aristotle's concentration on the male at the expense of the female. Read in its historical context, however, we see that the chief point of difference between Aristotle's theory and other theories concerned the concept of form, and so it naturally required fuller explication. On the other hand, another rival theory which remains within Aristotle's range of vision is Plato's, in which eternal Forms remain at some removal from material things. Aristotle wants to be sure that no mistake is made in this direction either. In his own theory, form is united with matter fundamentally to produce substantial entities. It is this very union which Aristotle is challenged to demonstrate in *GA*.

Next Aristotle examines the general nature of *sperma* and says, "Now the aim of *sperma* is to be, in its nature, the sort of stuff from which the things that take their rise in the realm of Nature are originally formed" (724a17). Analyzing the meaning of the "from which" in his definition of *sperma*, he shows that the two senses of "from which" that are relevant for generation are the matter from which and the movement from which a living creature derives. The question whether *sperma* is one or the other, or perhaps both material and moving cause, is raised and then temporarily set aside while a more precise determination of *sperma* and its derivation is pursued. Aristotle concludes that *sperma* is derived from a healthy residue, what remains from the body's useful nourishment (725a11). He then raises a crucial question:

Does the female discharge *sperma* as the male does, which would mean that the object formed is a single mixture produced from two *spermatizations*; or is there no discharge of *sperma* from the female? And if there is none, then does the female contribute nothing whatever to generation, merely providing a place where generation may happen; or does it contribute something else, and if so, how and in what manner does it do so? (726a31-32)

The question reveals why Aristotle is concerned about the claim that the female discharges *sperma* as the male does. If the female's *sperma* is the same as the male's, the fetation resulting from copulation might appear to be (merely) a mixture; that is, each of the two parents would contribute the very same thing, and then somehow

when they are added together a living creature comes into being. On such a view, the appearance of a new substance would depend entirely on the accumulation of a sufficient quantity of material being. According to Aristotle, however, such a "mixture" view leads to impossible results. Primarily, if the contribution to generation by the male and the female were identical, there would be nothing to prevent each from generating on its own, without the other, or for that matter for females to generate together by mixing menstrual blood, or for males to mix their fluids to produce offspring.²⁸ But this is manifestly not the way nature operates. Male and female, together, constitute the *archai* of generation, as Aristotle has already established. Their separate insufficiency indicates, for him, that their contributions must be of different kinds.²⁹ Furthermore, Aristotle's dissatisfaction with a strictly materialist reading of generation reveals why he would be unwilling to accept a "mixture" theory of the phenomenon, a view to which he would be committed if the female fluid were the same *sperma* as the male's. Either (a)

²⁸ For Aristotle, the puzzle appears not so much to be generation out of the union of the same sexes, but independent generation by the female: "Why does not the female accomplish generation all by itself and from itself?"; 741a4-5. Note that his first answer to this question depends on what he has already argued: that the fetation will be alive only on acquiring sentient soul, and this is what the male contributes. But, almost recognizing that this answer begs the question, he pursues the puzzle to arrive at a metaphysical explanation, in keeping with the tenor of book 2. His explanation relies on the concept of *telos*: "The female [by herself] is unable to generate offspring and bring it to completion; if it could the existence of the male would have no purpose, and nature does nothing which lacks purpose"; 741b3-4.

²⁹ It is useful to recall that the egg cell was not discovered until 1827. The principles for the discovery of the unique character of the germ cells (egg and sperm), each possessing only one half the ordinary complement of genetic material in readiness for fertilization, was not established until the middle of the nineteenth century. See Anthony Preus, "Science and Philosophy," 8, n. 11.

Aristotle's theory of generation resembles modern genetics and reproductive science in that he, too, sees the necessity for the union of two complementary components, which he believes to be matter and form rather than egg and sperm or—in the case of human beings—X and Y chromosomes. Scientifically, his is an advance over ancient "double seed" theories in which the female and male contributions are identical. Even if, in genetic engineering, it is possible to produce offspring without the union of the male and female cells, cloning of this sort is replication and not generation in Aristotle's sense: the production of a new and unique substantial creature.

there is no organizing principle, which is inadequate; or (b) there are two organizing principles, which is one principle too many. If (a), the material mixture has no organizing principle, then there is no possible explanation for how a unified, coherent, highly complex and directed creature is formed or forms itself from the body's residual food. But if (b), the male and female *sperma* are identical and so both contain organizing principles, one is then left with the daunting task of explaining how these independent principles could unite, as they must, to create a single principle to direct the unified development of the particular creature.

Here is what Aristotle decides on the question: menstrual fluid is a residue of healthy nourishment and it is "the analogous thing" in females to the male fluid. (The generative fluids of both male and female are blood or are derived from blood.) He demonstrates the status of menstrual blood as healthy (it is not a colliquescence, he explains), as a residue (which has been distilled from the body's nourishment, as has semen), and above all as generative or spermatogenic, that is, as playing a causative role in generation. In Aristotle's scheme, menstrual blood is not a waste product, nor is a woman's body regarded as simply a warm environment for the growth of the fetus. Despite the feminist claim that for Aristotle the female makes little, if any, genuine contribution and functions only as a container for the developing embryo, his determination that the menstrual fluid is spermatogenic is exactly what we would expect, since it is perfectly consistent with the initial thesis that male and female are both *archai* of generation.

Aristotle must now, for the reasons mentioned above, find a way of differentiating menstrual fluid from semen. Thus to his original question, Does the female discharge *sperma* as the male does? the answer must be yes and no. The female contributes *sperma* but not as the male does; she does not contribute semen. Her contribution is less fully heated or concocted than the male's semen. Misogyny does not direct Aristotle's analysis and lead to his yes and no conclusion. On the contrary, Aristotle here is rejecting the identification of generative fluid with the male semen, and establishing instead a fuller conception of *sperma* that includes both male and female contributions, contributions that do differ in kind. Each is unique; both are necessary.³⁰

³⁰ It appears to have been Hippocrates' theory, sometimes termed the

What we have here, then, is the outcome of his continuing endeavor to accomplish two aims: (1) to take the evidence seriously, in this case, that male and female are both involved most basically in generation, that they do differ anatomically, that the fluids produced by each do in fact have different features, and that separately each sex is insufficient to generate offspring; and (2) to develop a philosophical scheme that will permit the metaphysical dimensions of the phenomenon of generation to be exhibited.

From the opening of the treatise this scheme is being prepared, as Aristotle reminds his readers of the basic four causes. Two of these causes, the material and the moving, are components of causality physically understood; and the other two, the formal and the final, are components of causality metaphysically understood. Having established in *GA* 1, both by way of empirical scrutiny and theoretical considerations, that male and female are coprinciples of generation and that they differ with respect to their contributions to generation, Aristotle begins to assign causal efficacy to the male and female parents according to his scheme of the four causes.

Aristotle makes his first assignment seem easy. The menstrual blood, the *katamenia*, being heavier and bulkier, looks like a material contribution. Aristotle could also draw upon the evidence that dur-

"double seed theory," that both male and female contribute semen. Aristotle may have Hippocrates in mind when he argues against the suggestion that both female and male contribute semen to generation; see "The Seed," and Morsink's discussion of *GA* in relation to it in Morsink, "Was Aristotle's Biology Sexist?" Aristotle's argument at 727a26-30 is that no one animal produces two spermatric fluids, and since the female contributes the menstrual fluid, she does not contribute semen (*gonē*) as the male does.

There is a difficulty with the Greek terms which undoubtedly has aided the misunderstanding of Aristotle's intentions. He does not restrict the designation *sperma* to semen, as has been shown, but often enough when referring to semen he simply uses the broader term *sperma*. Sometimes it is plain from the context and his description which of the two *spermata* he has in mind; sometimes he seems to distinguish "generative fluid" from "semen" by use of *sperma* and *gonē* respectively, but this usage is far from consistent (for example at 729a21-23: "The foregoing discussion will have made it clear that the female, though it does not contribute any semen [*gonē*], yet contributes something, namely, the substance constituting the menstrual fluid"). While the lack of clear and consistent terminology easily can lead to confusion and support the sexism charges against Aristotle, it is plausible that the difficulty he has maintaining a clear distinction in the text by means of the language then available is, on the contrary, evidence of the conceptual advance that he is attempting in regarding both fluids as spermatric.

ing gestation the developing fetus must be nourished; the female parent can generally be said to be the source of nourishment for growth, so the association with material might seem obvious on these grounds as well. So Aristotle declares that "the contribution which the female makes to generation is the matter used therein" (727b30); the *katamenia*, then, is the material cause of the offspring. There is, of course, nothing commonplace about the material the female parent provides; rather, it is specialized and highly refined for generation. Unlike ordinary material, it contains all the parts of a body, potentially (737a23). Furthermore, it is specialized for generating just the kind of animal the female parent is. Aristotle soon takes an opportunity to make his second and third assignments on his list of philosophical causes: "The male provides the 'form' as well as the 'principle of movement'," that is, the male provides the moving and formal causes (729a10). The analogy he offers to justify associating both the moving and the formal principles with the male is the coagulation of milk when rennet is added to it. Just as the rennet initiates a reaction in the milk such that the fluid is set in motion and begins to coalesce, so the semen imparts a motion to the generative material of the female which causes it to set.

However unsatisfactory this analogy is, since animals and human beings decidedly do not begin simply by being "set" like cheese or custard—and Aristotle himself would reject any materialistic explanation of substantial generation by means of chemical or other strictly physical reaction—the analogy is illuminating in at least one way. After having assigned the first sort of physical principle, the matter, to the female, Aristotle looks to assign the second kind of physical principle, the moving cause, to the male. This he will do (with a good deal of the explanation of how still to come in book 2), thereby providing full *physical* accountability, via female and male, for the generation of the offspring. But the physical dimension, while distinguishable, is not separable from the metaphysical one, as Aristotle's example about the rennet setting the milk shows. When the rennet and milk react, setting up a motion in the milk, the motion is not arbitrary, but is already ordered; it is motion toward the form. It might better be said that the motion is the forming. (Additionally, we can observe that the fully actualized form functions as that for the sake of which, that is, as the final cause.) With this analogy of rennet and milk which he calls upon several times in *GA* (739b21–34, and at 772a22–25, where he notes

the disanalogy), Aristotle indicates the linkage between physical and metaphysical levels of explanation, and why it is in his system that the moving and material causes of the physical level are especially bound to the metaphysical. Living motion is always directed, always ordered, and its order and direction can be properly understood only in terms of form and *telos*.³¹

In elaborating his ideas about semen and its causal powers, Aristotle moves as far as possible away from the materialisms of pangenesis and preformation. His idea is that the semen does not contribute in any way to generation by its material (729b1-22), but rather produces a specific effect by way of "some disposition, and some principle of movement" (726b21). Aristotle is emphatic that the male's contribution is nonmaterial; instead, he says, the semen is a tool which Nature uses to impart motion (730b19).

Aristotle certainly makes his point against the materialist philosophers and physicians by regarding semen in this way. He also furthers his own philosophical mapping of generation by way of the four causes; in terms of physical causality, he now has the two necessary components, matter and motion, which together in his scheme are adequate to provide a physical explanation of the phenomenon of generation. But he has yet to explain how the semen, a material fluid, could convey form or soul.³² This is a philosophical problem, to which Aristotle develops a startling answer in book 2. But in book 2, the linkage of moving cause with the male, and material cause with the female, as it is developed in terms of act and potency, has furnished further evidence in the sexism case, and this also needs to be examined.

IV

Aristotle's move from the level of physical causality to that of metaphysical causality is apparent immediately at the start of *GA* 2.

³¹ Matter is always "formed," too, to some extent (see Furth, *Substance, Form, and Psyche*, 84-7: matter is that which is capable of further formation, and so it too is linked to the metaphysical dimension). See also Peck's note on prime matter and on matter at its highest degree of formation being equivalent to form; Peck, *Generation of Animals*, 110-11, n. e.

³² At 730b56 he offers a preliminary analogy to house building to help explain this at 730b5-6.

If we were to express the central question of book 1 as, How does generation occur? and see Aristotle's answer to be that generation occurs through the *archai*, male and female, then his metaphysical deepening of that initial question is presented at the beginning of book 2: How are these *archai* themselves generated? Aristotle takes note of the route of physical explanation available for answering the question about the source of the sources, but he postpones that exploration (until book 4) and instead offers a commentary on how the two *archai* arise: not out of the forces of necessity but because of "what is better [*to beltion*], that is, on account of the final cause [the cause 'for the sake of which']" (731b23). Aristotle declares that, viewed in this metaphysical way, the determining principle of generation has its source in the upper cosmos. He seems to realize that his readers might wonder about such a statement, and he explains that there are some things which are eternal and divine, other things that admit both of being and nonbeing. The things that are eternal and divine reside in the upper cosmos and they act "as a cause which produces that which is better in the things that admit of it" (731b26-27). As he explains in the *Metaphysics*, the final cause "causes motion as being an object of love" (1072b4). Living creatures like ourselves, who come into being and pass away, are acted upon by the divine and the beautiful to the extent that we are capable of being affected.³³ The divine and beautiful give rise in us (by means of final causality) to that which it is better to have or be: it is better to be ensouled than to be only a body; it is better to be than not to be; it is better to be alive than dead. This is the metaphysical "why" of the generation of animals: generation occurs for the sake of actualizing a good. The good is not actualized absolutely in this way, since it is impossible for individual creatures to exist eternally; but it is accomplished specifically, Aristotle says, that is, by way of the eternal perpetuation of the species.³⁴ Thus, male and female *as such* serve generation, and generation serves the end of actualizing the good (eternal, beautiful, divine being) that resides in the most elevated domain of the cosmos.

³³ See also his statement in *Parts of Animals* 1.5: "Absence of the haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in nature's works in the highest degree, and the end for which those works are put together and produced is a form of the beautiful"; 645a23-25.

³⁴ See also *De anima* 415a25-26.

In his thoroughness Aristotle wishes to give not only the metaphysical explanation for the existence of male and female but to explain as well the fact that these two principles for the most part are separate in the animal world. He states that because that which possesses the form is better and more divine than that which possesses the matter, "it is better also that the superior one should be separate from the inferior one" (732a5). In this instance, as in some others in *GA*, we have evidence of the infusion of Aristotle's commonplace views into his more careful philosophical thinking. There is, after all, no reason he has given to hold that those whose generative fluid transmits form are superior as a kind or class to those whose generative fluid transmits matter. It is true, of course, that within Aristotle's metaphysics form has preeminence over matter, but neither Aristotle nor his reader is entitled, on the basis of what has been established so far in *GA*, to conclude that this preeminence accrues to male creatures *qua* male. Recall from book 1 that organisms are male or female not as a whole but only with respect to their generative roles; he establishes further that both male and female are fully members of the same species, one implication of which is that both male and female individuals possess the same "substantial formula" of matter and form (see 730b34-5, for example; and *Metaphysics* 10.9). There is no philosophical justification, then, for this remark about the superiority of the male.

Returning to the progress of the discussion in book 2, Aristotle's next task is an embryological classification of animals. The metaphysical outlook of the opening of book 2 can be seen to dominate here as well when Aristotle makes the "perfection of the young" the basis for his classificatory system. That is, offspring are perfect in this case when they are brought forth, not as eggs or larvae, but as "similar to" the parents. Viviparous animals whose offspring are born in this state are themselves more perfect than oviparous or larvae-producing creatures. It appears to be more demanding for nature to produce young viviparously; animals that do so possess a more highly developed capacity for respiration and are able to generate a higher degree of needed body heat. Using the criteria of breath and vital heat, Aristotle describes the regular arrangement with which nature brings about generation in various classes of animals (733a35-b16). At the top of this series is man and then the other mammals, followed by birds, scaly fishes, and so forth. Near the bottom of the scale are those animals which begin as lar-

vae.³⁵ Finally there are those, too, which do not arise from *sperma* and the union of the male and female *archai*.

Mention of these exceptional nonspermatic animals leads Aristotle's attention back to *sperma*. It is "no small puzzle," he states, to determine how any animal is formed out of the *sperma*. He analyzes the process of forming into three components: (a) out of something, (b) by something, and (c) into something. The "out of something" is the "material out of which," supplied by the mother.³⁶ But the question Aristotle says he is interested in pursuing at this point is not, Out of what? but, By what? This "by what" is analyzed as something either external or internal to the fetation. He acknowledges that he is confronted with a problem: it is hard to see how something external could be in a position to act to form the fetation, for what is in close enough contact with it to form it? On the other hand, if there is something in the fetation from the start that forms it, Aristotle is then dangerously close to the pangenesis and preformation theories which hold that the miniaturized creature or the parts of the creature are already in the generative fluid. Aristotle opts for a more subtle dichotomy than internal-external, and switches to the concepts of "actual" and "potential" to solve the dilemma.³⁷ The "something" by which the fetation is formed is declared to be soul; this must be so since the fetus is living and growing, and all living things possess soul, the first actualization (or perfection, *entelechia*) of a living body (*De anima* 2.1). Aristotle takes the opportunity to repeat that none of the physical properties alone can explain the *logos* or the highly organized nature of the organism (734b32-33).³⁸ The *logos* derives from the parent who imparts movement. This parent is in actuality (that is, a living animal of a specific kind) what the offspring is potentially.³⁹ With the conjunction of material and moving causes, the newly formed organism has separate identity, and one part develops which can direct the

³⁵ Aristotle's higher animal types almost always correspond to Darwin's "later" types.

³⁶ Notice again that the material contribution is considered within the topic of the working of *sperma*, indicating once more that Aristotle regards the maternal fluid as generative.

³⁷ For Aristotle's fuller exposition of these concepts see *Physics* 3.3.

³⁸ See also 735a13: "The cause of this process of formation is not any part of the body."

³⁹ This holds true, of course, for the mother as well. She is in actuality what the offspring is only potentially.

rest of the new animal's growth. As Aristotle puts it, "Nothing generates itself, though as soon as it has been formed a thing makes itself grow" (735a14).

What are we to understand happens here? The generation of a new creature is, within Aristotle's conceptual scheme, the actualizing of a potential. The two specialized potentialities contributed by the female and male *archai* actualize in conjunction with one another. The offspring is the actualization of the union of the two potentials. His theory has been read by feminist critics and other commentators as maintaining that in the act of generation the passive, potential female matter is bestowed with life by the actualized and soul-bearing form of the male. This, however, is not Aristotle's view. Rather, the dynamic of generation which he develops in *GA* is subtle and at the same time is perfectly consistent with principles he lays down in both the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* regarding potency and act. Instead of associating the female and her contribution with passive potentiality and the male and his contribution with activating actuality, Aristotle sees both adult parents as actualities, both female and male fluids as potentialities, and the offspring resulting from their conjunction as an actuality.⁴⁰ Even though the male parent's *sperma* bears the form which, in Aristotle's system, has preeminence over matter, that preeminence is minimized by virtue of the potential status of both the female and male *sperma* and the actual status of the female and male parents. Thus male and female continue to be regarded by him as coprinciples of generation.

Aristotle's discussion of act and potency in connection with movement in *Physics* 3.3 is illuminating in this regard. There he explains that the two potentialities, mover and moved, actualize

⁴⁰ Regarding the maternal contribution, he speaks of "... the generating parent, who is in actuality what the material out of which the offspring formed is potentially"; 734b35. Regarding the paternal contribution he says, "It is clear that *sperma* [in context, "semen"] possesses soul, and that it is soul, potentially"; 735a9; see also 734b18-19. In *Metaphysics* 9.7 he says, "We must, however, distinguish when a particular thing exists potentially and when it does not . . . , e.g. is earth potentially a man? No, but rather when it has already become *sperma*, and perhaps not even then"; 1048b37-1049a5. In *Parts of Animals* he says, "Moreover, the seed is potentially something, and the relation of potentiality to actuality we know"; 641b36. In *De anima* he says, "So seed [*sperma*] and fruit are potentially bodies [which have the capacity to live]"; 412b26.

together, and that the result is singular: "The actualizing of the two potentialities coincides" (*Physics* 202a19). In the passage in the *Physics* mover and moved together give rise to motion.⁴¹ Correspondingly, in *GA* the conjunction of mover (male fluid) and moved (female fluid) gives rise to generation. Moreover, because in the generation of animals the moving cause is also bearing the formal and final causes (that is, the structure for and aim of the animal's development), once the conjunction of the material and moving causes occurs all four causes are really at work and the necessary and sufficient conditions have been met for (the beginning of) the realization of the new offspring. Everything it needs is available. So, Aristotle states, "Nothing generates itself, though as soon as it has been formed it makes itself grow" (735a14); and he repeats and develops this conclusion (735a16–17) that once a creature is formed—in the coactualization of the female and male principles—it must grow. The parallel case of motion is again pertinent since, for

⁴¹ With respect to the mutuality posited in this interpretation, Aristotle, speaking of body and soul, makes the following comment in *De anima*: "For it is by this association [*koinonion*] that the one acts and the other is acted upon, that the one moves and the other is moved; and no such mutual relation is found in haphazard combinations"; 407b18–20. The partnership of matter and form is emphasized, the partnership whereby the one *can* move and the other *can* be moved.

Regarding Aristotle's theory of the initiation of movement, as Frederick Woodbridge explains, "Motion strictly is not a transfer of movement from one body to another, but the change from rest to movement or the change from what can happen into an actual happening"; Frederick Woodbridge, *Aristotle's Vision of Nature* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1965), 13–14. There must be contact between the two bodies; but according to Aristotle, movement cannot be grasped as a mechanical collision. Some of Aristotle's commentators seem to assume a mechanical model when considering his explanation of the moving cause in generation—a model characteristic of modern science rather than Aristotle's physics. It is the modern model which involves one body in motion and one inertly at rest. For Aristotle, on the other hand, matter actively desires form, as he says in *Physics* 1.9; its potentiality is its orientation toward form. Thus, matter is not just the passive recipient of an external, haphazardly arising force.

On this subject Helen Lang writes, commenting on *Physics* 1.9: "Here we reach a key issue: for Aristotle, to be moved does not imply a passive principle. Matter (or potential), which is moved by form (or actuality), is moved precisely because it is never neutral to its mover: matter is aimed at—it runs after—form. Because of the active orientation of the moved towards its mover, no third cause is required to combine matter and form. They go together naturally: form constitutes a thing as natural and matter is aimed at form"; Helen Lang, *Aristotle's Physics and Its Medieval Varieties* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 26.

Aristotle, nothing moves itself, just as nothing generates itself. But having been generated, being a natural creature now possessing its own internal principle of motion, it must move, or, biologically speaking, it must grow.

At the start of *GA* 2.2 Aristotle returns to the topic of *sperma* and of semen in particular. It being the work of semen to contribute motion, and in some way *logos* and soul, from an actual adult parent to matter which is an animal potentially—and in an active state of desire for form and what it offers (see *Physics* 1.9)—he undertakes a close examination of semen which will try to answer the question of how this transmission takes place. Based on descriptions of its physical properties, especially its foaminess, and its behavior, Aristotle determines that semen is composed of water and *pneuma*, heated air. Now Aristotle has already committed himself to the notion that the male's semen does not provide material input of any kind into the fetation. So two questions arise for him: (1) What becomes, then, of the material stuff of which the semen is composed?; and the more crucial question, (2) Is soul in the semen and/or in the fetus to begin with? (736a27–28). He first addresses the second of these questions and decides as far as nutritive soul is concerned, the basic faculty of self-growth by which a living thing persists, that *spermata* (of the male and female parents) and fetations possess this aspect of soul potentially. He continues by saying that sentient soul, the perceptive dimension of soul unique to animals, is possessed potentially by semen. The most elevated dimension of soul, reason, possessed only by human beings, cannot, however, arise from some potential in the stuff of the semen or menstrual fluid or the developing body of the fetation: "Reason alone enters in, as an additional factor, from outside, and . . . it alone is divine, because physical activity has nothing whatever to do with the activity of reason" (736b28–29). Reason is divine, but all soul, Aristotle continues, has a connection with a physical substance "which is different from the so-called 'elements' and more divine than they are" (736b30–33). In other words, for Aristotle, soul is naturalized or physicalized to some basic degree (in distinction from Plato), but its material is highly rarefied and unique (in distinction from the physicians and the Pre-socratic materialists). There is a scale of substances, he says, concerned with levels of psychic transmission. In all cases, semen contains *pneuma*, and the *pneuma* contains enclosed within itself a substance that "is analogous to the element which belongs to the

stars" (736b37). This element, unnamed in the text but evidently aether, Aristotle sometimes calls "the first of the elements." It is the material of which the stars are made and is unlike the four earthly elements—earth, air, fire, and water—in that it is eternally existent, indestructible, and divine, moving forever in a circular motion in the celestial domain. It is never found naturally in this earthly region.⁴²

Aristotle immediately emphasizes that the vital heat which supports this "complex" by means of which soul is transmitted has nothing to do with fire (that is, a common, earthly element favored in the theories of some early naturalists) and should not be confused with it. Rather, the heat for the *pneuma*, which in turn is the source of the movement imparted by the male generative fluid to the female generative fluid, which in turn is the source of life for the new fetus—this heat has its own original source, not in the father's body or in some element occurring naturally in the environment, but in the region of the stars (see also 777b30–31). Aristotle does not say how this sublime element, this link between body and soul, between earth and stars, between the physical and the metaphysical, establishes itself in both these worlds. The absence of an explanation of the link may indicate that for him no explanation is required. Nature itself is a coherent whole; no fundamental division exists in nature which would be in need of philosophical repair.

Having, so it seems, answered the question about how semen provides motion, soul, and *logos* for the menstrual material, Aristotle returns to the more mundane level of his two earlier questions, that is, What becomes of the stuff of the semen after it has done its job? An explanation is required here to meet the suspicions of the partisans of pangenesis and preformation. That the semen cannot all be recovered after copulation is taken by them as evidence that the substance of the semen has been used up materially in the creation of the fetus. Now Aristotle can make short work of this question. He states as a general rule that the soul principle for which the semen is a vehicle is partly separable from physical matter (especially in those animals which possess a divine element) and partly

⁴² See Peck, *Generation of Animals*, 170–1, n. 1; and Friedrich Solmsen, "The Vital Heat, the Inborn *Pneuma* and the Aether," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957): 119.

inseparable from it. Here, once again, Aristotle stakes out his own position, distinct from the materialists and from Plato. The physical part of the semen, as fluid, "dissolves and evaporates." Semen has conveyed something indispensable to the fetation, but this something is the soul principle, neither an animalcule nor unassembled anatomical parts, as Aristotle's rival theorists contend. He closes these questions by reiterating his position that *spermata* and fetations have soul potentially but not in actuality (737a17-18).

The semen is a residue, and, Aristotle says,

The female's contribution, of course, is a residue too, just as the male's is, and contains all the parts of the body potentially, though none in actuality; and "all" includes those parts which distinguish the two sexes. Just as it sometimes happens that deformed [*pepērōmenōn*] offspring are produced by deformed parents, and sometimes not, so the offspring produced by a female are sometimes female, sometimes not, but male. The reason is that the female is as it were a deformed male; and the menstrual blood is *sperma*, though in an impure condition; i.e. it lacks one constituent, and one only, the principle of soul. (737a22-30)

Aristotle's comment that the female is "as it were a deformed male" is no doubt the one most frequently quoted by his feminist opponents. It is on the face of it a disturbing remark. We find, however, in the immediate context of the comment, confirmation that Aristotle regards both semen and menstrual fluid as *spermatic* residues. We also have seen through the course of this discussion that in order to maintain that both are truly generative and to avoid simultaneously a materialistic theory of generation, Aristotle has had to differentiate the two fluids, and the differentiation turns on the conveyance of sentient soul by the semen. His unfortunate comment about the female as a deformed male is prompted in this passage by a specific difficulty encountered earlier: to the extent that Aristotle's theory of generation includes a material component, and to the extent that is associated exclusively with the female, he must explain how it is that the material for the formation of a male body is available in a physical female body which does not possess male anatomical parts. Recall that he rejected preformationism on just such grounds: How could the father's body supply the sex-specific body parts for female offspring? His comment here about deformity is intended to anticipate and counter an objection to his theory; his crude-sounding analogy is meant to show that females can and do produce male offspring because they do possess (potentially) the

"extra" male organs. But they themselves, as females, do not manifest them and so might be said, in this way only, to be like those who are deformed or underdeveloped in that they possess parts which are of no use to them.⁴³ Aristotle is not in this passage offering a philosophy of woman as a deformity of nature or as an underdeveloped human but rather he is trying to solve some technical difficulties facing his theory. He overcomes them by positing an extended potentiality to this generative material of the female, potential to generate what the female herself does not exhibit.

Aristotle really has had two problems to overcome, one relating to each sex, in this portion of his discussion in book 2. The first, regarding how semen could be a vehicle of soul, he has tried to solve by way of the potentiality of the sublime, celestially connected element. The second, regarding the capacity of the female body to produce offspring which differ from her, has led Aristotle once again to a widened potential of the menstrual fluid, widened beyond the body features specific to females—and widened again, we might say, beyond the potential attributed to it within preformationism or other contemporary theories.

Apropos of Aristotle's penchant for expansion, if we return for a moment to book 1, we find that in attributing the material cause to the female, Aristotle makes the following remark: "The natural substance of the menstrual fluid is to be classed as prime matter" (730a32). Prime matter comes up for discussion in the *Metaphysics* and in the *Physics*. He explains there that "prime" means "primary in general," that is, that out of which the four elements arise, the

⁴³ Peck offers "underdeveloped" as an alternate translation for *peperomenon*: "underdeveloped," then, relative to the full range that is available to the female. See, too, Aristotle's statement that "the female's contribution . . . contains all the parts of the body potentially, though none in actuality; and 'all' includes those parts which distinguish the two sexes"; 737a24–25. Compare this with the comment in the Hippocratic treatise, "The Seed": "The children of deformed parents are usually sound. This is because although an animal may be deformed, it still has exactly the same components as what is sound"; *Hippocratic Writings*, 323. This comment can be read in keeping with the interpretation of Aristotle offered here, that is, that Aristotle holds that the female parent has all the anatomical components (male as well as female) potentially, even though she herself does not exhibit them. She is not, therefore, a deformity; it is only the principle that applies analogically. It is possible that the Hippocratic passage influenced Aristotle's statements, but Aristotle does not mention Hippocrates by name in *GA*.

most fundamental stuff of the cosmos, and also "primary in relation to the thing," the very first material of a particular entity (*Metaphysics* 1015a8-9). It has been suggested that the remark about menstrual fluid as prime matter should be interpreted as "primary in relation to the thing."⁴⁴ But considering Aristotle's comment now in connection with his celestial move in book 2 where he tells of the tie between semen and the element of the stars, aether, there is reason to suppose that Aristotle has in mind both the particular and the cosmic meaning of "primary." What he posits in his remark that the menstrual fluid is prime matter, therefore, is that it serves as a highly specialized basic material out of which the new entity will arise, and also that there exists a tie between the generated creature and the most primordial stratum of the natural world. What is produced, then, in the first two books of *GA* is an "axis" that stretches from the bottom to the top edges of the universe, along which the appearance of the new creature must be understood. The primordial, preelemental power that inheres in prime matter expresses itself (as potentiality) in the adult female's generative material. The active, moving power that is unique to the heavens expresses itself (as potentiality) in the male generative material. Viewed on a cosmic scale, then, the generated offspring is the outcome of the meeting of a vast scale of forces as these are embodied in the *archai* of generation; the female and male.⁴⁵

Aristotle turns his attention next to the different patterns of embryological development found among the creatures in his classificatory scale (the scale of *GA* 2.1 based on the creatures' perfection). Consideration of this topic and the others he studies later in the treatise is beyond the scope of this paper. In assessing the course of the discussion in book 2 up to this point, however, it is evident that Aristotle has provided a deepened and more thorough metaphysical analysis of generation and its sources in the female

⁴⁴ Preus, "Science and Philosophy," 9, n. 14.

⁴⁵ At the start of the treatise, just after Aristotle has stated his thesis that the female and male are the *archai* of generation, he makes this remark about cosmology: "This is why in cosmology too they speak of the nature of the Earth as something female and call it 'mother', while they give to the heaven and the sun and anything else of that kind the title of 'generator' and 'father'"; 716a15. Aristotle does not himself subscribe to this mythic way of speaking, but it is suggestive, perhaps, that he thinks of earth and heaven directly after establishing his thesis.

and male. This is precisely what he indicates he will do in the first lines of book 2:

I have already said that the female and male are *archai* of generation and I have also said what is their *dynamis* and the *logos* of their essence. As for the reason why one comes to be formed and is female and another male, . . . insofar as this occurs on account of what is *better*, i.e. on account of the final cause [the cause "for the sake of which"], the principle is derived from the upper cosmos [*anōthen echei tēn archēn*]. (731b18–24)⁴⁶

In these lines Aristotle offers the thesis developed in the discussion that follows: the principles of generation, the female and male *archai*, are themselves generated according to the direction of the better, that is, final causality as it affects nature as a whole. This direction has its ties to the upper cosmos, he says, the system of concentric spheres whose movement is continuous and eternal.⁴⁷ After explaining the working of this causality, that things are affected by the noble and eternal to the extent that they are able to be, Aristotle moves immediately to the classification of animals in the natural world. Having supplied the details of the distinctions among the animal kinds in his hierarchy he observes, "We should notice how well nature brings generation about in its several forms: they are arranged in a regular series" (733a35–b1). We are now in a position to see that Aristotle regards the female and male as the means for this orderly unfolding of nature's series according to the direction of the better. This is what it means in his system to be a *principle* of generation, rather than a tool or machine. The principles of generation are themselves tied to all four aspects of causality as it operates from the particular individual case to the universal. The female and male *archai* generate particular offspring, and they stand at the head of the ordering of the animal species. At the same time they themselves stand on an extended axis of cosmic causal influence, actualizing more remote potentialities.

It is evident now why Aristotle's discussion turns to potency and act in book 2 (734b). It is not, as sometimes supposed, that he

⁴⁶ In the Greek, Aristotle mentions "the female" before "the male" twice in this passage, although both Peck and Platt render these lines with "the male" first. The adjustment in Peck's translation above is mine. Platt translates the last phrase as follows: "That they exist because it is better and on account of the final cause, takes us back to a principle still further remote"; Platt, *The Generation of Animals*, 1135–6.

⁴⁷ Peck, *Generation of Animals*, 568.

turns to these concepts because there is no other solution available to the *aporia* about the formation of the fetus by an internal or external agent. A solution is needed for this technical problem, to be sure; but by introducing potency and act Aristotle shows, first, that the process of generating offspring requires the application of the same physical and metaphysical concepts as other phenomena require in order to be understood. The action involved in giving rise to offspring is consistent with the way nature moves and changes always and in all respects (the potency of the *spermata* becoming actualized), and thus generation is an intelligible process. He also shows, second, that generation, understood on the full natural scale, beyond the capacities and activities of the individual parents, is itself the actualization, insofar as it is possible, of nature's ultimate aims.⁴⁸

V

In book 1 Aristotle accomplishes his aim of demonstrating that male and female are both principles of generation. He shows there that they are both, clearly, anatomically fitted for the work of generating offspring, and he also establishes the more controversial point that both contribute generative fluids so that male and female must both be regarded as causally efficacious in generation. He studies their coeffectiveness, however, primarily at the level on which material and motive causality operates, that is, the physical level where necessity is the dominant factor. In book 2 Aristotle deepens his reflections on metaphysical causality in generation in his effort to give a full reckoning of generation in terms of all four causes stated at the outset of the treatise. He does this, as we have seen, both with respect to generation of individual offspring and to gen-

⁴⁸ As one immediate indication that in book 2 Aristotle's interest has expanded beyond that of book 1 and the working of generation in the case of particular male and female mates, to the consideration of generation with regard to classes of animals, see his statements at 732a1-2. He explains that since "the better" cannot be brought about in and for each individual creature, "there is always a class of men, of animals, of plants; and since the principle of these is 'the male' and 'the female' . . ." That is, Aristotle now takes up male and female as the principles of the classes, not just of the offspring of individual acts of generation.

eration understood as the coming into being of nature itself as an ordered whole directed by final causality.

In our examination of these sections of books 1 and 2 we have seen Aristotle's complex philosophical elaboration of his initial thesis that female and male are both *archai* of generation. Contrary to the feminist claim, then, that in his system only the male parent effects generation, it is now clear that for Aristotle both are causally effective. In establishing his thesis Aristotle critiques rival theories, demonstrating that among their shortcomings, they become unworkable because of the sexual imbalance upon which they are premised. Indeed, it is Aristotle's theory in which the female and her distinctive contribution is recognized and integrated. Methodologically, the necessity for a full and detailed reading of Aristotle's text has become evident; excerpted sentences or passages can neither convey the intellectual context within and against which he worked nor represent accurately the intricacies of his thinking on this subject. Above all, a close reading of the text provides us with a glimpse of a theory quite unlike the reproduction theory bequeathed by modern science: Aristotle's metaphysical science of generation ties the offspring meaningfully to the parents, and the parents and offspring together to the whole of nature.⁴⁹

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⁴⁹ I would like to thank Helen Lang for her helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

PRAGMATISM AS NATURALIZED HEGELIANISM: OVERCOMING TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY?

ALLEN HANCE

I

FROM ITS INCEPTION PRAGMATISM HAS DISPLAYED an ambivalent relation to Hegelianism. John Dewey conceived his experimentalism as a more modest alternative to Hegel's system of absolute idealism, which he deemed "too grand for present tastes."¹ At the same time, pragmatists from James and Dewey to Quine and Rorty have all assimilated important Hegelian motifs. These include most importantly a deep suspicion of modern representationalist epistemology, in both its rationalist and empiricist versions; a conception of intelligence as a form of practice, best conceived in terms of making, doing, and acting; and a commitment to a nonreductionist, holistic appreciation of our beliefs about the world (one which induces a general distrust of dualistic thinking). To this list Rorty adds an appreciation of Hegel's conception of the philosophical enterprise as *Nachdenken*, as a kind of edifying recollective summary.

Rorty has also provided what is perhaps the most concise formula for expressing at once pragmatism's debt to and criticism of Hegel: pragmatism is a form of "naturalized Hegelianism."² In this paper I wish to examine what it means to naturalize Hegel and whether this really is such a good thing to do. Naturalism can mean many different things, but I am interested primarily in

¹ John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929), 63.

² Richard Rorty, "Lumps and Texts," in Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 90.

naturalism as a theoretical critique of transcendental philosophy. For Rorty naturalizing is synonymous with a process he calls "de-transcendentalization." My question can thus be rephrased: If pragmatism is naturalized Hegelianism and if naturalism is a critique of transcendental philosophy, then in what specifically does the detranscendentalization of Hegel consist? I will argue that Rorty does not provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Since few if any of the charges Rorty levels against Hegel withstand careful scrutiny, and indeed seem to have been articulated in one form or another by Hegel himself, we are left to wonder not only what nonnaturalized Hegelianism really is but how it stacks up against contemporary pragmatism. Pursuing these issues can show us, I think, that Rorty is mistaken in his claim that "holism takes the curse off of naturalism."³ I will argue to the contrary that Hegel's holistic idealism exemplifies a form of philosophical theory superior to naturalism insofar as it saves the phenomena more comprehensively than the reductive explanatory strategies of naturalism.

To this end I want to examine how Rorty sets up Kant as the paradigmatic transcendental philosopher and then uses his critique of Kant to advocate a wholesale rejection of the transcendental project. My claim is that because Rorty's understanding of transcendental philosophy is filtered almost entirely through a reading of Kant, his understanding of Hegel (as well as others within the transcendental tradition, including Husserl, Heidegger, and Derrida) is for the most part reductive and off target. The point is not merely that in Hegel himself we find many of the same objections to representationalist epistemology that Rorty supposes originate with linguistic philosophy, though this is true and deserves careful scrutiny. Equally important is that fact that through his construction of a straw man called "transcendental philosophy" Rorty suppresses a philosophical voice distinct not just from contemporary Anglo-American philosophy but from the empiricist and rationalist traditions of modern philosophy in general. That Rorty is unable to distinguish this voice from the chorus of modern philosophy is in part due to the fact that this voice's lexicon derives largely from

³ Richard Rorty, "Inquiry as Recontextualization: An Anti-Dualist Account of Interpretation," in Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*, 109.

Descartes and Hume rather than from Plato and Aristotle, with whom it perhaps shares more in common. Ultimately, however, this inability has to do with the very proximity of Rorty's own thought to the epistemological tradition whose founding arguments and guiding metaphors he has so trenchantly criticized.

II

Rorty has claimed that Hegelianism consists principally in having a historical sense. To have a historical sense is to believe "that nothing, including an a priori concept, is immune from cultural development."⁴ This healthy historical sense is exemplified presumably in Hegel's view that different peoples constitute loci for different forms of spirit. The idea of fluid discursive webs suggested by this notion of spirit might alone have served as the basis for a critique of Kant's theory of a priori categories. It might have opened the door to the central argument of Rorty's pragmatism, which is that the rationality of assertions is a function not of correspondence with some extralinguistic ground but rather of "what society lets you say."⁵ Instead, however, of developing a historically informed sociology of knowledge, Hegel made the mistake of engaging Kant on epistemological matters, criticizing for example the intelligibility of the thing-in-itself. The upshot of this critique of Kantian epistemology was not the rejection of a priori conceptual schemes in general but rather the development of the grandiose alternative categorial framework found in the *Science of Logic*. As Rorty puts it: "Hegel . . . kept [Kant's] epistemology, but tried to drop the thing-in-itself, thus making himself, and idealism generally, a patsy for realistic reaction."⁶

Later I will contest Rorty's claim that Hegel's critique of the thing-in-itself commits him to some form of phenomenism. For

⁴ Richard Rorty, "The World Well Lost," in Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 16.

⁵ Richard Rorty, "Epistemological Behaviorism and the De-Transcendentalization of Analytic Philosophy," in *Hermeneutics and Praxis*, ed. Robert Hollinger (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 89.

⁶ Rorty, "The World Well Lost," 16.

the moment I wish to emphasize that for Rorty the underlying problem with Hegel is that despite his pointed anti-Kantian rhetoric he never really breaks with Kantian epistemology. This argument is unsound and derives, I would like to suggest, from Rorty's chronic conflation of the transcendental with the epistemological. Because Rorty conceives of transcendental philosophy in general as a species of epistemology, he is left no option, after registering the fact that Hegel worked within the tradition of transcendental philosophy, but to claim that Hegel also drank deeply from the chalice of modern epistemology. What Rorty chooses not to investigate closely is the extent to which post-Kantian transcendental philosophy from Hegel to Husserl and Heidegger has itself constituted a prolonged attack on the representational theory of mind developed jointly by modern empiricism and rationalism. The only way Rorty can make his general critique of transcendental philosophy stick is by reductively identifying transcendental philosophy with Kant's critical philosophy, with the one version of transcendental philosophy least free from the trappings of modern representationalist epistemology.

Rorty's guiding assumption about transcendental philosophy is that it carries to a higher level of abstraction the "battle"—as Dewey characterizes it in his 1948 introduction to *Reconstruction in Philosophy*—between science and religion, between the real and the ideal. This battle was initiated by Plato's discovery of mathematics and his subsequent attempt to define philosophy as that which parses the intelligible, actual, transcendent, and sacred from the sensory, apparent, immanent, and profane. It was Descartes and Kant, however, who gave form to the distinctly modern variant of this project. More rigorously conceived, transcendental philosophy consists in a cluster of theses about the distinctive character of philosophical, in contrast to everyday, knowledge. The most important of these theses, according to Rorty, are (1) the view that philosophy is an apodictic science modeled on logic and mathematics and made up of nonempirical, a priori knowledge-claims; (2) the view that a nonempirical practice of introspection or inference discloses this region of philosophical knowledge; (3) the view that this philosophical knowledge serves as a canon for judging the legitimacy of empirical claims forwarded by extraphilosophical disciplines.⁷

⁷ Rorty, "Epistemological Behaviorism," 90.

This model of philosophy was carried into the late nineteenth century by the neo-Kantians and by British and American idealists, and received new impetus from the critiques of psychologism developed by Frege and Husserl. These gave birth in turn to the major variants of transcendental philosophy in this century: in the analytic tradition, the logico-mathematical and linguistic theories of Russell, Carnap, and the early Wittgenstein (as well as neo-Fregean formalist semantics); and in the continental tradition, the phenomenology of Husserl, the philosophical hermeneutics of the early Heidegger and Gadamer, and the transcendental pragmatics of Apel and Habermas.

The particular brand of naturalism that Rorty employs to challenge transcendental philosophy (so defined) is linguistic behaviorism. For all his dissatisfaction with various practitioners of analytic philosophy and for all his gestural appropriations of continental philosophy, Rorty's philosophic outlook was shaped primarily by certain foundational arguments of the analytic tradition. These include Frege's claim that the sentence is the minimal unit of meaning, Wittgenstein's notion that meanings are rules for the use of words, Ryle's assertion that introspection is a learned behavior rather than a privileged mode of access, Quine's argument that the analytic-synthetic distinction is untenable, Sellar's critique of the notion of givenness, and Davidson's demonstration that the idea of a conceptual scheme is but one more dogma of empiricism. Taken together these arguments constitute the interpretative grid through which Rorty receives the philosophical tradition and in terms of which he narrates its fateful twists and turns. They also define the self-interrogative process through which, in Rorty's opinion, recent (post-) analytic philosophy has detranscendentalized itself and the wider tradition from which it stems.

Rorty's essay, "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," clearly exemplifies the critique of transcendental philosophy enabled by linguistic behaviorism.⁸ This critique centers on the fact that Kant's transcendental arguments attempt to isolate two sorts of privileged representations: meanings or concepts, and sensory data or intuitions. Arguments that Kant phrases using the representationalist language of concepts and intuitions, Rorty contends, can be restated

⁸ Richard Rorty, "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," *Review of Metaphysics* 24 (December 1970): 207-44.

in terms of the way we use certain kinds of words. Thus, for example, Kant's argument that the sensory manifolds presented through the forms of intuition do not of themselves constitute experience, but must be synthesized conceptually by the a priori category of substance, can be understood as the semantic claim that the use of adjectival terms such as "red" or "hard" (sensory quality words) makes no sense in isolation from the substantives or indexicals that form the nominal cores of complete sentences. We are dealing, in other words, not with the inner workings of the mind but with the logic of particular language games. To understand this logic we have no need for the mysterious first-person practice of introspection or for equally obscure transcendental deductions. We need only to see whether speakers of the given language do, as a matter of publicly verifiable fact, deviate from this pattern and still make sense.

Rorty does, however, credit Kant with beginning the move away from the Cartesian-style philosophy of consciousness that would culminate eventually in the behaviorist's complete repudiation of transcendental philosophy. Kant's argument that neither unsynthesized intuitions nor the a priori categories are able to be experienced directly challenges the Cartesian view of subjective mental states as incorrigible, immediate, and self-evident. But here, unfortunately, Kant stopped. Rather than abandon the representational model of mind altogether, Kant instead outlined what he believed to be a radically new way of doing philosophy. For Kant, Rorty writes, "The study of the relations between these two sorts of unapperceivable entities becomes the pseudo-subject of a pseudo-discipline, transcendental philosophy."⁹

Rorty promises a nonmentalistic account of the functions Kant attaches to his two species of mental entities. A concept is not a representation, "it is a skill; a skill at linguistic behavior—the ability to use a word."¹⁰ Intuition is not a nonconceptual representation or an unsynthesized mental content or a nondiscursive presentation of an object. It is rather the disposition toward certain definite speech acts of a linguistic animal standing in a causal relation to

⁹ Rorty, "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," 240.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 237.

an object. Accordingly, the epistemological problem of reconstructing necessary relations between different species of mental contents gives way to an investigation of the causal ordering of linguistic behaviors:

With both concepts and intuitions thus analyzed into dispositions to linguistic behavior, the notion of 'representation' itself seems to be left without work to do. The notion of *Vorstellung*—something in the mind which stands in place of the object to be known—thus vanishes, and with it the notion of epistemology as the discipline which investigates the internal relations between *Vorstellungen*.¹¹

Rorty's arguments in "The World Well Lost" and other more recent essays complement and extend the arguments from this earlier piece. Here we see again that Rorty's critique of transcendental philosophy consists in revealing the various dogmas of empiricism still latent in Kantian epistemology. As Rorty sees it, doubts raised by Sellars and others about the intelligibility of an uninterpreted given, and by Quine about the tenability of a hard and fast distinction between the necessary and the contingent, give rise to Davidson's more global questioning of the meaningfulness of conceptual schemes in general. If all acts of perception are theory-laden, then there are no intuitions (if by intuition we mean that which is purely received). In the absence of an idea of raw data yet to be categorized, however, the postulate of a spontaneously imposed interpretative scheme ceases to be necessary. Rorty thus argues that when the receptivity-spontaneity distinction falls by the wayside so too does the distinction between the merely given and the now categorized, the unschematized and the schematized. Furthermore, if with Quine we understand a priori concepts simply as concepts that, pragmatically speaking, we find it exceedingly difficult to do without in most of our scientific and nonscientific pursuits, then talk of the conditions of possible experience in general is better understood in fallibilistic terms as the absence of plausible alternatives. To say this is not to return to the contrastive notion of "the world as we happen to conceive it with our conceptual scheme" versus "the world as it is in itself." The very contrast between the "in itself" and the "for us" depends on a scheme-relative concept of world. The world is not something "out there," not an independent evidential ground

¹¹ Rorty, "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," 242-3.

that verifies our conjectures, not a noumenal realm forever beyond our phenomenal knowledge. These concepts of world are all generated by the confrontational picture of knowledge: concepts and a picture well lost.

III

Rorty's argument that Hegel shares something of Kant's epistemology is premised on the true assertion that Hegel develops a theory of categories and the false assertion that he utilizes some kind of scheme-content distinction. The "Hegelian picture," as Rorty characterizes it, is one which leads "to the notion of conceptual thought as 'shaping' and thus to the notion of the World-Spirit moving from one set of a priori concepts to the next."¹² Hegel, on this view, rejects the rigidity and arbitrariness (the "finitude") of Kant's table of categories and develops in its stead a truly comprehensive system of categories, one sufficient to embrace the whole of being. Though he questions the adequacy of Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding, Hegel does not break decisively with the notion of a conceptual scheme which organizes a pregiven experiential field.

Those familiar with Hegel cannot help but be struck by a sense of *déjà vu*. Was it not Hegel who claimed to "overcome" Kantian epistemology precisely through a critique of the residual empiricism of critical idealism? In my view, Rorty does not sufficiently appreciate Hegel's critique of empiricism and representational thinking and as a consequence is unable to recognize the nonepistemological and, for that matter, nonmetaphysical character of Hegel's kind of transcendental philosophy.¹³ Hegel calls into question traditional philosophical ways of conceiving the "relationship" between world and the categories of thought. At the same time, he argues that an overcoming of the impasses to philosophical thinking can result only from a radicalization of the transcendental project begun by Kant. The problem with Kant is not that he is a transcendental

¹² Rorty, "The World Well Lost," 4.

¹³ Cf. Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 91, 277-8.

philosopher, but that his transcendental philosophy remains too deeply rooted in modern representational epistemology. For Hegel, the problem of how thought or language (subjectivity) hooks up with the world (objectivity) is a philosophical canard introduced by presuppositions about mind shared in large measure by both Cartesian rationalists and Lockean empiricists. These presuppositions together constitute what Hegel calls picture-thinking.

The issue we must pursue then is whether Hegel's critique of picture-thinking addresses the same complex of problems which Rorty articulates in his critique of empiricism and representationalist epistemology. If so, then obviously Rorty's suggestion that we extend these criticisms to Hegel and to post-Kantian idealism and transcendental philosophy in general will prove seriously misleading. This raises further questions, first about what really distinguishes the naturalist critique of representationalist epistemology from the transcendental critique, and second about whether Rorty himself succeeds in extricating his pragmatism from picture-thinking.

A clarification is in order here. I do not deny that Rorty has argued persuasively that "the mental," as described by post-Cartesian epistemological theories, is a construction generated by certain misleading metaphors and unsatisfactory pictures of cognitive achievements. I am claiming that transcendental philosophy, having itself dispensed with the epistemological project through its critique of naturalism (through the critique of the notion of mind as a substance or a bit of the world), does not think about thought, meanings, and categories in terms of subjective mental processes. At least in this respect it shares with Frege's philosophy a deeply antipsychologistic conception of meaning. Clearly, however, the very intelligibility of transcendental explanations becomes problematic if one calls into question the intelligibility of meanings; and Rorty suggests that we have good reasons to do so. He arrives at these reasons, however, through the erroneous equation of transcendental theories of categories and meanings with epistemological ones. In Rorty's view, what transcendental philosophers refer to as categories and meanings are simply surrogate names for the mental entities that epistemologists call concepts, representations, and ideas. The entire epistemological project is an attempt to isolate some set of privileged representations and to claim for them a governing position with respect to other representations. For Rorty,

all such mental entities are fictitious: the imaginary progeny of a pseudo-discipline. In spite of all its innovations, transcendental philosophy—whether Kantian, Hegelian, or Husserlian—remains bewitched by the notion of a mental realm independent of or prior to the physical realm. Accordingly, as soon as a transcendental philosopher refers to his or her project as an explanation of the possibility of thinking and experience, Rorty sees the Mirror of Nature rearing its ugly head.

This perception is the result, I would submit, of Rorty's failure to comprehend the extent to which the transcendental turn initiated (but not completed) by Kant itself constitutes a radical attack on the modern epistemological conception of mind as a secondary or derivative subjective sphere set over against a primary objective realm. With Hegel, the transcendental turn does not result in insouciant pragmatism with its conception of truth as what society lets us say. It results rather in the elaboration of a phenomenological ontology. This becomes possible when, according to Hegel, philosophy is once again *able* to take "thinking" (*das Denken*) seriously. To recover this ability is the aim of Hegel's critique of picture-thinking.

IV

So what is Hegel's conception of "thinking," and how does it diverge from Kantian philosophy while remaining within the transcendental tradition? A satisfactory response to these two questions requires that we become more conscious of the embedded pre-suppositions that guide many contemporary interpretations of Hegel. Among Anglo-American readers of Hegel there has until quite recently been almost universal agreement about "what is living and what is dead of the philosophy of Hegel." Concurring for the most part with Croce's judgment in the famous 1907 monograph of that title, commentators on Hegel have deemed it a matter of intellectual respectability and common sense to pronounce Hegel's speculative logic and philosophy of nature dead, while treating his philosophical anthropology and diverse reflections on cultural and historical forms (minus his distracting thesis about an "end to history") as the living core of his thought. This view is nicely sum-

marized by Allen Wood in his recent study of Hegel's practical philosophy:

The living traditions that derive from Hegel's thought—the traditions of Marxist social theory and existential philosophy—are distinctly antimetaphysical in their orientation. The Hegel who still lives and speaks to us is not a speculative logician and idealist metaphysician but a philosophical historian, a political and social theorist, a philosopher of our ethical concerns and cultural identity crises.¹⁴

While Hegel's thought surely spawned the still living traditions of Marxism and existentialism, it is likewise true that those traditions in their turn have shaped our contemporary approach to the study of Hegel. Indeed, Karl Löwith has suggested that the interpretative horizon that governs most contemporary approaches to Hegel has an even earlier and more specific origin: it was Schelling's widely attended Berlin lectures, he argues, that set in motion both the Marxist and the existentialist reactions. The assumption that these lectures installed in the minds of Kierkegaard, Engels, Bakunin, Burckhardt, and others in attendance, and which had been resurrected by successive generations of existentialist, hermeneutic, Marxist, pragmatist, naturalist, historicist, deconstructive, and postmodernist interpreters is that Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute, insofar as it is based on his speculative logic, neglects "real being" and "positive existence."¹⁵ In an important sense the appeals to existence, facticity, and materiality in all these influential forms of post-Hegelian philosophy represent an attempt to revitalize the theory of intuition on which Kant bases his critique of rationalist metaphysics. Most all of Hegel's critics share the conclusion that his rejection of Kant's theory of intuition causes him to backslide into some form of pre-Critical metaphysics. An increasing number of Hegel scholars are now arguing that this is a seriously mistaken

¹⁴ Allen Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5–6.

¹⁵ See Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought*, trans. David E. Green (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), 115; and Karl Löwith, *Nature, History and Existentialism and Other Essays in the Philosophy of History* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 46–50.

interpretation.¹⁶ It is mistaken because the transcendental critique of metaphysics does not rest necessarily on a Kantian-style theory of sensuous intuition. Hence, although Hegel clears the way for his own conception of speculative thinking through a critique of the Kantian theory of intuition, this critique does not, of itself, necessitate a renewal of substance metaphysics. For internally connected reasons, the second key part of Hegel's critique of Kant, his rejection of the thing-in-itself, does not lead to phenomenism.

Contra Rorty, the Hegelian conception of thinking is itself based on a critique of representational epistemology and scheme-content theories of cognition. Hegel rejects the notion that categories are a priori rules of synthesis that bind together pregiven manifolds into objective appearances. He likewise rejects the argument internal to Kant's transcendental psychology that space and time are a priori forms of intuition that prediscursively order the contents of sensibility. He rejects these views because both are premised on a picture of the subject's relation to things-in-themselves and, following from this picture, on a theory of the faculties the subject must possess if we are to make sense of (what for Kant constituted) indisputable universal and necessary knowledge claims.

This picture, according to Hegel, distorts our capacity as philosophers to examine the contents of thought. Hegel conceives philosophy in general as the inquiry into mind (*Geist*), where by mind is meant the system of the contents of thought. As understood by speculative philosophy, thought is not a possession or predicate of a subject, psyche, or mental faculty; and the contents of thought are not contained somehow in intramental representations of the external world. Indeed, the project of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is in large measure to disabuse us of these mistaken assumptions of modern epistemology, assumptions which in Hegel's view give rise both to modern skepticism and to realist reactions against skepticism. At least on the surface, then, Hegel's attempt to overcome the impasse between skepticism and realism through a critique of epistemology shares much in common with Rorty's attempt.

¹⁶ This point has been forcefully argued by Robert Pippin in *Hegel's Idealism*. The most influential exponent of nonmetaphysical interpretations of Hegel has been Klaus Hartmann. See Klaus Hartmann, *Studies in Foundational Philosophy* (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1988). See also Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Dialectic* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

The trouble with representational epistemology is that it forwards a theory of mind that reduces the determinations of thought—public, linguistically mediated meaning-contents—to subjective states. In this deficient theory “the self is a represented subject (*ein vorgestelltes Subjekt*) to which the content is related as an accident and predicate.”¹⁷ Still caught up in an externally pictured and hence substantialized conception of mind, such theories proceed surreptitiously to assign things-in-themselves a being-status apart from what is, so to speak, “brought to mind” in and through thought-determinations. Representational epistemology does so, and believes it does so legitimately, because it interprets thought as a function of the subject and hence as a complex of psychological events. If our knowledge consists merely in representations caused by external things impinging on sense organs, then we have no reason to suppose that our particular view of things is the best, most accurate, or really real, one. Our view is thoroughly conditioned by the particular array of sense organs we, as human beings, just happen to possess. It could have been otherwise for us and it might well be otherwise for other intelligent beings.

Once these assumptions are made, however, it becomes necessary to posit the thing-in-itself in order to prevent the slide into subjective idealism. According to Hegel, however, Kant’s retention of the thing-in-itself is precisely what blocks the development of a thoroughgoing idealism and the comprehensive thinking through of the dogmas of representational epistemology. Both it and the causal theory of perception Kant inherits from Hume are residues of a naive form of realism which persists when the critique of epistemology begun by the transcendental turn is not completed. Phenomenalism, moreover, is the dialectical partner which comes to haunt the naive realist during his or her skeptical moments.

For Hegel, the realist postulate of a thing-in-itself is “contradictory” and dogmatic because it constitutes a theoretical posit for which Kantian and empiricist philosophers cannot themselves account. Identification of the thing-in-itself, in other words,

¹⁷ G. W. F. Hegel, Preface to *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in *Hegel: Texts and Commentary*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame: 1977), 90.

presupposes a relation of subject to object that is itself inaccessible to the thinking self (that is, to the thinking self as described by representational epistemology). Representational epistemologists seem to claim that the subject has direct access only to its own intramental contents. Presumably representational epistemologists, when they themselves are engaged in the reflective philosophical activity of developing theories of mind, are not exempt from this universal rule of cognition. If that is so, however, we are well on the way to proving that it really makes no sense at all to call that which is experienced by the subject its own "representations" or "mental contents." For if the subject knows only via its own representations, we must conclude that that same subject (in its role as an epistemologist) could not attain a position external to its own representations in such a way as to identify them *as* representations. This same argument extends to the thing-in-itself. The subject has no experiential access through representations to that which it sets up as the causal basis of its represented experiences. The representational epistemologist's model of mind is thus a fiction founded on the picture of consciousness somehow standing outside itself just long enough to identify the field of "real things" that might, the skeptical argument goes, be represented differently by other consciousnesses. To make this assumption, however, is to postulate for consciousness a relation to itself and its other that it does not and cannot possess.

Hegel concludes that the Kantian thing-in-itself cannot be meaningfully understood as a limit to thought because it itself is a posit of thought. But this means of course that the thing-in-itself is not other to thought at all. Indeed, by this chain of argument we are led to the absolute idealist's assertion that only thought itself (nonrepresentationally conceived) deserves the title of the thing-in-itself. When the ego comes home to itself in this way we are left with what Hegel calls thinking (*das Denken*): we have moved from the *Ding an sich* as a limit to thought to thought as the *Ding an sich*, or better, to thought as *die Sache selbst*. More prosaically put, Hegel's absolute idealism radicalizes the turn to the subject initiated by Descartes and Hume by recognizing the fallacious character of epistemological questions concerning the relation of subject to object and by attending exclusively to the determinations of thought. Thought, as Hegel puts it, must be conceived as infinite

rather than as something limited by something other to itself (intuition or the thing-in-itself).¹⁸ Only when we have gotten away from oppositional or confrontational models of subjectivity and objectivity can we articulate the nature of pure thought (*reines Denken*) and its categorial determinations.

Hegel's category theory does not, in Kantian fashion, generate a scheme-relative conception of the world (the phenomenal world of nature). In general terms, Hegel—much like Donald Davidson—argues that the question, Relative to what are these categories valid? proves meaningless once we abandon an epistemological orientation to philosophy of mind. More specifically, however, Hegel attempts to dissolve the problem of scheme-relativity through a critique of Kant's theory of sensuous intuition. As with all other proposed limits to thought, Hegel's strategy is to show that intuition is not an originally given, self-evident, or incorrigible element in immediate consciousness, but is itself a mediated content or determination of thought. Thought itself, in Hegel's view, ultimately provides no warrant for its being divided up into the component parts of concept and intuition. The latter is an abstraction. Space and time are not, as Kant argues, irreducible media that provide the subject with the nondiscursive matter to be taken up and shaped by categories into objective experience. Here again the problem is that Kant annexes space and time to the subject rather than treating them as determinations of thought. Conceived absolutely, space and time are categorial determinations specific to particular fields of inquiry. We should not treat space and time as subjectively given epistemological coordinates of empirical thought but as moments internal to the categorially determined system of thought as such.

In summary then, Hegel speaks of his categorial system as absolute because he claims to have overcome an epistemological problematic, with its misleading assumptions about the genesis, reference, and adequacy of representations. Because his philosophy of mind is founded on the premise that categories as modes of

¹⁸ Thus in the *Encyclopedia Logic* Hegel argues that "Kant's examination of the categories suffers from the grave defect of viewing them, not absolutely and for their own sake, but in order to see whether they are *subjective* or *objective*"; G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Logic. Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 67.

presentation are not functions of the empirical subject, Hegel can claim at once that objectivity is wholly a matter of thought and that his theory, though idealist, is not phenomenalist.¹⁹ Indeed, to make this charge is to remain committed, in however sublimated a form, to a misleading realist conception of thought and its relation to the "world."

V

I have tried to indicate how a number of the positions Rorty imputes to Hegel, and which in his view need to be naturalized in order to yield an acceptable form of historicized holistic pragmatism, in fact are not held by Hegel. As it turns out, they are positions more appropriately referred to Kant or to the pre-Critical tradition of representationalist epistemology. Moreover, they represent positions which Hegel himself cogently criticizes. It would appear then that in the end Hegel's critique of Kant results in something very similar to what issues from Rorty's linguistic-behaviorist deconstruction of Kant. Rorty has argued in Wittgensteinian fashion that "all that transcendental arguments—a priori arguments about what sort of experience is possible—can show is that if you have certain concepts you must have certain other concepts"²⁰ (or more precisely, that to use certain words you need to know how to use certain other words). For Hegel too, webs of concepts replace intuitions and the doctrine of synthetic a priori knowledge. So what is it in the final analysis that separates Hegel from Rorty? Both Rorty and Hegel seem to be left with an internalist account of how our beliefs hang together and of why we take them to be for the most part true. Perhaps we have just shown that Rorty is much more Hegelian than he supposes, because in point of fact Hegel himself was more of a pragmatist than is ordinarily granted. Or

¹⁹ "Thoughts, according to Kant, although universal and necessary categories, are *only our* thoughts—separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our knowledge. But the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real essence of the things, and of whatever is an object to us"; G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Logic*, 67–8.

²⁰ Rorty, "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," 231.

perhaps we have shown that Hegel was always already detranscendentalized, that Hegel was a naturalized Hegelian *avant la lettre*.

In this last section I would like to try to clarify just how much distance in point of fact continues to separate Rorty and Hegel. The best way to do this is to raise two internally related questions. First, in what sense does Hegel, despite his profound differences with Kant, remain a transcendental philosopher; and second, how does the holism that issues from this species of transcendental philosophy differ from that of Rorty's naturalist pragmatism?

Hegel's speculative idealism remains a form of transcendental philosophy because it does continue Kant's project of articulating a transcendental logic. Kant distinguishes transcendental logic from formal logic in that it is a theory of objective possibilities rather than pure logical possibilities. Thus the Kantian categories, as applied to the pure forms of intuition, carve out the a priori nexus for possible objects of experience. The doubts we have seen Hegel express about Kant's theory of pure intuition also impel him to question the narrow conception of objectivity found in Kant's transcendental logic. These doubts do not, however, prompt him to abandon the effort to expound a logic of "actual possibility." Whereas Kant, in other words, restricts actual possibility to the categorially determined spatio-temporal field of nature, Hegel seeks a richer and more comprehensive account of actual possibility, one that extends from his speculative logic through the entire real philosophy (the philosophies of nature and spirit).

With his speculative logic, however, Hegel is not constructing a transcendental doctrine of method.²¹ He offers neither a canon nor an organon, neither an accounting of the principles for the correct employment of understanding or reason nor an instrument for acquiring empirical knowledge. Both these notions are forward looking while Hegel's speculative logic is resolutely backward looking. Hegel's statements on this issue are strong and unequivocal. The image of the owl of Minerva in the preface of the *Philosophy of Right* testifies to Hegel's general disdain for the conception of philosophy as an applied or applicable science; his reminder in that same passage that philosophy comes on the scene too late to be of

²¹ See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B823.

any practical use indicates his belief that philosophy's orientation is essentially retrospective. Once these claims are taken into account it no longer makes sense to charge Hegel with attempting to constrain empirical inquiry. To assert that it is possible to reconstruct the most basic norms or categories operative in different domains of experience is not to claim that no further judgments can be made, or actions taken, within those domains, that everything has been thought and done, or that we stand at the end of history. Nor does Hegel's insistence that speculative reconstruction be systematic commit him to a closed and unrevisable theory of categories. It does, however, commit him to the holistic endeavor of establishing a reflective equilibrium between past and present accounts and between contradictory present accounts by demonstrating that incommensurabilities posited in or between rival philosophical accounts are not aspects of actuality but are products of category mistakes, reductive ontologies, or faulty models of mind. This process of philosophical adjudication is pursued through a method of progressive recontextualization through which categorial schemes that offer seemingly contradictory accounts of the nature of being, mind, or society are shown to be compatible within a larger explanatory frame. Hegel refers to this activity of thought itself attempting to come to terms with the limitations of its own accounts as dialectic. As Hegel writes,

The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature and complete development: they are at once the object of research and the action of that object. Hence they examine themselves: in their own action they must determine their limits, and point out their defects. This is that action of thought, which will hereafter be specially considered under the name of *Dialectic*, and regarding which we need only at the outset observe that, instead of being brought to bear upon the categories from without, it is immanent in their own action.²²

From the standpoint of his dialectically developed system (in which the forms of thought have, as it were, thought themselves through), Hegel claims to be able to offer a critique of those philosophical theories that operate with deficient, though not necessarily defective, categorial schemes. For example, various forms of naturalism propose to be able to describe all phenomena, including hu-

²² Hegel, *Hegel's Logic*, 66.

man thought and action, as natural events. Natural events are those explicable in terms of the fundamental category of efficient causality. Hegel argues that this proposition inevitably (and literally) proves self-defeating. In understanding explanation as the tracing of effects back to causes, naturalism reduces what explains (thinking) to the level of what is explained. But if in the final analysis it is thought that does the explaining, then the supposition that this explaining itself is caused by something other than itself (that such explaining is not spontaneous) undercuts the possibility of explanation; for if thinking is itself caused by another, then (as Fichte argues) it could not know this about itself. The defect of naturalism is thus that it utilizes categories appropriate to natural objects to account for activities of subjects, activities which cannot be properly understood as mere causal events. The point here is not to reject causal analysis but to demand of thinking that it do justice to the phenomenon in question. Logic must, accordingly, be able to account for how thinking is able to think itself.

We are now in a better position to address the frequently voiced objection that Hegel's speculative philosophy is an ill-conceived exercise in foundationalist metaphysics with absurd pretensions to exhaustive ("absolute") knowledge. Both the charge of foundationalism and the interpretation of what Hegel means by absolute knowledge are largely mistaken. The system that Hegel's dialectic seeks to elucidate is not "founded" on anything external to itself. Unlike Descartes, Hegel offers no axiomatic first principle from which he attempts to deduce his system. For Hegel there are no absolute beginnings; there is no indubitable ground or rudimentary set of principles from which the science of philosophy can proceed; there is not even a minimal premise, such as Davidson's principle of charity to which everyone will consent. Indeed, Hegel maintains that the foundationalist enterprise is precisely what his speculative system successfully avoids, while at the same time fulfilling the traditional philosophical task of articulating a presuppositionless science of sciences. It is of course far beyond the scope of this paper to assess Hegel's notion of science, especially the strictness of its claim to necessity. What we are interested in is Hegel's account of philosophical beginning, which holds that we begin inevitably with premises that are taken for granted, with *doxa*. The mistake is to suppose that we can secure these starting points prior to the activity

of philosophical investigation, that we might somehow learn to swim before getting into the water. The initial assumptions lodged in our opening gambit are discharged only through the development of an internally coherent system of thought; only the end product of speculation, the science of the whole, confirms the validity of one's starting points. This argumentative strategy forms the basis of what Tom Rockmore has aptly referred to as Hegel's "circular epistemology."²³

Absolute knowing has two basic senses for Hegel, neither of which has anything to do with divine omniscience. It refers in the first place to a theoretical standpoint achieved once thinking frees itself from the forms of dogmatism and skepticism generated by representational epistemology. This standpoint marks the conclusion of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the beginning of the *Science of Logic*. It is from this standpoint that thought, trusting its contents, dialectically investigates the limits and internal inconsistencies of its own categorial determinations. Secondly, absolute knowing refers to the outcome of dialectical investigation insofar as this investigation is a developmental process that produces a system of categorial determinations. In this sense the absolute notion, as Hegel writes in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, "is what contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it."²⁴

A comparison with a widespread modern conviction about knowing and what it yields clarifies further the distinctiveness of the Hegelian conception of absolute knowing. Unlike a long line of philosophers beginning with Frege and including Davidson and Rorty (who remain, in this measure, tacitly influenced by the modern epistemological tradition), Hegel does not sever the notion of "taking to be true" (appearance) from that of "being-true" (reality). Frege supposed that logical analysis of the accomplishments of thinking collapses into mere psychology if we link our account of reference to the thinking subject's intuitive registration of what is the case. He saw the failure to separate subjective states from the specifi-

²³ See Tom Rockmore, *Hegel's Circular Epistemology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); and Tom Rockmore, "Hegel's Circular Epistemology as Antifoundationalism," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 6 (January 1989): 101-13.

²⁴ Hegel, *Hegel's Logic*, 223.

cation of truth-conditions as leading inevitably to a psychologistic account of truth. As a consequence, he argued that what is the case must be accounted for exclusively with reference to a noncontingent, nonpsychological realm of "thoughts" (the ontological status of which, as has often been remarked, is never sufficiently clarified).²⁵

Hegel too was acutely aware of the problem of psychologism and, as his trenchant criticisms of Jakob Fries indicate, was seriously concerned to combat it. His attempt to circumvent psychologism proceeds not by detaching appearance from truth but by detaching his account of thinking from the subjective activities of a determinate consciousness and by conceiving of thinking "absolutely" rather than as the synthetical or associative activity of an ego. Categories are not forms that we impose on the world. They are the ways the world presents itself to thought. When Hegel states that the categories of speculative logic are absolute he means that they make being present in and for itself. These forms of thought are not representations of an epistemological subject but are rather the ways being manifests itself or becomes seen and known under descriptions given in everyday talk, as well as in the theoretical accounts of the particular sciences. Hegel's category theory is not a contribution to epistemology or to anthropology, but is the basis of a phenomenological ontology.

Here again it cannot be emphasized too often that for Hegel the work of dialectic is retrospective and interpretative rather than introspective and postulative. To be reconstructed are the most basic categorial schemes that govern our thinking about being. These historically developed and inherited ways of thinking about experience, nature, politics, and history together comprise the appearances (*Scheine*) of truth. Dialectical reconstruction aims at saving these appearances: it moves from appearance to truth by revealing that deficiencies within these schemes lie in the scope and richness of the categories brought into play in particular descriptive or explanatory projects. The truth of appearances thus lies in the systematic reconstruction of the increasingly more concrete whole

²⁵ This discussion is based on Richard Cobb-Stevens's phenomenological (Husserlian) critique of Frege in his *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), 26-7.

internal to which each of these varied accounts assumes a determinate place.

Now in contrast to Hegel, Rorty proposes to overcome representational epistemology and psychologism through behaviorist semantics. Dissatisfied with Frege's mysterious appeal to "thoughts," and yet still suspicious of appeals to intuition (how things appear to the subject), behaviorist semantics hangs its account of truth conditions on contingent but still nonpsychologistic (because thoroughly overt and publicly observable) behaviors of linguistic organisms. Rorty's more sociologically minded version of linguistic behaviorism thus refers the truth-conditions of assertions to "what society lets us say." Though it too, then, is founded on the recognition that modern epistemology falsely reduces the criteria for knowledge-claims to subjective representations, Rorty's linguistic behaviorism neither recovers the kind of trust in thinking that Hegel's speculative philosophy does nor elaborates a theory of interpretation that frees it decisively from the foundationalist enterprise of modern epistemology.

The reason why Rorty is unable to embrace a fuller conception of Hegelianism is that his thinking remains fundamentally constrained by naturalism and nominalism, which together form what might be termed "the two dogmas of neopragmatism." There is a strange way in which Rorty's linguistic behaviorism, shaped by these dogmas, effects only a partial paradigm shift, one that succeeds only in turning both representationalist epistemology and modern scientific theories of mind and society "inside out," but does not succeed in thinking them through. Ultimately, Rorty's attempt to think holistically works through explanatory reductionism rather than through the dialectical engendering of richer and more inclusive systems of explanation.

Of course, Rorty takes great pains to distance himself from objectivistic and scientistic theories of knowledge, so there is a *prima facie* implausibility to my claim that his pragmatist project itself uncritically extends presuppositions of the New Science, and that it itself is underwritten by the foundationalist and representationalist epistemological tradition he seeks to undermine. In the essay "Pragmatism Without Method," for example, Rorty identifies two fundamental strands of thought in the pragmatist tradition: one that uses modern science and experimental technique as a model

for rationality in general, another that brings science down off its high horse by appealing to the "softer" disciplines of history, literature, and religion, as well as the local knowledge and know-how of common sense.²⁶ Sidney Hook and others are singled out for criticism because they exhibit a latent positivistic urge to measure all belief, knowledge, and intelligence in terms of their adequacy to an ideal postulated by scientific method. Rorty recommends instead that we develop the "holistic and syncretic"²⁷ side of pragmatism, which, having given up the residual objectivism that drives the search for a unified method, contents itself with the more modest task of reweaving webs of belief, learning and translating foreign discourses, and litigating, where possible, between differing parties.

Through it all, however, Rorty retains faith in a kind of pragmatism that is "naturalistic without being scientific," one that "wants to hold on to the materialistic world-view that typically forms the background of contemporary liberal self-consciousness, while refraining from the claim that this view has been 'established' by a *method*."²⁸ While Rorty's embrace of this materialist world-view does not necessarily commit him to the philosophical dream of a *mathesis universalis*, it does betray his uncritical acceptance of the interpretation of being that the experimental sciences introduced into modern European philosophy—an interpretation whose phenomenological genesis remains unexplored in his work. This failure of self-reflection is, as we have already seen, the upshot of thoroughgoing naturalism. Naturalism is a habit of thought that forgets that physical nature, as understood by the natural sciences, is not the primary datum of consciousness; it forgets that the world intended in the scientific attitude cannot be inhabited, but only focused on temporarily. Or, to use Hegel's categorial language rather than the language of phenomenology, naturalism is a kind of explanation that forgets that the categories it employs in the explanation of natural being are insufficient to account for the thinking that uncovers natural being.

²⁶ See Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism Without Method," in Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth*, 63-4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 64.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 65.

Because Rorty's accounts of language and interpretation are tacitly structured by the ontological commitments of his naturalism, his pragmatic nominalism is not the theoretically neutral position he would have us believe it is. As a pragmatist, Rorty asks us to adopt a picture of "people in whose minds new vocabularies developed, thereby equipping them with tools for doing things which could not even have been envisaged before these tools were available."²⁹ As a nominalist, Rorty recommends that we see "language as just human beings using marks and noises to get what they want."³⁰ According to Rorty there are many different and at times overlapping uses to which we put language—in pursuit of food, sex, science, and beauty—but there is no reason at all "to lump these uses together into something big called 'Language', and then to look for its 'conditions of possibility'."³¹

Now while Rorty claims to resist identifying some common denominator of our multiple language uses, he nonetheless asserts something quite determinate about the nature of language in identifying his position as nominalistic. This identification strikes me as very odd, since if there is any philosophical doctrine that is the direct result of the subjectivizing, representational turn taken by modern epistemology (the turn criticized, of course, in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*), it is the nominalist thesis that the world consists only in particulars and that so-called natural kinds or species are in fact reifications of language use. In my view, it is precisely this nominalist outlook that blocks a sufficiently radical account of the constitutive character of language. Rorty's account of language as a contingent and shifting web of vocabularies issues from a curious subterfuge wherein this internally related system of vocabularies is identified as such "from outside," by someone detached from a first-order involvement in language. His nominalism rests unself-consciously on the assumption of a prelinguistic disclosure of the world as an infinite manifold of discrete particulars, and

²⁹ Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of Language," in Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 17.

³⁰ Richard Rorty, "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?" in Richard Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 127.

³¹ Ibid.

of language as an arbitrary system of signs. His pragmatism is thus structured by an antecedent (and illegitimate) viewing of us and our webs, one that places these webs within a reductive ontological frame. Ultimately language is for Rorty simply one part of nature that human beings, another part of nature, utilize to cope with the rest of nature.

It is the naturalistic and nominalistic presuppositions of Rorty's account of language that separate his frankly ethnocentric, conventionalist theory of belief from Hegel's conception of speculative thought, as well as from contemporary hermeneutic theories of language and meaning derived from Hegel's philosophy of spirit. Rorty argues that knowledge and belief cannot be explained epistemologically but only "sociologically": they are functions of what our society lets us say. In this idea of what our society lets us say Rorty would no doubt have us hear a less ghostly version of what Hegel calls spirit. Society is a complex natural entity comprised of persons engaged in multiple practices structured by shifting webs of discourse. By naturalizing the background conditions of meaningfulness or of what we are able to think and say, however, Rorty has simply begged the question. To identify society as the pregiven or already constituted empirical totality internal to which our thoughts and sayings hang together is to assume, for the sake of the theory that explains those thoughts and sayings, a standpoint external to them. Thus Rorty has called upon something which is revealed through thought and language—nature—to serve as the explanatory ground of thought and language themselves.

What Hegel calls spirit is precisely that which is beyond nature, not because it excludes nature, but because it comprehends—in the double sense of the term—the principles of nature within itself. Spirit takes up the principles of nature within itself and it knows itself as having taken them up. Nature, on the other hand, is not in possession of itself (knowingly or otherwise); it is not self-related but is constituted through external causal relations. As such its essence lies outside its being. Nature is comprehended and has significance only because there is an entity whose essence it is to understand nature and itself as at once belonging to and existing beyond nature. Spirit's activity, whether described in terms of thought or language, cannot therefore be "naturalized" without committing the most egregious of category mistakes. To naturalize

spirit is in effect to eliminate precisely those explanatory principles that enable both spirit's account of itself and its account of nature. In the final analysis, then, Rorty's naturalized Hegelianism is inadequate to Hegel because it is inadequate to our consciousness of ourselves as spirit. Spirit cannot be naturalized because nature cannot account for who we are. The reason that nature cannot account for who we are is simple: nature cannot account.

By naturalizing or detranscendentalizing Hegel, Rorty supposes he can eliminate the bogus metaphysical and epistemological pre-suppositions of Hegel's philosophy of spirit while bolstering its holistic, historicist, and antifoundationalist tendencies. What I have demonstrated in this paper is that Rorty's naturalizing zeal also leads him, quite consistently, to eliminate that most basic transcendental principle that Hegel takes over from Kant: the principle of self-consciousness. Rorty, to put things mildly, has yet to own up to the serious consequences that his attempt to naturalize self-consciousness and spirit present for his thinking; for in assuming the stance of the thoroughgoing naturalist, Rorty undercuts the possibility of accounting for himself and his own activity of giving account. The problem with being a consistent naturalist is that you ultimately argue away the condition of possibility of your own argument: yourself (your self's own consciousness of itself).

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THE RHETORIC OF JACQUES DERRIDA I: PLATO'S PHARMACY*

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ALTHOUGH A GREAT VARIETY OF TOPICS are discussed in Derrida's philosophical writings, a central theme recurs in many of them: the relationship between speech and writing. Derrida consistently uses the same methods to deal with this topic, and my reading aims to expose the regulation of these methods. This essay tries to point out the blurring moments of the strategy which lead to one of Derrida's most outrageous outcomes, which is that writing precedes speech. This notion, however, is only the starting point; its consequences are the impossibility of communication and the collapse of the Platonic maxims. Such successful moments of deconstruction are traced back to their origins so as to leave bare the devices on which they are based. It will then be possible to discern a specific recurring stage during which occurs an illegitimate movement according to the Derridian rules of the game.

Derrida's discussion of the *Phaedrus* begins at the "geographical" center of the dialogue (275c) with the deprecation of the profession of logography. The logographer, who writes orations for trials in which he himself does not appear, represents, for Derrida, the intersection of two crucial phenomena: the presence of the absence (the writer of the speech is present only by means of his own cited words, while being physically absent from the trial), and the gap between writing and truth. The logographer, he says,

in the strict sense, composes speeches for use by litigants; speeches which he himself does not pronounce, which he does not attend, so to speak, in person, and which produce their effects in his absence. In writing what he does not speak, what he would never say and would

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never think in truth, the author of the written speech is already entrenched in the posture of the sophist: the man of non-presence and non-truth. (76; 68)¹

At this point Derrida follows Plato, who temporarily abandons the topic of writing (274b), and also leaves the problem of absence and truth for a different subject, the kidnapping of Orithyia in the middle of a game with Pharmacia (229b). Pharmacia is a link (*une maille*) between the kidnapping, which ends in rape and death, and the reappearance of writing in a later stage of the dialogue. Here, the connection between Pharmacia and the Greek word *φάρμακον* is important:

Pharmacia is also a common noun signifying the administration of the *φάρμακον*, the drug: the medicine and/or poison. . . . A little farther on, Socrates compares the written texts Phaedrus has brought with him to a drug [*φάρμακόν*]. This *φάρμακον*, this "medicine," this philter, both remedy and poison at the same time [*à la fois*], already introduces itself, with all its ambivalence, into the body of the discourse. (78; 70)

For Derrida, the *φάρμακον* is only an element in the chain of significations (108; 95), whose interplay constitutes the textual phenomenon. It is impossible, however, to try to analyze each of the elements in isolation. This kind of interpretation, according to Derrida, would damage the subtle texture of the literary object in a most vulgar way. Sharp distinctions, he claims, are unacceptable in dealing with language:

It is always possible to think that if Plato did not realize [*n'a pas pratiqué*] certain options [*passages*] and even actively barred them from being realized [*les a même interrompus*], it is because he perceived them but left them in the domain of the potential [*dans l'impraticable*]. Such a formulation is possible if one avoids all reference to the difference between conscious and unconscious, voluntary and involuntary, a most vulgar means [*instrument fort grossier*] when one comes to deal with language. (109; 96)

The borders, however, between the conscious and the unconscious, the voluntary and the involuntary, are stressed here, only to

¹ Page numbers refer to Jacques Derrida, *La dissémination* (Paris: Seuil, 1967); and to Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). The left number refers to the French original, the right to the English translation. The citation given above is a modified version of Johnson's translation, and all the translations of Derrida in this essay (unless otherwise noted) are of the same type.

be blurred later on. It is not that the limits are important in and of themselves; their only significance stems from being targets for deconstructive assaults. In other words, from a Derridian point of view, the meaning of borders lies in the realization of their destructive potential. This aspect of his reading is vividly expressed in his discussion of Léon Robin's French translation² of the Greek word *φάρμακον* in the Platonic myth of Theuth.

Toward the end of the dialogue (274c5-275b2.), Socrates utilizes the Egyptian myth of Theuth to illustrate his own arguments against writing. In this myth, a conversation is held between the king and one of the minor deities, Theuth. At a certain point, the new invention of writing is defined by the latter as "a *φάρμακον* of wisdom and truth." When Robin translated this expression he chose the word *remède* (remedy) as the French equivalent of the Greek *φάρμακον*. At first glance, this choice seems quite reasonable; the presentation of a new invention should concentrate on its beneficial aspects if the inventor wants it to be accepted. Derrida, however, stresses that such a translation erases the ambiguity of the Greek original and with it the possibility of understanding the context (109; 97). In this dialogue, the meaning of *φάρμακον* as poison is no less important than its opposite, because it represents the point of view of the other interlocutor, the king. Writing will be a means of forgetting by giving the *illusion* of memory and wisdom. People will not know more as a result of the new instrument; on the contrary, they will know less, because of the false beliefs which are the inevitable outcome of writing. Each of the participants in the dialogue about writing thus emphasizes one of the polar signifieds of the signifier *φάρμακον*, while the text, which consists of both attitudes, defers from choosing either the one or the other (109; 97).

Thus, in that which is named "text," the border between opposites is blurred, and what seemed to be an either-or situation turns out to be a both-and situation. The *φάρμακον* is at the same time (*à la fois*) remedy and poison, good and bad, beneficial and harmful. The meaning of the text can be extricated only on the basis of this mutual coexistence of contradictions. The dialogue between the king and Theuth, held within the unity of the same signifier (*dans l'unité du même signifiant*), is proof of its being a

² Plato, *Phèdre*, trans. Léon Robin (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1947).

unity of opposites (111; 98). Consequently, any intention to choose between the different signifieds (which means a reestablishment of order and limits) is ipso facto a neutralization of the unique textual quality of the object under discussion:

When a word inscribes itself as the citation of another sense of the same word, when the textual predominance [*l'avant-scène textuelle*] of the word *φάρμακον*, although signifying "remedy," cites, re-cites and activates the possibility of reading that which *within the same word* signifies on a different level and in a different profundity of the scene, *poison* . . . , the choice of only one of the renditions by the translator has as its first effect the neutralization of the citational play, of the "anagram," and, in the end, quite simply of the very textuality of the translated text (111; 98).

The above citation indicates an important point in Derrida's approach. When one (for example, Robin) erases "poison" on behalf of "medicine," when one chooses a single option and gives it, by definition, even a limited predominance within a section of a given text, what is named "text" becomes a hierarchical phenomenon. According to Derrida, the inevitable outcome of the decision to choose is the deprivation of the text's own textuality, since in such a delicate object even the slightest hint of hierarchy means an immediate loss of the text's most precious characteristic: the plurality of its potentials. This statement, however, gives an important hint to the critic of Derrida. If one would be able to prove that the deconstructive strategy is generally based on the notion of hierarchy and that Derrida himself assumes the existence of hierarchy and utilizes it for his own needs, the very possibility of a deconstructive reading would have to be seriously modified, to say nothing of the process of reading itself. To indicate not only the existence, but also the importance, of that assumption in Derrida's philosophy, I shall now proceed to the *φαρμακός*.

The *φαρμακός*, the scapegoat in Greek religion, is intimately connected to recurring themes in Derrida's interpretation of the *Phaedrus*. Like the *φάρμακον*, it represents a both-and phenomenon: it is both inside the city, being raised and nourished by it; and outside, since it must be exiled at a certain time. It is both a remedy, as the city's existence in a time of crisis, especially in time of plague, depends on it; and a poison, since that kind of existence is an outcome of the scapegoat's expulsion and, sometimes, death. Moreover, the *φαρμακός* is strongly connected with the dialogue's protagonist, So-

crates, both metonymically and metaphorically: metonymically, since Socrates was born on the day of the *φαρμακός*'s expulsion; metaphorically, because Socrates was an essential part of Athens and as such was executed. Thus, he was both citizen and outsider, and his personality was the realization of the unity of contradictions. At the same time he was ugly (in his features) and beautiful (in his soul), honored and despised, loved and hated, close and at a distance, knowing all and nothing, alive and dead, a remedy and a poison. The main problem with the above link is its absence from the Platonic text. The signifier, the word *φαρμακός*, is absent not only from the dialogue, but also from the Platonic corpus as a whole. Derrida, who is quite aware of the significance of this kind of movement, gives a thorough explanation for it:

But what does *absent* or *present* mean here? Like any text, the text of "Plato" could not not be in connection with [*être en rapport*], at least in a potential [*virtuelle*], dynamic, lateral manner, all the words that composed the system of the Greek language. Certain forces of association unite—at diverse distances, with different strengths and according to disparate paths—the words "actually present" in a discourse with all the other words in the lexical system, whether or not they appear as "words," that is, as relative verbal units in such discourse. (148; 129–30)

This explanation does not stem merely from a polemical need. The insertion of a word which is absent from the text can be accomplished only with great difficulty, if one remembers how delicate the Derridian tissue is. Since the absence of the "presence" of a word in the text stopped functioning as a barrier for the external signifiers, there is a serious risk of opening the text to an unrestricted interpretation that might enable the entrance of any word into the fragile web. In other words, since the mere fact that Plato did not write a certain word in a certain text—for example, *φαρμακός*—is not a sufficient condition for preventing the word from functioning in the act of reading, the whole dictionary is poised to flood the text with an endless stream of words. To avoid demolition, a new principle must immediately be substituted for the old one, and this principle concerns the nature of the connection between different elements of what Derrida calls "text."

Not every word, according to Derrida, is a legitimate participant in textual activity. Only those words which, though actually absent from the text, are connected with it associatively and united with its present words by means of combining forces, can participate in

the reading process. This condition can also solve the problem of absence resulting from unconscious trends which cause the suppression of words like *φάρμακός*. The deconstructive movements shed light upon this involuntary activity and, by reconstituting the suppressed elements, better explain the object under discussion.

It is this limitation, however, which demonstrates the impossibility of the already mentioned necessary deconstructive condition, namely, that the text must be treated as an ahierarchical phenomenon. The mere admission of the fact that not every word may enter into the process of interpretation is an admission of the fact that the text is a hierarchical phenomenon. If there is exclusion, there must also be hierarchy; some words are more important than others, more "in" than "out." They stand on one side of the border, while others stand on the other side. This hierarchy is implied by the very words Derrida chose to realize in his own text: "potential manner," "diverse distances," "different strengths." True, many readers might consider the existence of the limits as obvious, if not banal; it is exactly this kind of banality and obviousness, however, that hinders Derrida's critics from seeing the possibilities of opposition. From a hierarchical perspective, which is that of Derrida's rivals, the border exists by definition, and therefore there is no need to prove its existence. Such a perspective, however, turns out to be one of the great misunderstandings of the rules of the game. Nothing exists by definition since nothing is and nothing can be defined. Only upon complete acceptance of this rule is it possible to see that Derrida himself can not play according to the rules of his own game. What is more, the difficulty in exposing an internal contradiction between two necessary deconstructive conditions (the text as an ahierarchical phenomenon and the importance of hierarchy to any Derridian reading) stresses the fact that the existence of the border is not so banal and obvious as it seems to be at first.

In order to present more vividly the existence of the limits in Derrida's reading, I shall now turn to another of Plato's dialogues, *Phaedo*, in which the *φάρμακον* plays a central role. The dialogue deals with the last hours of Socrates and with his death by means of the *φάρμακον*. Let us examine all the places where this word appears in the dialogue:

Have you been with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, when he drank the *φάρμακον* in prison? (57a1-2)

... except that after drinking the *φάρμακον* he [Socrates] died. (57b2-3)

"Well, definitely nothing, Socrates," said Crito, "except that for some time the one who is about to give you the *φάρμακον* says that you should be told to speak as little as possible. For he claims that those who speak get warmer, and this impairs the *φάρμακον*'s activity." (63d6-e2)

For it seems to me that it would be better to drink the *φάρμακον* after having a bath, so that the women will not have the burden of bathing the corpse. (115a7-8)

Despite the fact that for a long time I have claimed for many reasons that after I will drink the *φάρμακον*, I will not stay with you at all . . . (115d2-3)

Socrates, he said, as far as I am concerned, I will not condemn you, as I condemn all the others who are angry with me and curse me after I inform them that, according to the rulers' decisions, it is time for them to drink the *φάρμακον*. (116c1-4)

Well, Crito, let's obey him, and that somebody will bring the *φάρμακον* if it is ready. (116d7-9)

And the slave went out . . . and came back bringing the one who is about to give the *φάρμακον*. (117a5-6)

. . . and the one who gave the *φάρμακον*. (117e6)³

Robin's reasons for translating *φάρμακον* as poison in this context can easily be detected. The *φάρμακον* caused Socrates' death, and therefore it is reasonable to concentrate on its poisonous aspects. Derrida, however, calls his readers' attention to the duality of the *φάρμακον* even in this case. The *φάρμακον* which is given to Socrates as poison is also responsible for the immortality of his soul (144-5; 126-7). Thus, the *φάρμακον* brings death and enables immortality at the same time; it is poison-medicine and not poison or medicine. The justification for stressing this ambiguity is based on the context within which the word appears: *Phaedo* is a dialogue about the immortality of the soul, held on the verge of Socrates' death. In other words, the unity of contradictions is reaffirmed by the unity of the living speech and the death scene. The use of this kind of argumentation is neither surprising nor uncommon; on the contrary, the importance of the context is quite conventional where matters of interpretation are concerned. Something is hidden behind the innocent veil of convention, however, and not without cause.

³ The translations are based on Plato, *Opera*, ed. John Burnet, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1907). All the Greek translations in this essay, unless otherwise noted, are my own.

The same context which allows the addition of another signified (medicine) to the one given by the French translator Robin (poison) excludes yet another signified of the word *φάρμακον*: "paint." This option, which appears in the LSJ dictionary⁴ as a possible meaning of *φάρμακον*, does not take a place in the Derridian text, not as a result of a deconstructive repression, but due to the indifference of the context. In the *Phaedo* the Platonic text creates an environment which excludes the realization of "paint" as a signified. In other words, within the boundaries of this dialogue, the signified "paint" does not have the same intensity as the signifieds "poison" and "medicine." Thus, the context serves as the borderline, and consequently hints at a crucial internal contradiction within the Derridian strategy: either the context is indispensable, and the text is revealed as a hierarchical phenomenon, or the context is irrelevant, and the fragile texture of the text is crushed by vulgar intrusions of signifieds. Neither of these cases, however, is allowed according to the Derridian rules of the game, which demand that the text be both ahierarchical and confined within the limits of the context.

To strengthen and illuminate my critique, I shall now proceed to a more complex example taken from another Platonic dialogue, *Cratylus*. In this dialogue, Socrates talks about the connection between words and their meanings, or, to use modern terminology, between signifiers and signifieds. At a certain stage of the discussion, Socrates depicts a possible confusion:

However, a variety [*ποικίλειν*] of syllables is possible so that to the layman they [the names] might seem different from each other, although ontologically they are the same [*τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα*]; just as for us the *φάρμακα* of the physicians, being disguised [*πεποικιλμένα*] by paints [*χρώμασιν*] and smells seem different, although ontologically they are the same [*τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα*]. However, as far as the physician is concerned, since he examines the power of the *φάρμακα*, they seem the same [*τὰ αὐτὰ*], and he is not misled by the additions: (394a5-b2)

In this passage the physician represents the man who is a professional in ontology. The *φάρμακα* are portrayed as identical in their essence, in their "onticity" (*τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα*), yet they are colored by paints which make them seem different from one another. Unlike Socrates and Cratylus, who cannot perceive the identical

⁴ Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, revised by Henry Stuart Jony.

essences, being misled by the colors, the physician can recognize the activity of the *φάρμακα* regardless of their appearance. The professionalism of the physician will later have a central part in this discussion. At present, I prefer, like Plato, to use it as a model for the professionalism of the linguist, who is able to differentiate between the variety of signifiers referring to the same signified.

The signifier *φάρμακον* has several signifieds, among which are "drug" and "paint." When Socrates chooses to speak about the "*φάρμακα* of the physicians," the additional words "of the physicians" create a hierarchical context within which "drug" has a higher position than "paint." That is, speaking "of the physicians" gives priority to drugs over paints. The *Cratylus* is, however, a dialogue about linguists and not physicians, and its essential distinctions concern words (see, for example, 423-4) and not drugs. The above quotation is, therefore, located in a verbal context; this phenomenon cannot be ignored by any Derridian reading, as will be shown by the following.

The signified "paint" has an indispensable meaning within this verbal context. Socrates explicitly states that the main danger faced by nonprofessionals in the field of linguistics is that the signifieds, colored by different signifiers, will create ontological confusion, and that one will not be able to perceive the identity hidden under the cover of variation. At first, one may have the impression of an unavoidable deconstruction. The message of the above citation is centered upon the possibility of distinguishing between the different signifieds of the different signifiers. On the one hand, *ποικίλειν*, *πεποικιλμένα*, and *χρώμασιν* signify "paint"; on the other hand, *φάρμακον* signifies "drug." The context, however, tends to impede the realization of this distinction by loudly citing the association between *φάρμακον* and "paint." An association of this type would blur the boundaries not only between the different signifieds as such ("paint" would become a possible signified of *φάρμακον* as well) but also between the hierarchical values attached to them. The minute that "drug" equals "paint," the minute one cannot assign a higher position to "drug" than to "paint" within the context of "*φάρμακα* of the physicians," the whole hierarchical construct collapses, dragging with it the possibility of meaning.

It seems that I have come to a dead end. At the beginning of the discussion of *Cratylus* I claimed that it is possible to discern the boundaries and hierarchies both within and between signifiers and

signifieds; yet at this stage the associative connections (whose relevance is beyond any doubt) weave a web of contexts which refute the above claim. Although it is not an easy task to point out the misleading aspects of such an ambiguous reading, it is, nevertheless, not impossible. If one concentrates on the signifieds' importance, the force of the selection of the signifiers is forgotten; the citation, which is loaded with signifiers hinting at "paint," never utilizes the *φάρμακον* as a signifier for "paint," and not without reason. The selection of signifiers helps to avoid confusion; the variety of signifiers for "paint" proves the significance not only of the present realized options but also of the potential absent ones. Choosing *not* to utilize *φάρμακον* as a signifier for "paint" preserves the hierarchy between the inside and the outside, the signifier and the signified, and reasserts the boundary of difference. The different signifieds, "paint" on the one hand and "drug" on the other, have different signifiers: *ποικίλειν, πεποικιλμένα, χρώμασιν* for the one, and *φάρμακον* for the other. Plato thus reveals himself as being open to the risk of a deconstructive reading, and as being able to resist it at the same time. Further backing for this notion is found in another passage from the same dialogue, where Socrates says, "Like the painters who want to portray something, sometimes they add only the purple pigment and sometimes another of the *φάρμακα*" (424d7-e1). There is almost no possibility of mistake here. It is clear that the context is dominated by "colors," and Plato does not hesitate to use *φάρμακον* as the signifier for "paint." The firmer the limits between the signifieds ("paint" is predominant over "drug," "poison," and "medicine"), the wider the liberty of choosing within the group of associated signifiers (*φάρμακον, χρώμα, πεποικιλμένα*).

The deconstructive reading is based upon an ahierarchical perspective on the text. Although the above example tries to show the impossibility of that perspective, it is possible that Plato is an exception, that is, that the Platonic text *qua* text is unique in having hierarchical aspects. This possibility could be confirmed by giving as many examples as possible of the ahierarchical perception of the text. Despite being a rather conventional way of verification, however, this is also a defective one: it overextends the limits of discussion, and, even worse, it is always prone to refutation by unexamined texts, the number of which is always higher than that of the examined texts. A different method must therefore be put into practice. It is the giving of one example of an ahierarchical text and

proving its uniqueness; by proving the ahierarchical text to be the exception, the normativity of hierarchy will be reaffirmed.

At this point in the analysis, the reader might wonder whether such a text indeed exists, and, from the point of view of meaningful differences and limitations, if there is a possibility of realizing such a text within the boundaries of a book. It is certainly not an easy task to find a text completely fulfilling this deconstructive condition, but a consideration of the most recurring text within the Derridian corpus will give us the answer immediately. This text, which is ahierarchical by definition, is not philosophical but linguistic; it is the dictionary. The order of the words in the dictionary is meaningless from an interpretative point of view; the fact that signifiers beginning with "a" precede those beginning with "b" does not say anything about the precedence of the word "apple" over the word "bee." The same can be claimed about the signifieds: their order reflects the frequency of use but not any meaningful priority ("poison" is not ipso facto more significant than "paint"). The dictionary is the deconstructive text par excellence. It is the emblem of equality, the unity of signifiers and signifieds, the origin and the *arché* of all the texts; and therefore it has unlimited fertile possibilities. Yet it is also the most barren of all texts because it never stops being a potential and only a potential. The dictionary can never be a realization of its own copious options because any realization requires the abandonment of at least one of the alternatives. The dictionary is, no doubt, the Derridian both-and phenomenon. It is everything and nothing, all existing contexts yet not a text in itself; it is full of citations without being able to say something of its own. If the dictionary "means" something, it means no more than the possibility of meaning.

Thus, in being ahierarchical, in being extremely both-and, the dictionary is fundamentally different from all other texts. Any text, *qua* text, is a choice, is the exclusion of some contexts and the inclusion of others. The text is an inevitable selection, for good or bad, from the choices given in the dictionary. The text, therefore, is an either-or phenomenon, a hierarchical phenomenon. But let us now go back to the Derridian characterization of the *φάρμακον*. In a short passage Derrida refers to the appearance of the *φάρμακον* in the real world:

Sperm, water, ink, paint, perfumed dye: the *φάρμακον* always penetrates like a liquid; it is drunk, absorbed, introduced into the

inside. . . . In liquid, opposites are easily mixed. Liquid is the element of the *φάρμακον*. And water, pure liquidity, is most easily and dangerously penetrated then corrupted by the *φάρμακον*, with which it mixes and immediately unites. (175; 152)

At first glance, the deconstructive rigidity tends to evade the reader's eye; a second examination, however, reveals a curious signifier within the textual tissue: "always." If, in the works of Plato, the *φάρμακον* does not *always* penetrate like a liquid, then a meaningful difference exists between the Derridian *φάρμακον* and the Platonic one. The word "always" hints at a total condition whose importance to Derrida's reading is mentioned in the above passage. It gives another indication of the unity of opposites. It sustains the fact that boundaries tend to blur in Plato's writings, and it leads Derrida toward the simultaneous interpretation of the *φάρμακον* as poison-medicine. Any flaw in the integrity of this signifier would generate a crack in the whole of the deconstructive argumentation, as it would signal the possibility of another strategy of reading based on premises other than the Derridian ones. This different *φάρμακον* does appear in the Platonic corpus, as the following passage proves:

Anyhow, when he asked me [Socrates] whether I know the *φάρμακον* for the head, I answered with great difficulty that I knew it. "Well, what is it?" he [Charmides] asked. And I said that the thing itself [*αὐτό*] is a leaf, and that there is some kind of an incantation in addition to the *φάρμακον* which, being said with the practice of the thing itself [*αὐτό*], the *φάρμακον* completely heals the man, and without this incantation, the leaf is completely useless.⁵

The deconstructive liquidity realized in sperm, water, ink, paint and perfumed dye stands in opposition to the Platonic solidity of the leaf. The firmness of the leaf, however, can easily be dissolved in water, as in tea, and therefore, one might comment, my passage does not contradict the deconstructive reading. My answer goes back to the difference between potentiality and realization. It is always *possible* to liquify a substance; but one does not always decide to put that option into practice. When Plato wrote that for the leaf to be a *φάρμακον* it should be used substantially, he explicitly declares his preference not to liquify it. Of course, Derrida can always mix the Platonic substance with some kind of liquid, but this will be in contrast to the Platonic text. It will be a different *φάρμακον*, a

⁵ *Charmides* 155e3-8.

Derridian and not a Platonic one, inasmuch as the consolidation of the deconstructive fluidity creates a profoundly different text from that of Derrida. Such a difference is impossible according to the rules of the game which demand the complete dissemination of all the elements in order to achieve penetration.

The substantiality of the leaf, however, suggests another contrast between Plato and Derrida. In his argumentation, the latter defines the *φάρμακον* as follows:

The "essence" of the *φάρμακον* is that having neither stable essence, nor individuality "proper" [*ni de caractère "propre"*], it is not, in any sense of that word (metaphysical, physical, chemical, alchemical) a substance. The *φάρμακον* has no ideal identity; it is aneidetic. . . . This "medicine" is not a simple phenomenon [*un simple*]. But neither is it a composite phenomenon, a sensible or empirical *σύνθετον* partaking of several simple essences. It is rather the prior medium in which differentiation in general [*différenciation en général*] is produced; this medium is *analogous* to the one that will . . . be reserved for transcendental imagination. (144; 125-6)⁶

The Derridian *φάρμακον* is thus defined as a nonsubstantial phenomenon. It is deprived of any connection with "is-ness," with being as an appearance within the real world, and it has the attributes of an origin. It is the "prior medium." Again, the contrast between the *φάρμακον* of *Charmides* and the deconstructive *φάρμακον* is prominent. Whether metaphysical or not, the latter is completely beyond the limits of reality. It is not a substance, and therefore it is not a leaf. It is different from and alien to the Platonic *φάρμακον*. It is defined as *le pharmakon en général*, the unity of multiple possibilities. The moment of its realization in the physical world—the moment it becomes a drug, a poison, a medicine, or a paint—is the moment this unity breaks. The realm of *en général* is left, the border between what is an "is" and what is not an "is" is crossed, and this is the moment of departure from that which is signified by "deconstruction."

In this respect, the *φάρμακον* in general is very similar to the dictionary. It is medicine, poison, and paint, while it is not any of them as far as realization is concerned. As with words, which have

⁶ In Johnson's translation it is not clear whether "that word" refers to "is" or to "substance." The order of the words in the French original, however, gives the impression that the first of the two options is the correct one.

to leave the randomness of the dictionary and choose a context in order to start the activation of communication and meaning, so the *φάρμακον* in general has to give up its potential variability in order to become a poison or a medicine, to be absorbed or drunk, to be, and not "in general." In this respect, the *φάρμακον* in general is also very similar to "writing in general," which is the center of our next step in the analysis.

At the end of his Platonic discussion, Derrida characterizes "writing in general" in the following way:

That writing [is] *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*. . . . Nonpresence is presence. *Différance*, the disappearance of any originary presence, is *at once* [*à la fois*] the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth. At once. "At once" means that the being-present [*ὄν*] in its truth . . . is *doubled* as soon as it appears, as soon as it presents itself. *It appears, in its essence, as* the possibility of its most proper non-truth, of its pseudo-truth reflected in the icon, the phantasm, or the simulacrum. What is is not what it is . . . unless it *adds to itself* the possibility of being *repeated* as such. And its identity is hollowed out by that addition, withdraws itself in the supplement that presents it. (194; 168)

It is quite clear from the above that the emphasis of the deconstructive definition of "writing in general" lies in the meaning of the "at once" (*à la fois*). The former expression, however, is still obscure despite Derrida's efforts to illuminate it, and thus an examination of the context within which this phrase occurs is required. "At once" is connected with presence, with appearance, with essence, with addition, and with the possibility of repetition. As for "writing in general," it is somehow connected with a place beyond being (*ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*). Now, the possibility of repetition can "take its place" beyond being, and so can the possibility of presence, the possibility of appearance and essence. What can not be "there" is presence itself, the realization of repetition within a certain context. The moment of doubling is the moment of leaving the place which is beyond being. Onticity, being a part of what is *ὄν*, means the abandonment of the *à la fois*, of the both-and which is possible only in the place beyond being. Generality as such, whether pharmaceutical or written, is imprisoned behind the invisible walls of the "beyond being," and therefore is barred from actively participating in all that is real, such as presence, appearance, *φάρμακον* and writing.

Deconstruction is based upon the deferral of choosing; this is its great strength, but also its great weakness. One can always,

like Bartleby, "prefer not"; but one can not prefer not for text which is, by definition, preference and selection. Derrida, in characterizing his notions as multiple choice phenomena, makes them both potent (since they lead him to forceful and highly compelling readings) and impotent (since they are practically impossible outside the context of the dictionary) at once. The moment of doubling, unlike the potentiality of being doubled, occurs in the world, which is defined by Derrida himself as the neutralizer of all the force of his concepts. Thus, reading as an activity, as an interpretation of an object that *exists*, is excluded from the Derridian realms.

There is but one step left before leaving "Plato's pharmacy," and that is the unraveling of its rhetoric. The connection between the vehement criticisms of Derrida's opponents and the power of his argumentation can not be overemphasized. This, however, is merely an indication and not an explanation. Wrath is always a reliable sign of emotional intensity, but almost never a trustworthy guide to the reasons for its existence. To achieve the latter, we shall make a slight digression, which will illuminate the roots of the deconstructive strategy.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein develops his analogy between language and games in the following way:

Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, -but that they are *related* to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language." I will try to explain this.

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games." I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? -Don't say: "there must be something common . . . but *look and see* whether there is anything common at all. -For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. . . . Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. . . . And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances." . . . And I shall say: "games" form a family.⁷


⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), no. 65-67.

The main reason for the comparison between language and games is the impossibility of finding an overall characteristic for each. There is no one single aspect shared by all the manifestations of language and games. What they do share is associative connections; the absence of identity is filled by the presence of resemblance. Thus, in the category "games," one would not find an amalgamatic phenomenon, but rather a group of diverse elements. The comparison between Wittgenstein and Derrida should not surprise the reader, who can easily recognize many points of similarity (associations, links, diversity, and, obviously, games). The illumination of the rhetoric, however, demands concentration on the difference between the two.


Deconstruction reveals the connection between the different links of the textual net. In itself, this movement is quite legitimate; its usage, however, is open to criticism. For Derrida, the unveiling of hidden interconnections is a means of treating them *alternatively*. In other words, if *différance* is related to *φάρμακον*, it is possible to apply either one or the other to a given context, according to the requirements of deconstruction. Thus, "writing in general" can be an apposition to the *différance* (194; 168), and writing and the *φάρμακον* can be regarded as identical options (118; 101-2). The Derridian links, however, like those of Wittgenstein, cannot be completely alternative; they can only serve as partial supplements. Through most of the deconstructive itinerary one may easily ignore the incompleteness (for example, that despite its being a *φάρμακον*, writing is not a leaf like the *φάρμακον* of the *Charmides*) of most of the Derridian supplements. At a certain stage, however, such neglect is no longer possible, and it is here that the deconstructive strategy both veils this impossibility and brings into light its most compelling outcomes. Hence, the success of deconstruction lies in the possibility of taking almost invisible steps, so that in the end a prominent contrast may be displayed. It is thus easier to concentrate on the forceful identifications of truth and falsehood, of nonpresence and presence, of origin and repetition, and, of course, of the priority of writing over speech, than to perceive the movements upon which these conclusions are based.

A concrete example will clarify the above complexity. Let us imagine the *φάρμακον* and the writing to be two links in our game. According to Wittgenstein, they cannot be congruent, but only

partially overlapping. This is reasonable if one remembers that writing is not identical with the *φάρμακον*, yet has a lot in common with it. Graphically, it would have the following shape:



The center of the diagram, which signifies the common aspects of both writing and *φάρμακον*, is also the center of Derrida's discussion, that is, the metonymical and metaphorical connections between writing and the *φάρμακον* as two kinds of drugs. At the beginning of the deconstructive reading the margins can be identified with marginality, since the fact that the congruity of the elements is metaphorical and not concrete can be neglected. Then, to achieve the decomposition of the logos, another move is required, from writing to speech. Again, similarity (mimesis) is emphasized, while difference (distance from the origin) is expelled to the margins. In a diagram it would look as follows:



It is now, when identity between *φάρμακον*, writing, and speech seems to be achieved, that Derrida forcefully deconstructs the logos by means of difference. Suddenly, writing as a *φάρμακον* is not close to speech but something alien to it, trying to destroy it in one stroke (*en coup*); it is no longer a friend but an enemy, and, what is worse, an internal one. Thus, both inside (because of the similarity) and outside (because of the difference), it cannot be either expelled or

accepted without causing great damage. Deconstruction has once again won the battle.

I prefer not to focus here on the meaning of getting closer in order to create the greatest possible distance, despite this being a recurring, if not an essential, move in Derrida's strategy of reading. At this stage of the analysis, the flaws in the rhetoric are my main concern. The diagrams precisely exemplify that the move from writing as *φάρμακον* to speech is based upon the concealment of the insurmountable gap between writing and the *φάρμακον*. The chasm between the concrete and the metaphorical stops being marginal when Derrida tries to create an identity between the above two elements in order to deconstruct the *logos*. Writing is not *φάρμακον*, it is merely *a φάρμακον*, something similar but not identical to the *φάρμακον*. Again, one may discern that the resemblance between the links creates both the possibility of an easy transition from *φάρμακον* to speech and the impossibility of a complete liquidation of the latter by the former at once.

In conclusion, I have tried to show that deconstruction cannot fulfill its own precepts without generating an internal contradiction. The text is required to be both an ahierarchical and a hierarchical phenomenon. The rhetoric of the strategy which successfully blurs this contradiction is exemplified by the definition given by Wittgenstein to his language game. As for the deep and complex relationships between writing and speech hinted at in the last section, these are dealt with in the next essay on the *Phaedrus*.⁸

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⁸ This article has benefited immensely from the criticism of and discussion with Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Elizabeth Freund, and Shuli Barzilai. I am also indebted to Menachem Brinker for his comments on earlier versions of this essay, and to Andrew Lang for his careful editing of both essays.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

MATTHEW CUDDEBACK AND STAFF

AQUINAS, St. Thomas. *On Faith: Summa Theologiae 2-2, qq. 1-16*. Translated by Mark D. Jordan. Readings in the *Summa Theologiae*, vol. 1. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. x + 284 pp. \$9.95—For two principal reasons, this is a welcome translation of Thomas Aquinas's treatment of faith. First, it is one of the very few English translations of Aquinas that has heeded Aquinas's own sage advice on translating—preserve the sense of the original but adapt its style to suit the language into which it is being translated (see the prologue to *Contra errores Graecorum*). Most anglophone translators make Aquinas appear as if he concocted a highly technical language to impress his brother Dominicans. Jordan, on the other hand, rightly understands that while Aquinas uses words and phrases in very precise ways, he never does so at the expense of their common, ordinary meanings. In fact, Aquinas's precise language is unintelligible without its being seen as rooted in ordinary language and naturally developed through the philosophical and theological traditions he inherited. Thus, by avoiding the obscure Latinate English that plagues other translations and, instead, rendering Thomas into felicitous English with due attention to the sources, Jordan's translation well reflects the accessibility of the original.

The second reason concerns Aquinas's own discussion of faith. Jordan argues in his introduction that *Summa Theologiae* II-II (the special treatment of morals) best exhibits the surpassing organization of the whole work. For Thomas had inherited a tangle of moral traditions and yet established an order among them in which each became intelligible. He manifests, for example, the necessary connection between virtues and rules—a connection for which many today are groping. In addition, the treatment of faith in particular has an obvious bearing upon such questions in the philosophy of religion as the difference between faith and knowledge, the necessity of faith, and the proper scope of faith. May this be, therefore, the first in a

* Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

long line of favorably received translations of the *Summa Theologiae* II-II.—Gregory L. Froelich, *Barboursville, Va.*

BHASKAR, Roy. *Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991. xii + 202 pp. Cloth, \$47.95; paper, \$19.95—This book focuses primarily on a critique of the thought of Richard Rorty, who, according to Bhaskar, provides an excellent commentary on the epistemological problem of contemporary philosophy. This commentary, however, is partial. This is because, as Bhaskar sees it, Rorty fails to reject the "positivist instrumentalist and Humean-Hempelian bias" of contemporary thought (p. vii).

Bhaskar argues that certain assumptions underpin not only the contemporary philosophical tradition but also much of contemporary culture, including the social sciences. These assumptions are that (1) knowledge must be permanent and uncorruptible; (2) the world is essentially unstructured, undifferentiated and unchanging; and (3) the relationship between knowledge and the world is isomorphic or even identical. These assumptions, Bhaskar claims, provide the basis for the general epistemological fallacy of our times which generates common misconceptions regarding human nature and society.

In examining Rorty's conception of science Bhaskar points out that Rorty assumes that science entails that prediction and control presuppose Humean causality. Rorty thus becomes committed to positivism in his approach to the structure of scientific theories. Because Rorty espouses empirical realism he cannot avoid the epistemic fallacy it contains. Bhaskar believes that the main drawback to Rorty's position is that he rationalizes the history of science and therefore ignores the continuity between science and philosophy.

For Bhaskar, any valid epistemology must recognize both the principle of the existential intransitivity of objects (things exist and act independently of their descriptions) and the principle of the historical transitivity of knowledge (man cannot know that that which is known exists and acts independently of those descriptions). Bhaskar believes mankind stands at the threshold of a new era when the explanatory-emancipatory, critical human sciences are waiting to revolutionize our understanding of reality. He claims that we stand in relation to these sciences as Hobbes and Descartes stood in relation to mechanics, and he intends to lay the groundwork necessary for their realization. Bhaskar asserts that freedom requires the recognition of social structures as objectively existing entities which, though they are concept dependent, are not merely conceptual. The crisis of social sciences and the humanities lies in the fact that they appeal "not just to irrelevant but to absurd and patently inapplicable philosophies like positivism" (p. 74). Bhaskar advises philosophers to abandon the search for permanent, ahistorical foundations of knowledge, and to focus instead upon the historical arts and sciences and other social practices where they can help bring forth Bhaskar's new age of human sciences.

The author agrees with Rorty that philosophical problems are produced by the unconscious adoption of assumptions built into the vocabulary in which the problem is stated. Though he admits that Rorty's work does effectively demolish the ontic fallacy, the epistemological fallacy is left untouched. This leads Rorty to replicate the classical problems of philosophy. Bhaskar asserts that his own position, which he describes as critical realism, does not suffer from these drawbacks. Its premises are historical and open to development, and this is particularly helpful in the social sciences where the approach of positivism is particularly out of place.

The author also relates his position to social theory and moral philosophy. The critical realist accepts epistemic relativism, which asserts that all beliefs are socially produced and, therefore, that all knowledge becomes transient, and that neither truth-values nor criteria for rationality can exist outside of historical time. Simultaneously, he rejects judgmental relativism, which claims that there are no good grounds for preferring one set of beliefs to another. Thus Bhaskar avoids both epistemic absolutism and judgmental rationalism. Freedom from this perspective becomes the ability to know one's real interest, to possess the ability, resources, and opportunity to act upon them, and to be disposed to so act.—David J. De Leonardis, *Jersey City, N.J.*

BLANCHETTE, Oliva. *The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology*. University Park: Penn State Press, 1992. xvii + 334 pp. \$35.00—The purpose of this work is to summarize and clarify a centrally important but often neglected theme in the writings of Aquinas. The reason for the neglect, and the justification for presenting the work, lie in the difficulty, even for constant readers of Aquinas, of grasping this complex theme as a whole: on the one hand the texts which explicitly treat of it are widely scattered throughout Aquinas's writings, while on the other hand it may be said to be implicitly present nearly everywhere in his work. The success of the present volume, then, must be measured by the extent to which fidelity to the many texts and to Aquinas's overall intention is combined with a clear and orderly presentation.

After arguing that a "philosophical order" can be abstracted from Aquinas's theological work, and stating that, with respect to the theme at hand, such an abstraction will be undertaken "on our own philosophical responsibility" (p. 26), the author develops a strategy (set forth on pp. 29–30) of arranging the many and varied topics related to the central theme around two focal moments in Aquinas's consideration of the perfection of the universe: he first presents a somewhat "static" account of the "ontological constitution" of the universe, illustrated in the image of the construction of a house (Part 1); he then turns to a more "dynamic" consideration of the complex and systematic interaction of the parts of the universe, illustrated by the images

of a household and an army (Part 2). The first consideration is subdivided into treatments of the notion of perfection (chap. 1), the relation between this notion and that of "universe" (chap. 2), Aquinas's articulation of the diversity of the universe (chap. 3), and the "texture" of the universe afforded by the four causes (chap. 4). The second consideration is subdivided into treatments of the three successively "higher" orders of "physical arrangement" (chap. 5), "generation and time" (chap. 6), and "reason and intelligence" (chap. 7). The principal technique throughout is that of (a) selection and close analysis of brief texts from thirty-one of Aquinas's works, with a constant attentiveness to linguistic issues arising both from Aquinas's own vocabulary (see the excellent account of *perfectio* on pp. 43-5) and from the use of an English discussion to treat of Latin texts; as well as (b) regular comparisons between points taken from Aquinas's texts and views of other authors concerned with the theme, both ancient (Plato and above all Aristotle) and modern (notably Spinoza, Hegel, Darwin, Lovejoy, Collingwood, and Hartshorne). The importance of scientific developments since Aquinas's time is acknowledged, but in general the procedure is to respect Aquinas's world-view in its entirety. The notion of "parallel texts" in Aquinas's work is recognized and exploited, and both developments in his thought with respect to some points and constancy with respect to others are allowed for.

The conclusions to which the "circuitous" argument of the work leads are that the salient point of the universe in its perfection is human nature, which is the locus of the Incarnation, of the union of matter and spirit, sense and intellect, and the locus of the "reconstitution" of the entire cosmos in the kind of intellect which Aquinas calls "reason"; and that the perfection of this nature itself—and so, in a way, of the universe as a whole—is achieved by human acts of providence and charity, which both mirror and participate in the activity of the divine perfection. The perfection of the cosmic order thus culminates in fulfillment of the Christian command to charity.

This work is a significant contribution to the broad fields of Thomistic studies and philosophical cosmology. Its most evident achievement consists in drawing attention to a theme which both Thomistic philosophers and philosophers who treat of the universe are inclined to overlook, the former because of a tendency to remain bound by traditional philosophical subdisciplines, and the latter because of an abiding prejudice against, or superficial acquaintance with, medieval thought. By skilfully and thoroughly exploring this theme—which cuts across the boundaries separating metaphysics, natural philosophy, and ethics, and occasionally crosses the line between philosophy and theology—the work provides, from a particularly good vantage point, a survey of an impressive quantity of the Thomistic corpus, which will be useful to the beginning Thomistic scholar and the expert alike. A bibliography, an index of names, an analytic index, and especially an index of Thomistic passages, contribute to making the work as useful as possible.

The work does not offer any sustained treatment of *nobilitas*, a term which Aquinas suggests is convertible with *perfectio* and indeed with

"being" itself. Perhaps because of the extent to which the drift of modern thought interferes with its recovery, *nobilitas* remains the least accessible of the properties of being. A study of *nobilitas* in the thought of Aquinas, executed to the degree of perfection of the present work, would be most welcome.—Kevin White, *The Catholic University of America*.

BURKHARDT, Hans, and SMITH, Barry, eds. *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*. Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1991. xxiii + 1005 pp. \$380.00—This book is destined to become the definitive reference in the field of first philosophy. While the title is apt, it is worth mentioning at the outset that the scope of this two-volume study extends beyond metaphysics proper into the intrinsically related fields of epistemology and logic, thus allowing for a more comprehensive treatment of the central issues and figures of philosophy.

The book is advertised as reflecting "the conviction that the history of metaphysics and current work in metaphysics and ontology can each throw valuable light on the other." True to this aim, the *Handbook* contains, for example, two separate articles devoted to the ontological argument. One by Alvin Plantinga, treating of its classical formulations, and the other by the Polish logician Perzanowski, systematically working through the arguments of Leibniz, Descartes, and Gödel. Each of the articles is written by leading experts in the relevant fields. Thus, one will find contributions by Marilyn McCord Adams on Ockham, by Aune on analytic metaphysics, by Chisholm on mind, by Saunders MacLane on category theory, and by Alan Wolter on Scotism.

The work is comprised of almost five hundred self-contained articles, each of which is accompanied by a bibliography suggesting both classic and contemporary sources of further information. Its forty-eight page index provides a thorough and convenient guide, allowing one instantly to locate discussions of Adelard of Bath or Zeno of Citium.

The work under consideration is superior to other such reference books in the special attention which it pays to two things. First, the editors of the *Handbook* have attended to the various meanings which terms have acquired over the ages, dealing with each in their turn. So, for example, not only are the terms "transcendence," "transcendental," and "transcendentals" treated separately, but the author of the article on transcendence, Josef Seifert, discusses at least five different concepts of transcendence. A second way in which the editors have succeeded in distinguishing their work from that of others is seen in the *Handbook's* register of names. Articles are to be found dealing with certain thinkers who, although deserving of attention, have been consistently overlooked. I am thinking here in particular of Dietrich von Hildebrand, who broke new and important ground in ethics, axiology, and ontology; and of Johannes Daubert who, in bringing Husserl's *Logical Investigations* to Munich, first gave impetus and direction to the phenomenological movement.

Located in Liechtenstein and Germany, the editors have also succeeded in compiling a truly international group of contributors. The diversity of philosophical and cultural backgrounds is reflected in the breadth of the articles, and lends a certain completeness to the whole of a sort which would otherwise be lacking.

As with all of the books which Philosophia Verlag publishes, the *Handbook* is handsomely designed, and bound to last. The price of the set makes it affordable almost exclusively to institutional libraries; it is, however, a reference work that no institution should be without. The multifaceted approach which the editors have taken to the field of metaphysics and ontology ensures that the studies contained in the volume will long outlast the inevitable fashion changes of mainstream philosophy. In short, the *Handbook* does for metaphysics, what Copleston did for the history of philosophy.—James M. DuBois, *Die Internationale Akademie für Philosophie, Liechtenstein*.

BUTTIGLIONE, Rocco. *La Crisi della Morale*. Rome: Dino Editore, 1991. 225 pp. L35,000—In the attempt of post-Hegelian philosophies to substitute ethics with politics, failure is most evident in Marxism, the most powerful, politically speaking, post-Hegelian philosophy. This failure points out the need to rethink ethics. In *La Crisi della Morale* Buttiglione does not claim to satisfy this need, but this is for him the horizon to deal with a specific moral question: sexual ethics. The focus of this book is *Humanae Vitae* and the teaching of Karol Wojtyla, as Pope John Paul II. This collection of essays is particularly interesting for Catholic philosophers, and for whomever is interested in a rational discussion and justification of Catholic "opinions" on sexuality, marriage, contraception. Moral norms are rational norms for Catholicism, and even if the adherence to these norms may be external to a rational-philosophical process, as is normally the case, their content is rational (p. 15). In this review I will not be able to summarize the entire book essay by essay, but will try to give a taste of some of the major points, as an invitation, for those who read Italian, to read this book directly.

The real question of *Humanae Vitae* is not the prohibition of artificial birth control. A reading of this document in such a perspective both reduces and misstates it. The central question of the encyclical is rather "whether or not stable couples (Catholic and not) shall exist in general in the future" (p. 60). Is the institution of marriage essential to human nature, or has marriage been merely an institution fitting for a certain age in the development of humanity? Is this not the time in which "the disinterested impulse of passion is set free from the ties kept by the bourgeois family and by the entire Judeo-Christian tradition?" (p. 61).

Buttiglione looks at the question from the point of view of contemporary Western society, in which the welfare state has become large and strong, while the family has become weak and increasingly

irrelevant to the individual needs of citizens. Referring to Aquinas and Horkheimer, Buttiglione argues that the separation between sexuality and procreation does not set love free but, on the contrary, destroys it. When sexuality loses both seriousness and connection with the transmission of life it loses also its being the place in which the sense of life discloses itself as donation (p. 62). In a society in which sex is unrestrained, the person starts to lose an important element on his or her way to self-control and self-awareness. If the subject does not master his own instincts and passions, by framing them within his own project, then those instincts and passions master him. The result is a kind of human being which is not free, because it is not autonomous. This kind of man is "heterodirected": he is available to be directed by whomever has ways to control his elementary passions (p. 63). The logical alternative to self-control is being controlled. To use Freudian language, a certain measure of repression, that is, obstacles on the way to the immediate gratification of instincts, is necessary for the human being to become human, to become a free agent (p. 63).

Moral laws concerning sexuality do not decrease the joy which the Creator has placed in sexual difference, but express the nature of a human sexuality. "The absence of law, or its uncertainty, does not at all foster the sexual satisfaction, but (paradoxically) renders it more problematic; . . . the difficulty is not in the norm of *Humanae Vitae* but in the very nature of sexuality" (p. 117). Sex is so connected with life and its sense and meaning that, like life, it is a wonderful, as well as a dangerous and difficult, adventure. With sex, there is no irresponsible and easy way, because there is no irresponsible and easy way with life. Moreover, responsibility toward the generation and nutrition of a new life is not only a material responsibility. Buttiglione, following Aquinas's arguments for the natural indissolubility of marriage, underlines spiritual generation and nutrition—what we normally call education—as the natural and human element of a marriage. Already for Aquinas this was a major argument against polygamy in the case of wealthy persons who might support more than one partner.

To understand *Humanae Vitae* it is necessary to understand the very nature of a moral norm. Conscience and norm are the two polarities of moral experience (p. 69). *Humanae Vitae* excludes two alternative anthropologies: legalism and absolute autonomy of the conscience. On the legalistic position, what matters is merely the external conformity of a human act to the objective order of good. Here the only distinction is between a good and a bad act; and this distinction is an objective distinction. For an ethics of the conscience and of subjectivity what matters is not the content of an act—there are not good or bad acts; the only acceptable distinction is between authentic and unauthentic acts. Human being is free, and a human action is authentically human when it is free, no matter which action it is. These two positions make explicit the possible opposition between the right of truth and the right of conscience.

The argumentation which attacks *Humanae Vitae* by asserting the supreme and absolute rights of the conscience, however, "proves too

much." Before such a concept of conscience no norm can stand: whatever appears to someone to be right would be right. *Humanae Vitae's* doctrine that certain actions are *intrinsice malum*, independent of any possible judgment of the conscience, does not imply the legalist position. An unauthentic action, indeed, is never a good action. Moreover, *conscientia errans obligat*: a human being is always justified by his conscience. But this does not transform a bad action into a good one. Buttiglione notes that conscience is not a pure primitive datum. By reading the "masters of suspicion," we cannot forget that what we call conscience is not simply the interior light of the divinity, but a process of mediating what is subconscious (the internal pressure of what used to be called passions), as well as what is societal (external pressure, economic situation, social power, envy, and so forth). In order to exercise human freedom we must recognize the different masks of free choices that conceal the concessions to the unethical. Often what is called individual judgment of conscience is but a mask for giving in, for surrendering without the displeasing feeling of the injustice of the act. Buttiglione reverses the use of the masters of suspicion by showing that to renounce oneself to this unqualified freedom is not to choose freely to obey a norm, even if difficult, but rather to give in to each masked heteronomous passion and to the pressure of any power capable of endangering us. The fact that everyone must act always according to his conscience, and that the only criterion of imputability is the conscience, does not lead to moral relativism. It is right to say that "those, who do not recognize the truth of the norm of *Humanae Vitae*, do not have to follow this norm" (p. 127). But this does not affect the truth of it. Moreover, for those who know that conscience is not only and always the light of God, the opposition between norm and conscience does not imply immediately that the norm is wrong. It could imply the necessity of a process of internal formation of the conscience, and the necessity of time, difficulty, and struggle as the way to a good human life.—Paolo Guietti, *Universita' Cattolica, Milano*.

CHATTOPADHYAYA, D. P. *Induction, Probability and Skepticism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. xxxi + 448 pp. Cloth, \$73.50; paper, \$24.95—Pyrrho of Elis followed Alexander into the Indus Valley where he contracted the skepticism which has ever since goaded Western thought. In this masterful study of the limits of human knowledge, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, one of India's brightest philosophical lights, revitalizes the westward flow of skepticism by putting our major epistemologies and philosophies of science to the test of his "anthropological rationalism" (p. xiii). Often echoing Western pragmatists as well as Indians like Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara, he sustains fallibilism (interpenetration of certainty and doubt), "localized holism" (interdependence of induction and deduction), truth as phenomenological disclosure, and moderate realism.

The first quarter of the book is a sharply focused analysis of classic attempts to defend induction directly or via probability or confirmation theory. Taking induction as a theory of learning, reaching beyond immediate experience to an external world, to what is general in nature, to the conditions of experience, and to normative principles of cognition and conduct, Chattopadhyaya exposes Carnap's excessive formalism in both probability and decision theory for its tendency to exaggerate discontinuities between theory and practice (p. 11). In this way he also exposes Keynes' ambivalence towards measurability of probabilities (p. 67), and the circularity of Reichenbach's statistical construal of induction (p. 97). He is happier with the antifoundationalism of Popper and Quine (p. 75), while nevertheless scolding Popper for not realizing the holistic and conventionalist implications of the growth of knowledge (p. 69), the theory-ladenness of empirical statements (p. 82), and the interdependence of theory and practice (p. 100). Neurath's leaky boat, in which we all float precariously and which is repaired only piecemeal, seems to him, as it now does for most, the right image for human knowledge.

Without losing sight of the roots of skepticism in the problem of induction, the remainder of the book is an expansive intercultural and historical analysis of the place of various forms of skepticism in human life (richly conceived) and of totalistic attempts to refute it. It is aimed at showing "that the strong criticisms repeatedly leveled against skepticism are exaggerated, trivially true at best, and inconsistent with common sense at worst" (p. xxxi). Chattopadhyaya's realism consists precisely in his defense of the centrality and inevitability of skepticism in both theory and practice. Since what is knowable must have ontological status and since belief requires limited variety in nature, defensible skepticism accepts the knowability of reality (pp. 376-90). Although fallible because always in some measure transcendent, science and common experience are nevertheless self-correcting. Skepticism is candid recognition of the fallibility of human nature and knowledge, but a contextualized, phenomenological (p. 43) justification of induction will hold radical skepticism at bay.

The defense of skepticism consists of extensive and incisive critical commentary on the cognitive transcendentalism "from above" of Descartes, Kant, and Husserl; on the sensationalist transcendentalism "from below" of Moore, the early Wittgenstein, and the positivists; on localist notions of confirmation and information (Popper, Lakatos); and on holisms of meaning and truth (Hegel, Quine, and Davidson). Although his sociological orientation inclines him—not without tension—to favor the last of these, unlike many holists he finds Descartes' skepticism both intelligible and answerable (p. 124), and the private language argument no more stable or normative than a social contract (p. 184). Nor is he happy with the facile sociolinguistic transcendentalism of Davidson, whose coherentism fails either to ground correspondence or to contain skepticism, for "a theory of understanding of language is not a surrogate of sound epistemology" (pp. 222, 312; cf. the parallel critique of Hume, pp. 334ff.) Although he admits that the closer one is to experience and to the members of one's speech

community the weaker are one's cognitive claims and the threat from skepticism, still, what distinguishes our rationality, sociality, and linguistic practice is our *power of abstraction* (p. 226), that is, induction. Language and reality are indeed inseparable, but the connection between them is always realistically and inductively revisable.

Chattopadhyaya insists throughout on the centrality and irreducibility of mind in knowledge, indeed, as the object *sine qua non* of knowledge (p. 384). He contends, however, that self-knowledge, like all knowledge, is inevitably "fragmentary, inadequate and questionable" (p. 372). Self-knowledge requires that the knowing self be more durable than the known (p. 319), but equally that skepticism be faced not only epistemologically, but ontologically and praxiologically as well (pp. 278-9). This brings both the problem of skepticism and its resolution within the "human realm" (p. 286), eliminating the need for a transcendent god, ego, or society to warrant belief.

Skepticism is endemic in us then, for it threatens whenever we reason inductively, when we abstract to learn: if the Humean predicament is the human predicament, "the Humean predicament is born of transcendence" (p. 228). Clear evidence of epistemic fallibility is our inveterate insistence on evidence, leading us to ever-widening horizons of experience and thought. But Chattopadhyaya warns us against idealist constructionism (Kant to Davidson), which produces immunity to skepticism at the exorbitant price of failing to account for error or progress (pp. 272, 288), of reducing the world to a "non-playing player" (p. 312), and of falling into dogmatism.—James K. Swindler, *University of Utah*.

CLOUSER, Roy A. *The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of Religious Belief in Theories*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. xii + 330 pp. Cloth, \$39.95; paper, \$18.95—Clouser claims that every theory is based on a religious presupposition, that is, on an idea of what is self-existent (divine). Since all such ultimate presuppositions are unjustifiable in principle, those who presuppose the biblical faith in God as creator are equally respectable intellectually as are those who presuppose any other theory of reality. In fact, the presupposition of a creating God results in superior interpretations of reality in all its many facets. This thesis is laid out in four parts: (1) "Religion," (2) "Theories," (3) "A Casebook," and (4) "Radically Biblical Theories."

In the first part Clouser defines religion: "A religious belief is any belief in something or other as divine. 'Divine' means having the status of not depending on anything else" (pp. 21-2). In other words, religious belief is one's assumption about what is independent and self-existent, and on which all else depends.

In Part 2 he defines what he means by a theory and shows that every theory presupposes a religious belief. A theory is a hypothesis based upon an abstraction of an aspect of reality (p. 59). Behind

every theory, whether of mathematics, physics, psychology, or ethics, there lies an unproven (indeed unprovable) religious presupposition which guides one's choices about what to emphasize and what to downplay. Thus, one's assumption about what is self-existent (for example, matter, mind, God) will affect how one accounts for the order in the world or the status of mathematical entities or the nature of human agency.

In the third part Clouser presents a case book of theories, focusing on various theories of mathematics, physics, and psychology, and showing how these theories differ in proportion to the differences of their assumptions of what is divine (that is, what has independent status).

In Part 4 Clouser presents a biblical theory of reality, and then applies it to theories about society and the state. Throughout this part of the book Clouser draws heavily on the work of Herman Dooyeweerd, especially his *New Critique*, and grounds his theory on passages from Scripture with support from the writings of John Calvin. Clouser rejects what he calls pagan theories of reality (any theory which makes part of creation self-existent) because they are reductionist, and he rejects traditional Christian explanations of reality (for example, those of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas) because they make extensive use of these noncreationist pagan theories. Only by presupposing the biblical position of God as creator can an undistorted interpretation of reality be achieved. Such a position Clouser calls the "law framework theory," and it is guided by four principles: (1) the "principle of pancreation," which means that "everything other than God is his creation and nothing in creation, about creation, or true of creation is self-existent" (p. 202); (2) the "principle of irreducibility," which means that "no aspect of creation is to be regarded as either the only genuine aspect or as making the existence of any other possible" (p. 202); (3) the "principle of aspectual universality," which means that "every aspect is an aspect of all creatures, since all creation exists and functions under all the aspectual laws simultaneously" (p. 215); and (4) the "principle of aspectual inseparability," which means that "aspects cannot be isolated from one another; their very intelligibility depends on their connectedness" (p. 217). An explication of the theory is quite complex and would require definitions of many technical terms for which there is no space here.

The book is very well written. It is clear and informative. There is excellent work on recognizing deficient theories in terms of logical inconsistency, self-referential incoherence, self-assumptive incoherence, and self-performative incoherence (pp. 68-73). His case studies point out clearly the unproven presuppositions behind many so-called "rationalist" theories about various aspects of reality. In addition, the "law framework theory" is impressive in its complexity and subtlety and well worth serious study.

I have two general comments. First, treatment of Aristotle and Aquinas is rather weak. Perhaps Clouser is influenced by late Scholasticism's interpretation of their theories—the kinds of things Calvin would have known. Aristotle's notion of substance is far subtler than

it is characterized here. Also, Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of creation is every bit as strong as the pancreationism recommended by Clouser, with this difference: Aquinas thought creation was not just a matter of belief, but could be established by natural reason. This brings me to my second point. It does not seem to me that all ideas about what is self-existent (what I would call metaphysical rather than religious principles) are equally unjustifiable, and this for the very reasons Clouser mentions. The reductionist positions which he criticizes all lead to incoherence, whether self-referential, self-assumptive, or self-performative. Only a view of reality which lets reality speak in all its many aspects can avoid these incoherences. When reality is allowed to speak this way, it shows itself to absolutely dependent on God the creator.—Montague Brown, *Saint Anselm College, Manchester, N.H.*

DENNETT, Daniel C. *Consciousness Explained*. Illustrated by Paul Weiner. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991. xiii + 511. \$27.95—Dennett aims to develop an empirical, scientifically respectable theory of human consciousness—one that demystifies the mind by showing how the various phenomena that compose consciousness “are all physical effects of the brain’s activities” (p. 16).

The model of consciousness as “Cartesian theater,” where “a light-and-sound show is presented to a solitary but powerful audience, the Ego or Central Executive” (p. 227), is to be replaced by a “multiple drafts” model of consciousness. Consciousness is not a single narrative, with an author of record, but rather the gappy product of many processes of interpretation in the brain (p. 94).

Dennett’s theory closes in on consciousness from “above” and “below.” From above, the theorist begins with a subject’s “heterophenomenology.” From below, the theorist studies underlying mechanisms in the brain. A subject’s heterophenomenological world is the theorist’s third-person description of the world as it seems to the subject (the world according to Garp; Sherlock Holmes’s London). The theorist relates the objects of the resulting heterophenomenological world to events going on in the subject’s brain at the time (p. 407). Whether or not the deliverances of introspection are true is an empirical matter, to be determined by whether or not portrayed objects bear a striking resemblance to the “real goings-on in people’s brains” (p. 85). (It is hard to see what in the brain could even count as bearing a striking resemblance to the notion of Santa Claus expressed by “I just can’t stop thinking about Santa Claus.”)

The multiple drafts model of consciousness is supposed to solve, or dissolve, the traditional philosophical puzzles of consciousness. Dennett acutely sets out the traditional puzzles, and meets some of them head-on: on his model, there is no inner display, no “Boss neuron,” no qualia. In other cases, however, it is unclear how Dennett thinks that his view addresses the philosophical problems that he so vividly

lays out. For example, an initially compelling reason for dualism, he says, is an intuition that nothing in the brain could "hate racism, love someone, be a source of mattering" (p. 33). Yet even if dualism is untenable, I do not see how Dennett's overall argument either shows that the intuition is false or gives a mechanistic account of the intuition itself.

Dennett speaks of events of content-fixation in the brain (p. 365). This is the point at which Dennett's theory of consciousness must be joined with his theory of intentionality, developed elsewhere. Despite Dennett's cryptic remarks, it is not obvious how the pieces are supposed to fit together. Is a person in a "contentful" state in virtue of content-fixing events in his brain, as suggested here, or in virtue of patterns of gross observable behavior, as Dennett's intentional-stance theory implies?

Consciousness Explained is written for a general intellectual audience, not just for specialists in philosophy or the cognitive sciences. (For philosophers and scientists, Dennett provides two extremely short technical appendices, which raise more questions than they answer.) To induce the reader to think about consciousness from an exclusively third-person, materialist perspective, Dennett employs surveys of scientific literature, thought experiments, analogies, "just-so" stories, and other devices. The book brims with provocative suggestions—such as the idea of the self as a "center of narrative gravity"—that others may want to develop (or refute) in detail.

This book is vintage Dennett. On the one hand, it is too swash-buckling for those with a taste for close argument; on the other hand, it is stimulating and suggestive, full of clever turns, and enjoyable to read.—Lynne Rudder Baker, *University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and Middlebury College*.

DILMAN, Ilham. *Philosophy and the Philosophical Life: A Study in Plato's Phaedo*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xii + 139 pp. \$45.00—The *Phaedo* is usually taken to be among Plato's metaphysically richest dialogues. Dilman argues that, at best, the views of Plato's Socrates are here free of the taint of metaphysics, or that worthwhile, non-metaphysical theses are propounded alongside metaphysical ones. In these cases, Dilman attempts to separate out "Socrates' spiritual and moral perceptions" from the metaphysical claims. The latter are "a mystification of the grammar of the language in which such perceptions are expressed" (p. x). Dilman's objection to such metaphysical theses is Wittgensteinian. When philosophy goes beyond the attempt to articulate the role that a certain discourse plays in our form of life and, instead, attempts to provide some philosophical justification or explanation for our form of life, it degenerates into incoherence. Such language ceases to "do work" and is then "idling."

Dilman interprets Socrates' arguments for the soul's indestructibility as investigations of the grammar of the language that Socrates

uses. The soul's immortality, however, is a moral notion which is distinct from the metaphysical issues about the possibility of an afterlife. The philosophical life provides a means of purifying the soul in such a way as to help it become immortal. The way in which philosophy purifies the soul is complicated by the fact that Socrates confounds two conceptions of philosophical inquiry. The first is that of conceptual elucidation. This explores justice or goodness as "logical categories" within our language. The second is self-criticism. In this sense of philosophical inquiry, when we ask a question like, What is justice? we explore the "absolute values" which shape our own actions and we evaluate their appropriateness (p. 24). The value of philosophy lies not in the answers to particular questions which the first kind of inquiry might disclose, but in the "spirit of truth" that is necessary to this kind of inquiry. This facilitates an attitude of self-examination which can transform oneself and one's values. Dilman characterizes this transformation as one in which a person takes up a "spiritual," as opposed to a practical or worldly, orientation.

The remaining chapters explore familiar Platonic oppositions with an eye toward distinguishing between metaphysical theses and spiritual insights. The first of these is the opposition between appearance and reality. The notion that the world of sense is, as a whole, a deficient reflection of the more real world of Forms is, Dilman argues, incoherent. But run together with the metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality is one between appearance and spiritual reality. Here what is distinguished are what merely seems to be of value and what genuinely is so. This distinction does not rely upon the ontological distinction between Forms and sensibles. Rather, the opposition between what is sensible and what is not expresses Plato's view that our ideals of real goodness cannot be realized in a life dominated by sensuality (p. 48). Because of the role that sensuality plays in the distinction between appearance and spiritual reality, Dilman characterizes the *Phaedo's* positing of opposition between body and soul as akin to the moral distinction between the life of the spirit and the appetites of the flesh in Christianity. If we construe it as a kind of Cartesian dualism, we miss Socrates' moral insights. The kind of moral opposition that Dilman has in mind is rather nicely illustrated in his reading of Tolstoy's "Father Sergius." Philosophy is the practice of separating the soul from the body. Given Dilman's interpretation of the opposition between soul and body, this means renouncing a self-centered system of values. The person who succeeds in this struggle has genuine virtue: he acts only for the sake of doing what is morally right. By living according to his convictions, and ignoring considerations about the concerns of this mortal coil, the virtuous person achieves a state of "self-denial." His actions and beliefs are not assertions of his self, but rather of the right and the good. Socrates confuses actions motivated by convictions with a kind of knowledge because he confuses the moral commitment to an ideal of goodness which is never realized in human affairs with a state of knowing which is directed upon a super-sensible Form.

Historians are likely to find this a disappointing book. Dilman avails himself only of the Penguin edition of the *Phaedo*. A minor

nuisance is that the page citations can be off by as much as two Stephanus pages. More importantly, Dilman's argument relies heavily on the opposition between believing something "philosophically" and "self-assertively" (his 90d is actually 91a2-3). Given the role that the special kind of self-denial which Dilman identifies with the philosophical life plays in his argument, it is by no means obvious that φιλονίκως, or "victory loving," provides the contrast he needs. Historical issues aside, however, Dilman does utilize examples from literature and life to give some content to the notion of a "spiritual" moral attitude which is at odds with a life of practical concerns rooted in sensuality. His antimetaphysical presuppositions do not permit him to argue that this life is the good life for humans in ordinary philosophical ways. Nonetheless, he presents a picture of such a life which allows us to see its attractions.—Dirk Baltzly, *King's College, London*.

EMMET, Dorothy. *The Passage of Nature*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. xi + 137 pp. \$29.95—The notion of process is central to many contemporary discussions. It is the fundamental idea that has inspired a whole school of philosophy in the twentieth century—process philosophy—whose founding father is Alfred N. Whitehead. It is central to the Hegelian and Marxist world views of dialectical advance. It is also clearly at work in much of the debate over the status of events in the ontological theories of Donald Davidson, W. V. Quine, Peter Strawson, and others. Emmet contends that process is a notion that we constantly use but seldom discuss as a subject in its own right. She thus sets out "to elucidate the idea of Process as a key concept in describing what goes on in the world" (p. xi). In this endeavor, she acknowledges her debt to Whitehead but does not approach her subject in any typical Whiteheadian fashion. Rather, her method is an analytical treatment closer to Davidson's method.

Process is first of all shown to be different from a mere succession of events. Processes are continuants with an internal order and direction of change. This distinguishes what is happening within the process from forces acting on it from outside. The idea of a continuant derives from W. E. Johnson's view of "that which continues to exist throughout some limited or unlimited period of time during which its inner states or its outer connections may be altered or remain unaltered" (p. 6). Events are separate occurrences. Like processes, they are divisible into temporal parts, but "the temporal parts of processes can be distinguished from the temporal parts of events by the characteristic that one leads on to the next" (p. 8). A concert, for example, is best thought of as a single continuing process with *stages* dividing the different parts of the process. If someone feels ill during the concert and leaves, these occurrences would count as separate events (or temporal parts), but not as stages in the process. Such events do not affect anything going on in the concert. Having made this point,

Emmet then proceeds to distinguish processes and events from facts, things, and persons (understood as special instances of things).

Throughout this work, Emmet is concerned to develop a general account of process. Her analysis, however, appears to be strongly influenced by social and biological paradigms in that individual things act as agents bringing about processes. As she says, "Social processes illustrate my general view of processes as sustained and carried forward by the activities of their participants" (p. 87). This becomes particularly clear in chapter 5, "Things in Processes and Things-in-Process," where she rejects an exclusive event ontology sustaining processes in favor of the view that both events and objects must function as particulars in any adequate conceptual scheme. In this respect, she sides with Davidson over Whitehead, Buddhists, and Parfit, because events or processes by themselves cannot give us efficacy in causation. This, she believes, is the key to the issue of deciding between rival ontological theories on events. "Efficacy calls for actions and reactions, and the question is whether what might be called an active process . . . needs active constituents. . . . The capacity to act and be acted on is my general criterion of being a thing as distinct from a process or event" (p. 49). Moreover, if in moral theory we are to have responsibility, we require agents or persons as the enduring objects of action.

Emmet's view here is thought out on a macroscopic level of bodies or objects. It is thus unclear whether her position can be maintained consistently on a microscopic level of subatomic particles or at the level of atomic events (as one finds in Whitehead's later metaphysical theory). She requires agency for causation and argues that this cannot be accomplished by an exclusive ontology of events. Events do not act; they merely happen as a result of actions of things (p. 19). Whitehead derives such agency from the subjective aim of his actual occasions, but since Emmet rejects the omnipresence of feelings or sentience in what we ordinarily call "inanimate nature," this suggestion is "too high a price to pay for securing one basic type of all natural things" (p. 101).

This book has a definite affinity with her last book, *The Effectiveness of Causes* (1985), in that much of the content of the earlier work is taken up afresh in this book, for example, events, facts, immanent and transient causation, and process. While *The Passage of Nature* is explicitly devoted to an analysis of process, in many cases Emmet clarifies and strengthens her earlier views, especially where causation plays a fundamental role in determining ontological matters. This book is a highly creative and solid work in metaphysics.—Leemon B. McHenry, *Wittenberg University*.

GALE, Richard M. *On the Nature and Existence of God*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. viii + 422 pp. \$44.50—The aim of this book, reflected in its title, is to clarify the theist's conception of

God while supporting skepticism with respect to its instantiation (pp. 2-3). The first half of this task is carried out through an investigation of atheological arguments. These are arguments that (on Gale's definition) seek to deduce a contradiction from properties traditionally ascribed to God—omnipotence, absoluteness, immutability, timelessness, benevolence, and so on—with the help of only necessarily true additional premises. Arguments of this sort, Gale claims, are "thought experiments that probe the internal consistency of the theist's conception of God, often with the result that the theist must go back to the drawing board and redesign the particular divine attribute(s) that is the focus of the argument" (p. 3). This, however, is a good result, according to Gale, for, as he attempts to show, the traditional conception entails that God is a "nonperson" and is religiously unavailable (p. 178).

In Part 2 Gale seeks to carry out the second half of his task, examining and criticizing theological arguments—arguments which, as we have earlier been led to believe, are intended to provide support for belief in the existence of the redesigned God. Here both epistemological and pragmatic arguments are considered. That is, Gale examines and criticizes not only ontological, cosmological, and religious-experience arguments for the truth of the claim that God exists, but also non-truth-directed arguments that recommend belief on the basis of its (alleged) prudential or moral benefits. Since the book's discussion is, as he admits at the outset, far from comprehensive—omitting, in particular, inductive teleological and cosmological arguments, and the inductive argument from evil—Gale's final conclusion is the limited, hypothetical one that "if the only arguments [for belief] were the epistemological and pragmatic arguments examined . . . [then] faith would lack any rational justification" (p. 387).

Gale's book has many impressive features. Its argumentation displays a high level of technical sophistication and is overall of a very high quality—rigorous, yet clear and enlivened by many amusing anecdotes and examples, and containing many new insights. There are interesting, and often telling, objections to many arguments of recent philosophers of religion such as Plantinga, Alston, Rowe, Stump, and Kretzmann. Against Plantinga's famous response to the atheological argument from evil, for example, Gale argues that if, as Plantinga claims, God is the creator of human beings and has middle knowledge (that is, if God knows what every possible created person would do in every situation in which that person could possibly perform some action), then God has a "freedom-cancelling control over created persons" (p. 153). Under such circumstances the actions and choices of created persons must result from psychological conditions that are "intentionally determined" by God, and God must cause most of their behavior (pp. 158-9). Gale also provides powerful support for a denial of the claim that unsurpassable greatness (a property central to Plantinga's ontological argument and, Gale claims, to all cosmological arguments) is (is not) possibly exemplified. He appeals to "the property of being a morally unjustified evil"—a "property that (i) intuitively seems more likely to admit of the possibility of instantiation than

does having unsurpassable greatness and (ii) is *strongly incompatible* with it in that if either property is instantiated in any possible world, the other is instantiated in none" (pp. 227-8). What Gale has to say on these topics is of great interest, and potentially of great importance for contemporary philosophy of religion. Moreover, in making his points against traditional theism, Gale is able to shed light on a number of perennial philosophical problems, for example, problems of time, actuality, and the nature of persons. Thus his book will be of interest to writers in other fields as well.

Gale's discussion, however, also has its flaws. I will mention one of them. His aim in the second part of the book is, ostensibly, to discuss a reconstructed theism. The theological arguments he considers, however, are often arguments presupposing the *unreconstructed* concept of God. Now the arguments presupposing this unreconstructed concept (namely, ontological and cosmological arguments) are among the most philosophically interesting of theological arguments; and so any discussion devoted simply to examining "some interesting atheological and theological arguments" will no doubt consider them. Any discussion seeking to show that theism lacks support, however, even if only deductive support, must surely consider the strongest form of theism: theism as most charitably construed. Gale apparently starts out with this charitable intention, but ends up saddling the theist with assumptions that, on his view, render him vulnerable to atheological arguments, even after having shown that these assumptions need not be made. He discusses few theological arguments that do not make these assumptions. Structural problems of this sort suggest to me that the book is perhaps best read for its detailed discussion of particular arguments. Fortunately, this detailed discussion is full of insights and helpful analyses, and is well worth the price of the book.—J. L. Schellenberg, *The University of Calgary*.

GOCHET, Paul, and GRIBOMONT, Pascal. *Logique. Volume 1: méthodes pour l'informatique fondamentale*. Paris: Hermès, 1991. 456 pp. n.p.—This is a remarkable new French language introduction to elementary logical methods. Although designed primarily for computer and information specialists, it is also sure to interest philosophers and logicians because of its diversity of subjects, emphasis on graphic calculation techniques, and extensive historical background. The book is intelligently divided into nine main chapters with detailed descriptive subsections. It begins with the most fundamental principles of Aristotelian syllogistic and Boolean algebra, working through the essentials of Frege's predicate calculus and Gödel's consistency-completeness metaproofs before systematically articulating standard propositional and predicate logics, interestingly, from synthetic and then analytic perspectives. This leads to a largely informal exposition of Tarski-style model set theoretical semantics, and the modern

limiting metatheoretical results underlying what the authors call the "crisis" in the foundations of mathematical logic. Here are included such typical and more unusual topics as Herbrand models, König's Lemma, Herbrand's Theorem, Post machines, Floyd's Theorem, and Church's Theorem. The volume culminates in an expansive treatment of first order theories, including theories of order and models, and decidability. The exposition is somewhat rigorous, but should not be excessively demanding for nonprofessionals interested in the important implications of logic for philosophy, foundations of mathematics, and *informatique*. Among the book's virtues must be mentioned its profuse illustration of so many different graphic methods in mathematical logic, including Venn diagrams, the square of opposition, Smullyan truth trees, Wallen's reduction technique, Beth's and Hintikka's semantic tableaux method, and several styles of axiomatic and natural deduction. The work is certain to be a valuable resource for French readers in need of a lucid, comprehensive guide to the history and practical techniques of logic in its elementary applications to the philosophy of mathematics and information sciences.—Dale Jacquette, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

GOODMAN, Russell B. *American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition*. Cambridge Studies in American Literature and Culture. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. xi + 162 pp. \$34.50—"This book is about a tradition in American philosophy, running through the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, and John Dewey, that has its origins in Romanticism as a movement in European thought" (p. 1). Goodman's study of these thinkers develops out of his concern to identify a distinctively American philosophy, "a philosophy . . . not embarrassed by literature or by the idea of searching 'for the best human life'" (p. viii). Goodman makes a strong case for regarding Romanticism as the key element in such a philosophy.

A look at the *dramatis personae* of Goodman's study reveals its flavor, which is both synoptic and selective: Coleridge and Wordsworth are the principal European players; Emerson, James, and Dewey are the representative Americans. One might object to the omissions in this cast, of course—Goethe, Keats, Hawthorne, Melville, Thoreau, Peirce, and Whitehead, among others, are relegated to the wings. Goodman emphasizes the "initial" character of his study, however. His aim is not to be exhaustive, but "only to walk in, to chart some routes through the new terrain, and to open certain prospects to general view" (p. x). The view he provides is one that others in current American philosophy have glimpsed as well: framing chapters on the three focal figures are an introductory chapter focusing on the work of Stanley Cavell (whose *The Senses of Walden* inspired Goodman's inquiry), and an epilogue that considers Hilary Putnam's recent work in light of the American Romantic tradition.

This book might be considered a sign of the growing interest in classical American philosophy among those who, like Goodman, were

"trained in postwar 'Anglo-American' departments of philosophy" (p. vii). Indeed, Goodman launches his study from a reconsideration of the problem of skepticism. In the first chapter, "The Marriage of Self and World," Goodman builds upon Cavell's writings about external world skepticism and the problem of other minds. Goodman argues that these ostensibly "epistemological" problems are symptomatic of a deeper metaphysical and ethical crisis in modern philosophy. He suggests the nature of this crisis by posing several questions:

Could our relation with the world be as murderous as Othello's with Desdemona? Is something like jealousy operative in Descartes' (and modern philosophy's) attempt to identify irrefutable knowledge of the world? Does external world skepticism express an underlying but unnecessary disappointment with our knowledge of the world? (p. 10)

The implication is that skepticism arises from an unfortunate metaphysical divorce of self and world, a divorce precipitated by the modern craving for certainty and for the sense of power that certainty would provide. (Goodman signals his debt to Nietzsche and Heidegger, on this point and others.)

Goodman suggests that the American Romantic philosophers provide a way out of this crisis. He finds an alternative both to Cartesian and to Kantian metaphysics as expressed in Emerson's idealism in James' philosophy of pure experience, and above all in Dewey's account (in *Art as Experience*) of the union of the material and the ideal in aesthetic experience. The "voluntaristic structures of knowledge and being" (p. 24) characteristic of Romantic thought are refined in James's radical empiricism and Dewey's instrumentalism. Goodman argues that the Americans he examines develop a theory of knowledge centered on "fluxional" categories rather than on rigid Kantian categories: a theory of constructive interaction that complements Romantic metaphysics and allows a remarriage of self and world. In this book Goodman elegantly portrays the singular contribution that the American tradition offers to contemporary philosophy at large.—Kelly Parker, *Vanderbilt University*.

HATFIELD, Gary. *The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz*. A Bradford Book. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. 366 pages. \$35—This is a beautifully clear, detailed, and compelling revision of the received histories of late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German psychology and philosophy of mind. It focuses on the seemingly constant tension between what Hatfield calls normativism (the tendency, derived from Descartes and continued by Kant, to consider the mental as a power of knowledge to be explained through analysis and interpretation of its own immanent

standards of justification and validity) and naturalism (the tendency, derived from Hobbes and Hume, to consider the mental as a range of activities to be explained by something like scientific method in terms of certain simple elements and [associative] laws). Participants in this story are often both philosophers and psychologists (and, in Helmholtz's case, physiologists and physicists as well), in a mix in which it is difficult to see the differences. Hatfield presents us with the formative history of our present, uneasy distinction between "philosophical" and "psychological" approaches to the mind.

The test case here is spatial perception. By the mid-eighteenth century, thanks in good part to naturalistic (empiricist) critique of Descartes, the human ability to know the spatial properties of things, as well as the status of those spatial properties, had become deeply controversial. As he dealt with these issues, Kant sought to establish a sharp line between his philosophical investigation of the mind and naturalistic approaches.

As Hatfield very nicely shows, however, Kant's successors immediately misunderstood his efforts to guarantee the objectivity of geometry and of physical science by normative (in his terms, transcendental) arguments to the effect that Euclidean space must taken to be a "form" of human sensibility. Both defenders (such as Fries and Tourtual) and critics (such as Herbart and Steinbuch) read Kant to have made the naturalistic, "psychological" claim that the ability to perceive a three-dimensional world is not learned, but innate. This happened despite the fact that Kant considered causal questions about the mind to be independent of transcendental ones; and he actually accepted the view, common from the time of Berkeley, that the eyes only present us objects in a plane, requiring that the perceiver be educated by touch to see the shapes of things in depth. By giving a full picture of Kant's views, Hatfield shows us how to take Kant's transcendental psychology seriously while absolving Kant of the charge of psychologism. Moreover, by filling in the extensive debate over visual processes among the nativist and empirist psychologists who followed Kant, Hatfield prepares the way for a full understanding of the context within which Helmholtz undertook his remarkable work.

Hatfield's long discussion of Helmholtz is marvelously helpful: it shows the curious mixture of Kantian and non-Kantian beliefs which he took to be faithfully Kantian. We see Helmholtz banishing metaphysics from philosophy, taking a radically naturalistic attitude toward the mind, experimenting in psychophysics, and developing his distinctive theory that we acquire our ability to perceive the spatial properties of things through a lawful process of association among nonspatial sensations (from retinal stimulation and eye movement). We see him treating this as an account in keeping with Kant's view of the subjectivity of spatial perception, while arguing that Kant was mistaken in believing that Euclidean axioms must apply either to visual or physical space. Hatfield explains how the tension builds, in Helmholtz's thinking, between Helmholtz's commitment to a complete associationism, according to which scientific inference is itself but a conscious development of an unconscious tendency to make

associations, and his equally strong conviction that science yields objective knowledge of natural causes. Here, internalized, is the conflict between naturalistic and normative approaches to the mind. Helmholtz seems to have resolved it, in the end, by taking the law of cause as a practical necessity only.

Hatfield's final chapter offers a thoughtful assessment of current efforts to naturalize the mind in "reductive" or "eliminative" ways. He concludes, with a nice sense for the self-referential character of the matter, that even with a neuroscience as complete as you please there could be no sufficient account of the contingent concepts humans have acquired historically, science included. Thus, we have to understand ourselves historically, that is, in terms of cultural norms, with the result that "no natural-scientific imperative can eliminate normative epistemology" (p. 270). A happy thought.—John J. Compton, *Vanderbilt University*.

LEUPIN, Alexandre. *Lacan and the Human Sciences*. University of Nebraska Press, 1991. 191 pp. \$27.50—The articles assembled here demonstrate the impact of Lacan's thought on epistemology, anthropology, feminist studies, and literature. The focus of Leupin's introduction and of the first chapters by Jean-Claude Milner and Francois Regnault is Lacan's linking of the social sciences and science. Leupin writes that while Freud drew upon "medicine and biology to ensure . . . scientific consistency" (Milner lists physics and thermodynamics [p. 33]), in Lacan these are replaced by mathematics and topology (p. 2). Lacan argued that the social or human sciences should be renamed the "conjectural sciences"—that they are susceptible of an exact calculation in terms of probability.

Ragland-Sullivan's otherwise impressive article on the materiality of language includes passages linking Freud to a "simplistic biology" (p. 66) or a "biological determinism" (p. 69). She writes, "Freud's literalist definition of judgment as the quest for an identity of perception between internal representation of the satisfactory object and perception of a similar external object leaves us, finally, in the field of biological phenomenology" (p. 67). In addition to the fact that the meaning of "literalist" is unclear, the identity of perception and the identity of thought are conflated in this comment. The identity of perception in Freud is wish-fulfillment in the form of a fragmentary hallucination of a prior experience of satisfaction. The quest of judgment is for an identity of thought. While Freud's emphasis is on the means of refinding the object, and Lacan's on the permanent mark of lack the subject carries into that refinding, neither the identity of perception nor the identity of thought leaves us "in the field of biological phenomenology." No one more than Lacan has emphasized the difference between biological need and psychic wish. Read retrospectively, the identity of perception—original wish fulfillment—is, first of all, a negation, a denial of need, a denial of absence of the

object, a denial of want of being, and the first coming into play of the quest for the *objet à*—hardly biological phenomena.

Jean-Joseph Goux, in asking, "Why the letter? Why does Lacan constantly privilege the letter at the expense of the image?" (p. 109), pursues the question largely motivating this reviewer's *Arguing with Lacan* (1991). In accord with his title, "Lacan Iconoclast," Goux sees Lacan identified with Moses in banishing idolatry, the imaginary. The law of the father demands sacrifice of "the imaginary, and with it, the desire for the mother" (p. 113). Might not this be called, Goux asks, "the foreclosure of the mother and perhaps the feminine?" (p. 118).

Jane Gallop, in "Juliet Mitchell and the Human Sciences," portrays the threats that Mitchell resists. Mitchell, allying herself with Marx (Althusser's Marx), Freud (selected quotations from Freud), and Lacan (a particular interpretation of Lacan), valorizes history and humanization against the biological. "At stake here," Gallop writes, "is the way women have been relegated to the outskirts of culture, kept close to nature, in biology, trapped in unwitting reproduction" (p. 136). But Gallop resists Mitchell's resistance to biology. In her view it is the ideological use of biologism that oppresses women, rather than biology itself or nature itself.

Dennis Porter, responsible for the translation of Lacan's seminars, here introduces Lacan and psychoanalysis as a third term in Paul de Man's difference with Walter Benjamin's "Task of the Translator." The article, in Derridean terms, is on "the necessary and impossible task of translation, its necessity as impossibility" (p. 163). Denis Hollier, in the concluding chapter, approaches the topic of feminine *jouissance* in its relationship to the unknown, to the Other, by way of Emile Zola's 1894 novel, *Lourdes*.

Notwithstanding flaws such as Leupin's effort to approximate superego, ego, and id with Lacan's symbolic, imaginary, and real (p. 11), and Ragland-Sullivan account of the identity of perception (p. 67), each contribution in this volume is both highly readable and informative. To borrow from Benjamin, de Man, Porter, and Derrida, however, the task of the reviewer is impossible even in reviewing a single author, let alone in an attempt to enter a dialogue with eight.—Joseph H. Smith, *Bethesda, Md.*

MELLOR, D. H. *Matters of Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xiii + 295 pp. n.p.—These essays are characterized by meticulous argument in the analytical tradition. The book concerns matters of metaphysics in a broad sense: philosophy of mind and the problems of subjectivity; questions concerning nomological and statistical laws of nature; and, as we would expect, chance and induction.

The first group of five essays concerns mind and the self. Some of the topics are traditional: Are there subjective facts? physicalism, computation and the mind, token reflexive identifiers. There is also

an essay in this group that bears the distinctive stamp of Mellor's interest in probability and chance: "Consciousness and Degrees of Belief," in which he defends the Bayesian approach to probability. He does so through the distinction between the actual (that is, causally efficacious) degrees of belief of an agent, and the degrees of belief of which the agent is conscious: "second order" degrees of belief. For example, we may reasonably attribute to an animal degrees of belief as partial explanations for its behavior. But it need not, on this account, be capable of posting odds, or knowing what its degrees of belief are.

We distinguish between assent, which is conscious, and belief, which need not be conscious, and which plays a role like that of force in physics. One advantage of this way of looking at things is that then the lottery paradox is no paradox, but a natural consequence of uncertainty: we should not believe the logical consequences of everything we believe. "I can believe two things without believing their conjunction" (p. 53). I can assent to h on the basis of its high probability, and the same for i , but I need not then assent to h and i .

Unfortunately, as Mellor recognizes, we face a similar problem with regard to single beliefs. Suppose that h actually entails i . Then, since this requires as a matter of probability theory that the probability of i be at least as great as that of h , if I assent to h I am bound to assent also to i . But if i is a logical truth, then it is entailed by anything; and if I assent to anything and I think of i at all, then I must also assent to i . Mellor wrestles with this result by construing "that which is believed" as something that may not carry with it its own truth conditions. This is not an altogether satisfactory response, as he himself acknowledges.

The second group of four essays concerns metaphysics of the most traditional sort: getting clear about natural properties, kinds, and the laws that concern them. Dispositions are basic to this treatment, and, as we should expect, include dispositions corresponding to chances. A fascinating essay, "In Defense of Dispositions," shows Mellor at his best. He begins with Carnap's treatment of dispositions and shows that it is unsatisfactory. He then proceeds to Ryle, for whom dispositions are not properties at all, but features of laws that themselves serve only as "inference tickets." From there he moves on to Armstrong, Quine, and Goodman, and eventually to a view of dispositions as relations among events rather than as properties of things.

Three essays on causation and three on prediction and decision round out the book. In "Chance and Degrees of Belief," Mellor withdraws his earlier claim that indeterminism is necessary to make sense of chance (without, of course, endorsing determinism). This essay makes a close connection between a statistical law and a coherent betting quotient: the former ensures that "in the long run" one will break even on the basis of the corresponding betting quotient. But it is not made clear what the long run comes to: any finite run will reflect a loss or a gain, and in fact as that "run" becomes longer, the expected loss (or gain) will become arbitrarily large. "Breaking even" is not

likely in the short run, and it is not clear what it comes to in the infinitely long run.

This is a fine collection of essays. An index would have been helpful.—Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., *University of Rochester*.

MÉNDEZ, Julio Raúl. *El amor fundamento de la participación metafísica. Hermeneútica de la Summa contra gentiles*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1990. 308 pp. n.p.—The thesis of Méndez is preceded by a preface by Cornelio Fabro, who explains the design of this important dissertation: the author gives a presentation of the metaphysics of Aquinas such as he sees it laid down in the *Summa contra gentiles* (SCG). He does so from the viewpoint of the doctrine of participation.

After a general introduction to Aquinas's concept of being and the act of being, Méndez considers the distinction between essence and the act of being in SCG 2.52. Being as such is one and not diversified. It becomes many and varied by something outside itself. After these introductory investigations the author gives a survey of "ascending dynamics," that is, from being to the act of being (pp. 81ff.). By this Méndez means the analysis of gradated perfections which leads us to discover God.

Next the author returns to the level of created things, which depend on God for their being. According to Aquinas, Plato and Aristotle did not reach this insight. This takes us to the fourth section: the foundation of the metaphysical "disruption" (meaning differentiation in created things), which Aquinas places in God. In the last part of his dissertation Méndez shows that God's love is the cause of creation; out of love God lets created things share in his perfection. This divine love is free and entirely gratuitous.

This study in Thomistic metaphysics is a difficult but important work: it follows a well organized scheme and is entirely faithful in rendering Aquinas' thought. The stress laid on participation is so overwhelming, however, that the author risks pushing aside other considerations. He makes only scanty use for the First Way, whose conclusion (God is *actus purus*) is so important both in the SCG and the *Summa theologiae*. Likewise the Second, Third, and Fifth Ways are hardly mentioned. The metaphysics of Aquinas is broader and richer than one particular, sometimes onesided, approach (such as Fabro's) assumes it to be. One should never neglect the place of efficient and final causality in his doctrine. We cannot but protest any attempt to reduce all of St. Thomas's metaphysics to participation. A final remark concerns the wording of the text: it is clear inasmuch as it expresses acute reasoning, but it is often a far cry from the noble simplicity and limpidity of Aquinas's text. One sample (taken out of hundreds of similar phrases) will suffice: "This implies that the static moment of the synthetic being, in the affirmation of its consistent truth, is derived at the dynamic level of its foundation, from its

continuity with the Being-by-essence" (p. 75). Despite these flaws this thesis is a fine study of the theme of participation in the *Summa contra gentiles*.—Leo J. Elders, *Kerkrade, Netherlands*.

MONK, Ray. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*. New York: Penguin, 1991. xviii + 654 pp. \$14.95—From the first page, Monk is faithful to his announced intention: "By describing the life and the work in the one narrative, I hope to make it clear how this work came from this man, to show—what many who read Wittgenstein's work instinctively feel—the unity of his philosophical concerns with his emotional and spiritual life" (p. xviii). With life and thought thus tightly linked, it is doubly important that Monk get the thought right as well as the life; and, with rare exceptions, he does.

Deft interweaving of life and thought is punctuated by perceptive sketches at successive stages of Wittgenstein's philosophical progress. Early pages dwell, for example, on the influence of Kraus, Schopenhauer, and Weininger (pp. 16–25). More frequent philosophical accounts dot the account of the later years, with a page or more given to Sraffa's influence (pp. 260–1); "Some Remarks on Logical Form" (p. 274); discussions with Schlick and Waismann (pp. 284–8, 306–8); Spengler's influence (pp. 299, 302–4); reflections on Frazer's *The Golden Bough* (pp. 310–11); the lectures that introduced "language-games" (pp. 330–1) and those on "Sense Data and Private Experience" (pp. 355–6); the first installment of *Philosophical Investigations* (pp. 363–7); Part 1 of *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (pp. 380–81); the lectures on aesthetics, psychology, and religious belief, and their relation to a play by Rabindranath Tagore (pp. 403–12); lectures on the philosophy of mathematics (pp. 415–22); conversations about Freud (pp. 437–8); wartime work on the philosophy of mathematics (pp. 438–42); thoughts on religion (pp. 463–4); the 1944 shift from mathematics to psychology (pp. 466–9); the second installment of *Philosophical Investigations* (pp. 477–8); lectures on the philosophy of psychology (pp. 500–2); the lectures that led to Part 2 of *Philosophical Investigations* (pp. 507–16); their connections with humor, music, and culture (pp. 530–3); final writings on the philosophy of psychology (pp. 536–8); Part 2 of *Philosophical Investigations* (pp. 544–50); the conversations that initiated *On Certainty* (pp. 556–8); Goethe and the grammar of color (pp. 561–2); and, finally, *On Certainty* (pp. 569–71, 578–9), whose last remark was written two days before Wittgenstein died.

The philosophical content of Monk's work is therefore considerable. At the same time, he admirably captures the dark drama of Wittgenstein's life: his adolescent loss of faith, the life-saving discovery of his true calling, the inner transformation of the war years, his vain seeking before his return to philosophy, his troubled relationship with British academe, his estrangement from modern culture, his despairing efforts to perfect both himself and his later book, and the successive loves of his life—chiefly homosexual. On this last topic, of popular

interest, an appendix offers a judiciously skeptical appraisal of Bartley's sensational allegations. A bibliography, an index, numerous illustrations, and full references complete this first-rate intellectual biography. As an introduction to Wittgenstein and his work, I know of nothing better.—Garth Hallett, *Saint Louis University*.

NELSON, Daniel Mark. *The Priority of Prudence: Virtue and Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas and the Implications for Modern Ethics*. University Park: Penn State Press, 1992. xvi + 164 pp. \$28.50—David Nelsen follows the well-trodden path beaten by those (such as Vernon Bourke) who object to an over-universalized and over-deductive version of St. Thomas Aquinas's ethics. Focusing on the "priority" of prudence and the virtues vis à vis more speculative considerations of natural law, the book admirably stresses the role of prudence in enhancing human knowledge of ends. Inasmuch as one end is often ordered in act to another, prudence—which rightly concerns means—nonetheless clearly extends to the deepening and enrichment of our acquaintance with the right order of ends. Basing his case for the priority of prudence upon the indeterminacy of the will regarding any created good (pp. 53-4) and the presumed consequent lack of any natural ordering save to the final end, Nelsen argues that knowledge of the primary precepts of the natural law is too vague and abstract to be helpful in determining action. According to this interpretation, St. Thomas does not intend natural law considerations as "a source of concrete moral information" supplementing a prudential ethics of virtue (p. 72).

Nelsen rightly notes that for Aquinas "law is not first of all a juridical concept" but rather the divine reason as the principle of creation (p. 107), and considers Aquinas's natural law discourse to serve primarily "the explanatory function of accounting for how it happens that we come to reason practically and for the origin of the virtues" (p. 103). Acknowledging that the language of (natural) knowledge of natural law precepts is employed by Aquinas, Nelsen endeavors to so contextualize the considerations of the *Treatise on Law* with the preceding account of the virtues as to suggest that the *Treatise's* natural law preoccupations are only a causally explicatory account of the "starting point of practical reasoning" (pp. 87-8). This interpretation of the role of natural law considerations in Aquinas's ethics makes it possible to avert the tendency "to portray ethics as a primarily deductive science in which moral imperatives are deduced from basic naturally known principles" (p. 93). Correctly stressing that no deductive formula can apply to the variety and contingency of human situations, Nelsen's stress on prudence brings out the respect in which the virtuous man reflects the divine providence whose wisdom orders contingent singular events.

While a healthful corrective to those who would deontologize the natural law doctrine of Aquinas, Nelsen's effort does suffer from

certain omissions. First of all, the indeterminacy of the will regarding created goods does not equate with lack of natural inclination, which inclination is itself a telic indicator. As St. Thomas states (ST II-II, q. 47, a. 15)—and Nelsen notes (p. 102)—“the right ends of human life are fixed.” But as prudence is of the variable means, its extension to ends is *per accidens*. The primary grasp of ends will then be enhanced but not originated by prudence.

Nelsen will argue that “knowledge of universal first principles of practical reason is significant insofar as it pertains to Thomas’s concern about causality. That knowledge is insignificant with respect to guiding action” (p. 103). But insofar as teleological order informs practical activity, it would appear that the hierarchy of ends must inform ethically virtuous choice. As neither the points of the compass nor one’s final destination simply dictate one’s movement apart from knowledge of contingent impediments and requirements, while yet these factors do guide one’s movement, so the cognition of the hierarchy of ends seemingly must provide a principled basis for prudential discernments. This emphasis is lacking to Nelson’s account.

A further observation might also stress the dependence of acts of prudence upon prior rational apprehensions of the end in question. Hence St. Thomas comments, “Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end; nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of the reason a right apprehension of the end” (ST I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2). Appropriation of Yves Simon’s work concerning knowledge *via inclinationis* might have limited without vitiating the scope of Nelsen’s argument on behalf of prudence and the virtues.

Finally, while the context of the virtues is essential for any appraisal of St. Thomas’s natural law doctrine, it is arguable that the speculative ontological context of the *Prima Pars* provides the teleological focus whence both emphases in St. Thomas’s moral philosophy—natural law and virtue—are intelligible. Such a focus, eluding deontologism and over-universality, nonetheless will recognize not only a causal but a principled and content-laden contribution of natural law to ethics, in the form of that hierarchy of ends which provides the compass for practical life.

Nelson’s stress upon prudence and the virtues illustrates anew the complexity of Aquinas’s teaching and the attendant difficulties in successfully isolating any part of this doctrine from its ontological foundation.—Steven A. Long, *Silver Spring, Md.*

- OAKLEY, Justin. *Morality and the Emotions*. New York: Routledge, 1992. 253 pp. \$49.95—In this broadly argued treatise Oakley seeks to restore emotions to a significant generative role in our moral life. This counts as a restoration in that he would, with Aristotle, ground moral value in a humanly flourishing life, founded in virtues that involve not only acting well but having emotions of the right kind, degree, and direction (see *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106b15–29).

Oakley begins by arguing that emotions all consist of dynamically related elements of cognition, desire, and affectivity. Other views that see the essence of emotions in one or two of these factors fail to distinguish consistently between different emotion-types, he concludes. Oakley uses this descriptive claim as a foundation for some other major assertions.

First, he argues that emotions are connected in an important way with how well we achieve such great goods as psychic harmony, strength of will, love and friendship, knowledge and understanding, and a sense of self-worth. For example, "It is through our emotions that we constitute ourselves—i.e. through our emotions we bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives and invest ourselves in the world . . . , and it is in such constitution and involvement that an appreciation of our self-worth can be reached" (p. 64).

Reaching the above psychic goods requires such emotion-types as sympathy, compassion, care, concern, and courage, Oakley holds, while other emotion types such as fear, resentment, envy, and self-pity are inimical to gaining these goods. Moreover, the life of an emotionally deficient person will also be morally defective.

Oakley then seeks to refute the denigration of emotional motives, which are morally unimportant in both the Kantian and utilitarian views. Only an areteic ethics can adequately capture the moral significance of emotions, he argues, though such an ethics of virtue also has some problems.

An important chapter deals with our responsibility for our emotions. Based on a compatibilist view of responsibility, Oakley suggests that we can cultivate, affect, and control many emotions, and thus we hold some responsibility for these. He offers a four point program for emotional training: first, try to find what elements are strongly linked to the emotion and either cultivate or eliminate those elements. Second, try to develop or avoid certain emotional capacities, both by reading and by practice. Third, order your emotions in relation to your basic values, and commit yourself to encourage or discourage them correspondingly. Fourth, interpret what you perceive so that you are led to respond appropriately (pp. 136-8).

Oakley urges that we can and ought to cultivate our emotional capacities as traits of character, thus becoming emotionally sensitive people. This leads to the view that a person may be blameworthy or creditworthy for feeling morally significant emotions for which the person is responsible, whether or not these lead into actions. Further, Oakley argues, a person may deserve esteem or disesteem for emotions felt without an accompanying feeling of personal responsibility for them.

"Our emotions are an integral part of our moral character," Oakley concludes (p. 186). He compares them to those other human products, our children. Both, he observes, are partly controllable, partly uncontrollable, bringing credit, blame, responsibility, the need for training, and a sense of how important they are.

This book seems to me a worthy effort to clarify some very murky areas of moral philosophy. Some, myself included, will dispute

various points in Oakley's presentation. But anyone who accepts an enduring human self or soul (a presupposition, surely, for any moral philosophy, even if not for a sociology of morals), will find it hard to ignore the author's strong arguments linking emotions with moral character and action.

Nonetheless, Oakley has limited himself severely by staying within the bounds of philosophical analysis. Empirical evidence—clinical, experimental, even biographical studies—are crucial components toward reaching any true practical wisdom about emotions and their effect on our moral life. These seem outside Oakley's scope here. Perhaps he concluded that moral philosophers will not yet find many firm and broad answers among the psychologists. They, too, have their lacunae, disputes, and paradigm shifts.—Michael Marsh, *Washington, D.C.*

Ockham, William of. *Quodlibetal Questions*. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley, 2 vols. Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. xxviii and vii + 702 pp. \$100.00—The Ockham *Quodlibetal Questions* are the first translation in this new series edited by Norman Kretzmann, Eleanor Stump, and John Wippel. It includes a brief introduction by Freddoso which summarizes the growing scholarly consensus that despite the novel character of Ockham's thought and the uses to which it was later put, it is fundamentally Aristotelian and medieval-Christian in inspiration. Freddoso is also convinced of Ockham's usefulness for contemporary philosophical questions which thus turn out to be not merely contemporary but perennial. The collection fills a heretofore unmet need for fully representative selections from Ockham in English translation. Footnotes are kept to a minimum, but the index at the end of volume 2 runs twenty-seven pages. As the name implies, each *quodlibet* can include questions on any philosophical or theological topic whatever; for the benefit of those wishing to study Ockham's thinking systematically and according to standard philosophical convention, Freddoso provides an outline of topics (for example, terms, predication, categories, motion) with references to the scattered questions where they are considered. The paucity of explanatory footnotes (which are quite informative in their brevity) is supplemented by bibliographic reference to editions of works cited by Ockham and to secondary literature.

The range of topics included in these *Quodlibets* is truly representative of Ockham's interests, including logic, physics, anthropology, ethics, and natural and revealed theology. There is some treatment of intuitive and abstractive cognition. Theological topics such as angels and transubstantiation provide the occasion for meticulous clarifications of substance, quantity, place, local motion, and the nature of intersubjective communication, linguistic and (in the case of angelic "locution") nonlinguistic. He makes extensive use of his theory of

signification and supposition when treating logical questions raised by Trinitarian doctrine.

Ockham accepts Aristotle's criteria of demonstrability in the *Posterior Analytics* with the utmost rigor; thus we find a clear distinction within the realm of philosophy between what can be "proved" (*probatum*) and what can be demonstrated. The late scholastic sense of "probable" is a reasoned mode of knowledge which though lacking the certainty of demonstration is nevertheless stronger than the modern sense of "merely probable." When treating purely theological questions Ockham presupposes what he found he could not demonstrate in the more philosophical questions.

Ockham's philosophical treatment of the existence of God in the *Quodlibets* often works with a modified Anselmian account. He finds that in order to avoid accepting an infinite series of beings, we must posit the existence of a *de facto* most eminent being. (He does not say we can demonstrate the existence of something "than which nothing greater can be thought.") We do not know, however, if this being possesses the attributes of unity and infinity which God is believed by Christians to possess. Furthermore, not knowing if they ever began to exist, we cannot demonstrate that Aristotelian separate substances and celestial bodies are caused; it is possible that they rather than the most eminent being are the first or uncaused efficient cause. In other words, we cannot demonstrate that coincidence in reality of "most eminent" and "first efficient" which would be a minimally adequate description of the Christian God, though this identification is "plausible" (*persuaderi potest*).

Ockham finds logical, ontological, and temporal difficulties in the essence-existence distinction, some of which could be easily refuted by Thomists, while others would be more thought-provoking if read in conjunction with Thomas's example of the phoenix in *De ente et essentia*. Not sharing Thomas's understanding of *esse*, Ockham finds that the "distance" from nothingness to existence is measured by the finite essence of a creature and therefore does not require an infinite power to be spanned. We cannot therefore rationally exclude the possibility of a creature creating, although no creatures known to us do so. These metaphysical issues are but a small sampling of an exhaustive range of topics in the *Quodlibetal Questions* of Ockham.—Ansgar Santogrossi, *Mt. Angel Seminary, St. Benedict, Or.*

PELLETIER, Frances Jeffry. *Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. xxi + 166 pp. \$23.95.—The book treats Plato's *Sophist* 237–264. The introduction observes that problems Plato tackled are the same as contemporary problems about predication and mental representation of natural-language statements, and that Plato's account of the relation between language, mind, and reality strongly resembles a contemporary mental-representationalist language. Given that Plato was

responding to a problem about negation, the author finds it "quite astonishing that modern representationalists pay no attention to these difficulties concerning negation" (p. xv).

Chapter 1, "Methodological Preliminaries," sketches three different possible approaches to a past philosophical text: these are called "literal-," "historical-," and "eternal-questions." It sketches the symptoms of an interpretive disability, "precursoritis," and gives nine principles for an interpreter of a past text. One such principle is: If an argument is attributed to an author, it should be valid (missing premises to be supplied). Any principle may be overridden.

Chapter 2, "Parmenides' Problem," builds on Furth's reconstruction of Parmenides to give this version of the argument which concerned Plato: (1) For any declarative sentence, either it is true or its negation is true, but not both; (2a) the meaning of a sentence is the fact to which it refers; (2b) the meaning of a singular term (or a predicate) is the object(s) to which it refers; (3) whatever is can meaningfully be stated by true sentences; (4) there are no negative facts; (5) therefore, all true meaningful sentences mean the same thing (p. 14). Plato says that he is contradicting Parmenides (258c-d). He also says, "Any discourse we can have owes its existence to the interweaving of forms with one another" (259c5-6). That Plato was worried about the possibility of our discourse fits with the view that he was worried about the Parmenidean argument sketched above, whose conclusion certainly rules out our discourse.

Chapter 3, "Plato's Problems," argues that it is a likely interpretation of *Sophist* 237-264 that it relevantly responds to the argument of Parmenides sketched in chapter 2. *Sophist* 242 says that all who "have given a precise account of what is have spoken carelessly." Plato includes in his objection his earlier self of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. "Plato thinks . . . the . . . solution of Parmenides' Problem will be to 'speak carefully' by means of a 'philosopher's language'—a language which mirrors reality exactly" (p. 32). One feature of the philosopher's language is that every general term names something which is its meaning (p. 45).

Chapter 4, "Some Interpretations of the *συμπλοκή εἰδων*," usefully classifies forty-five (by my count) interpretations of Plato's account of the meaningfulness and truth of sentences like "Theaetetus is sitting" and "Theaetetus is not flying" into four broadly similar groups, one with thirteen subgroups. The forty-five include distinct positions attributed to some single authors, for example Ackrill₁ and Ackrill₂. The upshot of the whole is that the best interpretation to date is "still Ackrill₂'s" (p. 87).

Chapter 5, "The Philosopher's Language," gives some presuppositions about language which help account for Plato's sweeping claim that all discourse necessitates the interweaving of Forms with one another. Chapter 5 offers an account of *Sophist* 249d-264b on blending. The account urges that Plato's genitive and dative constructions systematically mark a threefold distinction (pp. 97-9) between (1) cases in which one Form participates in another because it directly has an attribute (Motion so partakes of Rest because the Form Motion

is at rest), (2) cases in which one form participates in another because all the one Form's instances must be instances of the other (Non-Being so partakes of Being because all nonbeings must have being) (p. 128), and (3) cases in which one form partakes in another because the two must have some common participants (as Sameness so participates in Motion) (p. 123). The discussion of the significance of the genitive and dative constructions goes beyond previous scholars' discussions, some scholars having found no significance and some having found significance other than that found here. The book is accessible to attentive Greekless readers. Greek expressions are translated, though not transliterated, at first occurrence but not thereafter.—Sandra Peterson, *University of Minnesota*.

PERRY, Michael J. *Love and Power: The Rule of Religion and Morality in American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. viii + 218 pp. \$29.95—The author introduces this sequel to his *Morality, Politics, and Law* as an extended gloss on John Noonan's statement that the "central problem of the legal enterprise is the relation of love to power." The renown of its author ensures that *Love and Power* will become a focal point in legal academic discussion of its central concern: the proper relation between morality, particularly religious morality, political choice, and public deliberation "in a morally pluralistic society like the United States."

Perry argues that religiously grounded moral assertions can and should play a significantly greater role in public life than that assigned to them by contemporary liberals. Liberal theorists—Perry examines the work of Bruce Ackerman, Thomas Nagle, Kent Greenawalt, and John Rawls—would (to slightly varying degrees) exclude from public deliberation and political choice claims about what it is truly good for human beings to be and to do. This is the familiar "neutrality" principle of liberal political morality: the state must remain scrupulously neutral on what constitutes genuine human flourishing out of respect for individual autonomy and to avoid religious strife. Perry thinks this liberal political morality "impossibly restrictive." It cannot seriously address important problems, like human rights, which liberals agree belong on the political agenda. Perry also says that liberal political morality is decidedly nonneutral: Ackerman, for instance, gets to decide political questions using all his moral premises. Perry does not.

Perry thus rejects what is usually (though not in this volume) called "antiperfectionist" liberalism. He argues passionately and often cogently for a host of important propositions: the liberal neutrality principle has no place in a sound moral or political theory; political choice and deliberation must be founded upon a correct account of human flourishing; liberalism privatizes religion; most religions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, are intrinsically public.

Once in *Love and Power* Perry calls his politics "neo-Aristotelian liberalism," a liberalism stressing the priority of the good over the

right. But his appellation of choice is "ecumenical politics." Ecumenical politics has two basic components: ecumenical political dialogue and ecumenical political tolerance. The former rests upon a controversial conception of religion drawn primarily from the work of David Tracy. Religious faith is an existential attitude of trust in reality. Religious beliefs are symbols expressing this attitude. They are contingent, revisable, culturally conditioned, fallible.

Important components of ecumenical dialogue are public intelligibility and public accessibility. Together they form "the habit of trying to elaborate one's position in a manner intelligible or comprehensible to those who speak a different religious or moral language to the point of translating one's position, to the extent possible, into a shared ('mediating') language." These components rule out of public deliberations sectarianism and reliance upon religious authority. The chapter on ecumenical political tolerance is basically a set of arguments *against* coercing those who hold false religious beliefs or who would engage in immoral actions.

Perry is no Pollyanna. He does not think that if we Americans just sit down a while at the kitchen table we would reach consensus on, say, abortion. Perry does think we can diminish (though not eliminate) disagreement. Besides, he says, ecumenical politics' benefits are largely affective. Even if we continue to disagree, we will be better off. We will respect, understand, and care for each other more because we have dialogued. It seems that an important objective of *Love and Power* is the communitarian politics which antiperfectionist liberalism stymies by its insistence that believers (that is, most Americans) participate in public life as mutilated, partial selves, or participate not at all.

I agree with most of Perry's major conclusions. But there are great difficulties in his argument. I shall mention a couple. First and rather surprisingly for a self-professed neo-Aristotelian, Perry never clearly distinguishes theoretical from practical reasoning. The effects of this and related mistakes are severe. Perry adopts a "realist" antifoundationalism, characterized by a "coherentist" (not "copy" or "correspondence") "conception of rationality" and "theory of truth." He seems to follow Richard Rorty in thinking that moral propositions are objectively true or false in the manner that assertions in the natural sciences are objectively true or false. Since moral propositions are not verifiable in the manner scientific propositions are, Rorty concluded that moral assertions are arbitrary, and became a nihilist. Perry resists nihilism, but more as an act of will or feeling than reason. He shares Rorty's confusion of theoretical with practical reason; and the failure of moral propositions to "correspond" to some picture of the world has serious consequences for Perry's moral reasoning as well as for Rorty's.

Perry states, for example, that "moral positions are more fundamentally a matter of feeling, or sensibility, than of thinking." Perry also seems to think believers can (do? must?) deduce or infer morality from an attitude of existential trust, that is, from their "religious faith." But believers cannot, do not, and need not. It may be that

problems Perry would introduce religion to solve—lack of community, of fraternity, and of a firm basis for human rights—owe more to his defective moral reasoning than to liberalism.

Second, and very briefly, Perry has not gained very much ground. Like Tracy (and other proponents of public theology or public religion), he renders religion publicly accessible and thus politically acceptable by treating religions as revisable verbal formulations of a common human experience. Religion, in this view, has to do with strictly human possibilities, variously expressed. Were that the case, however, we would not have antiperfectionist liberalism, or responses to it like *Love and Power*. It is precisely that religion which Perry would continue to exclude from politics—the religion of most Americans—that is the putative cause of such theorizing. The religion that worries liberals is not Perry's but the more traditional conception that an audible Word of the personal, transcendent God attracts and binds. It is no revisable, contingent human expression. Further work on religion and politics must proceed from these traditional premises.—Gerard V. Bradley, *Notre Dame Law School*.

SCHOEDINGER, Andrew B., ed. *The Problem of Universals*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1992. x + 360 pp. Cloth, \$60.00; paper, \$19.95—This is a useful collection of readings for a senior undergraduate or junior-level graduate course on universals. The selections are short (twenty-eight or so pages), but generally self-contained, and thus accessible to readers unfamiliar with the literature. Most of the great contributors to the debate, from Plato to the early Russell, Husserl, and Heidegger, are well represented, with a good sampling of the medieval discussion in pieces from Abelard, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and Ockham. Postwar twentieth-century contributors include Quine, Carnap, Strawson, and David Pears; and the text ends with a helpful bibliography of books and articles for further inquiry.

These desirable features having been listed, however, it must also be said that this book has two very serious flaws. One is that for Schoedinger, the controversy over universals seems to have come to an abrupt end in 1973. The most recent essay in the text was published in that year in *Mind*, and the latest entry in the bibliography is a commentary on Locke put out in 1971. Surely there are later contributions which would be worthy of inclusion (for example, some of the work of Armstrong and Tooley on laws). Yet nothing appears. This will count as a major shortcoming for some potential users of the book.

The other major flaw is in the editor's introductory material, which is badly written, opaque, and often misleading. The mercifully brief general introduction (pp. ix-x) advances the claims that "it is indubitable that relations exist," that "qualities and relations are

ontologically inescapable," and that "one cannot escape the existence of universals"; but it then asserts the ultimacy of the question whether there are universals. It divides the field of theories about universals into such inane categories as the "straightforward" versus the "more complex." It serves up such truisms as, "Without [universals] there could be no language as we understand it," and, "Thinking and language go hand in hand."

The introductions to the individual selections are not more helpful. In discussing St. Thomas, for example, Schoedinger says that "form acts on matter to give it recognition as types of things" (p. 35); in introducing Duns Scotus, that "the morning star and the evening star refer to the same thing—the planet Venus" (p. 42); and in opening for Strawson, that "a particular, to be a particular, requires more than the meanings [sic] of a singular substantival expression" (p. 212). It might be too much to demand that the editor of an anthology should display a clear understanding of the material he presents, but surely it is not too much to expect of both editor and publisher that introductions be presented in at least rough conformity with standard grammatical conventions.

On the other hand, perhaps these flaws are not fatal. I often encourage my students not to bother with introductory essays in anthologies, for better or worse preferring my own backgrounding to the editorial comments of others. Furthermore, I cannot imagine trying to do a truly comprehensive historical presentation of the problem of universals in a single term or semester. So I, and perhaps others, might be able to make good use of Shoedinger's book, just as a sampler of important ideas and arguments on its subject. In the absence of the packages of copied readings so many of us had learned to rely upon, this anthology might prove to be pedagogically valuable despite its shortcomings. It certainly provides ample material for fruitful study and discussion, and suggests more.—Peter C. Appleby, *University of Utah*.

SEBEOK, Thomas A. *Semiotics in the United States*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. 173 pp. Cloth, \$29.95; paper, \$10.95—Semiotics in America has had a long and rich history. It has been customary to begin historical accounts with Peirce, and to trace his influence through subsequent generations of semioticians as they in turn encounter Continental structuralist and post-structuralist semiotics. Sebeok's account strikes out in new directions by tracing semiotics back to Native American sources (in the mode of the hunter-tracker), moving through the "book of Nature" framework of subsequent Eurocentric North Americans, passing through literary models (such as the detective fiction of Poe), and moving forward into nineteenth-century sources that in some respects made Peircean pragmatism possible.

Sebeok gives particular attention to the correlation between language and nature in the American tradition, and insists that

contemporary semiotic theory remains impoverished insofar as it refuses to acknowledge earlier sources that took the priority of nature seriously. Sebeok quotes, with some approval, the amateur philosopher Alexander Bryan Johnson (lecturing in Utica, New York in 1825): "My lectures will endeavor to subordinate language to nature, to make nature the expositor of words, instead of making words the expositors of nature" (pp. 12-13). Needless to say, Emerson could make similar claims effective because of soil already well prepared.

Sebeok takes pains to show how early American writers anticipated many of the insights later developed by Peirce. In particular, he shows how such now-classical Peircean distinctions as: icon/index/symbol and sign/object/interpretant, were already common coin among American religious and philosophical writers. More and more commentators (for example, David Savan) are coming to the recognition that there is a rich field of pre-Peircean semiotic theory awaiting further exploration.

Long active in animal research, the domain now known as zoosemiotics, Sebeok argues that semiotic theory needs to remain in deep contact with the life sciences so that its own categorial structures reflect the more pervasive structures of natural forms of communication and signification. Referring to the biological theories of Jakob von Uexküll, Sebeok argues that animals inhabit a semiotic *Umwelt* (environment or semiotic modeling system) that is species specific. The *Umwelt* provides the animal with a way of exchanging information with nature. "Behavior" is here defined as the "sign trafficking among different *Umwelten*" (p. 103). Preverbal forms of semiosis connect the animal to its own *Umwelt* and to other *Umwelten*. Only the language-using animal, studied by the discipline of anthroposemiosis, can create possible *Umwelten*, or, more appropriately, lifeworlds, and thereby open out an unbounded number of semiotic possibilities.

The historical and conceptual analyses are frequently spiced with rich anecdotal accounts. Sebeok, himself a central part of the history of semiotics, recounts his relations with such figures as Cassirer, Jakobson, Morris, Langer, and Maritain. This conveys some of the inner history of American semiotics in a way that might not otherwise be possible. It also sketches in stark outline some of the tensions among the various practitioners of the craft of semiotics.

In tracing out the most recent versions of semiotic theory, Sebeok gives short shrift to the tradition inspired by Lacan, referring derisively to "the cold leftovers of the French psychoanalytic bazaar" (p. 86). On the other hand, he gives very high marks to what he calls the "Dominican vein in semiotics," running from Aquinas, to Poinsett, to Maritain, to John Deely. It is a shame that there was not more said about Deely's many contributions to several distinctive branches of semiotic theory, or about the important cross-fertilization between the Dominican and Peircean traditions.

This book is an invaluable historical, conceptual, and anecdotal account of the rise of semiotics in the United States. In addition, it contains an extensive bibliography that enhances its intrinsic value. The style is engaging and exhibits the vast richness of the author's mind.—Robert S. Corrington, *Drew University Theological School*.

SWINDLER, J. K. *Weaving: An Analysis of the Constitution of Objects*. Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1991. xv + 197 pp. \$33.00—The fundamental thesis of this book is the following: "The first principle of ontology is that existence is property possession. Nothing is bare of properties and no properties are unattached. Properties (including relations), the universals they instantiate, and the individuals into which they are woven are all there is" (p. 121). Swindler puts forward this ontology in the first third of the book. Like Roderick Chisholm, who has distinguished between occurring and nonoccurring states of affairs, Swindler distinguishes between instantiated and uninstantiated universals. For Chisholm, the non-occurring states of affairs exist; and for Swindler the uninstantiated universals exist. In other words, they are both explicit Platonists. The description of Swindler as a moderate realist must be understood in this light. He describes Aristotle as a "conceptualist," not a realist, for whom the universal "appears only *in intellectu*" (p. 75). Swindler's realism is to be understood as moderate by comparison with the "ultra realism" of Anselm and David Lewis, whose ontologies include "implicit reduction of the individual to the general" (p. 44). The book, therefore, describes and participates in an argument among contemporary Platonists in the philosophy of language.

Platonisms are usually characterized by dualism as well as by existing universals. In Swindler's ontology, "property possession (existence) discloses an inherent, internal duality in each thing. On the one hand there is the thing itself; on the other are its properties" (p. 28). This is not a dualism of substances, however, because a thing itself cannot exist without properties, nor can properties exist apart from a thing itself which has them. But even this seems odd. How can a thing's properties not be viewed as part of the thing itself? To this reviewer it seems much better to say that properties are part of a thing itself, but that univocal universal terms are not the only terms that can be truthfully applied to a thing itself. Terms such as "particular," "individual," and "exists" can also be truthfully applied. Indeed, it seems they can be applied to all parts of the thing itself, including its properties.

Swindler uses the ontology he has developed in Part 1 to address two sets of problems in Parts 2 and 3. In Part 2 the problems center around "Frege's Paradox": "the failure of substitutivity of co-referential singular terms *salva veritate*." In Part 3 they center around "Parmenides' Paradox," including such ancient puzzles as "reference to non-existent objects" (p. 91).

A standard example of Parmenides' Paradox is the statement, "The planet Vulcan does not exist." The paradox here is that "the planet Vulcan" appears not to have a reference, which in turn appears to argue that the statement is either meaningless or false; but astronomers and others would regard this statement as meaningful and true. In his effort to solve this paradox, Swindler reviews the solutions offered by Russell, Quine, Strawson, Searle, Donnellan, Kripke, Putnam, Frege, Meinong, Butchvarov, and others. In the end Swindler rejects all these positions in favor of one he takes from Plato's *Sophist*.

But nowhere in this section does Swindler discuss the work of the later Wittgenstein or the kinds of solutions that work appears to make available. In particular, if meaning is defined as use in a language game rather than as reference to an object, then "the planet Vulcan does not exist" can be seen as meaningful but false. This contradicts Swindler's claim that "referring expressions without referents . . . can be meaningful only if they invoke uninstantiated universals" (p. 141)—where such universals have existence apart from human knowers.

In his much longer discussion of Frege's Paradox, Swindler entertains standard problems about the substitutivity of coreferential terms in intentional and modal contexts. Here, as throughout, his review of alternative positions is conducted at high speed, and unexamined assumptions accumulate at a rate that many readers will find frustrating. At the very least Swindler has set up these issues in a way that invites comment and participation from many philosophical directions.—Thomas A. Russman, *University of St. Thomas, Houston*.

TURNER, Mark. *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. x + 298 pp. \$29.95—Turner argues that our most original and impressive literary achievements depend on the same conceptual and linguistic capacities that underlie our most mundane and unoriginal uses of language. He therefore proposes a "cognitive rhetoric" that would ground all studies of language and literature on what the cognitive sciences have revealed about how the mind works. Turner's guiding thesis is that human cognition is fundamentally embodied and imaginative, because "a human being has a human brain in a human body in a physical environment that it must make intelligible if it is to survive" (p. 1).

The way we conceptualize things, reason about them, and communicate our thoughts are all dependent upon the nature of our embodiment. Turner thus examines empirical evidence that shows how our language and literary creations are shaped by various kinds of embodied, imaginative structures, such as images, image schemas, prototypes, metaphors, and metonymies. After showing that some of our most basic assumptions about the nature of mind, concepts, meaning, language, and literature are incompatible with what we are learning about cognition, Turner sets out (chapters 3-6) the basic empirical results that reveal the fundamentally imaginative character of human understanding. He shows that our conceptual system is grounded in, and structured by, "image-schematic" patterns of our bodily interactions with our environment, for example, image schemas for source-path-goal, compulsive force, balance, containment, linking, and so forth. Many of our abstract concepts are then understood via metaphorical extensions of such image schemas, as, for example, when we conceive of argument as constrained movement along an abstract path from a starting point (premise) to an end point (conclusion).

The building up of concepts by such metaphorical cross-domain mappings is imaginative, although highly constrained, and therefore (contra deconstructionism) anything but arbitrary. Turner's most brilliant chapter shows how the symmetry of our bodies provides imaginative structure that is the basis for metaphorical mappings onto all forms of abstract symmetry, including various types of imagistic and conceptual symmetry in poetry and in argument structure. He then appropriates this analysis as part of his treatment of the basic image schemas that underlie our conceptions of argument.

The next three chapters investigate some of the ways in which these commonplace embodied and imaginative structures are turned to more impressive and spectacular effects in poetry. A key part of Turner's argument is that there are empirically derived and testable hypotheses about the kinds of constraints on the imaginative activity that underlies language.

The penultimate chapter, in which Turner traces out the implications of cognitive rhetoric for our conception of the humanities, is alone sufficient justification for reading this book. Arguing that humanistic studies must be grounded in our best knowledge of how the mind operates, he shows why Hirsch cannot be right when he defines cultural literacy as mastery of a list of great ideas. Instead, what is required is a deep understanding of how the human mind makes sense of these ideas via imaginative devices.

Reading Minds is not only for literary theorists, critics, writers, and students of literature. It is a philosophically sophisticated work that goes a long way toward an empirically responsible account of the bodily and imaginative bases of concepts, meaning, reasoning, and language.—Mark L. Johnson, *Southern Illinois University at Carbondale*.

WALLULIS, Jerald. *The Hermeneutics of Life History: Personal Achievement and History in Gadamer, Habermas, and Erikson*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990. xv + 158 pp. \$29.95—In this thoughtful essay Wallulis argues that a rethinking of Gadamer's seminal claims about our historical situatedness is necessary if we are to have an adequate account of personal achievement. He argues that in stressing that we are the effect of tradition, Gadamer does not allow personal initiative its due. Wallulis wants to oppose a consciousness of "having been enabled" to what he sees as Gadamer's exclusive emphasis on a consciousness of being affected by history, as well as to Habermas's notion of a consciousness oriented towards emancipation, that is, towards overcoming pseudo-natural constraints and attaining complete self-transparency. While sympathetic to Gadamer's hermeneutic critique of Habermas, Wallulis wants to offer a corrective to Gadamer's one-sided focus and thereby to elaborate a "hermeneutic of life history" that does justice to personal achievement.

Wallulis makes his case by paying close attention to texts. In the first chapter he discusses Gadamer's description of the happening or

event structure of our appropriation of tradition. He takes Gadamer's well known analysis of play to be paradigmatic for Gadamer's understanding of our relationship to history and tradition—namely, that we are caught up in the happening of history and tradition as we are caught up in the action of the game. The event of appropriation thus overshadows action or achievement.

The second chapter, which pursues themes sounded in the Habermas-Gadamer debate, argues that though Habermas provides a successful account of processes of self-formation as achievements, he overstates what those achievements can accomplish; for the claim to self-transparency must run up against hermeneutic limits.

The third chapter argues that Gadamer's rhetorical emphasis suggests an opposition between historical belongingness and personal achievement, privileging the former over the latter, stressing limitation over enablement (pp. 59–60). To produce a more balanced account, incorporating both historical belongingness and achievement, Wallulis returns in the fourth chapter to the work of Habermas, this time to his more recent work on the theory of communicative action, and compares Habermas and Erikson on ego identity. In a highly competent discussion of Habermas's recent work, Wallulis concludes that its account of the role of tradition so abstracts from the *content* of tradition that it is still not sufficiently attentive to our hermeneutic situatedness. The author finds a more persuasive balance struck by Erikson in his analysis of the life cycle.

In the fifth chapter, Erikson's analysis of play, with its focus on an "action structure" highlighting mastery and achievement, is contrasted with Gadamer's analysis, with its emphasis on an "event structure." Wallulis argues for our viewing these structures as complementary rather than opposed (p. 96).

In the last chapter and in the conclusion Wallulis focuses upon the appropriation of individual life history. He develops the notion of a "consciousness of having been enabled" as one of the complementary forms that our awareness of our past should assume if we are to have a consciousness of personal achievement and are successfully to achieve an historical perspective on our lives (p. 125). He has interesting things to say here, derived from his Erikson interpretation and against Habermas, about how we can understand the notions of the continuity of a life and of the integration of life history, about our seeing our past not only negatively as an immature stage of development but also positively as a stage of enablement.

One might object that Wallulis's reading of Gadamer should more fully reflect an attempt to determine whether Gadamer's position can accommodate the author's legitimate concerns. In particular, two important aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutics are given short shrift in this book: his analyses of judgment or *phronesis*, and of linguisticity. For Gadamer, tradition lives in being handed down to and taken over by succeeding generations through acts of interpretation. Each succeeding generation "understands differently" what its predecessors understood. Tradition *per se* plays only a partial and schematic role here; our concerns and our hermeneutic situations are also

operative and are productive of something *novel*. Tradition leaves action underdetermined and thus necessarily leaves a space for individual responsibility and judgment.

Moreover, for Gadamer, "Tradition is linguistic in nature" (*Truth and Method* [New York: Seabury Press, 1975], 351). The conditions for the intelligibility of action are handed down by tradition through being encoded in language. So "action structures" themselves must be understood within the context of what is handed down. One can distinguish between understanding history or the past as cause-like factors on the one hand, and understanding history as the bearer of the conditions for the intelligibility of action on the other. Wallulis tends to operate with the first sense and hence tends, in my view, to reify history and tradition. By interpreting historical belongingness in the first sense and by claiming that Gadamer places an unbalanced emphasis upon it, Wallulis is led to think that the topic of personal achievement cannot be profitably pursued within the ambit of Gadamer's doctrine (p. 134). Hence Wallulis's search for a more balanced account. It is not clear, however, that such a search would be as pressing if the second, more linguistic way of understanding tradition were given its due, for on that understanding history and tradition do not stand in the sort of tension with personal achievement that they might otherwise be thought to.

These objections aside, this study does repay careful reading, for it encourages one to think in a critical fashion about the scope and limits of Gadamer's notion of historical belongingness and about what is requisite for an adequate hermeneutic of life history.—Lorenzo C. Simpson, *University of Richmond*.

WHITE, Stephen L. *The Unity of the Self*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. xii + 424 pp. \$35.00—This book consists of eleven essays together with an introduction and preface. The essays are grouped into five parts: "Content," "Qualia," "Identity and Consciousness," "Rationality and Responsibility," and "Moral Theory." Six of the essays have been published previously, all but two of these within the past five years.

The introduction claims that the essays can be viewed as stages in the development of a coherent view of the nature of unity of the self, and in an argument for the importance of such a view for addressing major philosophical issues. The essays do, indeed, cover an impressive range of important topics in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, moral psychology, and ethics; and they do argue effectively for a tighter connection among these issues than is usually recognized. White claims that adequate accounts of self-consciousness, personal identity, and free will must have normative elements, and that adequate accounts of moral responsibility, self-deception, rights, and values must have elements making reference to the metaphysics of the self.

Chapters 1-4 and 6 present a spirited defense of orthodox functionalism against recent critics. White argues that functionalism can

provide adequate accounts of intentional content, qualia, and consciousness. The only serious competitor to functionalism, according to White, is the subjective or transcendental dualism suggested by the writings of Nagel. White argues that, ironically, this view cannot give an adequate account of privileged access.

Functionalism alone is not capable of providing an account of self and person; but this is because an adequate account of self and person must make reference to normative and external features. For example, consciousness must be distinguished from self-consciousness. Subsystems of a person may satisfy a functional account of consciousness, but only the entire person is self-conscious. This is because only the entire person has the appropriate patterns of self-concern. In chapter 5 White argues that adequate resolution of the puzzles concerning personal identity requires accepting metapsychological relativism. This view maintains that personal facts supervene in part on facts about the attitudes of others and on conventions of the person's society. The remaining chapters are devoted to developing an account of the internal normative and conative features that play an essential role in accounts of the self and person.

Crucial here is the concept of an Ideal Reflective Equilibrium. Roughly, this is the maximally coherent set of all of a person's non-instrumental desires. Any desires that do not cohere well enough with the other desires are eliminated, any desires that would improve coherence are added, and the weights among desires are adjusted so as to maximize total coherence. Any desires that are in the set have an internal justification in terms of their coherence with other desires in the set. An important subset of these is the set of unconditional desires. These are desires that a person now wants to be satisfied in the future even if the person should no longer have that desire. This set comprises the conative core of the person, and it contains the values with which the person identifies and represents his commitments.

This theoretical apparatus is used to distinguish between responsible parties and compulsives and psychopaths. Roughly, responsible parties are those whose Ideal Reflective Equilibriums contain the resources for their being self-critical with respect to the actions at issue. This is used to explain the phenomenon of self-deception (chap. 7), moral responsibility (chap. 8), and irrational actions (chap. 9). In chapters 10 and 11 the apparatus of Ideal Reflective Equilibrium and conative core is applied to provide criticisms of Rawls's theory of justice and of consequentialist theories of ethics respectively.

Each of White's essays begins by mapping out the position to be developed. Nearly every controversial claim is supported by careful argument, often by several arguments. The accounts developed are bold, and they advance the discussion of the issues. White's arguments and positions deserve attention from all who are interested in these important topics.—Michael J. Costa, *The University of South Carolina*.

WOOD, Robert E. *A Path into Metaphysics: Phenomenological, Hermeneutical, and Dialogical Studies*. Albany: State University of New

York Press, 1990. xviii + 387 pp. \$59.50—Metaphysics, the most concrete of human inquiries, cannot rightly leave anything out, not even or especially its own history. At the very least, a consideration of the history of metaphysical investigation is necessary in order to recover the peculiar naiveté proper to the discipline, for any language at our immediate disposal comes to us already stamped by the thinking of our predecessors. Nor may we rule out of hand the possibility that metaphysics is itself in some way subject to "physics" or time. Finally, only arrogance could keep us from admitting that the "history" of metaphysics might hold answers to our most pressing questions, and indeed put questions to us we had not thought to ask. Metaphysics is, in short, an archeological science in a double sense.

Wood, who takes his bearings principally from Heidegger (pp. xv, 4), devotes half of this "introduction" (cf. p. xvii) to metaphysics to its history. Part 2 of the book, "Reading the Tradition," surveys the contributions of three ancient philosophers, one medieval thinker, and seven modern writers. One might, as a matter of emphasis, quarrel with his decision to treat Aquinas as simply one with the tradition of Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle (cf. p. 181): the hyphen in his "Ancient-Medieval Tradition" bears more intensive examination. And while Wood's attempt to read the "Modern Tradition" as in many ways continuous with and an advance over its past (p. 205) is to be applauded, one regrets that he does not explore in sufficient detail the reasons which led Descartes, Spinoza, and even Leibniz to oppose the ancient and medieval traditions. Otherwise stated, Wood does not adequately explain why the phrase "the modern tradition" is not an oxymoron. However that may be, the breadth of his interest in the history of philosophy is exemplary. His deft summaries of key figures in that history—these also include Kant, Hegel, and Whitehead—will prove helpful especially to those who are unfamiliar with it.

The first part of the book, "Humanness, Metaphysics, and Being," begins with a series of "meditations" on birth, death, embodiment, consciousness, and related themes meant to shake the reader free from the grip of the everyday. Subsequent chapters, using the various "dimensions" of human life as evidence of the analogical character of worldly being, advance the thesis that metaphysics, far from indicating a forgetting or denial of our humanity, is its proper fulfillment, a fulfillment which remains in principle incomplete or "open" (pp. 112-17). For Wood, then, "divine science" is in its beginnings and in its end inseparable from anthropology in the strict sense (pp. 67, 308). The "dialogue" he initiates in Part 2 sets in motion the static principles of Part 1.

The irenic tone which characterizes the book as a whole is certainly due more to Buber, Wood's other acknowledged guide (pp. xv, 307), than to Heidegger, whose logomachy is rarely well emulated because rarely well understood. Wood also has the ability, frequently displayed, to make apparently inaccessible or outlandish notions comprehensible and pertinent. For this and for other reasons his book would make a good undergraduate text. In this regard, the author would seem to have realized his intention most admirably.—John C. McCarthy, *The Catholic University of America*.

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS*

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Consequentialism, Incoherence and Choice, PETER SIMPSON and ROBERT MCKIM

Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, and Germain Grisez (BFG) have replied to the authors' criticism of their argument that consequentialism is incoherent. They say that the criticism failed to distinguish between rationally motivated and nonrationally motivated choice. Our paper denies this and shows that, even granted this distinction, their original claim is still false. That claim is false because BFG continue to misunderstand what consequentialism is. It is shown how this is so by repeating, though in words relevant to their reply, our original criticism. Other things BFG have said are equally a result of misunderstanding and just add to the number of confusions they are falling into. The paper concludes that consequentialism cannot be shown to be wrong in the way BFG try to do so.

A Note on Barth and Aquinas, LOUIS ROY, O. P.

The purpose of this article is to examine two short passages of the *Church Dogmatics*, in which Barth contrasts his thought with the views expressed by Thomas Aquinas on the God of love. Those excerpts have escaped the attention of Barthians and Thomists alike. Barth quotes Aquinas in Latin and proposes an inversion, in a sentence whose pivotal word is *inquantum*. For him *inquantum* conveys the idea of a priority, whereas for Aquinas it merely expresses the idea of an equivalence. Barth's misreading of Aquinas also depends on the fact that he associates

* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

Aquinas with some German philosopher-theologians, whom he is trying to refute in that part of the *Church Dogmatics*. Actually, the difference between the two authors on this topic is less significant than Barth himself thought.

Person As Resonating Existential, ROBERT A. CONNOR

This paper suggests a metaphysical model in conformity with the Trinitarian based notion of person as a nonaccidental relation. *Gaudium et Spes* 24 offers a dynamic between "substance" and this new notion of "relation": person becomes self (substance) by gift of self (relation). Wojtyla's phenomenology of self-gift by self-determination suggests such a model, that is, a resonating, Heisenberg-like, deeper metaphysical core (the intensive ["thick"] applies to the *esse* of St. Thomas) which determines itself as relational gift. I become what I give. I give what I become. As the *esse* expands and transcends itself as self-gift, it coalesces by self-determination into an ever increasingly substantial structure. Integrally, being is neither substance nor relation, which are modes of existing, but, on the level of person as an *intelligere*, it is *esse* resonating in these two dimensions which we conceptualize as substance and relation.

Aquinas's Changing Evaluation of Plato on Creation,
MARK F. JOHNSON

In a previous article the author argued that St. Thomas Aquinas attributed to Aristotle a doctrine according to which the very being of all things depended totally upon a single first being, a doctrine Thomas took to be a doctrine of creation. This short article turns to Thomas's treatment of Plato on the same issue, in order to see whether Thomas did with Plato as he did with Aristotle. As it turns out, Thomas did not at first attribute a doctrine of creation to Plato; but sometime in the early 1260s, during his Italian sojourn, and without clear reason, Thomas changed his evaluation of Plato. In the end he did attribute to him what he attributed to Aristotle all along: a doctrine of eternal creation.

Friendship, Self-Love and Knowledge, JONATHAN JACOBS

Friendship and self-love are explicated as normative matters grounded in knowledge of human nature. Both involve doing good for a person because that person is worthy of good on account of being productive of it. Proper self-love is not a feeling or an emotion but a condition of enjoying acting in conformity with knowledge of one's good. Proper friendship is the activity of enjoying doing good for another because of his excellences. The causal relationships between self-love and friendship are explored, particularly with reference to how one acquires knowledge of human nature. The account relies on Aristotle but also considers the

significance of the plurality of human goods and variety of virtues in the "chemistry" of self-love and friendship. It also considers some of the subjective dimensions of them his account ignores—in particular the difficulties of self-knowledge and knowledge of others. Still, there are objective considerations of worth that shape the ethical character of friendship and self-love.

Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods,
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE

Four theses are argued in this paper. The first is that the practical questions posed in everyday life by plain persons involve them to some extent in philosophical inquiry. The second is that plain persons are by nature proto-Aristotelians. The third offers an account of how the relationship of rules, virtues, and goods has to be understood by plain persons, if they are to avoid error. The fourth explains the genesis of error. Finally, there is a discussion of how Aquinas should be read in order to be responsive to the plain person's Aristotelian questions.

Minds and Machines, GERARD CASEY

In this article it is claimed that the position one defends in the philosophy of mind significantly affects one's views on the possibility of artificial intelligence. A taxonomy of the basic positions in the philosophy of mind is presented and discussed. These positions are: extreme immaterialism, moderate immaterialism, moderate materialism, and extreme materialism. The untenability of extreme immaterialism is assumed and it is argued that extreme materialism is self-refuting. No explicit argument is offered against moderate materialism; instead, an old but neglected argument for moderate immaterialism is refurbished and represented. It is concluded that if moderate immaterialism is the most defensible of the four basic positions in the philosophy of mind, then, given the implications of that position in regard to life and consciousness, there is no reason to suppose that computers are or will ever become capable of intellectual thought.

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On the Absolute Freedom of the Will, BERNARD BEROFISKY

Aristotle, Descartes, Bradley, Sartre, Ginet, and Albritton have all defended some variant of the doctrine that an unfree will is a conceptual impossibility: if we will or choose at all, we do so freely. It is argued

against all these philosophers that we have the same sort of unfreedom in the arena of will that we do in the arena of action. Although we in fact have greater freedom of action, we are unfree to will certain things and we sometimes will unfreely. We will unfreely when the will fails to express the self, and that is made possible by the distinction between the strength of a desire (for example, an addiction), and the degree of its dominance in the self. Sartre's version, according to which the nihilating nature of consciousness precludes its subjection to determination, confuses logical and empirical possibility.

The Trouble with Phenomenalism, LENN E. GOODMAN

Phenomenalism escapes impracticality by reducing ordinary discourse to subjectivity. Whole bodies of tradition can be absorbed—as instrumentalists accept scientific method, or as Sextus accepts medical methods and techniques—not as a road to truth but as an established practice. Such openness betrays a dependence on realism, semantically and epistemologically, undercutting phenomenalist claims to simplicity and ontic economy. If phenomenologists intend no less in specific judgments and imply no less by their actions than the rankest realists, it grows questionable which is the fiction: the shadow realities concessively assigned a merely notional existence or the denial of ontic commitment. When phenomenologists seek to choose critically among opinions and appearances, the game is up: systematic assignment of merely subjective status to all entities is a sham resting on the very notion (extramental reality) whose applicability it seeks to deny.

Recent Work on Intentional Action, ALFRED R. MELE

This essay reviews literature—primarily since 1980—on the nature and explanation of intentional action. Section 1 identifies some general problems for the project of analyzing intentional action and critically explores some attempted resolutions. Issues discussed include side effects of intentional actions, belief constraints on intending, actions done for their own sake, luck, impulsive actions, sudden actions, and subsidiary actions. Section 2 examines causal approaches to the analysis and explanation of intentional action, highlighting problems stemming from causal deviance and attempted resolutions. Section 3 addresses noncausal approaches and difficulties that they face.

The Possibility of Conceptual Clarity in Philosophy,
MICHAEL A. BISHOP

Philosophers since Plato have expended considerable effort proposing, criticizing, and amending accounts of philosophically significant concepts couched in terms of singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. This

paper spells out a number of aims one might have when engaged in this philosophical endeavor: (a) to delineate the structure of the concept, (b) to preserve the extension of the term, (c) to give an account of what the thing "really" is, or (d) to revise the concept. Given the familiar method of proposing, criticizing, and amending accounts of concepts, there are robust empirical reasons to suppose that aims (a)–(c) cannot be achieved. So is conceptual clarity in philosophy possible? The paper offers reasons for thinking that it is, but only if philosophers adopt a thoroughgoing naturalism that admits the possibility of significant conceptual revision.

Rethinking Reason, JEAN HAMPTON

The idea that reason's only function is instrumental has been popular among philosophers, economists, and other social scientists who have sought to understand reason as consistent with the strictures of science. This article begins by reviewing some of the recent criticisms of the instrumental conception of reason, and argues that none of them fully succeeds. But it goes on to argue against this conception of reason by showing that instrumental reasoning is based upon, and only possible because of, certain noninstrumental, evaluative forms of reasoning. Because instrumental reason presupposes noninstrumental reasoning, human reason cannot be solely instrumental in nature.

Blame and Autonomy, EDWARD SANKOWSKI

Warrant and Responsibility, DOUGLAS ODEGARD

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Self-Interest and Survival, RAYMOND MARTIN

Since the late 1960s, philosophers concerned with personal identity have been preoccupied with examples in which people who believe they might continue to lead worthwhile lives nevertheless apparently have—and have as an expression of their desire to survive—sufficient, self-interested reasons to cease to exist. These paradoxical examples seem to shed light on how much preserving one's identity either does or should matter to a person in his or her concern for survival. There is a neglected problem, however, which not only complicates any attempt to draw a moral from these examples but is symptomatic of a deep tension in our understandings of such fundamental notions as self-interest, self-regard, egoism, and

survival. The purpose of the present paper is to explain what this problem is and why it is important, and then to solve it.

Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility,
JAMES MONTMARQUET

This paper argues two main claims: (1) that in many instances moral responsibility for what we do depends on epistemic responsibility for what we believe; (2) that such responsibility for belief is typically direct, in the sense that it is not dependent on further responsibility for whatever actions may have led one to have those beliefs. More positively, it is argued that this doxastic responsibility depends on the control we have in exercising qualities of epistemic character (epistemic virtues). Such direct control is typified by the exertion of care.

Realizing, STEVEN G. SMITH

Realizing, distinct from simple knowing, synthesizes things apprehended and things not directly apprehensible in such a way that subjects find themselves centered as knowers in contact with the center of what is known. Three always-complementary modes of realizing correspond to the three basic limits on apprehensibility: imaginative, bringing things-in-themselves into (posited) relation with the contents of consciousness; intellectual, which is the mind's grasping of mental forms as such (a weak mode inasmuch as it makes the mind count as a reality for itself to be related to); and spiritual, which is actualization of relationship with other beings *qua* other (that is, as transcending consciousness). This analysis illuminates the meaning of metaphysical arguments.

The Possibility of an Indigenous Philosophy: A Latin American Perspective, VICENTE MEDINA

The aim of this paper is to explore the controversy over the possibility of an indigenous Latin American philosophy. Reference is made to Ernest Sosa's distinction between "serious philosophy" and "free-spirited philosophy." This distinction is part of a broader and older controversy between "universalism" and "historicism." First, it is argued that the controversy over a Latin American philosophy is not only one between "serious philosophy" and "free-spirited philosophy," but one between philosophy as a "moral attitude" and philosophy as a "rigorous methodology." Second, it is argued that the idea of an indigenous Latin American philosophy of liberation, as some liberationists conceive of it, is dubious and ideological. If this is true, then to uphold the desirability of such a philosophy is incoherent.

Taking Evolution Seriously, MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE

Philosophers, like other academicians, are prone to a highly selective reading of Darwin's three consecutive formulations of "descent with modification." In this highly selective reading—which has never been critically examined on grounds of reasonableness—all but physical continuities are disregarded. Continuities between humans and nonhumans with respect to mental powers and to emotions (in *The Descent of Man* and *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*, respectively) are ignored along with their historical implications. Reverse anthropocentrism is one of the practices that perpetuates the highly selective reading. It effectively blots out Darwin's organic and evolutionary holism by apportioning submental credit to nonhuman animals and making humans special creations. When Darwin's holistic themes are taken seriously, then philosophy has another task: looking beyond evolutionary theory *qua* theory to an examination of its actual historical significance. Such an examination has direct and powerful implications for present day Cartesian metaphysics.

Nonfallacious Arguments from Ignorance, DOUGLAS WALTON

The *argumentum ad ignorantiam* has traditionally been classified as a fallacy, but in this paper it is shown to be nonfallacious in some cases. Two argumentation schemes are outlined to represent the form or structure of the correct use of the argument from ignorance. Using these schemes, it is shown how arguments from ignorance can be judged correct or fallacious in a particular case, in a given context of dialogue.

Who or What Has Moral Standing? MARTIN SCHONFELD*Causation, Probability and the Monarchy*, ALEX ROSENBERG

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 70, No. 3, September 1992

The Problem of Psychophysical Causation, E. J. LOWE

It is widely supposed that interactionist dualism cannot plausibly be reconciled with the conservation laws of physics. These laws do not, however, imply that the physical universe is a causally closed system. Various dualist systems of psychophysical causation are shown to be consistent with our current knowledge of physical law, the most plausible of these being one in which mental causes impose structure on patterns of physical events without entering directly into chains of physical causation. It is

argued that a dualist account of this kind, which is distinctly non-Cartesian, is superior to any supervenience account of mental causation and provides, in effect, the only serious alternative to eliminative materialism.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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The Inevitable, JOHN MARTIN FISCHER and MARK RAVIZZA

The conditions under which an agent can legitimately be held morally responsible for bringing about something whose occurrence is inevitable are explored. Particular attention is given to account offered by Peter van Inwagen and Robert Heinaman. It is argued that an agent can indeed be morally responsible for certain things which are inevitable.

A Buridanian Discussion of Desire, Murder and Democracy,
LAURENCE GOLDSTEIN

Sophism 18 of the *Insolubilia* chapter of Buridan's *Sophismata* is a paradox about apparently conflicting conditional desires: Socrates wants to eat if and only if Plato wants to eat, but Plato wants to eat if and only if Socrates does not want to eat. Two paradoxes of recent provenance—James Forrester's "Paradox of Gentle Murder" and Richard Wollheim's "Paradox of Democracy"—are structurally similar to (though simpler than) Sophism 18. This paper attempts to show how aspects of Buridan's immensely rich solution of his paradox can be appropriated for solving, in a satisfying way, these other paradoxes. The solution to Forrester's paradox is close to recent work in temporal deontic logic by Lennart Aqvist and his collaborators; the solution to Wollheim's paradox is entirely new but is interestingly related to Arthur Prior's suggestion for handling the "Paradox of the Preface."

Internalism in Epistemology and the Internalist Regress,
STEPHEN JACOBSON

This article begins with a detailed study of Jonathan Dancy's defense of internalism in epistemology against the internalist regress in his recent book *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*. Dancy's defense is found to be inadequate, and the author proposes a different defense. The author distinguishes various forms of internalism in epistemology and claims that while the internalist regress may be a threat to an idiosyncratic form of internalism, it is not a threat to more paradigmatic forms. The author discusses these points in terms of internalist foundationalisms, coherence theories, and skeptical arguments.

A Purely Causal Solution to One of the Qua Problems,
RICHARD B. MILLER

This paper attempts to solve a problem facing the causal theory of reference. The problem is this: the causal-historical connection by which the theory explains reference seems unavoidably particular. A particular speaker encounters a particular individual at some particular time and this event establishes the word's reference. Yet reference seems unavoidably general. Hence it would seem that causal relations could not establish reference. The paper shows first that no compromise with descriptive theories of reference could solve the *qua* problem. Then the problem is solved purely within the context of causal theory by appealing to an implicit generality built into causal relations.

On Conventions, SEUMAS MILLER

The most plausible theory of conventions is both individualist and rationalist. It is a theory which helps itself only to the individualist notions of intentions, ends, beliefs, and actions. Roughly, there is a convention to perform an action among a set of agents if each has a procedure to perform the action and all or most following this procedure realize some collective end. A detailed account along these lines accommodates objections to David Lewis's theory of convention.

Why Semantic Innocence? GRAHAM OPPY

Direct reference theorists sometimes subscribe to a principle of semantic innocence, namely that sentences embedded in belief reports have the same content as they would have if they were not thus embedded. But (1) there are no good reasons for direct reference theorists to accept this principle (the supporting arguments, offered by, for example, Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon, are defective), and (2) there are good reasons for direct reference theorists to reject this principle.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 32, No. 3, September 1992

Some Remarks on the Object of Physical Knowledge—
Yves R. Simon, RALPH C. NELSON

Taking the term physical knowledge in a broad sense that would include the philosophy of nature, the author proceeds to examine three formulations of the object of this kind of knowledge—mobile being, sensible being, and material being—in order to establish that the three are

equivalent. Theoretical knowledge in its optimal state is certain, and explanatory and physical knowledge would have these notes as well were it perfect. The analysis utilizes distinctions between necessity and contingency, between typological and extensive abstraction, and between the inherently sensible and the accidentally sensible. (The last distinction is ignored in the Berkeleyan account of physical knowledge.) The object of physical knowledge, Simon states, is "the incorruptible formulation of a corruptible reality."

Inverse Correspondence in the Philosophy of Nishida:
The Emergence of the Notion, MASAO ABE

"Inverse Correspondence" is one of the key terms in the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro, the foremost philosopher of modern Japan and the founder of the Kyoto School of Philosophy. When he says, "Only by dying do we encounter God in terms of an inverse correspondence," and "we are always encountering the absolute one in the act of self-denial and in terms of an inverse correspondence," the phrase "inverse correspondence" expresses the dynamic relationship between a human being and God, or between the absolute one and the self. The article tries to clarify how Nishida reached this notion from his earlier logic of *basho* (place), through the confrontation with the Logic of Species expounded by Tanabe Hajime, his rival philosopher. The article is an introductory part of a larger article in which the author presents a critical understanding of Inverse Correspondence.

Music of the Spheres: Kierkegaardian Selves and Transformations,
 EDWARD F. MOONEY

The formulation of self as a relational field (in contrast to an "atomistic-substance") in *Sickness Unto Death* is elaborated musically. The three sets of paired *relata* constituting self are interpreted on analogy with a performing musical ensemble. Kierkegaard's view of self-development through "life-spheres" and the nature of the shifts between them is also given musical elaboration, which, along the way, undermines a widespread misconstrual (see, for example, MacIntyre) holding (a) that life-spheres are arbitrarily chosen, and (b) that the self so choosing is asocial, unrooted in the world. Finally, such musical elaboration throws light on the "contradictions" of the "glad suffering" of Kierkegaard's religious life-sphere.

The Ironist's Utopia: Can Rorty's Liberal Turnip Bleed?
 HOLLIBERT E. PHILLIPS

The paper first sketches quite briefly Rorty's historicist-ironist position as presented in his *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*. It then undertakes to do three related things. It argues: (1) that far from renouncing any

view of a common human nature, Rorty's version of "we-intentions," as a working notion, preserves, indeed entails, some such view; (2) that in maintaining that "cruelty is the worst thing we do," Rorty presents a position which is either incoherent or, if coherent, fails to yield any moral obligations; and (3) that his utopian society consisting of "liberal ironists" represents a dubious improvement over one that appeals to the "myth" of the rational grounding of its central beliefs.

Comprehending Anna Karenina: A Test for Theories of Happiness,
DEAL W. HUDSON

Wittgenstein on Voluntary Actions, JORGE V. ARREGUI

Aristotle's Argument from Motion, JAMES F. MCNIFF

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 89, No. 7, July 1992

Caesar's Wife: On the Moral Significance of Appearing Good,
JULIA DRIVER

This paper explores the question of whether an action is bad, or immoral, simply in virtue of resembling an action which is immoral on other grounds. The answer to this question is yes, given certain qualifications. What is surprising about this answer is that it means that the immorality of some actions will depend completely on the false beliefs of other people. Thus, if wearing real fur is immoral, then wearing a very good fake may be also, if other people are prone to mistake it for real fur. Actions immoral in this way are termed "mimetic immoralities." How these actions are immoral is the focus of this paper.

Semantic Supervenience and Referential Indeterminacy,
JAMES VAN CLEVE

The topic of this paper is the bearing of semantic supervenience (the thesis that semantic facts supervene on nonsemantic facts) on currently influential arguments for the indeterminacy of reference. The argument is that semantic supervenience is a two-edged sword: it is an essential weapon in some attacks on referential determinacy (for example, that of Kripke's Wittgenstein), but it may also be used to undercut the main points against referential determinacy that have been urged by Putnam. Semantic supervenience works against Putnam's argument because it leads

to semantic externalism, a doctrine the article expounds and defends by analogy with externalism in epistemology.

Bayesian Conditionalization Resolves Positivist/Realist Disputes,
JON DORLING

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 89, No. 8, August 1992

Metaphysical Pluralism, HUW PRICE

The paper argues that semantic and ontological minimalism undercuts the distinction between various non-Humean forms of metaphysical realism and something akin to a Wittgensteinian linguistic pluralism. Moreover, pluralism is the default position, and hence constitutes an important and neglected option in a range of contemporary metaphysical debates.

Rigidity, Ontology and Semantic Structure, ALAN SIDELLE

The standard way rigid designation is understood—and must be, to play the role elsewhere in philosophy (especially metaphysics) it is taken to play—holds that counterfactual reference is determined by “identity to the actual referent,” without any more descriptive intermediary. It is argued that this understanding requires a “privileged” ontology, one according to which some, but not all ways of carving up the world (particularly across worlds) get at metaphysically “real” objects. If this understanding of rigidity, and typically associated metaphysical positions—particularly the scientific discovery of identity and essence—are to be accepted, this privileged ontology must be independently defended; neither it nor these other positions are at all supported, as is commonly (if implicitly) supposed, by the basic intuitions supporting the rigid-nonrigid distinction. An alternative account of rigidity is sketched which is ontologically neutral but which explains reference, rigidity, and the truth values of modal statements in terms of descriptive conditions analytically associated with referring expressions.

A Popular Presumption Refuted, V. H. DUDMAN

It is popularly presumed that “Pete will win” encodes about the future exactly what “Pete won” encodes about the past, just as, incontestably, “Pete is cheating” encodes about the present exactly what “Pete was cheating” encodes about the past. But in that case, if Grannie says, “Pete will win,” we ought to report this after the event by saying “Grannie said

Pete won"; just as, incontestably, we report Grannie's allegation "Pete is cheating" after the event by saying "Grannie said Pete was cheating." This is not so, of course. Similar reasoning shows that "If he calls Pete will win" and "If he called Pete won" differ in more than just the times they are about.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 89, No. 9, September 1992

Rights Between Friends, MICHAEL J. MEYER

This paper addresses the question, Are there rights between friends or does the adversarial nature of rights inevitably frustrate the truly mutual orientation of friendship? To suppose that there is no possible legitimate employment of rights in close-knit communities like that among friends (as is frequently done among some "communitarian" thinkers) is to entertain some common, and the paper argues, misguided presumptions about both rights and friends. For instance, the existence of a friendship need not directly result in a flawless cooperative partnership—a kind of "preestablished harmony" between friends. One must also not presuppose, however (as do some liberal thinkers), that the activity of claiming rights is not liable to any limitations.

*Rationality and the Prisoner's Dilemma in David Gauthier's
Morals by Agreement*, BYEONG-UK YI

The article is a critical examination of Gauthier's argument that it is rational to follow the commands of morality. Gauthier bases his argument on "the maximizing conception of rationality," which identifies rationality with the pursuit of individual interest. He applies the maximizing conception to choices of dispositions to action: disposition to constrained maximization is rational to adopt. This is not sufficient to show that acting in accordance with the disposition—that is, acting with restraint to direct pursuit of individual interest—is rational; this does not directly follow from the rationality of adopting the disposition. Further, it is argued that to achieve its aim Gauthier's argument should be based on a conception of rationality which has built-in constraints on direct pursuit of individual interest. Thus, his argument cannot "start from an initial presumption against morality."

Rationality within Reason, DAVID SCHMIDTZ

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 30, No. 3, July 1992

Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle,
HENRY S. RICHARDSON

Why does Aristotle mark out three levels of ends in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7? By developing a uniform interpretation of what it means to pursue something for the sake of an end, this article explains what an unqualified final end (sought solely for its own sake) offers that a (merely) final one does not. This understanding, in turn, suggests an improved account of what Aristotle means by an "ultimate end," distinguishing it from the notion (invoked by Korsgaard, among others) of a source of value. This clarification allows a better understanding of (1) the regress argument at the outset of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2, (2) the way Aristotle argues for the existence of a highest good, (3) the special contribution of "self-sufficiency" (*autarkeia*) within that good, and (4) the potential flexibility of Aristotle's view about the content of the highest good.

The Molyneux Problem, MENNO LIEVERS

The Molyneux problem, as it appears in Locke's *Essay*, is usually taken to be a question about the relationship between the ideas acquired by touch and those acquired by sight. In this article it is argued that the problem must be seen first and foremost within the context of the problem of the visual perception of depth. This interpretation is corroborated by contrasting Descartes' theory of depth perception with that of Molyneux and Locke. The article concludes with an attempt to show how Berkeley's treatment of the Molyneux problem has distorted its proper interpretation.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
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Plotinus' Account of Participation in Ennead VI.4-5,
STEVEN K. STRANGE

It is proposed that the organizing project of *Ennead* 6.4-5 is to present a unified response to two problems in Plato: the Sailcloth Dilemma of the *Parmenides* and the problem of the mode of presence of Soul to the universe in the *Timaeus*. The solution of the latter difficulty is a corollary to that of the first. The treatise's concern with the Sailcloth Dilemma has long been recognized, but it is argued that Plotinus's solution to it has not been fully understood, and that it consists in going between the horns of the dilemma by denying its key assumption that intelligible Being is in any real way present to the sensible world. Rather, matter is supposed to be

present in a special, nonreciprocal manner to the Ideas and Being, with the sensible realm an emergent result, in some sense illusory or unreal, of this relation.

Hume on the Duties of Humanity, ROBERT SHAVER

It has often been argued, both before and after Hume, that while justice is necessary for the subsistence of society, humanity is not. From this argument it is often concluded that justice is more important than humanity, or that there are, strictly speaking, duties of justice but not of humanity. Hume disagrees. He finds humanity just as necessary for subsistence as is justice, and he supposes that there are duties of humanity.

Bergson's Concept of Order, RUTH LORAND

The traditional concept of order recognizes only one type of order, according to which laws, external to the ordered set, govern the set and dictate the necessity of each element's location within the set. A set perfectly ordered thus is highly predictable and its details highly redundant. The only alternative of such an order is disorder. Bergson recognizes two types of order: (1) geometrical or intellectual order fits the traditional concept but does not reflect the true nature of things; (2) vital or intuitive order, more loyal to immediate experience, is highly unpredictable, sensitive, and governed by internal necessity. Art is Bergson's most favorite paradigm for vital order. Bergson concludes that disorder does not exist, since in the absence of one type of order there is always another type, and one never experiences disorder. This paper presents and examines Bergson's original distinction and criticizes his claim about disorder.

Mathematical Construction, Symbolic Cognition and the Infinite Intellect: Reflection on Maimon and Maimonides,
DAVID LACHTERMAN

Leibniz's Adamic Language of Thought, MICHAEL LOSONSKY

Fichte, Lask, and Lukacs's Hegelian Marxism, TOM ROCKMORE

MIND

Vol. 101, No. 4, October 1992

On Content, NATHAN SALMON

A novel interpretation of Frege is suggested on which *Erkenntniswerte* is not identified with *Sinn*, but is instead a third semantic value distinct from both *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*. Independent reasons are provided for positing a semantic value—logical content—between cognitive content and extension. Expressions have the same logical content if and only if they are logically equivalent. This criterion is sharpened and modified, with the result that sentences of different languages may be said to share the same logical content. Logical content emerges as a feature of propositions; cognitive content determines logical content but not vice versa, and logical content determines extension but not vice versa. A novel solution is proposed for a puzzle introduced by Ali Kazmi. It is argued that such items as Church's Theorem, Goldbach's Conjecture, and so on, are not propositions but logical contents. Extensions of the apparatus are considered, generating a more general notion of theoretical content.

Why Is There So Little Sense In Grundgesetze? PETER SIMONS

Introducing the sense-reference distinction was the biggest alteration in Frege's philosophy of logic between *Begriffsschrift* and *Grundgesetze*. He conceivably fixed upon the distinction when considering Schröder's *Logik* and Husserl's review of it, which were part of a wider contemporary controversy in Germany between extensionalist and intensionalist logicians. Having distinguished senses (especially thoughts) from referents (especially truth values), Frege took truth, and in general reference, to be the prime concern of logic: hence the relative paucity of considerations of sense in *Grundgesetze*. Frege probably published "On Sense and Reference" partly in order not to have to write about the distinction in *Grundgesetze*. But sense is not completely absent from the latter: in particular Frege says in "Function and Concept" that the two sides of the infamous Basic Law V have the same sense, although this is presented in different ways.

Hybrid Proper Names, WOLFGANG KÜNNE

If we take literally what Frege says in his essay "The Thought," then in an utterance of an indexical sentence *S* the complete thought-expression is not *S* by itself, but *S* together with a slice of nonlinguistic reality. This suggests a rather nonstandard conception of the makeup of certain Fregean proper names as well. In a first-person utterance, for example, the proper name consists not only of a token of the first-person pronoun, but also of the speaker. It is this "hybrid" proper name, and not the indexical by itself, which refers to (*bedeutet*) the speaker. The article outlines some consequences of this view and tries to make it look less bizarre by comparing hybrid proper names with quotation names. As an aside, there are also a few observations concerning similar (and similarly neglected) ideas in Wittgenstein and Schlick.

The New Intensionalism, JERROLD J. KATZ

From the beginning of the linguistic turn in this century to the present, philosophical discussions of language have consistently assumed that

intensionalism, the doctrine that expressions of natural language have sense as well as reference, can only be Fregean intensionalism. In earlier papers, the author argues that this widespread assumption is false because there is another form of intensionalism fundamentally different from Frege's; and, further, that the failure to recognize such an alternative has led to the acceptance of criticisms of the intensionalist position which, in fact, are only criticisms of Fregean intensionalism. Since then the author has come to think that the assumption is false for a different and deeper reason, namely, that the systematic semantics that Frege developed and that Carnap refurbished is not intensionalism at all. In this paper, the author seeks to explain why he now thinks this. In the process, it is hoped there will be provided a new perspective on the linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy and a new conception of the relation between the analytic and the necessary and a priori.

Content, Embodiment and Objectivity: the Theory of Cognitive Trails, ADRIAN CUSSINS

The possibility of a new kind of representational theory is demonstrated: a theory which is not empiricist but which explains concepts and thoughts in terms of the nonconceptual, embodied contents of experience. The theory is not empiricist, because it does not presuppose the mind in order to explain reference; and neither is it rationalist, because concepts and truth are not presupposed. It adopts a symmetric metaphysics in which mind and world are explained as the logical genesis of the distinction between mind and world. Objectivity is treated not as an external goal at which human practice can aim, but as something which may be achieved internally to practice. The notion of "cognitive trails through environmental experience" is introduced, and objective content is formalized as a dynamic construction within a two-dimensional space whose axes are given by the perspective-dependence of the cognitive trails, and by their degree of stabilization.

Frege's Puzzle, Sense, and Information Content,
WILLIAM W. TASCHEK

THE MONIST
Vol. 75, No. 4, October 1992

Purpose, Power, and Agency, VINCENT M. COLAPIETRO

This article reexamines classical American pragmatism in light of the three themes indicated in the title, with special consideration being given to the pragmatic reconceptualization of human agency. In opposition

to the marked tendency of various contemporary neopragmatists to equate the pragmatic outlook with cultural criticism, it is argued here that what we encounter in the writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey is nothing less than a speculatively bold vision of our agency-in-the-world. The outlines of this vision are traced. In addition, its roots in the exigency of agents to come to a fuller and finer comprehension of the conditions and consequences of their agency are explored.

Continuing Empiricist Epistemology: Holistic Aspects in James's Pragmatism, ISAAC NEVO

The purpose of this paper is to show that James's pragmatism involves an empiricist epistemology of an evidentially holistic sort, akin to that of Quine; and that, in virtue of his defense of such an epistemology, James's project cannot be regarded as a precursor of Rorty's employment of pragmatism to debunk epistemology as such. The argument of this paper consists in two parallel lines of polemics: against Quine, who fails to recognize the holistic character of James's empiricism; and against Rorty, who equally fails to acknowledge the empiricist character of James's pragmatism. In different ways, both overlook the way in which holistic reasoning grounds and qualifies James's pragmatic account of truth and knowledge. The historical development of post-Humean empiricism is thus shown to be more complex than Quine's tale of five consecutive accomplishments suggests, and the outcome of these developments is philosophically more viable than Rorty's ridicule would lead one to suppose. This paper attempts to recover the sense in which James's pragmatism is an important chapter in post-Humean empiricism—a correction to its reductionist zeal which does not abandon the empiricist defense of science in the polemics of modernity.

Pragmatism and Pluralism, BETH J. SINGER

Even though "pragmatism" names a recognizable movement in philosophy, it does not denote a unitary outlook. Nevertheless, the contention that the connection among the diverse pragmatic philosophers is only methodological is ill-founded. There are substantive features of pragmatic thought that are characteristic, and one of these is pluralism. The objective of this paper is twofold: first, to review some of the pluralist elements in the writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey, and second, to call attention to the work of two seldom discussed pragmatists in whose writings pluralism is a central motif: John Herman Randall, Jr. and Horace Kallen. The paper focuses on pluralism of four types: metaphysical and moral pluralism, and the empirical and phenomenological pluralism to which both are linked.

Peirce on "Substance and Foundations,"
VINCENT G. POTTER, S.J.

C. S. Peirce has something to contribute to our better understanding of two sometimes puzzling notions: (1) the substantiality of things,

especially of the "self"; and (2) the "foundations," if any, of human knowledge. With regard to the notion of substance, Peirce uses his categories to advantage in rendering an account of the two functions required of substance, namely, to account for individuality and continuity, and to account for individuals perduring as individuals over time. Here Peircean Secondness and Thirdness come to the rescue. With regard to the notion of a foundation for human knowledge, Peirce maintains that since all human knowing is inferential, there are no first principles, abstractly conceived of by most of the tradition to ground our knowledge. Rather, there is a "first principle" concretely operative in knowing, namely, intelligence itself in act. This "principle" is encountered only as concretely instantiated and is grasped not in an abstract formula but in the concrete act of intelligence.

William James's Theory of the Self, W. E. COOPER

How is the physicalism about the self in James's *Principles of Psychology* to be reconciled with the spiritualism about the self in later works such as the *Varieties of Religious Experience*? A two-level analysis of James's theorizing reveals that there is no inconsistency here. James always recognized the need to distinguish metaphysical from scientific levels of inquiry. The *Principles* studies the self from a scientific point of view, issuing in a predominantly physicalistic account; but it leaves a place for a metaphysical account of the self, which might reveal a nonphysical, spiritual dimension of the self.

The Purpose of the Proof of Pragmatism in Peirce's 1903 Lectures on Pragmatism, PATRICIA ANN TURRISI

By 1903 Peirce recognized a need for a logical proof for pragmatism as a maxim of science. He further recognized, however, that the criteria for any logical proof depend on a definition of logic derived from precise observation of the capacities and uses of logic in relation to the whole of all knowledge possible by science. Thus an architectonic of sciences is elaborated and defended in his lectures on *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking*. Logic grounds psychology and is founded on the other normative sciences, ethics and aesthetics, which derive "data" from the most primal of the positive sciences, phenomenology, and which depend upon pure mathematics. Pragmatism is a tool by which logic elucidates the basic elements of reasoning. This article demonstrates how the inquiry into a logical proof of pragmatism is related to the deeper issue of the definition of a science of logic.

The Sentiment of Pragmatism: From the Pragmatic Maxim to a Pragmatic Faith, PETER OCHS

The uniquely pragmatic aspect of C. S. Peirce's philosophy consists in a sentiment that competing theories ought to be referred to a single

norm of inquiry and that such a norm will be located only in the contributions these theories make to repairing errant practices in the communities they serve. This pragmatic sentiment informs Peirce's efforts to integrate the two competing tendencies in his own theoretical work: an historicist tendency, exemplified in his critique of Cartesianism; and a foundationalist tendency, exemplified in his transcendentalism. Unmediated by a pragmatic sentiment, these two tendencies divide contemporary pragmatic scholarship into opposing schools of deconstructive historicists and semiotic foundationalists. A suggested remedy is to reread Peirce's later pragmatism, pragmatically, as a dialogue between two complementary modes of philosophic inquiry: hermeneutics and logic.

*Feminism and Pragmatism: On the Arrival of a Ministry
of Disturbance, a Regulated Source of Annoyance; a Destroyer
of Routine; an Underminer of Complacency,*
MARJORIE C. MILLER

William James's Theory of the Self, W. E. COOPER

*The World We Practically Live In: William James's Concrete
Analysis of Experience,*
CHARLENE HADDOCK SEIGFRIED

William James's Theory of Truth, RODERICK M. CHISOLM

NOUS

Vol. 26, No. 3, June 1992

Frege: The Royal Road from Geometry, MARK WILSON

Under the leadership of Poncelet's "projective" school, traditional Euclidean geometry gradually transmogrified until it became, by mid-nineteenth century, the investigation of a richer "complexified" domain, where ordinary figures like circles were treated as possessing sundry invisible parts. A rich variety of attempts to justify these changes philosophically in geometrical methodology were discussed by mathematicians of the period. The present article argues that a deep affinity binds Frege's logicism to some of these proposals, notably those advanced by K. von Staudt. This geometrical background, it is claimed, clarifies the motivations behind many of Frege's well known philosophical opinions.

Pity, Fear, and Catharsis in Aristotle's Poetics,
CHARLES B. DANIELS and SAM SCULLY

The question addressed in this paper is whether in Aristotle's analysis of tragedy the production of pity, fear, and a catharsis of these emotions in audiences—readers, auditors, or viewers—is essential to works of dramatic tragedy, or to good ones. The authors argue, taking Aristotle passage by passage, that it is not. Among the distinctions brought to bear are (1) real life actions and responses as opposed to make-believe ones, and (2) felt emotions as opposed to typically felt emotions as in turn opposed to emotional characterization of actions, events, incidents, and situations.

Being Knowingly Incoherent, RICHARD FOLEY

Leibniz and the Miracle of Freedom, R. CRANSTON PAULL

NOUS

Vol. 26. No. 4, September 1992

Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires,
ALFRED R. MELE

Pristine belief-desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, second order desires have been imported into a more streamlined view to explicate freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. This paper's focal question is whether continent and incontinent behavior are to be conceived, as some argue, in terms of the victory or defeat of higher order desires. The answer no is defended. The problems with traditional "judgment-centered" conceptions of continent and incontinent behavior can be resolved by means of a proper understanding of practical commitment—one that does not treat such commitment as an essentially second order phenomenon.

The Lockean Theory of Communication,
CHRISTOPHER GAUKER

Linguistic communication is commonly explained as a process in which the speaker chooses words to express a thought and the hearer grasps the thought expressed. Such a theory can be found in Locke, for instance. This theory of communication conflicts with the idea that language is itself the medium of propositional thought. This paper examines the most important reasons for accepting such a theory of communication and argues

that none of them is persuasive. The paper closes with an argument to the effect that the phenomenon of language learning depends on a kind of communication more fundamental than that which this theory describes.

Explanatory Instability, ROBERT BATTERMAN

In this paper it is argued that there exist phenomena ubiquitous in classical physics that require for their explanations a model of statistical explanation that is fundamentally different from current accounts. In particular, Peter Railton's Deductive-Nomological-Probabilistic model, as well as Hempel's Inductive-Statistical model, fail to provide the correct explanation for these phenomena. Fully deterministic classical systems can exhibit behavior requiring statistical explanation of a sort completely ignored by the received models. This behavior is the result of instabilities found, in various forms, in the motions of dynamical systems. A sketch of the form an appropriate model for statistical explanation in these cases should take is offered.

Changing the Past, PEIMIN NI

It is commonly believed that it is possible to change the present and the future, but not the past. This paper carefully distinguishes several senses in which we may use the term "change." It shows that in some senses, to change the past is no less possible than to change the present and the future; in some other senses, it is as impossible to change the present or the future as it is to change the past. The paper argues that the commonly accepted asymmetry between changing the past and changing the future can be accepted only in a modified sense, and as a contingent truth rather than as a logical necessity.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 42, No. 169, October 1992

Loyalty and Virtues, R. E. EWIN

Loyalty gives a special position to members of a favored group and can therefore lead to injustice to those excluded; it can also lead to other forms of unfortunate behavior. On the other hand, loyalty can be displayed through virtues, and virtues can be displayed through loyalty. That loyalty is an emotional tie requiring that one sometimes be prepared to go against good judgment is a special problem in trying to sort out loyalty's status among the virtues. This paper argues that loyalty, as an expression of the sociability that provides the context for ethical life, is not itself a virtue, but is the raw material for all virtues and many vices.

Modesty, Pride and Realistic Self-Assessment, DANIEL STATMAN

Some philosophers believe that modesty means underestimating one's real value. This view, however, makes modesty dependent on a kind of ignorance, or even on self-deception, qualities which are incompatible with virtue. Others suggest that modesty means a realistic self-assessment, taking one's achievements in perspective. It is unclear, however, how a person who is genuinely worthy and admirable can take his achievements in perspective and still be modest. This is possible only if a pessimistic view of human nature is presupposed, one based, for instance, on the low status of human beings in comparison to God. The article contends that modesty is a disposition which helps one avoid immoral kinds of behavior, a disposition typical of those who excel. In the paradigmatic case the modest person has a realistic, high self-assessment but nevertheless treats other human beings with the appropriate moral respect. Since those who excel are justified in being proud of themselves, pride and modesty are not necessarily incompatible.

Externalism and Token Identity, WILLIAM SEAGER

Donald Davidson espouses two theses about the individuation of mental events. The first is the thesis of the causal individuation of events: $(\forall x)(\forall y) (x = y \equiv (\forall z)((x \text{ caused } z \equiv y \text{ caused } z) \wedge (z \text{ caused } x \equiv z \text{ caused } y)))$. The second thesis gives only a sufficient condition for difference of mental events. Call it the thesis of the content individuation of mental events: $(\forall x)(\forall y)(x \text{ and } y \text{ have different contents } \supset x \neq y)$. This paper explores the logical tensions that spring from acceptance of these theses in conjunction with Davidson's theory of token identity and the doctrine of psychological externalism (the view that the content of intentional mental states is, in part at least, determined via reference to factors external to the subject of these mental states). It is maintained that given these theses, psychological externalism of a particular sort entails that Davidson's doctrine of token identity is false.

Necessary Conditions and Explaining How-possibly,
RICHARD REINER

William Dray has argued that historical explanations may take the form of answers to the question, How could the event *E* possibly have occurred? and that such explanations are not reducible to the Hempelian covering-law form. In this article it is argued that a how-possibly explanation of an event must involve the assertion that some known necessary condition for the event has been satisfied, but that in the examples Dray uses to support his argument only a single member of some hypothetical, and possibly infinite, jointly necessary set of conditions has been satisfied. It is further argued that Dray's examples seem convincing only because the condition satisfied suggests a particular causal account of the event,

that is, a covering-law explanation. Finally, it is argued that explanation by necessary conditions is methodologically hazardous, because statements of the form " E_1 is a necessary condition for E_2 " are unfalsifiable.

Towards a Unified Theory of Higher-Level Predication,
C. J. F. WILLIAMS

Peirce and Prior rightly held that propositions were no-place predicables. Second level predicables, therefore, can be said to form predicables out of predicables. "Everyone", for instance, is one which forms an n -place predicable from an $(n + 1)$ -place predicable, for example, "_____ likes everyone" from "_____ likes. . ." So is "himself," which forms "_____ likes himself" from "_____ likes. . .". Unary sentential operators form n -place predicables from n -place predicables; binary operators form $(n + m)$ -place predicables from an n -place and an m -place, where n and m may be zero. We can regard "_____ believes that . . ." as forming an $(n + 1)$ -place predicable from an n -place predicable. Third level predicables will allow us to understand the relation between singular and plural verbs and go some way to providing a nominalist analysis of number-statements.

The Liar Paradox and Many-Valued Logic, S. V. BHAVE

A philosophically satisfactory resolution of the paradox of the Liar and the Strengthened Liar sentences needs an extension of logic to incorporate the logical principles governing inferences when expressions like "most probably true," and so forth, are involved. The resolution of the paradoxes lies in the realization that a sentence x can be such that it is neither true nor false, but is only x_1 -probably-true, (x_1 being some degree of probability); and if x is x_1 -probably-true, given that Y is true, then if Y itself is only Y_1 -probably-true, X can only be x_2 -probably-true, where x_2 is necessarily different from x_1 as well as from y_1 . The paper also discusses the need to modify the established probability calculus, taking into account the fact that two sentences in different levels of languages with apparently the same meaning can be true with different degrees of probability.

PHILOSOPHY

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Disgust and Moral Taboos, JOHN KEKES

The central claim of this paper is that there is a form of disgust that has fundamental moral importance because it is the justified reaction to the violation of moral taboos. Moral taboos prohibit breaking basic moral

rules that protect us from evil and constitute part of our identity as moral agents. Since the moral taboos whose violation causes disgust form the bulwark against barbarism, the disposition to feel disgust on the appropriate occasions is a sign of justified moral seriousness. Correspondingly, its absence is a sign of a reprehensible weakening of moral commitments.

Caring About Justice, JONATHAN DANCY

This article examines the relation between the "care perspective" and the "justice perspective." It argues that the suggested differences between them are exaggerated. There are differences, however, and a crucial one turns on the particularistic tendency of the care perspective; but particularism has independent sources and merits.

The Definition of "Game," M. W. ROWE

It is argued that there are two fundamental sorts of game: games with an internal goal, which can either be achieved by skill, luck, or some combination of these; and games whose content is determined by a sequence, either involving make-believe or a specified series of actions. Games are distinguished from performances of works of art, rituals, ceremonies, stunts and sports. The final section discusses the relationship between games and play.

Duty and Desolation, RAE LANGTON

The remarkable correspondence between Kant and Maria von Herbert concerns friendship and secrecy, duty and desire. What role do these have in Kant's philosophy? An answer is given that draws on the letters, and on the work, of Strawson and Korsgaard. Kant's contrast between lying and reticence is, it is argued, ill-founded by Kant's own lights. Taking the principle of humanity as fundamental, one sees that truth-telling can be vicious, and lying virtuous. Moreover, von Herbert presents a challenge to Kant's philosophy that remained unnoticed by Kant. Von Herbert is, on a severe reading of Kantian philosophy, a saint: so much the worse for that philosophy. But there is a saner Kantian philosophy. What resources might this provide in understanding the situation of women in general, and this woman in particular? Following Korsgaard, the article explores the possibility of a consequentialist Kantianism, and shows how it might apply to von Herbert's case.

Goodness and Truth, RAIMOND GAITA

The article explores whether we are able to make sober sense of the talk of a love of truth. It asks whether the phenomena which incline us

to speak of a love of truth really are forms of love rather than mere enthusiasms or passions disciplined by the intellectual virtues which must characterize any serious form of inquiry. The articles argue that we can make sense of a love of truth if our thought is informed and disciplined by certain examples. It argues by way of examples that a serious conception of the love of truth goes hand in hand with a conception of goodness of a kind which invites a capital *G*, and that the Platonic conviction that there is an intimate connection between a truth and goodness is not merely edifying but obscurantist rhetoric. The argument is located in the context of a discussion of the intrinsic value of academic study.

Forms, Qualities, Resemblance, MAX DEUTSCHER

The paper attacks the lack of attention to the meaning of terms in current "neotraditionalist" metaphysics. It describes how Plato's Socrates moved towards Forms because he would not admit the various origins of knowledge. Nevertheless, the Forms develop within and beyond the imagery of Plato's Cave towards their dismemberment in the *Parmenides*. In contrast, blind to its own problematic history, neotraditionalism proceeds as if metaphysical language did not have to be explained.

The paper redeploys conceptual analysis and phenomenology to show the twists of meaning within "quality," "characteristic," "property," and "resemblance." A parallel is drawn between the bogus dichotomy of universals and particulars, and the split between appearance and reality. To replace "Form" or "universal" by "resemblance," is to treat "resemblance" itself as a universal. But the sense of the whole cluster—"resemblance," "semblance," "quality," "characteristic," "property," and "universal"—can be revived by attention to etymology, phenomenology, and actual use.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Vol. 52, No. 3, September 1992

Was Meinong Only Pretending? FREDERICK W. KROON

This paper argues that there is a plausible interpretation of Meinong's work on which his commitment to nonexistent objects has nothing to do with his desire to validate such claims as "The golden mountain is golden." It argues instead for a two-stage interpretation of Meinong's reading of such a claim. On this interpretation, Meinong's reasons for regarding the claim as true have to do with the way we are able to exploit existential pretence. His reasons for accepting the further objectual thesis that we are thereby attributing a property to a certain nonexistent golden mountain have to do with his view that the golden mountain clearly constitutes the nonpretend focus of a number of actual relationships people find themselves in. Far from this being a strange way of motivating the semantics of

statements like "The golden mountain is golden," and hence a strange interpretation of Meinong, it is argued that this compares favorably with the sort of view defended by Kripke in his John Locke Lectures.

Causality, Reliabilism, and Mathematical Knowledge,
ALBERT CASULLO

In his seminal paper, "Mathematical Truth," Paul Benacerraf argued that a plausible theory of knowledge cannot accommodate knowledge of statements whose truth conditions involve abstract entities. Recent writers have argued that once the causal theory of knowledge is rejected in favor of reliabilism, Benacerraf's problem evaporates. This paper examines whether this optimistic assessment is warranted. Two forms of reliabilism are distinguished: reliable indicator theories, and process reliabilism. It is argued that the former theories cannot accommodate knowledge of abstract entities since they involve causal constraints similar to those required by the causal theory. In the case of process reliabilism, it is argued that although some versions of the theory are compatible with knowledge of abstract entities, they are too weak to provide plausible constraints on knowledge. A stronger version of the theory is proposed and defended. Finally, it is argued that this stronger version presents obstacles to knowledge of abstract entities.

What is at Stake Between Putnam and Rorty? PAUL D. FORSTER

The disagreements between Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty worry sympathetic pragmatists. Rorty claims that his view is almost the same as Putnam's internal realism and that he shares Putnam's desire to find a middle ground between metaphysical realism and radical relativism. Despite this, Putnam insists that Rorty's pragmatism is a self-refuting relativism that leads to cognitive nihilism. This paper attempts to determine whether this disagreement is the result of a schism in pragmatism or merely of a difference in the formulation of their positions. A detailed interpretation of Rorty's pragmatism is articulated and defended against objections levied by Putnam and others. The version of pragmatism outlined is then shown to be immune from several intractable problems associated with Putnam's limit theory of truth.

Are Human Rights Based on Equal Human Worth?
LOUIS P. POJMAN

The rhetoric of human rights and theories of equal human rights have experienced an exponential growth during the past forty years. From declarations of human rights, such as the United Nations' "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," to arguments about the rights of fetuses versus the rights of women, to claims and counterclaims about the rights of

minorities to preferential hiring, to assertions of the rights of animals to life and well-being, the proliferation of rights affects every phase of our socio-political discourse.

Virtually the only candidate for a rights theory today is egalitarianism. Whatever the differences in these theories, they all accept what Ronald Dworkin calls the "egalitarian plateau," the "deepest moral assumption" of our time, that each person is of equal intrinsic value or dignity and thus ought to be treated with equal respect and be given equal rights. This paper outlines and examines ten principal arguments for equal human rights given by contemporary egalitarians. It argues that in their present form none of them is compelling and that there are reasons to give up egalitarianism altogether.

Lying, Liars and Language, DAVID SIMPSON

This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth tellers.

Toward a Compatibility Theory for Internalist and Externalist Epistemologies, JAMES F. SENNETT

It is canonical and customary to divide epistemological theories into internalist and externalist theories. The internalist argues that justification is a matter of internal access, while the externalist insists that processes or mechanisms functioning to produce certain types of beliefs in certain types of stimulative situations are the key to a theory of justification. These positions are often considered mutually exclusive. It is the author's contention, however, that the intuitions that motivate both theory-types are important epistemologically, that both define issues that must be addressed in a theory of knowledge, and that they can be understood as compatible doctrines. This paper presents certain distinctions between internalism and externalism that define two different epistemological tasks. It then proposes an approach to the theory of knowledge according to which both tasks can and should be legitimately pursued. It closes with some musings concerning the implications of the author's compromise proposal for the post-Gettier quest for an analysis of knowledge.

The Truth Connection, EARL CONEE

Epistemic justification is the sort of justification that is needed in order to have factual knowledge. It justifies in a way that is directly pertinent to the truth of what is justified. The precise relation between

this sort of justification and truth is not clear. The present work identifies the nature of this relation, called "the truth connection." It is contended that the justification that is necessary for knowledge supports propositions rather than beliefs. This justification consists in evidence for the truth of the supported proposition.

Putnam on Intentionality, JOHN HALDANE

In a series of widely discussed and influential recent publications, Hilary Putnam has conjoined the advocacy of metaphysical antirealism ("empirical" or "internal" realism) with a sustained criticism of a realist account of intentionality and semantics. In his view, meaning is neither reducible (as supposed by Fodor) nor eliminable (as supposed by Churchland). Thus he stands opposed to the project of naturalistic theories of mental representation—such as is favored by computational functionalists—and to that of a nonintentional, neuropsychological alternative.

Equally, however, he rejects what he titles "the Brentano Thesis," the claim that intentionality is an objective, primitive, mind-world, thinker-thing relation. According to Putnam, the "Brentanist" or intentionalist view is demonstrably incoherent. The present paper identifies several distinct charges brought against intentionalism, and in examining them (and their presuppositions) it argues that the case is not complete. At least one version of realism, intentional content and reference, escapes conviction. This view is central to classical intentionalism, a tradition contributed to in complementary ways by Aquinas and Reid. It is acknowledged that Putnam advances additional arguments relevant to the issue, but these rest upon independent metaphysical and epistemological considerations, and to press them at the points Putnam chooses is simply to beg several questions.

Heidegger and Habermas on Criticism and Totality, DAVID KOLB

Habermas's criticisms of Heidegger stem from philosophical differences that are independent of and partly responsible for Habermas's wayward readings of Heidegger's text. This paper examines the criticism that understandings of being, and the later sendings (*Geschicke*) and epochs of being, overwhelm (because they set the conditions for) any intersubjective process of validation aimed at individual propositions or at questioning frameworks of meaning. By way of an example from Aristotle's physics, and a defense of Heidegger against that example, it is argued that Habermas is mistaken in the details of his criticism, but it is concluded that the overall point of his criticism is correct. The author locates the root of the problem in differing sorts of conditions of possibility, and suggests a position that might preserve some of the insights of both thinkers.

Things Change, MARK HELLER

A common objection to the temporal parts ontology is that such an ontology is inconsistent with the fact that things survive change. Various

versions of the objection are considered. It is argued that they all depend on a misunderstanding of the temporal parts ontology.

Substance Without Substratum, ARDA DENKEL

This paper shows that the following metaphysical assumptions, made by both the critics and defenders of the bundle theory of objecthood, are false: (1) The bundle theory entails that the (particular) elements of a compresence are its parts, and (2) to inhere in a substance entails being borne by a substratum. Against these it is argued that even though there is a sense in which the parts of a whole overlap in space-time, this is not existence in compresence. The latter necessitates sharing a position with elements that fall under different determinables, without sharing parts with them: the parts of a compresence are compresences themselves. The principle of inherence is consistent with the bundle view: If inherence is understood as "being present in an object," and objects are construed as bundles, inhering becomes "being the element of a compresence." Such a move leaves the substratum out of substance.

Of One's Own Free Will, DENNIS W. STAMPE
and MARTHA I. GIBSON

RATIO

Vol. 5, No. 1, June 1992

Scepticism and Goldman's Naturalism,
MARKUS LAMMENRANTA

Alvin I. Goldman sees epistemology as a multidisciplinary enterprise that needs help, for example, from empirical psychology (or cognitive science). He thinks also that such an epistemology should be able to give a response to skepticism without just assuming that skepticism is false. It is shown that Goldman's epistemology (epistemics) cannot give such a response. His attempt either leads to circularity or makes psychology irrelevant to epistemology. In other words, his epistemics makes it impossible to give an adequate answer to the question whether our psychological processes are reliable and whether our beliefs are thus justified.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* (formerly *Philosophical Studies*) announces a call for articles in all areas of philosophy, especially articles which concern the history of philosophy or which address issues common to analytic and continental styles of philosophizing. All submissions are refereed and should be sent in duplicate to Dermot Moran, Editor, The International Journal of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Dublin 4, Ireland. The journal will publish its first volume and number in March 1993, and will be published two times a year. Subscription information may be obtained from Trevina White, Routledge Subscriptions, ITPS Ltd., Department J, Cheriton House, North Way, Andover, Hants SP10 5BE, England.

The Metaphysical Society of America announces a call for papers to be presented at its March 1994 meeting entitled "Becoming." There will be four sessions, each focusing on a different aspect of reality from the perspective of the general theme: "Becoming and Time," "Becoming and Person," "Becoming and Society," and "Becoming and Nature." Some papers will be invited; the majority will be selected by the Program Committee. A prospectus of at least two pages, outlining the theme and general arguments, or a draft paper of no more than twenty-five pages, should be sent by May 1, 1993, to George Allan, Dean, Dickinson College, P.O. Box 1773, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. Papers that are selected must have a reading time of no more than thirty minutes.

The Scots Philosophical Club, in association with Trinity College, Dublin, invites papers for a conference to be held in the spring of 1994 commemorating the three-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Francis Hutcheson. Papers may be on the interpretation of Hutcheson and on present day debates in the topics with which he is associated, notably moral theory, utilitarianism, and aesthetics. Abstracts of two hundred to four hundred words, together with a biographical note, should be sent by September 1, 1993, to L. G. Graham, Secretary of the Scots Philosophical Club, Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland KY16 9AL.

Papers are invited for the Third International Jaspers Conference, to be held in conjunction with the Nineteenth World Congress of Philosophy, which will take place in August 1993 in Moscow. Papers should have a reading time of twenty to twenty-five minutes and should be submitted by January 31, 1992, to Leonard Ehrlich, 7 Baldwin Lane, Amherst, Massachusetts 01002.

An international conference on "Ethics as First Philosophy? The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature, and Religion" will be held May 20-23, 1993, at the Lake Shore Campus of Loyola University, Chicago. The conference is funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities and organized by Adriaan T. Peperzak. The program will include sessions on ethics as first philosophy, responsibility, philosophy and literature, philosophy and Judaism, philosophy and religion, and the

importance of Levinas for art and politics. For information on the program and accommodations write to Beth Spina, Department of Philosophy, Crown Center for the Humanities 344, Loyola University Chicago, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60626.

The Kennedy Institute of Ethics will hold its nineteenth annual Intensive Bioethics Course from June 6-12, 1993, at Georgetown University. The course is open to physicians, nurses, chaplains, lawyers, policymakers, and other health care practitioners, and will have a combined lecture and small group discussion format. Proposed topics are informed consent, health care allocation, death and dying issues, and human gene therapy. The cost of approximately \$1,400 covers all materials and most meals. Invited faculty include Tom L. Beauchamp, James F. Childress, Ruth R. Faden, Edmund Pellegrino, Robert Veatch, and LeRoy Walters. Graduate credit and continuing education credit will be available. Information about the course and membership in the Institute may be obtained from Diane Michutka, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057.

IN MEMORIAM

F. S. C. Northrop
(1893-1992)

F. S. C. Northrop was singular among American philosophers in his concern with ideological conflicts and their resolution. During a century in which the world was rent by wars and philosophers retreated to their academies, Northrop directed his philosophical endeavors to an understanding of the ideologies that erupted into the conflicts, and to the discovery of the principles of international law that would serve as the foundations for world peace.

Northrop began his career as a philosopher of science. At Harvard he prepared his dissertation under William Ernest Hocking and L. J. Henderson on the topic of organization in biology. Earlier he had studied under A. N. Whitehead at London, and subscribed to the English philosopher's call for a reconstruction of cosmology based on humanistic as well as scientific concepts. From Harvard Northrop joined the Yale University faculty in 1923. Subsequently he studied Einstein's relativity physics and befriended the German scientist. Einstein's influence on Northrop is immeasurable. When Northrop retired from Yale after nearly four decades of teaching and research, he was Sterling professor of philosophy and law.

Northrop's first book, *Science and First Principles* (1931), offers a philosophical cosmology consonant with humanistic values. Northrop utilized his mastery of the concepts and methods of theoretical physics and biology to propose a Parmenidean interpretation of the world. His hypothesis of the macroscopic atom as the ultimate constitution of the cosmos has been deemed by A. N. Whitehead to be the only alternative to his own cosmology of microscopic atomic occasions or actual entities.

Northrop authored or edited a dozen books. His fame, however, springs mainly from his 1946 book, *The Meeting of East and West*. Appearing in the immediate post-World War II environment, as the clouds of the Cold War were gathering, this book analyzes the cultural differences that divided the world into armed camps at war with each other, and proposes a method of resolving the conflicts through a synthesis of ideas and values. Northrop's approach to an understanding of cultures was carried on by means of philosophy and in particular by his epistemology of science. He held that basic to a culture is its philosophy, and he proceeded to analyze the different cultures of the world in terms of the philosophies which are implicit in them. It is interesting that his theory placed the culture of the Soviet Union on the side of the West; and fundamental to Western cultures are, according to Northrop, abstract, general notions—concepts by postulation. Eastern cultures, on the other hand, are shaped by philosophies which accentuate immediate experience—concepts by intuition. Just as modern science had established epistemic correlations between these two sorts of concepts to develop comprehensive theories capable of explanation, prediction, and hence control of nature, Northrop hoped that similar success might be achieved in the construction of a world order which would enhance cultural pluralism under the rule of international law.

As the Cold War unleashed its storms, Northrop's optimism of 1946 faded. Nevertheless, he continued to seek the conditions requisite for world peace through an examination of the role of philosophies in the formation of cultures and an exploration of the possibilities for international law. His insistence on the study of philosophies to understand the genesis of national policies that lead to conflict rested in part on his painstaking efforts to grasp the living laws of different societies and on his conviction that sociological methods fail where philosophical analysis succeeds. Hence, Northrop recommended that the major department of any government's Foreign Office or Department of State should be its Division of Cultural Relations, a division in which comparative philosophy would be a required subject. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the promise of a new world order marred by ethnic strife, Northrop's recommendation is eminently timely.—Andrew J. Reck, *Tulane University*.

HISPANIC PHILOSOPHY:
ITS BEGINNING AND GOLDEN AGE

JORGE J. E. GRACIA

I

HISPANIC PHILOSOPHY. The notion of Hispanic philosophy is a useful one for trying to understand certain historical phenomena related to the philosophy developed in the Iberian peninsula, the Iberian colonies in the New World, and the countries that those colonies eventually came to form.¹ It is useful for two reasons. First, it focuses attention on the close relations among the philosophers in these geographical areas; and second, other historical denominations and categorizations do not do justice to such relations. This becomes clear when one examines the standard general categorizations according to which the philosophical thought of the mentioned geographical areas is divided and studied: Spanish philosophy, Portuguese philosophy, Catalan philosophy, Latin American philosophy, Spanish-American philosophy, and Ibero-American philosophy.

The category "Spanish philosophy" usually includes only the philosophy that has taken place in the territory occupied by the modern Spanish state, whether before or after the state was constituted in the fifteenth century as a result of the efforts of Ferdinand of Aragón and Isabella of Castile. Thus, most histories of Spanish philosophy discuss the thought of Roman, Islamic, and Jewish

¹ The term "Hispanic" is a derivative from *Hispania*, the name used by Romans for the Iberian peninsula. Its use was popularized by the members of the Generation of 1898, a Spanish group of intellectuals who flourished at the turn of the century and who can be considered the progenitors of modern Iberian thought. In philosophy, the term "Hispanic" has been used by Eduardo Nicol to refer to the philosophy of Spain and Spanish America. See Eduardo Nicol, *El problema de la filosofía hispánica* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1961).

philosophers who worked in that territory, as well as of medieval and subsequent authors who did likewise. In some cases, these accounts concentrate on Castillian-speaking philosophers, and at other times they also include those that speak Catalan and Portuguese. They generally ignore, however, the work of Latin American authors and seldom explore the close ties of those authors to philosophers working in the Iberian peninsula.² Something similar can be said about other peninsular histories of philosophy, with the added disadvantage that they, like those histories of Spanish philosophy that deal exclusively with Castillian-speaking philosophers, tend to ignore the developments in the Iberian peninsula that take place in linguistic and cultural contexts other than their own.³ The reasons for these sometimes conscious oversights are rooted in nationalistic feelings dating back to historical conflicts and antagonisms which have little to do with philosophical, historical reality but which nonetheless affect historical accounts of that reality.

New World histories of philosophy concerned with Latin America suffer similar shortcomings, although in this case their neglect concerns the thought of Iberian authors and their close relations with, and impact they have had on, Latin American philosophers.⁴ Histories of Latin American or Ibero-American philosophy and thought tend to concentrate on developments in the New World, ignoring the strong relations that tie such developments to the thought from Spanish and Portuguese sources.⁵ In the case of his-

² Cf. Alain Guy, *Histoire de la philosophie espagnole*, 12th ed. (Toulouse: Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 1985); Marcial Solana, *Historia de la filosofía española: Epoca del Renacimiento (siglo XVI)*, 3 vols. (Madrid: Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, 1941); and José Luis Abellán, *Historia crítica del pensamiento español*, 7 vols. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1979-91).

³ There are occasional attempts, however, at establishing the influence of some peninsular authors on Latin America. See, for example, María del Carmen Rovira, *Eclécticos portugueses del siglo XVIII y algunas de sus influencias en América* (Mexico: Colegio de México, 1958). These attempts, however, are usually specialized and do not seem to influence general histories of philosophy of peninsular nations.

⁴ I am conscious that my use of the term "New World" to refer to North and South America is Eurocentric, but there is no other adequate term available. "America," which works in Spanish and Portuguese, does not work in English because it has been appropriated by the United States; moreover, "America" is as Eurocentric as "New World."

⁵ Cf. Harold E. Davis, *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction* (New York: The Free Press, 1974); Manfredo Kempff Mercado, *Historia de*

tories dealing specifically with Spanish American philosophy, the situation is even worse, insofar as they tend to ignore the Portuguese side of Latin America and the cultural and intellectual ties that relate it to the rest of the area.⁶

General histories of philosophy seldom, if ever, do justice not only to the historical relations between Iberian and Latin American philosophers, but also to the philosophy of Spain, Catalonia, Portugal, and Latin America.⁷ Indeed, it is particularly rare to find any reference to Latin American contributions to philosophy in histories other than histories of Latin American philosophy.⁸ This becomes quite evident when one turns to particular periods of the history of philosophy, such as the period which will especially occupy us: the sixteenth century and part of the seventeenth century. This period is studied under such labels as "Renaissance philosophy," "Counter-Reformation philosophy," "Late Scholasticism," "Late Medieval Philosophy," "Second Scholastic," and "Silver Age of Scholasticism," to mention just the most frequently used. Some historians may want to argue that there is justification for this oversight in some cases. Indeed, one could argue that the impact of the Renaissance in Latin America came too late to be incorporated

la filosofía en Latinoamérica (Santiago: Zig Zag, 1958); and Francisco Larroyo and Edmundo Escobar, *Historia de las doctrinas filosóficas en Latinoamérica* (Mexico: Editorial Porrúa, 1968).

⁶ Cf. Ramón Insúa Rodríguez, *Historia de la filosofía en Hispanoamérica* (Guayaquil, Ecuador: Universidad de Guayaquil, 1945). The tendency to isolate Spanish America from Portuguese America is present in many authors of very different persuasions. See, for example, José Mariátegui, *Obras*, ed. Francisco Baeza, vol. 2 (Havana: Casa de las Américas, 1982), 250.

⁷ For example, Wilhelm Windelband's influential *A History of Philosophy*, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), which covers the sixteenth century in some detail, makes no reference to Francisco de Vitoria and only two passing references to Francisco Suárez (see vol. 2). W. T. Jones' extensive *A History of Western Philosophy*, 4 vols. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970) does not have a single reference to Iberian or Latin American philosophers.

⁸ Even in histories of Western philosophy which take into account Iberian developments this is true. See, for example, Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Image Books, 1950). It is only recently and sporadically that general dictionaries and encyclopedias of philosophy include references to Latin American philosophy. Only general histories of philosophy produced by Latin American philosophers contain materials on Latin American thought. See, for example, José Vasconcelos, *Historia del pensamiento filosófico* (Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria, 1937).

into a general history of the Renaissance, and also that the vector of influence went only one way, from Europe to Latin America, and not vice versa.⁹ It is not true, however, that the impact of European Renaissance thought on Latin America came too late to be considered in histories of Renaissance thought; humanism influenced Latin American thought via Iberian thought beginning in the first half of the sixteenth century. Although it is true that Latin American humanism did not influence European humanism, it does nonetheless present some interesting characteristics which should not be ignored in an overall history of Renaissance philosophy.¹⁰ Moreover, just like histories and studies of Renaissance thought, histories of the Counter-Reformation, late Scholastic philosophy, and so on generally neglect Latin America. They often fail to represent the particularly vibrant tone of the intellectual life of the Iberian peninsula during this time, even though they do make reference to Iberian contributions to philosophy.¹¹

The general neglect of Iberian and Latin American thought outside Iberian and Latin American countries makes no historical

⁹ Among histories and studies of Renaissance thought that ignore Latin America, see, for example, Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961); *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

¹⁰ Cf. José M. Gallegos Rocafull, *El pensamiento mexicano en los siglos XVI y XVII*, 2nd ed. (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1974); Guillermo Furlong, *Nacimiento y desarrollo de la filosofía en el Río de La Plata, 1536-1810* (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, 1952); Alain Guy, *Panorama de la philosophie Ibero-Américaine du XVIe siècle a nos jours* (Geneva: Patino, 1989); Mauricio Beuchot, *La filosofía en el México colonial* (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, forthcoming); Alain Guy, "La influencia del Renacimiento en la Colonia," in *Estudios de historia y filosofía en el México colonial* (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1991), 73-106; and Gabriel Méndez Plancarte, *Humanismo mexicano del siglo XVI* (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1946). It should also be noted that, as we shall see later, the nonhumanistic thought of the period in Latin America did influence European thought.

¹¹ Carlo Giacon, *La seconda scolastica*, 2 vols. (Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1946), and *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* pay considerable attention to Iberian philosophy (see in particular the chapters by Charles H. Lohr and E. J. Ashworth in the latter). Other histories which cover the period do not do so. Cf. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzman, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

sense. What is particularly distressing is to see the failure to take into account the close relations between the philosophy of Latin America and the countries of the Iberian peninsula, even in studies produced in Latin America and the Iberian peninsula; for texts dislodged from the tradition which produced them are silent, and many of the texts produced by Latin American and Iberian philosophers are the product of close relations between Latin America and the Iberian peninsula. This is especially clear in the case of Latin American scholastics, because their link to the authors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries they emulated was mediated by Iberian scholastics. Alfonso de la Vera Cruz and Alonso Briceño cannot properly be understood when one does not take into account the work of Iberian Thomists and Scotists on whom they partly relied or through whom they approached the work of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.¹² But this problem is not restricted to this period. The work of Latin Americans in the twentieth century who looked at Hartmann and Scheler as intellectual mentors, for example, is incomprehensible unless one keeps in mind that they first learned about them through José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955). There is an Orteguean “color” to the Germanism of Samuel Ramos (1897–1959) and others who relied on Hartmann and Scheler for many of their ideas.¹³ Although this color fades somewhat as Latin Americans learn German and become directly acquainted with German texts, it never quite disappears, for the patterns of interpretation and emphasis established at the beginning left discernible traces.¹⁴

The same can be said about studying Iberian philosophy apart from Latin American philosophy, for even in cases in which the

¹² See, for example, Mauricio Beuchot, “Panorama de la historia de la filosofía novohispana,” in *Estudios de historia y filosofía*, 22–36. Concerning Alonso de la Vera Cruz and his relations to Iberian thought, see in particular Walter Redmond and Mauricio Beuchot, *Pensamiento y realidad en Alonso de la Vera Cruz* (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1987). Concerning Briceño, see Walter Hannisch Espíndola, *En torno a la filosofía en Chile 1594–1810* (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1963), 24–30.

¹³ Cf. Samuel Ramos, *Hacia un nuevo humanismo: Programa de una antropología filosófica* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1962).

¹⁴ Cf. Francisco Romero, *Theory of Man*, trans. William Cooper (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); and Risieri Frondizi, *What Is Value? An Introduction to Axiology*, trans. Solomon Lipp (La Salle: Open Court, 1963).

philosophy of Latin America did not explicitly influence Iberian philosophers, the Latin American reality did. Consider the case of Iberian philosophers from the sixteenth century, like Francisco de Vitoria (1492/3-1546). Can we ignore the fact that much of what they thought about philosophically was prompted by the new reality they confronted as a result of the discovery?¹⁵ Did they not see that new reality through the eyes of those who lived and travelled to the colonies? It was Latin Americans, whether adopted or native, who provided Iberian philosophers of the sixteenth century with many of the issues and themes they were to explore. Again, this need not be restricted to that age. The most distinguished group of Spanish philosophers in the twentieth century, the *transterrados* (fugitives from the Spanish Civil War), moved to Latin America and were influenced by the philosophers they found or helped develop there as much as they influenced them.¹⁶

For all these reasons it should be clear that we need a general category to bring out the philosophical reality encompassed by the Iberian peninsula and Latin America. The category of Hispanic philosophy responds to this need, focusing attention on historical relations and phenomena which are generally ignored in histories which use other categories and divisions. I have not considered the national histories of philosophy of individual Latin American countries, for it should be obvious that they are even more restrictive than the sorts of histories I have mentioned.¹⁷ Moreover, they are

¹⁵ In the case of Vitoria the discovery seemed to be a important concern, as is evident in his *Relectio de indis* (1538) and *Relectio de iure belli* (1539). In fact, there is substantial evidence that colonial Latin American thinkers influenced not only Iberian authors but also European philosophers such as Descartes. See Mauricio Beuchot, "Aportaciones de pensadores novohispanos a la filosofía europea y universal," in *Estudios de historia y filosofía*, 43-51.

¹⁶ On the *transterrados*, see José Luis Abellán, *Filosofía española en América* (1936-1966) (Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama, 1967). The concern of José Gaos, Eduardo Nicol, and other *transterrados* with the relation of Latin American thought to Iberian thought is evident in their writings and can be explained only by the influence that Latin Americans and the Latin American reality had on them. Gaos's *Historia del pensamiento de lengua española en la edad contemporánea* (1744-1944) (Mexico: Séneca, 1945) and Nicol's *El problema de la filosofía hispánica* make no sense plucked from the Latin American experience.

¹⁷ A couple of examples will serve as illustrations: Samuel Ramos, *Historia de la filosofía en México* (Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria, 1943); and Guillermo Francovich, *La filosofía en Bolivia* (La Paz: Juventud, 1966).

sometimes marred by nationalistic concerns which distort the historical record, although one must grant that, like most historical accounts, they have their uses.

Having noted the advantages of using the category of Hispanic philosophy in the historical account of the development of philosophy in the Iberian peninsula and Latin America, I must warn that use of such a category does not imply that there is something peculiar, some idiosyncratic feature or features, which characterize such philosophy throughout its history.¹⁸ Much Spanish and Latin American thought of the last one hundred years has devoted itself to the search for the unique features which characterize Spanish, Latin American, and national philosophies, distinguishing them from each other and from the philosophies of other countries and cultures.¹⁹ This effort, however, has been to a great extent fruitless, for it has been difficult to identify even one feature that can serve to characterize any of these philosophies, let alone characterize what I have referred to here as Hispanic philosophy. There are no doubt certain concerns, certain approaches, and certain methods in philosophy that characterize one or more periods of the history of Hispanic philosophy, a fact which is well established by numerous studies.²⁰ But there

¹⁸ In this I must differ with Nicol and those who have tried to see some element common to all Hispanic philosophy. See Eduardo Nicol, "Meditación del propio ser: La hispanidad," in *Filosofía e identidad cultural en América latina*, ed. Jorge E. Gracia and Iván Jaksic (Caracas: Monte Avila, 1988), 231-63.

¹⁹ Iván Jaksic and I have gathered the most important texts of this controversy concerning Latin American philosophy in the collection cited in the previous note. The controversy was fueled in part by the peninsular quest for a cultural ethos, so evident in the Generation of 1898 and in subsequent authors, and received philosophical justification through Ortega y Gasset's perspectivism. It was explicitly formulated as the problem of Latin American philosophical identity by Leopoldo Zea in 1945, and although it found immediate detractors, such as Risieri Frondizi, the controversy still survives in various forms. For Frondizi's objections, see Risieri Frondizi, "Hay una filosofía iberoamericana?" *Realidad* 3 (1948): 158-70. Zea's original article, "En torno a una filosofía americana," and Frondizi's article are reproduced in *Filosofía e identidad cultural*, 187-207 and 211-27 respectively. Ofelia Schutte explores the issue of cultural identity in Latin America in her *Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993).

²⁰ See, for example, *La filosofía en América: Trabajos presentados en el IX Congreso Interamericano de Filosofía*, 2 vols. (Caracas: Sociedad Venezolana de Filosofía, 1979); *Ideas en torno de Latinoamérica*, 2 vols. (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1986); *Latin American*

is no definitive evidence that indicates this may be true for all the philosophy included under the epithet "Hispanic."

The category of Hispanic philosophy needs to be understood differently. I propose to understand it as the philosophy produced by a group of philosophers who span diverse political, territorial, linguistic, and ethnic and racial boundaries, but who are closely tied historically. It is not language that ties these philosophers, for some of them write in Latin, while others write in Catalan, Spanish, or Portuguese. Nor do they come from the same country. Some of them were born in Spain or Catalonia, but others were born in Portugal and the various Spanish and Portuguese colonies and countries of Latin America. Indeed, in many cases they taught and wrote in lands other than their native countries. Finally, they cannot be regarded as having the same ethnic or racial background, since their origins differ, some being European, others being descendants of American Indians or Africans, and still others representing a mixture of various races and ethnic groups. What these philosophers have in common is not language, country, race, or ethnic background, but rather a history. It is the events of that history, the historical reality they share, that provides the unity which brings them together.

Naturally, historical ties tend to generate common characteristics, but those characteristics may not extend beyond certain periods of time or geographical areas. There can be continuity without commonality. *A* may follow *B*, and *B* may follow *C*, and *C* may follow *D*, thus implying a connection between *A* and *D* even though *A* may have nothing in common with *D*. This is the kind of unity that Hispanic philosophy has. It is not a unity of common elements. Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) may not have anything in common with Francisco Romero, but both Suárez and Romero are tied by a series of events which places them together and separates them from Descartes, Hume, and Kant. It is not necessary, then, to find characteristics common to all Hispanic philosophers for them to be justifiably categorized as Hispanic. What unites them is the same sort of thing that unites a family, as Wittgenstein would say.²¹

Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986); and *América Latina: Historia y destino*, 2 vols. (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1992).

²¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, (New York: Macmillan, 1953), secs. 66–7.

There may not be common features among all of them, but they belong together because somehow they are all historically related, as a father is to a son, an aunt to a niece, and grandparents to grandchildren. The Wittgenstenian metaphor of the family is particularly appropriate in this case, for a history of philosophy is always the history of the philosophical thought of a community. Beginning in the sixteenth century, the Hispanic community includes not only the inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula but also those of Latin America.

Still, one may question the need or benefit of using the category of Hispanic philosophy to study the philosophers from the Iberian peninsula and Latin America. If there are no characteristics common to all Hispanic philosophers, what can an account of Hispanic philosophy add to accounts of periods or countries which more clearly have characteristics in common? In short, what do we gain from the study of Hispanic philosophy that we do not already know and know better from the study of, say, Spanish, Catalan, Portuguese, and Latin American philosophy? My claim is that we gain a greater understanding of the historical reality of a particular area of the history of philosophy which is otherwise missed.

A history of philosophy is an account of how ideas developed and thus involves an account of how philosophers influenced each other. For an account to be historical it must pay careful attention to the events and figures which played roles in history, avoiding the introduction of artificial divisions among them. My claim is that the notion of a Hispanic philosophy more than any other notion reflects the historical reality of the philosophy produced in Spain, Catalonia, Portugal, and Latin America, for it recognizes that there are no fast boundaries among the philosophers of these territories. Consider Francisco Suárez, who was born in Spain but taught in Portugal for many years; and consider Antonio Rubio (1548-1615), who worked in Mexico but whose *Logic* became a textbook in Spain.²² More recently, the case of Ortega y Gasset stands out, for his

²² Concerning Suárez, see Raoul Scorraille, *François Suárez de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 2 vols. (Paris: P. Lethiellieux, 1912). Concerning Rubio, see Gallegos Rocafull, *El pensamiento mexicano en los siglos XVI y XVII*, 262-78; and Walter Redmond and Mauricio Beuchot, *La lógica mexicana en el siglo de oro* (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1985).

influence in Latin America was perhaps greater than in Spain.²³ These are just a few examples of the many that reveal the historical unity of Hispanic philosophy. To parcel out Hispanic philosophy into various compartments according to political, territorial, racial, or linguistic groups is to miss many of the historical ties which bind the diverse elements which make up the philosophy of Spain, Catalonia, Portugal, and Latin America.

There are still two other objections that may be raised against the use of the term "Hispanic" to characterize the philosophy of the countries of the Iberian peninsula and Latin America. One may wish to object, for example, that the term "Hispanic" is not only Eurocentric but in fact indicates the relation of dominator-dominated which for several centuries characterized the relations between the countries in the peninsula and their colonies in America. Would not the use of this term, then, tend to perpetuate a spirit of domination which would stand in the way of the intellectual liberation of Latin America?

Notice that this objection does not challenge the accuracy or usefulness of this term for describing the actual historical reality of Latin America. The objection challenges its use because the term is seen as dangerous insofar as it can be used to perpetuate a situation which is morally wrong and thus intolerable. Could the use of the expression "Hispanic philosophy" promote the dominance of Iberian philosophy, thus leading to further intellectual enslavement in Latin America?

My response to this objection is twofold. First I would like to respond as a historian. Even if it were the case that the term "Hispanic" carried with it the kind of baggage which could stand in the way of the intellectual liberation of Latin America, still the use of the term would be justified as long as it were applied to a historical period where it served to characterize accurately the historical situation. The historian is not concerned with what should have been but with what actually was the case. My claim is precisely that the history of Iberian and Latin American philosophy up to the present, and particularly in the period that concerns us, supports the use of

²³ Any good history of Latin American philosophy will refer to this influence, but there are also more specialized studies. See, for example, Abellán, *Filosofía española en América (1936-1966)*, 103-92; and José Gaos, *Sobre Ortega y Gasset* (Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria, 1952).

such a term, bringing to the fore historical connections which otherwise would remain hidden.

Second, although the term may at some point have been used in a way which gave support to the objection, I do not believe that this is any longer the case. As it is generally used today, I believe the term simply refers to anything that has to do with Spain, the Spanish language, Latin America, or the Iberian peninsula.²⁴ Thus, I do not think its use can result in the perpetuation of a relation of dominator-dominated in a way that would promote the continuance of a subservient role for Latin America.

The second objection is that the use of this term is misleading because it suggests that Latin American philosophy depended throughout its history on the thought of the Iberian peninsula, whereas in fact this is not so. Indeed, so the argument goes, after the colonial period Latin America turned toward France, England, and Germany for philosophical inspiration, ignoring what went on in the peninsula.

In response I must first agree that at least since around 1750, Latin America has been heavily influenced by the thought of philosophers from France, England, and Germany. But this does not militate against the notion of a Hispanic philosophy for two reasons. First, the term "Hispanic philosophy" used here is not meant to convey a sense of the philosophical dependence of Latin America on the peninsula. My point in using the term does not concern philosophical dependence, but historical relations in general. Second, it is not only in Latin America that the influence of France, England, and Germany has been felt, but also in the Iberian peninsula itself.²⁵ In this sense, there is much that looks the same in Latin America

²⁴ In Latin America and Spain, the term is frequently used to refer to things Spanish, thus excluding the Portuguese or Brazilian; see note 6 above. There are some subgroups of the Hispanic community in the United States, however, which object to the use of the term to refer to themselves. Whether they are justified or not is irrelevant for the historiographical thesis of this paper. Nonetheless, it should be noted that most of the arguments adduced in this direction are based on limited knowledge of the history of the Iberian peninsula or of Latin America. See "Chicanos, not Hispanics," (anonymous paper from the Third World Forum, Montréal, 14 March 1990); Earl Shorris, "Latino Sí. Hispanic, No," *New York Times*, 28 October 1992; David González, "What's the Problem with 'Hispanic'," *New York Times*, 15 November 1992.

²⁵ See Abellán's monumental history of Spanish thought (see note 2 above), where such influences are recorded in detail.

and in the Iberian peninsula. Finally, much of the influence of the thought of French, English, and German authors, whether we Latin Americans like it or not, did come through Iberia. The case of Ortega's introduction of German thought into Argentina and elsewhere, and the influence of the *transterrados* in Mexico and other countries, should suffice as illustrations.

In short, the category of Hispanic philosophy is a useful one for the description and understanding of the history of the philosophical thought of Latin America and the countries of the Iberian peninsula. Whether it will continue to be so is, of course, a matter to be determined by the future. For the present it serves well the purpose of those who wish to understand the thought of the world created by the European discovery of America.

II

The Beginning and Golden Age. Having clarified the notion of Hispanic philosophy, I must turn now to the part of it which concerns us in particular. The period in question covers, like the *Siglo de Oro* of Spanish letters, more than a century: from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth. Its first notable figure is Juan de Zumárraga (1468?-1548) and its last is Juan de Santo Tomás (Jean Poincot) (1589-1644). In between are Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566), Vasco de Quiroga (1487?-1568), Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540), Francisco de Vitoria (1492/3-1546), Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), Alonso de Castro (1495-1558), Alonso de la Vera Cruz (1504?-1584), Francisco de Salazar (1505-1575), Melchior Cano (1509-1560), Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599), Domingo Bañez (1528-1604), Tomás de Mercado (1530?-1575), Francisco Toletus (1532-1596), Luis de Molina (1535-1600), Benito Pereira (1535?-1610), Juan de Mariana (1536-1624), Antonio Rubio (1548-1615), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), Gabriel Vázquez (1549-1604), Antonio Arias (1564-1603), and Alfonso Briceño (1587?-1669?), among many others. Territorially, it covers the Iberian peninsula and the Iberian colonies in the New World. In the Iberian peninsula certain universities stand out, such as Salamanca and Coimbra, but others, like Valladolid, Segovia, Alcalá, and Evora, follow closely. In the New World, the most important centers of activity are found in Mexico

and Peru, particularly in the capital cities of Mexico City and Lima, although there are also developments in other areas.

It is important to note both that this period deserves to be regarded as the golden age of Hispanic philosophy because of the number and brilliance of its members and the influence they exerted on others, and that it is also the first period of philosophical development that properly merits being called Hispanic. It merits the name for two reasons. First, this is the first time that a new intellectual unity that can be distinguished from European philosophy is formed by the Iberian peninsula and the Latin American colonies. There is for the first time in history a political unity of the kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula and thus of the colonies of those kingdoms. There is also religious unity after the expulsion of the Muslims and the Jews. In addition, there is a strong sense of mission which permeates the activities and thinking at the time. This is the period in which the international medieval intellectual union which had characterized Europe for over a thousand years breaks up under the stresses of humanism, the Reformation, and the political pressures exerted by modern European states. Moreover, the Iberian world, in spite of its strong political and ideological interests in Europe, gradually directs its attention toward the colonies of the New World, the extraordinary opportunities they make available, and the enormous demands those colonies exert on the peninsula. Iberia, then, not only becomes unified in various ways but at the same time becomes increasingly separated from the rest of Europe and closer to the New World. This is reflected in the intellectual life of both the peninsula and the territories and thus justifies for the first time the category "Hispanic."

Previous to this time it makes no sense to employ this category in historical accounts. The Roman philosophers of Iberian origin, such as Seneca, belonged culturally and intellectually to a unit that was centered elsewhere and extended well beyond Iberia. Likewise, Islamic philosophers of Iberian origin, such as Averroes, belonged to a world which gravitated toward a different axis. Something similar can be said of Maimonides and other Jewish philosopher-theologians of the medieval period, for their history grouped them in ways which had little to do with the Iberian peninsula. Likewise, medieval scholastics from the peninsula were part of the greater unit represented by European Scholasticism. They were at home in that philosophy and their historical and intellectual relations

were not so much to each other as to the common heritage of the age. Indeed, the agenda that moves them is centered primarily in Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, and Rome. All this changes in the sixteenth century. Although the Iberian and Latin American philosophers of the time continue to address issues of general concern to Europeans and to be influenced by sources which originate outside the peninsula and Latin America, there is a strong surge of interest in problems and issues which arise from the historically unique situation posed by the discovery, colonization, and evangelization of the New World. Moreover, there is also, in part as a result of common interests, but also as a result of other factors, a tightening of the relations among philosophers of these Hispanic lands, who exchange ideas and dispute among themselves in ways which were not enacted before. Indeed, recent studies show a strong predilection in the Hispanic authors of this period for their Hispanic contemporaries.²⁶

This leads me to the second reason that this is the first historical period for which the term "Hispanic philosophy" is justified. The philosophy produced in the Iberian countries and their colonies between 1500 and 1650 springs forth to a great extent as the response of a well-established Iberian scholastic tradition to the issues that confront Iberian and Latin American intellectuals at the time and that result from the discovery and colonization of the New World. It is a philosophy, then, grounded in an Iberian tradition and in the consideration of issues and problems of which Iberian and Latin American philosophers had first-hand experience in most cases. This lends to their philosophy an autochthonous character which is missing in most subsequent Iberian and Latin American thought. Indeed, many Iberian and Latin American philosophers have complained repeatedly about the derivative nature of more recent Iberian and Latin American philosophical thought. They charge, often with reason, that philosophical thought in these areas has resulted from uncritical borrowing from non-Hispanic, European, and Anglo-American sources, thus making it lack originality and authenticity.²⁷ The reasons for this lack of originality and authenticity are to be

²⁶ See, for example, Hannisch Espíndola, *En torno a la filosofía en Chile (1594-1810)* (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1963), 36-7.

²⁷ The most eloquent articulation of this criticism is provided by Augusto Salazar Bondy in his *¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América?* (Mexico:

found precisely in the fact that Iberian and Latin American philosophers have forgotten their roots and that philosophy must begin in human experience. It does not pay to talk about what others say if we have no first-hand experience of what gave rise to what they say. This is, of course, what makes the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries different. For the thinkers of that period were not only well-grounded historically in their intellectual traditions, but concerned themselves with what they knew best. That is why they can be accurately regarded as Hispanic philosophers and why they were able to excel to the degree they did.

The development in the sixteenth century of the kind of intellectual unity which I have used to justify the category of Hispanic philosophy can be understood if one considers the four challenges faced by the period in question: the discovery of the New World, the rise of Renaissance humanism, the spread of the Reformation, and the growth of skepticism. The discovery of the New World had a profound and lasting impact on the thinking of Europeans. It posed for Iberians in particular a set of problems which were new and which required an immediate solution. They were confronted with hitherto unknown peoples with different cultures and religious beliefs who nonetheless possessed enormous riches and who quickly became subject to them. What are the rights of these people? Should Christianity be imposed on them? Should they be treated as slaves? Who is the rightful owner of the riches which hitherto had belonged to them? What should the conquerors make of the natives' laws and traditions? Questions such as these were raised and had to be answered concerning most aspects of the lives of the conquered peoples, from general aspects of the relations among peoples considered as nations, to particular aspects of daily living. Issues ranged from international mercantile laws to the validity of pre-Columbian marriages.²⁸

Obviously, the discovery of America represented an enormous challenge to intellectuals in the Iberian peninsula, forcing them to

Siglo XXI, 1968); and his *Sentido y problema del pensamiento hispano-americano*, with English translation by Arthur Berdtson (Lawrence: University of Kansas Center for Latin American Studies, 1969).

²⁸ The rest of this discussion follows in part a section of my "Scholasticism: A Bridge between Classical Antiquity and Colonial Latin American Thought," in *The Classical Tradition and the Americas*, ed. W. Haase et al. vol. 2, forthcoming.

raise and deal with issues that they had not confronted before. This oriented their thinking toward new issues, away from traditionally travelled European areas and into new territories. The impact of the discovery on philosophy was an awakening to the need to deal with legal and ethical issues which were new to the times and which tended both to form a core of concerns which tied Iberian and Latin American thinkers together and at the same time to distance them from their European counterparts who had other concerns and agendas.²⁹

The other three challenges faced by Iberian and Latin American philosophers and theologians at this time had a similar effect of strengthening the ties among them and distancing them from the rest of Europe, supporting their historical interrelations and thus the development of a Hispanic philosophical universe. But this effect was not accomplished in the same way as the discovery of the New World. The challenges of humanism, the Reformation, and skepticism did not open the exploration of new themes that would draw Iberian and Latin American philosophers closer together. What these challenges did was to alert them to the need to come together in order to collect their forces and repel those whom most of them perceived as enemies. The need to defend what they considered to be the true Faith, to purge it from contamination by unorthodox or dangerous doctrines, and to vanquish those who threatened it, had the effect of drawing these philosophers together in a way which had not happened prior to this time.³⁰

The impact of humanism on the Iberian peninsula and its colonies was felt quite early and, although several Iberian and Latin American intellectuals were receptive to humanism, the movement was generally perceived by ecclesiastical and governmental author-

²⁹ There is much literature on this topic. Among the more recent publications which give an idea of the issues in question is Luciano Pereña, *The Rights and Obligations of Indians and Spaniards in the New World* (Salamanca: Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca and Catholic University of America, 1992). The issues in question were not only moral and legal, but extended to matters of commerce and economics. See, for example, M. Grice-Hutchinson, *The School of Salamanca. Readings in Spanish Monetary Theory, 1544-1605* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952); and R. Sierra Bravo, *El pensamiento social y económico de la escolástica desde sus orígenes al comienzo del catolicismo social* (Madrid: CSIC, 1975).

³⁰ Cf. Luis Gil Fernández, *Estudios de humanismo y tradición clásica* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1984), 15-94.

ities as a threat to the orthodox Faith.³¹ The discovery of new literary, philosophical, and artistic works from the ancient world had given rise not only to a renewed interest in pagan ideas, but to a change of attitude in the intellectual community that was taken by many to pose a threat to the integrity of Christianity. Humanism was considered a threat, then, because it looked to pagan antiquity as an ideal era whose values had to be emulated. The Christian Middle Ages and Scholasticism in particular also had looked to antiquity for enlightenment, but the attitude of the humanists was broader and less cautious. Scholastics borrowed from the past selectively, filtering what they borrowed through the sieve of Christian doctrine, and accepting only what they thought could be harmonized with that doctrine.³² In spite of the borrowing *en masse* that took place in the thirteenth century, a suspicious attitude concerning pagan antiquity was never absent, as the repeated condemnations of heretical and pagan doctrines illustrate.³³ The humanists, by contrast, were attracted to the ancients and emulated less discriminately the forms and values of the period as displayed in art and literature. Their concern with beauty, the human body, ancient rites, literary style, and pagan religious ideas was a source of concern to ecclesiastical authorities. Although some humanists were devoted Christians and used their textual and linguistic skills in the service of the Faith, many were interested in the recovery of classical knowledge and art for their own sake, and not for the sake of enriching the Christian faith. This was certainly different from the attitude of medieval Scholastics and, moreover, appeared potentially dangerous to those in the Iberian peninsula and its colonies who wished to preserve the medieval worldview.³⁴

Another challenge, the Reformation, had an effect on Iberian and Latin American philosophers and theologians similar to that

³¹ See J. Fuster, *Rebeldes y heterodoxos* (Barcelona: Edicions Ariel, 1972), 72.

³² Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaemeron* 19, in *Opera omnia* (Ad Claras Aquas: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902), vol. 5, p. 422.

³³ The most important of these condemnations took place in Paris, in 1277. See Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1954), 402-10.

³⁴ The conduct of Renaissance popes such as Leo X did not help to assuage the fears of such people. For a readable account of Leo X and other Renaissance popes, see E. R. Chamberlin, *The Bad Popes* (New York: Dorset Press, 1969).

of humanism. Indeed, it posed an even greater threat to the Church than humanism, for it was a challenge within the Church's own ranks and involved theology, the Church's conceptual foundation. Moreover, this rebellion against institutionalized Christianity gained considerable political support in some parts of Europe. There had been heretical challenges to the Church from within its ranks during the Middle Ages. Large revolts had occurred in southern France, as happened with the Albigensians, for example. There had also been serious threats to Christianity from without, primarily from Islam. But the Reformation was a different sort of movement for various reasons, three of which stand out: first, it was a challenge based on criticisms concerning the corruption prevalent at the papal court; second, it had strong political overtones, which lent it power that some of the earlier reform movements had lacked; third, it was a theological challenge arising from within the Church itself. These factors combined to make the Reformation a most powerful threat and one that endangered the stability and future of the Church.

The final challenge which helped to draw Iberians and Latin Americans together is less defined than the others, but not for that reason less effective. This was the rise of skepticism. Skepticism had not been strong in the Middle Ages. It was known primarily through Augustine, who had argued against it in *Contra academicos* in particular. In fact, skepticism had a bad name among Scholastics, who used it to accuse and condemn their opponents.³⁵ Yet there were many Scholastics who adopted a skeptical or somewhat skeptical stance in order to defend those tenets of the faith that they thought could not be defended if reason were held to be the ultimate arbiter of belief. Thus, there was a background to the skepticism that developed in the sixteenth century with authors like Montaigne, and which was to affect so decisively the course of early modern philosophy. The skepticism of Montaigne, however, went far beyond that adopted by some Scholastics and did not aim to support the Faith. Montaigne's question, *Que sais-je?* combined with a tolerance

³⁵ See John Duns Scotus's charge that Henry of Ghent is a skeptic: *Opus oxoniense* I, dist. 3, q. 4, a. 1, in Duns Scotus, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. Allan Wolter (London: Nelson, 1963), 103-6. For discussions of skepticism in the Middle Ages, see K. Michalski, *La philosophie au XIVe siècle. Six études* (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969); and Mauricio Beuchot, "Escepticismo en la edad media: El caso de Nicolás de Autrecourt," *Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía* 15 (1989): 307-19.

of what ecclesiastical authorities considered an easy morality, was regarded as an unwelcomed development by those who considered themselves champions of the Christian faith.³⁶

The response of the Church to humanism, the Reformation, and skepticism was swift. First, there was a movement toward reform led by members of the Church hierarchy which aimed to stamp out corruption and also to regularize Christian doctrine, rites, and laws. The most effective instruments used to achieve these aims were the Council of Trent (1545-1563) and the Inquisition. The Council took care of doctrinal matters, whereas the Inquisition was charged with the task of enforcing the new standards. Second, the movement of renewal affected also the rank and file members of the Church. Among grassroots efforts the most successful was the founding of the Society of Jesus by Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556). This religious order became the symbol of reformed Roman Catholicism and one of the most effective instruments of the Counter-Reformation.

In the Iberian peninsula and the Iberian colonies, the reaction to the use of humanistic, skeptical, and Reformation ideas by the ecclesiastical establishment was also quick. Humanists, reformers, and skeptics were portrayed as mixtures of grammarians and heretics whose influence had to be eradicated.³⁷ This was achieved in various ways, including the exercise of strict controls on the publication and distribution of books and the general discouraging of book learning.³⁸

The intellectual climate at the time in which the Iberian thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries flourished, therefore, was a defensive one. The Church was under siege and felt it had to fight its assailants. The result among Roman Catholic intellectuals was a great effort to rethink and defend traditional Christian theology. Thus we find an abundance of literature dealing with doctrinal

³⁶ For a treatment of the growth of the skeptical movement in the sixteenth century and the beginning of the reaction to it, see Richard Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1964).

³⁷ See notes 30 and 31 above.

³⁸ See M. de la Pinta Llorente, *La Inquisición española y los problemas de la cultura y de la intolerancia* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1953-58); M. Defourneaux, *Inquisición y censura de libros en la España del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Taurus, 1973); and Vicente G. Quesada, *La vida intelectual en la América española durante los siglos XVI, XVII, y XVIII* (Buenos Aires: Arnoldo Moen y Hermano, 1910), 3-33.

controversies cast in both apologetic and theological modes. Both modes are amply documented in the history of the Church prior to this time, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was a renewed interest in them. Moreover, the polemical and defensive tone of some of these writings stands in contrast to the tone of many earlier Scholastics. The Iberian and Latin American thought of the period mirrors these polemical characteristics. The effect of humanism, the Reformation, and skepticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then, was to make Iberian and Latin American philosophers and theologians close ranks so that they might overcome these challenges to the established Church.

As noted, the attitude developed by the Roman Church in response to the challenges of humanism, the Reformation, and skepticism was not peculiar to the Iberian countries and their colonies, but the leadership of the Church's movement fell largely to the Iberians—to the government of the peninsula where arms were required, and to its philosophers and theologians where intellectual weapons were in order. Latin Americans, of course, did not participate as actively in this affair, but their activities were regulated to a great extent by what was taking place in the peninsula, making them dependent on the peninsula. Nowhere is this more evident, for example, than in the controlling of reading materials allowed into the colonies. Although there have been some exaggerated claims concerning the control exercised by peninsular authorities over the circulation of books in the New World, it is evident that efforts were made in this direction and thus that to a certain extent the peninsula established the intellectual parameters within which intellectuals from the New World were supposed to work.³⁹ This, naturally, tended to separate the New World from intellectual developments occurring beyond the Pyrenees, and to tie it closely to peninsular concerns and news.

Apart from the four challenges discussed, there are two other factors that need to be mentioned because they also helped shape the course of Iberian and Latin American thought and thus the development of Hispanic philosophy. These two factors are the relatively late emergence of Iberian Scholasticism and the close relations between Church and State that developed in the Iberian peninsula.

³⁹ See note 38 above.

The relatively late emergence of Iberian Scholasticism meant that this movement was influenced by well-established traditions associated with various religious orders. From the thirteenth century onward, religious orders, particularly the powerful Franciscans and Dominicans, had appropriated certain ideas and authors, and they promoted them with extraordinary zeal. The Franciscans devoted themselves to the study and dissemination of the thought of Augustine and Duns Scotus, whereas the Dominicans worked under the spiritual tutelage of Thomas Aquinas and, through him, Aristotle. This commitment to a certain set of ideas and to certain authors became accentuated in some writers as time went on, lending the later Middle Ages an overall ideological tone. There was, however, a reprieve on this feeling of partisanship in the early sixteenth century, perhaps as a result of the influence of humanism and of the overall rebellion against the excessive technicism that characterized the practice of philosophy in most European universities, and particularly in Paris, at the time.⁴⁰ But this reprieve ended quickly after the rise of the Jesuits and the subsequent growth of rivalry between them and the Dominicans.

The respect for well-established conceptual traditions, together with the large literature inherited from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, helped develop, moreover, an encyclopedic attitude in which recovery and exposition became central to the Scholastic enterprise. Not that this attitude had been lacking in earlier stages of Scholasticism. From the very beginning the Middle Ages displayed a concern with the recovery and preservation of the past. Thus we find throughout the period many encyclopedias of knowledge. The earliest successful attempts in this direction were the

⁴⁰ For the technical character of the philosophy of this period, see Carlos Noreña, *Studies in Spanish Renaissance Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975); R. García Villoslada, *La Universidad de París durante los estudios de Francisco de Vitoria, O.P. (1507-1522)* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1938); V. Muñoz Delgado, *La lógica nominalista en la universidad de Salamanca (1510-1530)*; V. Muñoz Delgado, "La lógica en Salamanca durante la primera mitad del siglo XVI," *Salmanticensis* 14 (1967): 171-207; V. Muñoz Delgado, "La obra lógica de los españoles en París (1500-1525)," *Estudios* 26 (1970): 209-80; V. Muñoz Delgado, "Lógica hispano-portuguesa hasta 1600 (notas bibliográfico-doctrinales)," *Repertorio de historia de las ciencias eclesiásticas en España* 4 (1972): 9-122; and E. J. Ashwoth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974). There were some good reasons for criticizing humanists such as Luis Vives and others.

De institutione divinarum litterarum of Cassiodorus, and the *Etymologiae* of Isidore of Seville. Both of these authors owed debts to earlier classical sources—as in the case of Isidore and Suetonius Pratum, for example—and both works were greatly successful, the first owing to its elegant and easy style, and the second because of the mass of material it contained.⁴¹ This kind of effort went on, as is clear from the *Speculum majus* of Vincent of Beauvais, produced in the thirteenth century, and the *Crestià*, undertaken by Francesc Eiximenis at the end of the fourteenth century.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the encyclopedic emphasis on gathering all available information surrounding a topic became more pronounced. So much had been produced, and it was of such high quality, that it was natural for late Scholastics to feel they had to preserve it and at least take it into account in their own thinking. For this reason we find during the period much that is primarily expository, and many works whose character is informative. This attitude is displayed even in the work of the most original Iberian Scholastics, such as Francisco Suárez. In many ways, and in spite of their originality in many areas, Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597) constitute an encyclopedia of metaphysics in which every topic, every author of importance, and every relevant argument is carefully presented, examined, and evaluated.⁴² Unfortunately, this emphasis on the past sometimes obscures the brilliant contributions of the period and has led some historians mistakenly to characterize the period as sterile.

The second factor that played a major role in shaping the Hispanic thought of the period was the close relationship that developed between the Roman Church and the Iberian states, particularly the Spanish state. In the fifteenth century the Roman Church became the state church in Spain and the Pope granted the Spanish kings the right to appoint the highest members of the hierarchy in the country. This extraordinary development made Spain a *de facto* theocracy in which the interests of the state and the interests of

⁴¹ See Peter L. Schmidt, "Suetons 'Pratum' seit Wessner (1917)," in *The Classical Tradition and the Americas*, vol. 2. See also Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, 107.

⁴² Other examples are the *Cursus Conimbricensis*, and Juan de Santo Tomás's *Cursus philosophicus*. See John Trentman, "Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 835–7.

the Church were identified. It is easy to understand the reasons for this situation. First, Spain had become the main defender of the Faith against the threat of Islam. Having successfully expelled the Moors from Iberian soil after a seven hundred year struggle, Spain was in a favorable position to continue the defense of Christianity throughout the Mediterranean. Moreover, Spain was poised to become, and in fact did become, the first and most powerful European modern nation. Its kings, who became also emperors of the Holy Roman Empire for a time, controlled not only the Iberian peninsula but also territories in Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, and thus exercised extraordinary power.

Second, the Spanish struggle against Islam had been both national and religious; the Spanish kings had fought in the name of the Cross both for territory and the spread of Christianity. Therefore, it made sense to extend this political, military, and religious struggle against the reformers.

Third, Spain had recently discovered America and this provided an unusual opportunity for both colonization and missionary work. Since the Church had no means to organize the indoctrination of the newly discovered lands, it was natural that the Spanish crown be entrusted with the task, enforcing once more the bonds that united Church and state in the peninsula.

Fourth, the preoccupation with the *Reconquista* had to some extent kept Spain away from the intellectual developments associated with the early Renaissance, making it an ideal place of operations for the defense against humanists, reformers, and skeptics. A militant faith was needed to defeat the challenges faced by the Church, and Spain certainly had such a faith. Spain had the faith, the power, and the means to conduct the struggle, and so it was to Spain that the task fell. Consequently, philosophical thought in the Iberian peninsula became subject to political influence and functioned in many instances as a tool of the Spanish government.

As a result of the two factors identified (see page 494 above), and the four challenges it faced (see page 489 above), the philosophy of this period in Iberia and its colonies not only developed close ties between Iberia and its colonies, which separated it from the rest of Europe and made it chart a course on its own, but it also developed some characteristic features which tended to distinguish it from prior and subsequent European thought. It was, for example, more encyclopedic, expository, and eclectic; it had a defensive, apologetic,

and theological emphasis; it had the state and its power behind it and thus was partly influenced by political considerations that affected the state; and it developed a set of new issues dealing with international law and human rights.

III

Hispanic Philosophy and European Philosophy. For our purposes, the most significant aspect of all this is the separation of Hispanic philosophy from the mainstream of European thought: for in spite of their considerable popularity at the time, most of the Hispanic philosophers of this period have been largely forgotten. Suárez, Vitoria, Molina, and some of the other authors listed earlier were common names in the philosophical controversies of the time. Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae*, for example, was printed in more than seventeen editions outside the Iberian peninsula between 1597 and 1636, while Descartes' *Meditations* were edited only nine times between 1641 and 1700.⁴³ Yet Descartes is considered a major figure in the history of philosophy, while Suárez is hardly known. Indeed, if we were to ask the more than eleven thousand philosophers who teach in the United States today to tell us a few facts about Suárez, I am sure only a couple hundred, if that many, would be able to reply. Yet Suárez is without a doubt the most important and well-known Hispanic philosopher of the period. Only a dozen American philosophers have ever heard of Fonseca or Vázquez.

We may ask, then, two questions: first, Why have these philosophers been forgotten? Second, How can their thought constitute a golden age, as I have claimed?

The answer to the first question is to be found in the very points I have been making concerning the development of Hispanic philosophy. For the reasons given, the philosophy of the Iberian peninsula and its Latin American colonies became increasingly isolated from European philosophy, thus losing the historical ties it had had with it. Hispanic philosophy turned in upon itself, concerned about the peculiar and pressing problems faced by Hispanic society. In

⁴³ See J. Iriarte, "La proyección sobre Europa de una gran metafísica, o Suárez en la filosofía en los días del Barroco," *Razón y Fe*, número extraordinario (1948): 236.

fear of European developments that threatened political and religious stability, it looked for support in the past. Thus it not only became isolated from the mainstream philosophical developments in the West, but consciously rejected these developments in favor of the West's medieval foundations. The result was to be expected. European philosophy continued on its own way and came to regard the philosophy practiced in the Iberian peninsula and its colonies as marginal and regressive. For a while, the political and military power of Spain insured that Iberian voices were taken seriously outside the peninsula, but the decline in Spanish political and military power in the seventeenth century contributed to the view that Iberian philosophy was stagnant and retrograde. This view was slowly extended to all Hispanic philosophy and thought, leading to the general perception that there was little of importance to be found in it.⁴⁴ Thus were forgotten the original and extraordinary contributions to philosophy of the Hispanic authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

This brings me to the answer to the second question asked earlier, namely, How can the thought of the Hispanic philosophers of this period constitute a golden age? Hispanic philosophy in the period we have been exploring stands out not only in the history of Hispanic philosophy as a whole, but also in the complete history of Western philosophy. It is true that Hispanic philosophy has its roots in medieval philosophy, and that its scholastic language and theological concerns make it look as if it belonged in an earlier age from which it is but a derivative development. But these characteristics are in many ways deceiving, for the philosophy of this period makes possible much that was to come in early modern philosophy and breaks with medieval thought in significant ways. I will mention only three of the many areas in which this is evident.

First, as is clear from what was said earlier, the philosophy of this period formulated and tried to address many philosophical issues which were new to the history of Western philosophy. These issues had to do with the discovery and colonization of the New World and later came to form a permanent part of the concerns

⁴⁴ Indeed, Hispanic philosophers themselves are relentless in their repetition of this view. Cf. E. Villanueva, "Philosophical Analysis in Mexico," in *Philosophical Analysis in Latin America*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia, et al. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984), 170.

that Western philosophy has addressed. Authors like Las Casas and Vitoria were pioneers who opened up new areas of investigation in philosophy. Not only that, but their views formed the basis for the kind of humane and liberal thinking that was to become mainstream in European philosophy. Second, Hispanic philosophers from this period often went beyond the limits of what had been achieved in Scholastic thought prior to this century, deepening their analyses and extending the parameters established by earlier Scholastics. This is evident in most of the authors of the period. Mariana's notorious doctrine of tyrannicide and Molina's much discussed view of middle knowledge are just two dramatic examples of how far the thinking of these authors exceeded anything taught in the previous ages.

Finally, and most importantly perhaps, these Hispanic philosophers, in spite of a deep faith and a desire to preserve and support traditional Christian teaching, took bold and conscious steps to keep philosophy separate from theology. Perhaps the most stark example of this phenomenon is to be found in Suárez, who not only was a devout Christian, but also saw his primary role to be the understanding and defense of Christian doctrine. In spite of this, he consciously separated metaphysics from theology. Suárez's contribution in this regard can be seen in both the stated intention of his *Disputationes metaphysicae* and the method that he employs in it. The fact that he calls himself a philosopher, that he avoids arguments based on faith in philosophy, and that he apologizes for dealing, even incidentally, with theological matters in a work of philosophy, should be sufficient to make the point.⁴⁵ Although many of the masters who taught liberal arts in the Middle Ages were not theologians, and taught subjects independently of theology, the most famous Scholastics of the age considered themselves theologians, and their philosophical views were generally presented within theological works. Moreover, even though many Scholastics distinguished between theology and philosophy, none of them would have apologized for the introduction of theological matter in a philosophical context, and most of them used both faith and reason to

⁴⁵ I have dealt with these points in more detail in my "Francisco Suárez: The Man in History," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991): 262-5; and in my "Suárez and Later Scholasticism," *The Routledge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon, forthcoming.

argue for both philosophical and theological views. But such a procedure is abandoned in Suárez's *Disputationes*. Occasionally he does bring up a theological point, but in such cases the aim is to show the reader how to apply metaphysical principles to theology rather than to use theology to prove philosophy. This secular emphasis in metaphysics both sets Suárez apart from his medieval predecessors and situates him at the beginning of the modern tradition.⁴⁶

What has been said about Suárez's views concerning the relation of philosophy and theology, together with Hispanic philosophy's formulation of new issues in philosophy and the development of original views mentioned earlier, illustrates the importance of Hispanic philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the development of European philosophy. Indeed, the influence of Hispanic philosophy on European philosophy at this time was substantial.⁴⁷ Early modern philosophers from Locke and Descartes to Wolff and Leibniz are full of the language used, and sometimes introduced, by Hispanic philosophers of this period, and they often explicitly refer to the Hispanic philosophers.

As to this period's enduring philosophical importance, I believe that time will vindicate it. In my own experience, I have dealt with no philosophical issue for which I have not found much help in the writings of these philosophers. Consider the problem of individuation, to which I have devoted considerable time in recent years. I have yet to find a treatment of this issue in the history of philosophy before the twentieth century that, measured by philosophical sophistication and comprehensiveness, even approaches Suárez's discussion of it in his *Disputation* 5.⁴⁸ This is but one example. In

⁴⁶ For further discussion of the relation of Suárez's metaphysics to early modern philosophy, see my "Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991): 287-310; Jean-François Courtine, "Le projet Suárezien de la métaphysique," *Archives de Philosophie* 42 (1979): 236; and Charles Lohr, "Metaphysics," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, 611ff.

⁴⁷ See notes 15 and 43 above; and William A. Wallace, "The Early Jesuits and the Heritage of Domingo de Soto," *History and Technology* 4 (1987), 301-20. There was also influence outside of philosophy. See William A. Wallace, *Galileo and His Sources* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁴⁸ See my "Francisco Suárez," in *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter Reformation* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, forthcoming); and my *Suárez on Individuation* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982).

areas of contemporary interest, such as semiotics, the philosophy of language, and logic, the work of Hispanic philosophers in the golden age holds vast reservoirs of interesting, original, and valuable materials.⁴⁹ Most of these materials, however, are not easily accessible; they are available only in old and difficult to find editions. And of course, the materials are in Latin, a language with which very few philosophers are familiar today. Thus, the job of those who wish to bring to light the contributions of this period to the history of philosophy is not easy, but I believe the enterprise should nonetheless deliver ample rewards. I finish, then, with a call to renew the effort to recover the contributions of Hispanic philosophy in its golden age.⁵⁰

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⁴⁹ See, for example, *Tractatus de signis: The Semiotic of John Poinset*, translated and presented in bilingual format by John Deely in consultation with Ralph A. Powell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

⁵⁰ A shorter version of this paper was read at the conference "Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery," The Catholic University of America, October 1992. I am grateful to Edward Mahoney and William Irwin for offering some useful criticisms.

HUSSERL AND THE DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME

JOHN B. BROUGH

IN A RECENT AND PHILOSOPHICALLY RICH STUDY, David Wood has undertaken the deconstruction of time through an engagement with the thought of Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, and, of course, Derrida.¹ The present essay is not intended to offer a sustained criticism of Wood's arguments or to canvass what he says about the quartet of philosophers noted above; rather, with his book as background, the essay's purpose is to say something about only one of the four philosophers—Edmund Husserl—and particularly about the place of presence and absence in Husserl's phenomenology of time and the consciousness of time. The results may supply ammunition both to those inclined to criticize Husserl from a deconstructive point of view and to those bold enough to defend him. In any event, what Husserl has to say about these matters is worth considering for its own sake. His discussion of the different ways in which presence and absence enter into our temporal experience is subtle and nuanced. He draws delicate distinctions and points to continuities and discontinuities that deserve the philosopher's careful and sympathetic attention. I will focus on a few of these, hoping that they will suggest something of the rich resources for reflection on this topic that are present in Husserl's texts.

I

Wood hazards the prediction that eventually philosophers will turn "to time as the focus and horizon of all our thought and

¹David Wood, *The Deconstruction of Time* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989).

experience,"² a view quite in keeping with Husserl's conviction that time offers not only the most difficult but also the most important of all phenomenological problems.³ But if time is thus to come into its own as the one philosophical problem "that is truly permanent," a legacy of thought about the temporal must first be set aside: "time has to be freed from the shackles of its traditional moral and metaphysical understanding."⁴ Now in the thought of Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger, Wood thinks, one can see this process of liberation unfolding, even if none of them finally succeeds in securing time's freedom. Derrida, however, takes the process to a conclusion, although not quite the conclusion one might have expected: "The concept of time belongs entirely to metaphysics and it designates the domination of presence."⁵ If the concept of time is intrinsically metaphysical, as this text suggests, then to purge it of its metaphysical character is to eliminate it altogether;⁶ or as Wood nicely puts it, rescuing the concept of time "from metaphysics would be like rescuing a fish from water."⁷ There would be no concept of time left at all.

That is a conclusion, however, that Wood wants to avoid. He thinks that there are many times and many concepts of time rather than just one, as the tradition seems to hold, and that none of them is metaphysical. I will return later to this claim and its relevance to Husserl, but first it might be helpful to summarize briefly the reading of metaphysics at work here—a reading that receives a kind of canonical formulation in Derrida, but that the deconstructionist

² Wood, *Deconstruction*, xi.

³ Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)* (hereafter "PIZ"), ed. Rudolf Boehm, in *Husserliana* 10 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 276, 334. English translation: Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)* (hereafter "*Internal Time*"), trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 286, 346. In subsequent citations, page numbers of *PIZ* will be followed by the corresponding pages from the translation.

⁴ Wood, *Deconstruction*, xi.

⁵ Jacques Derrida, "Ousia et Gramme," in Jacques Derrida, *Marges de la philosophie* (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 23. English translation: Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 63. This passage is quoted in Wood, *Deconstruction*, 2.

⁶ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 147.

finds adumbrated in Nietzsche, Husserl (in some respects), and Heidegger. Wood's account is especially instructive for the Husserlian phenomenologist. So what are some of the key features of the "metaphysical," according to this way of reading the tradition?

The history of philosophy, we are told, has been largely the history of metaphysics. The history of metaphysics in turn has been the history "of the privileging of a certain temporal/evidential value, that of 'presence'."⁸ If one retorts that the history of metaphysics has been the history of reflection on Being and beings, the reply will be that metaphysics determines "Being as presence."⁹ This does not mean that "presence" is some thing; it might be better described as a condition or state of something. But it is the sort of condition that tends to dictate the kind of thing that can enter into it. That thing is usually taken to be an "object" standing over against a contemplative knower, a "subject." The paradigm of knowing in this tradition, then, is to have something present to the subject: standing before the subject in full and immediate self-evidence, but also standing forth in the temporal present, in the pure moment of the now. Hence the dual aspect of presence: as self-evidence and as temporal presence. Given the focus of this essay, I will take presence, for the most part, to mean temporal presence—and more specifically, to mean temporal presence in the sense of the now. It seems natural to take the now as presence in its most vivid and original sense. Absence will refer to temporal absence in the sense of past and future. Other senses of the terms, however, will intrude themselves from time to time.

The metaphysics of presence, thus understood, is also foundationalist. The metaphysician, intent on building up a theoretical structure, seeks a foundation for that structure; and for the foundation the metaphysician will look for something that presents itself self-evidently in the pure now. After all, only a firm foundation will do, and an absent foundation—a foundation that is elsewhere, that is deferred—would not be firm. A present foundation, on the other hand, would be primitive and original.

As for the specific nature of the present foundation, it may be anything the fertile metaphysical imagination can represent. Metaphysicians have, historically, tended to settle on some substance

⁸ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 1.

⁹ Derrida, "*Ouïsa et Gramme*," 23; quoted in Wood, *Deconstruction*, 2.

as the foundation. Such objectivizing or substantialist thinking is typical of the metaphysical tradition because substance appears to be just the sort of thing that can come to presence—be self-evident—in the temporal present. But whatever the *archē* or foundation may happen to be, it will be one and identical, further marks of the metaphysical. Thus if the self, or even more loosely, subjectivity, is taken to be the foundation, it will be conceptualized as primordial self-presence, and conceptualized in its self-presence as self-identical substance, or, if the transcendental turn has been made, as the original source of objectivity. In either case, however, it will be viewed as one and identical.

There are a few other aspects of this reading of the metaphysical tradition that might be mentioned. Metaphysics is said to be motivated by the desire that the edifice that rises from its foundations exhibits “formal and systematic completeness”¹⁰ and universal applicability. In its endeavor to satisfy this and its other desires, it tends to evade radical self-criticism. Finally, metaphysics is said to be characterized by “logocentrism.”¹¹ This term, as applied to the tradition, is supposed to capture the idea that metaphysics preeminently values the spoken word, or sees in the spoken word the privileged realization of linguistic presence. At least in the modern era, this spoken word comes to presence in “a conversation in inwardness.”¹² The immanent word in its presence is there intuitively, immediately, before all signification, before difference and otherness. Indeed, the desire for presence that *is* metaphysics closes metaphysics off to otherness: the price of unity, identity, and so on, is a kind of entombment. Derrida’s view, on the other hand, is that metaphysics in fact—a fact hidden from the metaphysician—dwells in public written words, in signs, not in the internal spoken word; it is a form of textual articulation and inscription. There is scripture, but no Word; or such Word as we may claim to have is the one that exists exclusively in the text. Specifically, “metaphysics is a theoretical writing organized around a privileged point—a presence,”¹³ which, of course, means a merely alleged presence from the deconstructionist’s point of view. . . . But because it is writing organized

¹⁰ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 223.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 303.

¹² *Ibid.*, 198.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 303.

around such an alleged presence, which it wants to capture, metaphysics exhibits "tendencies towards theoretical centering and congealment,"¹⁴ which, again, are marks of presence and the present, as they are understood in the metaphysical tradition.

II

If these are the features of metaphysics generally, as the deconstructionist presents them, then we should expect their reappearance in one form or another in the metaphysical conception of time. Metaphysical interpretations of time privilege the present. They find in the present moment the foundation for time and for the understanding of time. Original, primordial, primitive time is built out of such moments, each of which is taken to be a self-contained unit—a distinct "now"—rock solid in its identity and unity, with nothing undecidable about it, a point-instant of pure presence. Such moments are thought of as arranged serially to form ordinary or universal time, which is one-dimensional and linear, stretching infinitely backward and forward, with every event having its place in the endless temporal series. This succession of discrete moments forms the *one* time to which all other times are reducible: the "original primitive time,"¹⁵ as Wood puts it, the temporal foundation "containing within itself some fundamental power and evidential primacy."¹⁶ As such, it shares in the metaphysical claims to absoluteness and universal applicability. It is time neutralized in the interests of generalization.¹⁷ Whether one has in view the time of subjectivity or the time of objectivity, the time of the cosmos or the time of human existence, the same serial structure will prevail. Furthermore, while it itself embodies metaphysical values associated with presence such as unity and identity, this metaphysical time is also the locus of the unity and identity for everything that falls within it. It is this metaphysical conception of time that the deconstructionist intends to undermine.

¹⁴ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 304.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, xi.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 86.

III

Wood adopts a double deconstructive strategy. On the one hand, he deconstructs presence at the level of the moment, "the primitive event"; on the other hand, he deconstructs presence at the level of time's structure.¹⁸ I will look first at the moment, and at the degree to which Husserl would or would not be in sympathy with its deconstruction.

We have already caught a glimpse of how the moment is understood in the metaphysical conception of time, as the deconstructionist presents it: if the moment is pure and uncontaminated presence, then it must be a single, identical point, closed up in itself and excluding all otherness. The "now" would be the moment's most familiar guise in ordinary as well as in philosophical language.¹⁹ From Husserl's perspective, there is a cleavage in views about the now, or better, a pull in two directions. On the one hand, there is the conviction that one can be aware *only* of what is present, of what is there itself in the sense of the now. On the other hand, there is the conviction that one can be aware of anything *except* the present, that the now—if one can speak of it at all—will have vanished before consciousness can so much as register it. The first view would fit comfortably into the metaphysical tradition that the deconstructionist seeks to subvert. If the subversion is carried far enough, the second view results, a view that seems to be reasonably close to the one that the deconstructionist defends.

IV

Consider first the view that one cannot experience what is now, that one cannot experience what is present in its presence. "*Consciousness*," Husserl writes, "*is a perpetual Heraclitean flux*."²⁰ One could take this to mean that one can indeed intend something as now but that it will immediately pass away and then be retained in continuously changing modes of the past. But the view that one cannot experience what is now goes further than that. It

¹⁸ Wood, *Deconstruction*, xii.

¹⁹ See for example *Ibid.*, 264.

²⁰ *PIZ*, 349; *Internal Time*, 360.

understands the flux to imply that one cannot be conscious of what is now in any significant sense at all: it is always gone before it can be fixed by consciousness.

One might argue in defense of this position that although one is aware of what the casual observer or incautious philosopher thinks one is aware of—the first part of a melody, say—the awareness one enjoys is not the presumed awareness of the object as now; one is rather aware of it as past. In an interesting text in which Husserl directly confronts this argument, he takes as his example the internal consciousness I have of an immanent content such as a present intentional act—the hearing of the melody mentioned above would be a case in point. (What Husserl says about the presence of the act would also be true, with a few qualifications, of its object.) Now one might be inclined to say that one is conscious of the initial phase of the act as now. On the view that Husserl is concerned to reject, however, I would never be aware of the initial phase of the act as now, although the phase would in fact occur. *After* its original occurrence, of which I would not be aware, it would come to be given, but “only on the basis of retention”;²¹ it would never cross the threshold of consciousness if retention did not make it conscious. This position, which directly challenges the possibility of experiencing the now in an original way, would presumably beckon attractively to the deconstructionist. It is no surprise, then, that Wood essentially adopts it: “What is actually perceived is not the now, but *the now as it passes away into retention*. And the now has no existence independent of its becoming a not-now.”²² He goes further: “It is tempting,” he writes, “to treat retention as the primal phenomenon, with impressional consciousness as extrapolated or derived from it, or perhaps as only one of its abstract phases.”²³ From this position, it is easy to take the next step and let the now-perception, and the now it would perceive, vanish entirely: “Put more strongly,” Wood writes, “. . . *there is no now-perception* as such, and so nothing with which retention could be compared.”²⁴ Here the deconstructionist’s determination to open up the present moment—

²¹ *PIZ*, 119; *Internal Time*, 123.

²² Wood, *Deconstruction*, 94.

²³ *Ibid.*, 95.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

to which we will turn shortly—evolves into the conviction that one cannot be aware of the present at all.

Husserl, on the other hand, defends the view that the now enjoys a phenomenal reality in our experience, and even a privileged position. It is true, he observes, that the act's initial phase can become an object—as opposed to something experienced nonobjectively, as my acts always are when I am not reflecting on them—only by means of retention and reflection (or reproduction). “But if it were intended *only* by retention, then what confers on it the label ‘now’ would remain incomprehensible.”²⁵ Retention confers the label “just past” on what it intends. Furthermore, if it were intended only in retention, the initial phase in its first occurrence would not appear at all: it would be unconscious. But, Husserl claims, “it is just nonsense to talk about an ‘unconscious’ content that would only subsequently become conscious.”²⁶ The nonsense Husserl has in mind is double-barrelled. It is nonsense, first, because “retention of an unconscious content is impossible.”²⁷ Retention's role is to retain, in the mode of the past, what has just appeared in the mode of the now. If the content never appeared in its presence, there would be no content for retention to intend in its absence. Second, it is nonsense to deny that one experiences things, whether immanent acts or their transcendent objects, as now: “The primal datum is already intended—specifically, in the original form of the ‘now’.”²⁸ This is a matter of experiential fact.

Husserl offers no quarter here. He simply affirms that some things appear to us as now. At a moment in philosophy's history when the willingness to deny that one ever experiences anything as present is seen by some to be a test of one's philosophical mettle, Husserl's claim may seem naive—and naivety, for the Derridean, is the most egregious of all philosophical sins.²⁹ A brief glance at experience, however, suggests that something might be said in expiation of the Husserlian transgression.

Husserl thinks that we are always conscious of something as now whether our experience is pedestrian and ordinary, as it usually

²⁵ *PIZ*, 119; *Internal Time*, 123.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ See for example Wood, *Deconstruction*, 305–6.

is, or dramatic and exceptional. But perhaps experiences of the latter sort—the extraordinary ones—supply the most striking evidence that we can be aware of something as now. Imagine a perfectly still morning—say, Thanksgiving Day at 7:00 A.M. Imagine that no sound disturbs the stillness as you lie in bed. Then imagine that a tremendous boom rends the silence. Any denial that the sound is there in full and startling presence seems plainly and perversely false. The sound, it is true, will immediately sink into the past; it will be retained, and you will almost surely direct a natural reflection towards the retained sound and ask, “What was that?” But that presumes that it did stand before you as now. Consider another example. You are coming to rapid stop in a line of cars on a bridge. Your concentration is focused on the car in front of you and on bringing your vehicle to a halt. You succeed, and at that very moment there occurs a massive blow emanating from the rear and you are thrown violently forward against your shoulder harness. Someone in the car shouts, “We’ve been hit!” The statement is a report, and depends again on a natural reflection on a retained complex of experience. It will also strike everyone in the car as a statement of the obvious, because the blow was experienced—alarmingly so—in the mode of the now.

If someone persists in denying that anything is actually experienced as now in these cases, there is not much that one can do. As Husserl says about the experience of both now and past, “Here, in the unity of the consciousness that gives us something itself, the past pretends to be given itself only as past; the now, only as now. We state this honestly, just as we see it and have it.”³⁰

I suspect that one reason that one might question the possibility of experiencing what is now as now is that one has surreptitiously imported the model of reflection into the experience. The deconstructionist, so critical of objectivizing reflection, may in fact be uncritically assuming it when he or she rejects the now. But there is no more reason to claim that all presence is reflective presence than there is to claim that all consciousness is reflective consciousness. Husserl asserts neither and denies both.

It remains true, of course, that what is experienced as now is fleeting, that it is caught up in the Heraclitean flux of consciousness.

³⁰ PIZ, 344; *Internal Time*, 355.

As we have seen, this might supply another reason for denying that what is present is ever experienced in its presence. It would be something that dissolves into absence before ever announcing its presence; only its trace would be left behind in retention. Husserl, however, never suggests that what appears in the now is anything but fleeting. Any attempt to capture and fix what is now in its immediate presence is indeed doomed. One experiences what is now precisely as flowing: its presence ceaselessly giving way to absence. It is that character that the phenomenologist must "state honestly, just as we see it and have it." The very character of the now that some philosophers find so frustrating is precisely the character on which they, as philosophers, should reflect.

V

What is the now, as Husserl understands it? It is not something substantial in the metaphysical sense. It is not a thing or a part of a thing; it is not *what* is present. Nor is it a "time-point" in the sense of a place or location in a series of points forming "time," whether subjective time or objective time. It is not part of an object's duration, or part of an objective succession. The now, or presence, is rather a mode of appearance:³¹ the mode of appearance of that which is present.³²

This means that the now itself does not appear, apart from a peculiar kind of reflection. The now—"presence" in its preeminent and original form—is, one might say, "absent." But what appears in the mode of the now is not absent: it is there as present, as present "itself," "in person,"³³ in its fullness, as the explosive sound shattering the morning stillness was present. Not itself a temporal position, "the now . . . is the givenness of the present of the temporal position."³⁴ "Now" is the name or the "label"³⁵ for this irreducible

³¹ PIZ, 24; *Internal Time*, 25.

³² See Thomas Prufer's discussion of the difference between presence and that-which-is-present in his "Heidegger, Early and Late, and Aquinas," in *Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition*, ed. Robert Sokolowski (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988).

³³ PIZ, 60; *Internal Time*, 62.

³⁴ PIZ, 66; *Internal Time*, 68.

³⁵ PIZ, 119; *Internal Time*, 123.

way of appearing. If one reflects in the appropriate way,³⁶ which will not be a natural reflection, then one will be able to point philosophically to the difference between the object appearing—that which is present—and its temporal way of appearing, its presence, just as one can point to the difference between the spatial object and the spatial perspective in which it is given. What is said of the now is also true of the past and future: they too are modes of appearance and are not identical to what appears in them, which is why the same object can appear as future and then as now and then as past.

To say that the now is absent is to say that it is not itself a thing or a part of a thing, that it is not itself the sort of thing that appears in a temporal perspective. It is not absence in an absolute sense, but only absence of a particular sort of being. As mode of appearing, or as a mode in which something is given to consciousness, it is as transparent and yet as real as any spatial perspective.

That the now is absent in the sense of not being a thing or part of a thing accounts for two of its essential features: its oneness and its hospitality, both of which are expressive of the now's unique unity and identity. The now is one in the sense that everything of which I am conscious as present in a given moment has the same now,³⁷ that is, the same form or mode of appearance.³⁸ Simultaneity is, originally, "same nowness" (*Gleichzeitigkeit*).³⁹ The sounds I am now hearing, the colored shapes I am now seeing, the memory I am presently entertaining do not severally possess their individual nows.⁴⁰ They rather share a common now: they all appear in the same temporal way. This in turn points to the now's hospitality. If the now were a thing in some sense, it could not simultaneously play host to such a rich and varied range of experience. Its presence as a mode and its absence as a thing enable it to accommodate whatever is compatible in a single moment. That does not mean, of course, that the now is infinitely hospitable; certain experiences cannot exist simultaneously with others. Beyond that restraint, however, the fact that the now is a kind of absence grants it a

³⁶ *PIZ*, 275; *Internal Time*, 285.

³⁷ *PIZ*, 71, 207; *Internal Time*, 73, 214.

³⁸ *PIZ*, 77; *Internal Time*, 81.

³⁹ *PIZ*, 117; *Internal Time*, 120.

⁴⁰ *PIZ*, 207–8; *Internal Time*, 214–15.

hospitality unmatched by, say, the spatial perspective, which can accommodate only what is spatial. The temporal perspective embraces what is spatial, including the spatial perspective, and much else besides. It is the "one" in which the "many" of experience first appear.

VI

That the now is one and open suggests two of the reasons why Husserl speaks of the "privilege" of the now.⁴¹ There are other reasons as well. One of these is again connected with the now as absence in the sense of its not being a thing, not even a present thing. The now, Husserl claims, is the source of the new. The now's absence as a thing is to consciousness as the window's absence as something opaque is to the wall of a house. The now is consciousness's aperture to the new. Indeed, the Husserlian monad not only has its window but is downright drafty with the new. The now, he writes, is "the living source-point of being" in which "ever new primal being . . . wells up."⁴² What appears in the now is something "new" and "original," something "deposited 'from without', 'alien to consciousness'."⁴³ It is in this mode that I hear sounds I have never heard before, read new texts about old texts, and wonder whether I ever experience anything as present. It is also—to turn from what fills time to time itself—the place in which time-points first appear: the now is "the source-point of all temporal positions whatsoever."⁴⁴ What is present is what is new, and the now is its mode of appearance.

Once the new has announced itself in the now, it slips away into the past. Having become present in that peculiar absence that is the now and that lets new things and events become present for the first time, the new becomes absent in the mode of the past. The new becomes old; it no longer appears in temporal presence but in temporal absence. This suggests a further aspect of the now's privileged status, one that involves past and future.

⁴¹ *PIZ*, 35; *Internal Time*, 37.

⁴² *PIZ*, 69; *Internal Time*, 71.

⁴³ *PIZ*, 88; *Internal Time*, 93.

⁴⁴ *PIZ*, 72; *Internal Time*, 74.

The now, Husserl claims, is the point of reference for consciousness, the point of orientation in terms of which what appears as absent in our temporal experience organizes itself. Any temporal object is originally given in the now; it then immediately slips into the past. "Past" here is not to be understood in terms of objective before and after, which would be a relative sense of past in which something could be past in relation to one thing and future in relation to another. The past we are considering is a past always "oriented towards the actually present now,"⁴⁵ the now that serves as an absolute standard determining the degree of pastness in which something appears. Moreover, what is past in this sense continually sinks further and further into the past in relation to the actual now; its mode of the past changes continuously. Thus considered, it has a "shifting orientation in relation to the living now."⁴⁶ The now is therefore "one" in a new sense. Not only is it the common form of appearance for everything that appears in it, it is also the single point of orientation for all of my temporal experience. Husserl, it is true, does sometimes speak of ever new nows replacing those that have become old,⁴⁷ but the stress in such statements is on the element of the new, on what appears in the now: the now itself is the abiding and formal mode of appearance that is always freshly filled in one way or another while preserving its identity as absolute point of reference. Here again we can say that if it enjoyed the presence appropriate to something given in perception, the now would not be able to fulfill its task: specifically, it too would recede into the past and could not be the orientation-point in terms of which we speak of something as receding in the first place.

Retention is one of the ways in which I experience something appearing as past in relation to the now. Recollection or secondary memory is another. In recalling the past object, the recollection always gives it a position in relation to the actually present now.⁴⁸ Indeed, authentic memory is distinguished from "mere" phantasy because the former posits its object in relation to the now while the latter does not.⁴⁹ The now is the mode in which the act of memory

⁴⁵ *PIZ*, 106; *Internal Time*, 111. See also *PIZ*, 214; *Internal Time*, 221.

⁴⁶ *PIZ*, 55; *Internal Time*, 57.

⁴⁷ *PIZ*, 275; *Internal Time*, 285.

⁴⁸ *PIZ*, 51; *Internal Time*, 53.

⁴⁹ *PIZ*, 104; *Internal Time*, 110.

itself is experienced, and the present memory relates the past of which it is aware to its own position. It would not be memory otherwise. To fulfill such a memory, Husserl suggests, means to fulfill the nexus-intentions running from the remembered past perception right up to the now.⁵⁰ The now's privilege, then, consists in its hospitality, its openness to the new, and its position as absolute point of orientation for the life of consciousness. It is the mode of appearing thanks to which what is present can be experienced as present and in relation to which the absent can appear as absent. In these senses, apparent in the temporal phenomena themselves, the now and its privilege, rooted in its peculiar unity and identity, resist the subversive efforts of the deconstructionist.

VII

The suggestion that we never really experience the present surely has more currency in our philosophical world than it did in Husserl's. It is the other conviction—that all we truly experience is the present or what is in the now—that seemed most seductive and formidable to Husserl. It appears in many guises in his texts on time, and in at least one respect and at one period in his career he fell victim to its charms. The struggle that Husserl wages in this case is not to rescue some vestige of presence from the threat of universal absence; it is rather to admit real absence into a realm of presence from which it seems to have been excluded. This is also the struggle the deconstructionist undertakes: in deconstructing the moment, for example, Wood proposes to replace presence by "time as the absolute openness to the other."⁵¹ The moment, understood as the now, will be opened up to what is other than it; this, the deconstructionist thinks, will radically compromise the now's unity and self-identity, and thereby its capacity to be present purely and fully, or even to be present at all.

There are various ways in which the moment can be opened up. One is to point to its undecidability. The moment is undecidable in the sense that one cannot finally say that it is either one or many. Wood develops this theme in connection with Nietzsche's doctrine

⁵⁰ *PIZ*, 301; *Internal Time*, 313.

⁵¹ Wood, *Deconstruction*, xii.

of eternal recurrence, but one confronts it also in the case of Husserl's conception of the now. As mode of appearance for whatever is actual, the now is one: a single form in which many different things and events can appear simultaneously. Yet each one of these simultaneously appearing items might also be said to be (a) now. So even in the present moment a certain undecidability between one and many occurs, and with the metaphysical understanding of time as a linear succession of now-moments, the actually present moment finds itself attended by myriads of other moments that precede or follow it. Each may be a unity considered in itself, but the point is that no one of them by itself could compose time—time demands that there be many such unities—and so the value of the sheer presence of a single moment is compromised.

One might argue that the undecidability of the moment in these senses does not really crack the hard shell of the self-identical instant; it just confuses the matter of the privilege of that instant by multiplying it. But with Nietzsche and then with Husserl, Wood claims, the integrity of the now-moment itself is compromised. "Nietzsche's 'moment', so far from being the reworking of the metaphysical value of presence, is the scene of its explosion."⁵² Husserl's understanding of the moment is perhaps less pyrotechnical, but it is certainly subtle, and introduces into the now a deeper sense of undecidability. Wood cites Husserl's statement that "even this ideal now is not something *toto coelo* different from the not-now but is continuously mediated with it."⁵³ This, Wood observes, "is a momentous remark."⁵⁴ Why momentous? Because "the true ideality of the now is itself a *dynamic ideality*, a continuous accommodation of the now to the not-now."⁵⁵

Hence the deconstructionist, in seeking to open up the now, the moment, finds in Husserl a sympathetic ally. The Husserlian now is inherently connected to its others, to past and future; its integrity is seen to be relational and not hermetic. The now is not a self-enclosed and perfectly discrete instant. It is rather a way of appearing—true, a way that enjoys certain privileges over against its temporal others, but also one that shades off into past and future,

⁵² Wood, *Deconstruction*, 34.

⁵³ *PIZ*, 40; *Internal Time*, 42.

⁵⁴ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 94.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

that is penetrated by past and future. Husserl knows that now and past exclude one another, but he also knows that now and past (and future) are relative to one another.⁵⁶ This is the deeper undecidability that affects the now: it cannot simply be dissolved into past or future, but it cannot be thought apart from them either. All three elements will be in play at any moment, however arbitrarily we may choose to carve the moment up. This is precisely the sophistication of Husserl's conception of the now: he realizes that to open up the now does not entail its loss. That the now stands in perpetual relation to past and future, that this presence—the now—is always interwoven with absence, does not compromise its integrity. Indeed, from Husserl's perspective it is integral to its integrity: it constitutes, rather than subverts, the now's unity and self-identity. We have already seen that the deconstructionist, in the concern for exploding the hermetic now of the metaphysical tradition, tends to lose sight of this subtle way in which the now opens out to its others without itself vanishing.

VIII

There are still other ways in which Husserl opens up the moment. One of these is his many-faceted critique of what might be called the "prejudice of the now."

On the face of it, any temporal object we experience appears in both presence and absence. Consider a succession of tones: first tone *A* appears as now and tone *B* and *C* as yet to come, then *B* appears as now and *A* as just past and *C* as yet to come, then *C* as now and *B* as just past and *A* as still further past. The tones that no longer appear as now have sunk into the past, but not into "the abyss of the . . . past"⁵⁷ in the sense of disappearing from consciousness altogether. This sort of abysmal absence may well occur, but not in cases such as this. What is past here, or what is future, is not simply absent. I am aware of the tones that are past in their absence, as I must be if I am to be aware of their succession at all. One might be tempted to say here that the absent tones are somehow still present, but I think it would be safer and more accurate to say

⁵⁶ *PIZ*, 68, 179, 318; *Internal Time*, 70, 185, 330.

⁵⁷ *PIZ*, 349; *Internal Time*, 360.

that they appear in appropriate modes of absence. In Husserl's language, the elapsed tone phases "are *still* intended, they still *appear*, but in a *modified* way."⁵⁸

Now none of the theories Husserl contends with in his writings on time denies that we experience enduring or successive objects—temporal objects—and that they appear to us in something like the way I have just described. The differences arise over how the *consciousness* of such temporal objects is constituted, and it is here particularly that the prejudice of the now asserts itself. The prejudice takes somewhat different forms. One version involves the conviction that one can be conscious of something only if it is in some sense present or now. Another version is based on the notion that the consciousness of what is temporally extended can occur only in a phase of consciousness that is actually now and that is not itself temporally extended.

Brentano's view, at least as Husserl presents it,⁵⁹ would represent an example of the first version. From the Husserlian perspective, Brentano's theory offers a double difficulty with respect to presence and absence.

One difficulty is that Brentano thinks that in the actual perceiving of a temporal object one is aware of the object's just-past phases in the same way as one might be aware of an object one perceived in the more distant past. Thus the elapsed phases of a passage of music I am now hearing on the radio would be intended in the same way as a concert I remember attending last week. In both cases I am conscious of what has become absent, but Husserl wants to insist that I am aware of them in their absence in quite different ways. The difference is the difference between retention and recollection, which are species, respectively, of impression and re-presentation (*Vergegenwärtigung*), the two distinct modes of consciousness that, according to Husserl, divide the whole of conscious life. In retention, "the past object is 'given' as past";⁶⁰ it is presented⁶¹ or "perceived."⁶² In recollection, the past is not presented but re-presented; it is not there "in person," but intended as

⁵⁸ *PIZ*, 275; *Internal Time*, 285.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* See also, for example, secs. 3–6, and no. 14.

⁶⁰ *PIZ*, 311; *Internal Time*, 322.

⁶¹ *PIZ*, 97; *Internal Time*, 102.

⁶² *PIZ*, 39; *Internal Time*, 41.

if "seen through a veil."⁶³ In both cases, the mode of absence is that of the past, but the modes let their objects appear in fundamentally different ways. Thanks to retention and its mode, I can be said to perceive a melody and not just those tones that appear as now; in more general terms, I can be said to perceive a succession or duration. That Brentano cannot account for such perception, that he restricts perception to what appears as now and leaves to recollection the consciousness of what is past, suggests one of the ways in which he is subject to the prejudice of the now.

The other sense in which he is subject to it is revealed in his account of the way in which the consciousness of past or future phases of the perceived object is constituted. Brentano holds that one can be conscious of a past phase of a temporal object only on the basis of a present content *now* in consciousness. What this amounts to saying is that one can really experience only what is now. The tone I seem to be conscious of as past is really present.

Husserl replies to this position by saying that past and now exclude one another, that what is past is really past.⁶⁴ What appears as past, what appears in this fundamental mode of temporal absence, is not, clandestinely or overtly, present in the sense of the now. If it were, it could not appear as past, and Husserl insists that it does appear as past: "The past pretends to be given only as past; the now, only as now."⁶⁵

The view that the consciousness of something that is not now can be had only on the basis of some content that is now appears in at least two other forms in Husserl's texts. One of these is the image theory of secondary memory. The image theory Husserl criticizes assimilates recollection to pictorial consciousness, that is, to the representation of something absent by means of a present painting, sculpture, or other kind of image.⁶⁶ Husserl is not concerned to deny that pictorial consciousness does occur (he knows that it does); his point is only that it is not the same kind of consciousness as recollection. Pictorial consciousness is an appealing candidate for explaining memory if one is convinced that one cannot be directly conscious of what is past itself, that the consciousness

⁶³ *PIZ*, 48; *Internal Time*, 50.

⁶⁴ *PIZ*, 318, 152, 320; *Internal Time*, 330, 156, 332.

⁶⁵ *PIZ*, 344; *Internal Time*, 355.

⁶⁶ *PIZ*, 59, 309; *Internal Time*, 61, 321.

of what is past, precisely because what is past is absent, must depend on a present surrogate, the pictorial image. This raises the question about whether one is aware of the past itself in secondary memory. In some texts, Husserl suggests that forms of re-presentation, including recollection or secondary memory, do not give the past object "itself";⁶⁷ in other texts, however, he indicates that re-presentation does give the object itself,⁶⁸ and that its difference from retention or other impressional forms of awareness rests in the way in which the object itself is intended. The latter, I believe, is clearly Husserl's settled view. Thus when I remember the illuminated theater I experienced yesterday, it is the past, the absent theater itself that I am remembering: I intend something absent in the manner appropriate to it, that is, in the manner of recollection as opposed to retention. No present content stands between me and the past object I intend; the past object itself stands before me in its absence.

The prejudice of the now also appeared in Husserl's own interpretation of the constitution of time-consciousness before about 1908. During this period, Husserl thought that the retention or primary memory of just elapsed phases of the perceived object and protention or primary expectation of the phases yet to come depended on the presence in the "now of consciousness"⁶⁹—in the actually present phase of the perceptual act—of appropriate contents and appropriate temporal apprehensions. This would mean, for example, that the retention of elapsed tone *A* would be constituted by the animation of an "*A*" content now present in consciousness by the appropriate apprehension of the past. That the prejudice of the now is at work in this interpretation should be clear enough: the awareness of the not-now must, in effect, be the consciousness of something that is now, on the underlying assumption that one cannot be directly conscious of what is absent. Husserl eventually came to criticize this interpretation of the constitution of time-consciousness on the grounds that a content that is actually present in consciousness must appear in its presence, as now, and could not also be apprehended as past.⁷⁰ If the consciousness of the past is made to depend on the consciousness of what is now, then one will never be conscious

⁶⁷ *PIZ*, 41, 45; *Internal Time*, 43, 47.

⁶⁸ *PIZ*, 59; *Internal Time*, 61.

⁶⁹ *PIZ*, 321; *Internal Time*, 333.

⁷⁰ *PIZ*, 322–3; *Internal Time*, 334–5.

of the past at all, and one will then have no experience of time or temporal objects—or even of the now, since now and past are relative to one another.

When Husserl rejects the interpretation we have discussed, he comes to understand retention, primal impression, and protention as intentional moments that transcend the actually present phase of consciousness to which they belong. Retention, for example, simply is the consciousness of what is just past and does not include in itself any present content, not even an echo of what is past.⁷¹ In its retentive and protentive moments, consciousness transcends the present toward the absent. In doing so it makes no attempt to transmute the absent into the present, the not-now into the now. Time-consciousness is no alchemist. It lets what is absent appear as what it is. Husserl thus comes to conceive of consciousness as self-transcending intentionality and not as a kind of bag⁷² stuffed with really present contents that are supposed to make do for things now abysmally and irrecoverably absent: "*Retention*, which is an act now living . . . , transcends itself and *posits* something as being—namely, as being past—that does not really inhere in it."⁷³

Husserl, we said, insists that consciousness must reach out beyond the now to what is not-now in the sense of what is past and what is future. Time-consciousness, then, is the awareness of what is present and of what is absent, and of the two as bound together always and in various ways. The present's privilege is equally the privilege of the absent. But there is another dimension of this awareness that deserves attention, and it too may be seen against the background of the prejudice of the now.

IX

Husserl reports that it is a common conviction in his own day that the perception of a temporal object—of a succession, for example—must occur in a single now of consciousness. The consciousness of succession would not itself be successive; the consciousness of a duration would not itself endure. Husserl finds this

⁷¹ *PIZ*, 31, 311-12; *Internal Time*, 33, 323-4.

⁷² *PIZ*, 279; *Internal Time*, 289.

⁷³ *PIZ*, 344; *Internal Time*, 355-6.

“dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness”⁷⁴ in Lotze and Herbart, but one suspects that it applies equally to his own rejected interpretation of time-consciousness in terms of contents and apprehensions. The prejudice of the now shapes this view in the sense that the view assumes that only in the immediate present could consciousness do its constitutional work; past phases of consciousness are gone, absent, and so could play no role in constitution. Consciousness is shrunk to its immediate now-phase; the succession of consciousness *cannot* be the consciousness of succession.

Husserl, on the other hand, comes to argue that consciousness reaches out beyond the now to the past and future phases of the temporal object precisely through consciousness’s own succeeding phases, and therefore through its absent phases as well as its actual phase. On this view, the succession of consciousness is the consciousness of succession, and the two are inseparable. Absence, then, is an ingredient not only of the temporal object but also of the consciousness of the object.

It is only with the maturing of the notion of the “absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness”⁷⁵ and its double intentionality that Husserl is able to give a satisfactory account of the sense in which the succession of consciousness is, or makes possible, the consciousness of succession. What Husserl means by the absolute flow is notoriously difficult. In this and the next section, I only want to make a few comments about how the theme of presence and absence enters into it, and what connection it might have with the deconstructionist’s project.

Husserl acknowledges that he employs a metaphor when he calls the absolute consciousness a flow,⁷⁶ but, like all good metaphors, it conveys a number of important truths. In this case, the metaphor points to the continuous character of time-consciousness: it is continuous in the sense that its phases ceaselessly well up and pass away, and it is continuous in the sense that its phases dovetail with one another. There are no beginnings and no endings in the flow. Through the flow’s phases, one becomes conscious of acts as immanent temporal objects, and, if the acts have transcendent objects,

⁷⁴ *PIZ*, 20; *Internal Time*, 21–2. Husserl takes the phrase from William Stern.

⁷⁵ *PIZ*, 73; *Internal Time*, 77. See also *PIZ*, 371; *Internal Time*, 382.

⁷⁶ *PIZ*, 75, 371; *Internal Time*, 79, 382.

of those transcendent objects as well. The absolute consciousness, then, is a continuous flow in which objects and (as we shall see) the flow itself are intended in presence and in absence.

One might point to two ways in which the flow is involved with presence and absence. The first echoes the peculiar absence we saw earlier in the case of the now as mode of appearance—or of past and future as modes. Considered in itself, the actual phase of the absolute flow, with its primal impression, retentional, and protentional moments, is the absence of anything except sheer experiential consciousness. Just as the now is absence in the sense of not being any particular thing but only a mode of appearing, so the flow's primal impression is not an act or content but just the consciousness of acts and contents as now. The primal impression is the intentional source-point⁷⁷ for what appears as now and as new in the life of consciousness. Thanks to it, one can experience all at once sound and color contents, kinesthetic experiences, a feeling of anxiety, and the judgment that $2 + 2 = 4$. That the actual phase of the flow is the absence of anything but presenting makes possible the great variety of experiences I live through at each moment. It is an absence in the center of conscious life that, through its moment of primal impression, allows us to have acts and contents in their presence and, through its moments of retention and protention, in their absence. As source of the temporal modes, the flow itself is beyond them: we have no names for the absolute flow,⁷⁸ Husserl says, by which he means no temporal names.

The second way in which presence and absence are involved in the flow is through what Husserl calls the *Längsintentionalität*⁷⁹ of the flow, the flow's intending of itself. The actual phase of the flow will elapse and be replaced by a new actual phase, and this will happen continuously; I will be conscious of this "succession" of phases of the absolute flow, not through another flow, but through the flow's very succession of phases itself. Furthermore, it is through the flow's consciousness of its own elapsing phases that it is conscious of the immanent temporal objects that endure and succeed one another. It is in this sense that the flow's succession is the consciousness of succession, of its own succession and of the

⁷⁷ PIZ, 133; *Internal Time*, 136.

⁷⁸ PIZ, 75, 371; *Internal Time*, 79, 382.

⁷⁹ PIZ, 81, 379; *Internal Time*, 85, 391.

succession of immanent objects. The flow lets itself go but recaptures itself, becomes absent but overcomes its absence intentionally. Each actual phase of the flow intends retentionally the just-past—the “just-absent”—phase of the flow and is open protentionally to phases yet to come. It recaptures itself not by making its own absent phases present but by intending them (retentionally) in their absence. The retained phase is also preserved with its reference to the now-absent moment of the immanent object originally given in it; the immanent object is therefore constituted in its temporal extension. This “double” intending⁸⁰—of phase of the flow by phase of the flow, and thereby of phases of the immanent object—goes on until retention fades. The temporal object and the flow itself are thus woven out of presences and absences. The consciousness of object and flow is equally a complex process of presenting, of letting go, of letting become absent, and yet of intending what has become absent in its very absence.

X

There are interesting connections and parallels between Husserl’s absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness, as we have just described it, and Derrida’s deconstructive notions of *différance* and trace. Wood notes that when Husserl pushes the question of the constitution of time back to the absolute flow as its ultimate foundation, time itself seems to vanish.⁸¹ It is true that Husserl claims that temporal predicates do not apply to the flow—recall that he says we have no names for it. Similarly, Derrida says that we have no names for what *différance*—itself not a name—tries to capture.⁸² But Husserl also refers to the flow as “quasi-temporal.”⁸³ In point of fact, if one sees the metaphysical conception of time as

⁸⁰ PIZ, 80, 379; *Internal Time*, 85, 390.

⁸¹ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 109. See also PIZ, 78; *Internal Time*, 83: “We can no longer speak of a time that belongs to the ultimate constituting consciousness.” On the senses in which Husserl’s internal time-consciousness is not internal, not temporal, and not consciousness, see Prufer, “Heidegger, Early and Late, and Aquinas,” 200.

⁸² Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 159.

⁸³ PIZ, 83, 381; *Internal Time*, 88, 393.

wedded indissolubly to the image of a line of phases automatically succeeding one another, then Husserl may fairly be said to be maintaining just such a metaphysical conception when he describes the absolute flow. He views the flow precisely as a series of phases, marching along in perfect succession, one of which will be actual, with others having preceded it and still others to follow it. Whether or not this apparent adherence to a linear conception of time is a case of fatal metaphysical backsliding is something we will discuss later. What it indicates now is that we must probe more deeply if we are to uncover affinities between Husserl's conception of the absolute flow and the deconstructive notions mentioned above.

From the discussion in the previous section, a number of things about the absolute flow should be clear. The actual moment of the flow—the “present” phase of internal time-consciousness—is a moment of intentional consciousness; it is nothing but intentionality. Certainly it is not any sort of present substance, or even a mental content present within consciousness. This present or actual moment of the absolute flow, while possessing a unity and identity, is also intrinsically many, and that in two important respects: first, internally it is many; second, through its internal manyness it is open to the many other phases that make up the flow and, through them, to what they intend. Put another way, the flow's internal complexity opens it up to multiple otherness: to other phases of the flow, to the many other moments of conscious life that the flow constitutes, and to the other in the sense of objects transcendent to consciousness.

The phase of the absolute flow is internally complex in the sense that it possesses a threefold intentionality in the form of primal impression, retention, and protention. Now what is significant is that while there is “now-perception,”⁸⁴ or, more precisely, primal impression, it is simply one of three intentional moments constituting the phase of the absolute flow. The whole, then, is not the primal impression, the intending through which a phase of an object appears as now; the primal impression is only a dependent part, along with retention and protention, of a larger whole. Primal impression thus escapes the net of the metaphysical conceptualizing that wants to think of distinct though dependent parts as discrete

⁸⁴ PIZ, 226; *Internal Time*, 233.

units. In addition, as intentional phase it also escapes self-containment: it opens out onto something else. Indeed, the whole, the actual momentary phase of the flow, is no more self-contained than its moment of primal impression; for, through retention and protention, a given phase of the flow also reaches out to past and future phases of the objects, immanent and transcendent, that one experiences. It does this, as we have seen, by opening out intentionally onto phases of the flow itself that are no longer or have not yet become actual. Finally, the flow is precisely flowing—in a process of continuous movement or becoming. Whatever difficulties may attend Husserl's notion of the absolute flow of time-constituting consciousness, it is very difficult to read it as something that gives itself in simple, sealed moments abiding in static presence.

With these considerations in mind, we are in a position to explore the affinities between Husserl's flow and Derrida's *différance* and trace. Certainly the least one can say is that the sort of consciousness Husserl's flow has of itself and of temporal objects is much closer in spirit to the deconstructionist's standpoint than it is, say, to the Cartesian's way of understanding the ego's presence to itself and its objects.

Différance and trace, Wood observes, "make meaning possible without themselves *having* meaning."⁸⁵ Of course, one can say something about them, as we are now doing; and one can add, as Wood does, that *différance* has the dual aspect of differing and deferring.⁸⁶ Yet they are not themselves meaningful contents. A sign in an airport indicating the direction of restaurant facilities has meaning or content. *Différance* does not have meaning in that way, but it does make possible meaning in that way, according to Derrida. In Husserlian terms, *différance* and trace are, or make possible, the awareness of contents or of objects, without themselves being contents or objects; specifically, with respect to time, they make possible the consciousness of temporal objects. Now this is precisely what occurs in and through the phases of Husserl's absolute flow. The phases themselves are not contents, nor is the threefold intentionality that makes up each phase a matter of content. The phases make possible the awareness of contents precisely by highly complex *differing*. Thus the phases differ from the contents of which

⁸⁵ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 114.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 112, 261.

they are aware, and only by so differing can they be aware of them. Then, within a momentary phase of the flow the intentional moments that make up the intentionality of that phase differ from each other—primal impression is not retention and it is not protention, nor is retention protention, and so on; again, only through these differences can the temporal object appear in its temporality. Finally, each phase of the flow is different from every other phase of the flow, though intentionally interwoven with them through retention and protention. Again, it is only through that difference that one is conscious of the flow as a flow of succeeding phases, and as one and identical; only if one is thus aware of the flow's succeeding phases will one be aware of temporal objects in their temporality. Difference, then—moving and widely distributed difference—marks Husserlian time-consciousness. Here one might apply what Wood says of Heidegger's "primordial temporality" to Husserl's absolute flow: it "is difference rather than identity."⁸⁷ Or perhaps, since Husserl's flow does indeed possess identity (and unity as well), one would be more faithful to Husserl if one said that the flow is "identity constituted through difference." Since Husserl views the absolute flow as the deepest level of subjectivity—even as beyond the subject as that which constitutes it—one can reasonably say that Husserl meets, as did Heidegger in his own way, "the task of substituting for any atemporal sense of self, a radically temporalized interpretation."⁸⁸

Différance also carries with it the idea of deferring, of postponing. If one takes this to mean that there is no present in the sense of a place of final closure in which something or perhaps everything will be there in pure presence, then Husserl's flow is surely marked by deferring; for the protention built into each phase ensures that time-consciousness is always incomplete and is intrinsically aware of being incomplete. One could equally well argue that retention, which presents what it intends in ever-decreasing fullness, also points to the incompleteness of time-consciousness: to be aware of temporality is to be aware that the fullness of presence is always deferred.

As for trace, it is said not be the trace of anything,⁸⁹ which again detaches it from any particular content or meaning. Perhaps

⁸⁷ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 217.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 223.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 116.

saying that the trace is not the trace of anything is analogous to saying in Husserl's case that retention—the actual retaining—is not what is retained. There can be something retained only because retention differs from it. The point is that ongoing retaining, “tracing,” is part of the primitive movement that makes the experience of time possible.

Wood formulates nicely the point of these discussions, at the same time betraying the sense in which, from the Husserlian perspective, deconstruction tends to overreach itself:

What Derrida does is to draw out of Husserl, with renewed force and determination, the recognition that temporality fundamentally undermines and does not sustain the idea of presence, and the very possibility of the interiority by which subjectivity has been traditionally thought possible. For Derrida, this will not only open up the present primordially to what is not present, but also open up the “inside” of subjectivity to the “outside” of the world.⁹⁰

Derrida can draw out of Husserl this “opening up” because it is precisely what occurs in Husserl's absolute flow. In this respect Wood is surely on firm ground when he wonders “whether the distance between Husserl and Derrida is not in part mirage.”⁹¹

For all their affinities, however, there remain deep differences between the two. Husserl, as we have seen, does not take the opening up of the moment as undermining the idea of presence: to open up the present, whether in the sense of the now or in the sense of the actual phase of the time-constituting flow, is not to lose it, as the deconstructionist may think, but to see it for what it is. Husserl may well say that retention “transcends itself” towards the past, but he also insists in the same sentence that retention is “an act now living”⁹²—a presence, that is, essentially open to absence. Furthermore, as we suggested at the beginning of this section, Husserl does not simply reject the standard linear conception of time as a succession of moments, nor does he draw back from the traditional notion that there are certain basic temporal concepts or forms that will be found wherever time is found. In all of these respects Husserl would remain, from the deconstructionist's perspective, a “metaphysician” in what he says about time. Now to this point we

⁹⁰ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 128.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁹² *PIZ*, 344; *Internal Time*, 355.

have been defending, from various perspectives, Husserl's complex understanding of the temporal moment. Is it also possible, in the face of deconstructionist criticisms, to say something in defense of his apparent allegiance to a linear conception of time, and of his related conviction that there are certain fundamental and universal temporal features?

XI

The liberation of the moment from its isolation in the metaphysical chamber of perfect self-identity and unity was only one of the deconstructive tasks Wood set for himself. The other was to deconstruct presence in connection with time's structure. In his pursuit of this strategy, Wood argues against the traditional view that there is only one concept of time, specifically, "the standard model of time as a single linear sequence of moments."⁹³ This concept of time, we know, is metaphysical: it would either found all other concepts of time, or it would be the concept to which all others could be reduced. Derrida, recall, suggests that this or any other concept of time would be inherently metaphysical and therefore could not survive the deconstruction of metaphysics. Wood certainly thinks that the concept of time should be eased out of the metaphysical quagmire, but he also thinks that it can survive the extraction. More precisely, he claims that what we took to be a single concept of time—for that is what it appeared to be when sunk into metaphysical obscurity—turns out, when deconstructively scrubbed down and rinsed off, to be plural. What remains are many times and many concepts of time, and none of them is metaphysical, none is original and primitive. Wood aims, therefore, at a non-metaphysical, nonfoundational "pluralization of time and its structures."⁹⁴

What sorts of time might be involved here? Wood makes no claim to give an exhaustive list, but he does make suggestions about what some of these plural temporal structures might be: he discusses, for example, phenomenological time, existential time, and the time of signification. What marks each of these times taken in isolation,

⁹³ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 354.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

that is, taken as their proponents have usually taken them, is a claim to universality, or at least to priority. But that is precisely what Wood denies to them. He rather gives them "local" significance, and describes them in terms of "models" of time with restricted scope but hermeneutical utility. This, he observes, fits better with our intuitions about the range of applicability of any one of them.⁹⁵ Thus, we may appreciate the existential dimension of temporality, but we know intuitively that it does not exhaust the possibilities of time. However much we may appreciate Husserl's investigations of phenomenological time and time-consciousness, we sense that it can hardly claim to provide a complete account of temporality; we know, for example, that it would need to be supplemented by something like Heidegger's existential temporality.⁹⁶

The assertion that there are many times and concepts of time rather than only one is inherently plausible. But it also raises the question whether there is any inner unity among these many times. Certainly Wood makes no claim to have discovered one,⁹⁷ and I suspect that he thinks that it would be futile even to look. There are arguments for his position. Among the strongest is that the phenomenological temporality Husserl investigates is not able to account for the "structures of signification"⁹⁸ that belong to many of the objects of time-consciousness. Mahler's First Symphony, for example, has an internal structure that is not brought into being, or created by, time-consciousness. This is true even if one describes the symphony in terms of a succession of notes, measures, or movements. Such sequences form the stuff of the object, what it is. One might appropriately refer to them as constituting the specifically musical temporality of the work. It is true that one will not be *aware* of the symphony unless it is intended through the structures of time-consciousness, and in that sense time-consciousness may be described as a necessary condition for the experience of the symphony. It is not a sufficient condition, however. So there we have two times, and two concepts of temporality, already: the temporal structure of the intending consciousness and the time of the musical object of consciousness. Husserl was quite aware of this distinction;

⁹⁵ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 332.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 58-9, 325.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 332, 374.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 344, 347.

he does not view time-consciousness idealistically, that is, as somehow generating the structures of signification of the objects of which it is conscious.⁹⁹ True, one might observe that Husserl himself does not undertake a phenomenology of the unique temporalities of music or of the visual arts or of a multitude of other regions. All that means from the Husserlian perspective, however, is that plenty of tasks remain for phenomenology to take up. But even if all of them were brought to fruition and we had arrayed before us a myriad of diverse times, the central position of time-consciousness, alluded to above, would not have been usurped; for it is difficult to imagine a single time, including the quasi-temporal structure of time-consciousness itself, that does not involve time-consciousness in some way as a necessary condition. This may not bestow on time-consciousness a foundational role in the metaphysical sense, and certainly it does not deny that there are multiple conceptions of time; but it does point to the ubiquity of time-consciousness.

Whether or not there are still other universal aspects of temporal experience will become clearer if we look briefly at Wood's chief strategy in developing his notion of "a pluridimensional and delinearized temporality."¹⁰⁰ That strategy consists in a turn to discourse, or better, to textuality. "The text," Wood claims, "is a privileged site for the liberation of time."¹⁰¹ In examining textuality's structures of signification, Wood is not claiming that "life is a text, but that it is textured. And that man is a tissue of times."¹⁰² Both the written text and human existence "can display some of the most commonly recognized features of the narrative. The claim will be that these features offer us a model by which discontinuity, nonlinearity, and pluridimensionality can each be thought of as dimensions of both existential and textual temporality."¹⁰³

What would some of these features of narrative be? Wood discusses seven "levels of time narrative"¹⁰⁴ that might appear in a text: the times of the reader, narrator, plot, actions, events, char-

⁹⁹ PIZ, 362-3; *Internal Time*, 372-4.

¹⁰⁰ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 276.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 331.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 334.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 354. This is a theme nicely developed by David Carr in his *Time, Narrative, and History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).

¹⁰⁴ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 354.

acters, and narrative discourse. That these times may differ is illustrated most simply by the familiar case in which the time of the telling of the events in a story differs from the chronology of the events themselves. Wood goes on to point out how our lives are fabrics woven out of similarly diverse times.¹⁰⁵

Now Wood, one will recall, does not claim to find anything unifying these many times, no "primitive 'elements' "¹⁰⁶ that might pull them all together. I want to suggest, however, that there may indeed be such elements, and that they are basically the ones that Husserl discusses in his phenomenology of temporal experience. To assert that there are certain fundamental temporal features that appear wherever any of the many times appears clearly runs the risk of signalling a metaphysical retreat and a shameless yielding to the metaphysical desire for unity, but perhaps Wood would grant me the license to use in a nonmetaphysical way what had been metaphysical concepts—a use that he allows, at least in principle.¹⁰⁷

What sort of fundamental features do I have in mind? Start with past, present, and future, and before and after, and succession and simultaneity, indeed, with the very concepts implicated in that rather decrepit, and certainly ordinary, linear conception of time. It may be true that the time of the telling of a story will differ from the time of the events narrated; but in either case, if temporality is present at all, there will be sequence—before and after—and in the telling and in the events told there will be past, present, and future, and temporal beginnings and endings. It is true that what is in sequence in the two times will not coincide, which is why we have two times and not one. The point here is not that there is only one time, but that wherever there is time in any form, certain primitive features will be in play. Another way of saying this is that these features will always be there as background, and it is only against the constant background they provide that the differences among

¹⁰⁵ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 358–9.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 291. Wood suggests, under the inspiration of narrativity, that at least some varieties of time may share certain primitive features (p. 352), but this does not seem to run counter to his rejection of universal primitive elements deriving from the linear conception of time. He seems to be aware that he is in danger of substituting one set of universal features for another. From Husserl's perspective, the set offered in substitution (if it is) would be demonstrably less primitive than the one it is intended to displace.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 276–7.

the various times can appear. Thus the claim that there are a plurality of histories or a plurality of futures presupposes and would not undermine linearity as a *form*.¹⁰⁸ One might venture still further (dangerously so!) and say that to speak of a *plurality* of histories may assume something more: the background concept, and perhaps even the reality, of a single linear history, even if it is not something that we will ever capture, or inscribe, in its overwhelming complexity.

Consider the existential dimension, which phenomenology, Wood argues, cannot adequately handle with the categories at its disposal. Now it may be true that, existentially speaking, what most deeply characterizes the past for us as living beings is not that it is no longer now, but that it cannot be changed.¹⁰⁹ It may furthermore be true that the future enters our lives not as a reservoir of new nows, but as a projection of possibility,¹¹⁰ and perhaps as the anticipation—not merely the expectation—of death. Yet is it not built into the notion of the past as that which cannot be changed that it is no longer now or future, that it is, as Husserl says, something over with and fixed?¹¹¹ What defines the future, for Husserl, is precisely its openness.¹¹² In protention, consciousness is perpetual openness to more experience; while this is not in itself an existential project, could one have such a project without such sheer openness as a necessary condition? If death is something to be anticipated in Heidegger's sense, if it is something in relation to which one can assume an authentic or inauthentic existence, might this not presuppose, again as a condition, the collision of protention's unqualified openness to more conscious life with the profound realization of that life's ultimate closure? I am not suggesting that Heideggarian temporal *ekstacies* can be reduced to Husserl's senses of past and future, retention and protention; I am suggesting that existential temporality presupposes them as background.

Finally, it is part of the metaphysical conception of time, as the deconstructionist reads it, that the present is levelled and neutralized. The now in its unity and self-identity is a kind of

¹⁰⁸ As Wood suggests; Wood, *Deconstruction*, 373.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 214.

¹¹¹ *PIZ*, 64; *Internal Time*, 66–7.

¹¹² *PIZ*, 106; *Internal Time*, 111.

neutral form that is indifferent to its contents. As opposed to this, Wood suggests a now that fuses with its content; if one is now hearing music then one has a unique time, a tuneful sequence.¹¹³ The now is a sponge soaking up its contents, finally disintegrating into many nows and many times. This is a compelling phenomenological observation, but the notion of the now's neutrality should not be jettisoned entirely. After all, my now may be tuneful, but may also be, if less intensely, other things as well: headachy, warm, dark, anxious, and so on—and it will be all of these things without losing its unity and identity. Simultaneity is something we live all the time, and the neutrality of the now—the now's hospitality, as we called it earlier—is its background.

With regard to time's structure, then, one might put the following suggestions before the deconstructionist: There may be plural times and concepts of time, but they will share certain fundamental features; these times may not fit the pattern of a single, unified, linear time, but they do presume the conception of such a time in certain respects; finally, the possibility that all particular times may implicitly have a place in a single all-embracing time should not be foreclosed by an a priori conception of what is metaphysical and what is not.

XII

The Husserlian account of time and of temporal presence and absence that I have attempted to defend, because it accepts both the possibility of many times and of a common basis for all of them, might be charged with naive pluralism. Naive pluralism, in Wood's formulation, takes the following position with respect to the linear conception of time: "Plurality could leave linearity untouched. What is still required is an account of the complex subversions of linear order—of . . . inversions of order, structures of repetition, substitution, . . . and so forth."¹¹⁴ The latter account would presumably yield the galaxy of radically plural times that the deconstructionist desires. My suggestion is that all such subversive efforts come to embody, in some way or other, the very values or

¹¹³ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 121-2.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 375.

features that they intend to subvert. In so arguing, I am not attempting to silence time's "Babel of voices,"¹¹⁵ but simply to find something their many expressions might share. Husserl offers the example of a philosopher of time who respects equally the one and the many, the present and the absent, and, above all, their connections and relationships.¹¹⁶

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¹¹⁵ Wood, *Deconstruction*, 358.

¹¹⁶ Portions of this essay were read at the annual meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in October 1990 and October 1991. I am grateful to the Executive Co-Directors of the Society for permitting them to be published here.

THE RHETORIC OF JACQUES DERRIDA II: *PHAEDRUS*

YOAV RINON

IN MY PREVIOUS ESSAY, I concentrated on the importance for Derrida of regarding a text, *qua* text, as an ahierarchical phenomenon, and of the unity of contradictions necessary for a deconstructive reading.¹ In this essay I shall discuss in detail the realization of the latter principle in Derrida's reading of Plato's *Phaedrus*.² This will illuminate the problematic relationship between the deconstructive interpreter and his text. Since the path is long, the reader will need to follow me patiently through the different and sometimes tedious stages of the discussion. I shall begin with Plato's notions considering the origin:

The soul as a whole [$\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$]³ is immortal, for that which is always in motion [$\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\tau\omicron\nu$] is immortal. But that which is both a cause of movement for something else and is moved by something else is able to stop its moving, and therefore is able to stop being alive. Only that which moves itself . . . is the beginning and the origin [$\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$] of movement. Yet, it is an origin without a genesis [$\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}\ \delta\epsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\omicron\nu$]. For it is a rule of necessity that from the origin becomes all that exists while the origin itself becomes from nothing. For if the origin had become of something, it would no longer have been an origin . . . , and since that which is moved by itself comes into being as immortal, one will not have to feel shame saying that this thing itself is the essence of the soul and its logos [$\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$

¹ The first article in this two article series is "The Rhetoric of Jacques Derrida I: Plato's Pharmacy," *Review of Metaphysics* 46 (December 1992): 369-86.

² Page numbers refer to Jacques Derrida, *La dissémination* (Paris: Seuil, 1967); and to Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). The left number refers to the French original, the right to the English translation. The translations of Derrida in this essay, unless otherwise noted, are modified versions of Johnson's translation.

³ See Appendix for more information on the translation.

οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον]. For any body which is moved by an external source is soulless, while the body which is moved by an internal source has a soul, since that is the essence of the soul's nature. . . . It is thus a rule of necessity that the soul would be without a genesis (ἀγέννητον) in as much as it would be immortal. (245c5–246a2)⁴

The expression ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον is usually translated as "the soul's essence and definition."⁵ Although the validity of this interpretation cannot be disputed, in a metaphysical context⁶ one might prefer to preserve the Greek original, λόγος. Thus, there is almost an identity between essence and logos,⁷ and therefore a reaffirmation of what Derrida calls the "logocentric hierarchy." This logos is the uncreated origin, and as such the beginning of everything. It is not, however, identical to the logos which is contrasted to writing, since it is definitely not what one might call speech. It is quite similar, though, as can be seen from the repeated use of the word "logos." What is this logos, then?

The answer is found in the context. The passage preceding the one cited above makes a distinction between two types of soul: the human and the divine (245c3). In other words, Plato makes an internal division within the signifier "soul." The same technique is apparent here; we have, in fact, two kinds of phenomena under the heading of logos, and only the logos connected with the divine appears in the above section. The human logos is something different. This difference is marked in my analysis in the following manner: "Logos" refers to the divine Logos, and "logos" to the human logos. The division itself is far from new and the hierarchical as-

⁴ The Translations of Plato are based on Plato, *Opera*, ed. John Burnet, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900–1907). All translations from Greek in this essay, unless otherwise noted, are my own. Citations given in the text are from the *Phaedrus*.

⁵ See for example Reginald Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus, Translated with Introduction and Notes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).

⁶ See Charles L. Griswold, Jr., "Self Knowledge and the *ιδέα* of the Soul in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 86 (1981): 482.

⁷ See Gerrit Jacob de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato* (Amsterdam: Adolf U. Hakert, 1969), 124.

pects have been previously noted.⁸ I give it emphasis here due to the fact that the Derridian avoidance of paying attention to such internal divisions will be revealed as a crucial element in his rhetoric.⁹

Somewhat later in the dialogue, when Socrates deals with the art of eloquence (λόγων τέχνη; 266c3), it becomes evident that an internal division within the category of the human logos is also needed. While the Sophists Thrasymachus and Lysias are mentioned in connection with dialectic, Socrates and his interlocutor are searching for the definition of a different kind of art: rhetoric. The latter, says Phaedrus, has "escaped our notice," and Socrates agrees that it should be discussed (266c8-d4). Here Phaedrus comments, "No doubt, what is written in the books about the art of eloquence [περὶ λόγων τέχνης] is quite long." Socrates answers: "How elegantly you have mentioned [ὑπέμνησας] it" (266d5-7).

It is apparent from this that the art of eloquence, λόγων, is connected with writing, since the argumentation is in the written books, and since the verb ὑπομνήσκω reappears in the king's deprecation of writing as a φάρμακον which impairs memory (ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον; 275a5). Yet, in this context, it is not the form that is to be blamed, but rather the content.¹⁰ The Sophistic art of

⁸ See Paul Friedländer, *Plato*, trans. Hans Meyerhoff, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954) vol. 2, p. 108; and Robert Zaslavsky, *Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing* (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), 96.

⁹ The prominence of the Logos in *Phaedrus* is strengthened at the end of the dialogue in Socrates' prayer to Pan. According to Diskin Clay ("Socrates' Prayer to Pan," in *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. Knox on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*, ed. Glen W. Bowersock, Walter Burkert, and Michael C. J. Putnam [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979], 347), Pan is a link in a chain of strong associations to the Logos. In the *Phaedrus* the Logos is not identified with the gods, who have to climb in order to have a look at the metaphysical region. They are, however, closer to the Logos than are human beings, whose only connection with the Logos is a mediated one. The fact that Hestia does not join the climbing gods is evidence of the boundary between the metaphysical and the physical (see Zaslavsky, *Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing*, 82), and therefore another proof of the two kinds of logos. On the connection between Hestia's wings and the importance of the notion of internal division in the *Phaedrus* see Kenneth Dorter, "Imagery and Philosophy in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 9 (1971): 285.

¹⁰ Ian Machattie Crombie emphasizes the fact that Socrates finds fault not in rhetorical techniques *qua* techniques but in the switch of their usage

eloquence, that of Teisias and Gorgias, is revolting to Socrates not because it is written—which is, in this context, relatively unimportant—but because the power of the logos (διὰ ῥώμην λόγον; 267a8) is put into practice in an unseemly manner. The minor role writing plays in the argument can be deduced from the emphasis given to the logos in Socrates' condemnation of the Sophists. In Polus's book, *A School for Eloquence* (μουσεια λόγων) there are three techniques of speech containing the word "logos": repetition of words (διπλασιολογία), sententious style (γνωμολογία), and figurative speaking (εἰκονολογία) (267b10–c1). They are condemned by means of a metaphor which is very well known to Derrida's readers: Socrates says, "But, my blessed of all, have a look for yourself as well, whether, in truth, it seems to you too that their warp is loose [διστηκός] as it seems to me" (268a5–6).

The Sophistic weave is criticized for its disjointed nature. The participle διστηκός is taken from the Greek verb δίστημι, which means, according to the LSJ dictionary, not only "to loosen" but also "to set apart," "to be at variance," "to differ." The participle itself can also be translated as "not homogeneous." One might be surprised that so many Derridian concepts appear under the same Platonic signifier. From the deconstructive point of view, however, this merely serves as another proof of the validity of the Derridian interpretation. Still, the Platonic applications are fundamentally different from the Derridian ones; while Platonists find fault with difference, Derridians find difference laudable. For our discussion, however, the emphasis lies not in the valuation itself but rather in its roots. In other words, the significance lies not in regarding a phenomenon as either good or bad, but in the deeper motives for the ethical labelling of the phenomena.

Derrida tries to claim that *Phaedrus* is focused on the devaluation of writing as writing. The above, however, indicates that Plato's emphasis is not on the textual angle, on the written nature of Sophistic argumentation, but on the logos, on the meaning, in which writing is no more than a formal aspect. Of course, it is always possible to overemphasize the formal aspects, and, by making them predominant, to lead the reader to a deconstructive variety of meanings. This procedure, however, creates a weave which is both

from a means to an end in themselves; see his *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) vol. 1, p. 198.

different from the Platonic one and alien to it. Although legitimate in itself, this different weave is the definition of failure according to the Derridian rules of the game.¹¹

In accordance with the Platonic context, the art of eloquence is bad as much because it lacks "speaking in a plausible way" (λέγειν πιθανῶς) as because it lacks harmonious composition (269c2-3). Socrates states explicitly that it is impossible to reach dialectic, the summit of the art of speech,¹² while following the Sophists Lysias and Thrasyarchus; since they cannot be regarded as experts in this field. At this stage, I shall postpone the examination of the role of the expert in order to go back to the Platonic distinction between logos and writing.

Originally, both speech and writing are equally moral. Writing as such is not a shameful thing.¹³ Socrates repeats it three times:

Well, this is a well known fact, that writing arguments [τὸ γράφειν λόγους] in *itself* is not a shameful thing. . . . But I believe that the shameful thing is the following: both [τε καὶ] speaking and writing in a way which is not good [καλῶς] but shameful, i.e. [τε καὶ] bad. . . . So, what is the way of writing either [τε] in a good way or [καὶ] in its opposite? (258d1-7)¹⁴

Writing is not, as Derrida claims, always an already disgraced version of speech; and when mortality is introduced into the discussion, it is applied to both writing and speech in the same manner. The distinction between the good and the bad¹⁵ is not between writing and speech but rather within writing and within speech. To put it differently, Socrates defines two opposing kinds of speech and two opposing kinds of writing, and not one kind of speech which stands

¹¹ See Derrida's Introduction to *La dissémination*, which considers the problems of adding something to the "object" of reading.

¹² Careful attention should be paid to the fact that dialectic is not the opposite of eloquence. On the contrary, dialectic is both eloquence and plausibility of argumentation, and therefore it is harmonious.

¹³ See George Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates* (London: John Murray, 1888) vol. 3, p. 27; and W. H. Thompson, *The Phaedrus of Plato* (New York: New York Times, 1973), 86.

¹⁴ The emphasis in this passage is signified in the Greek original by means of γε.

¹⁵ This is an aesthetic definition as much as a moral one since the good, καλός, is also the beautiful; see Terence Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory: The Early Dialogues* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 239.

in opposition to one kind of writing.¹⁶ This notion is stressed in the Socratic rejection of writing using the myth of Theuth.

When the king refuses to accept the new invention that might serve as a *φάρμακον* for memory, he does so on the basis of its negative features: marginality, externality, supplementarity, and pre-tention. Socrates' words following the story seem to reaffirm both the rejection and its motives:

Certainly, the one who believes that he left an art in a written form [*ἐν γράμμασι*] and also the one who accepts that reliability and firmness stem from writing [*ἐκ γραμμάτων*] is possibly very naive, and, in fact, it is probable that he does not know the prophecy of Ammon, if he believes that the written arguments [*λόγους γεγραμμένους*] are something different from a means of memory [*ὑπομνησάι*] for the one who knows the matters to which the written thing [*τὰ γεγραμμένα*] refers. (275c5-d2)

Subsequently, Socrates compares writing to a painting:

For writing [*γραφῇ*], Phaedrus, has this peculiar characteristic, which makes it more like a painting. For, although the products stand as if they were living, yet if you ask them something, they will respond

¹⁶ The basic equality of writing and speech, which is prior to moral definitions, is a recurring theme in the dialogue, not only in 258d4-5 and 259e1-2, but also in the following passages: *λεχθήσεται ἡ γραφήσεται* (271b8), *λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι* (271c4), *λέγων ἢ γράφων* (272b1). In 273a7 Teisias speaks (*λέγει*), and in 273b4 he writes (*εγραψεν*). These may serve as examples of the limited importance of binaric oppositions within the Platonic text, which stands in contrast to the predominance given them by deconstructionists. See also the relationship between *mythos* and *logos* in Griswold, "Self Knowledge and the *ιδέα*," 48; and in Charles L. Griswold, Jr., *Self Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 140. See also Kent F. Moors, *Platonic Myth: An Introductory Study* (Washington: University Press of America, 1982), 23. Clearly, equality is not an accidental attributive in the passages mentioned above; it is, on the contrary, a sign of the basic ethical neutrality of both speech and writing, as is claimed by Luc Brisson, *Platon: Les mots et les mythes* (Paris: Maspero, 1982), 110. This moral neutrality is thoroughly discussed by Friedländer, *Plato*, 118; J. J. Muhlern, "Socrates on Knowledge and Information (*Phaedrus* 274b6-275a9)," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 30 (1969): 180; Victor Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon* (Paris: Presses Universit   de France, 1971), 329; Gregory Vlastos, *Platonic Studies*, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 395; Brisson, *Platon: Les mots et les mythes*, 120; and Daniel Babut, "*Δεῖν . . . πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶν συνεστάναι*: Sur quelques   nigmes du *Ph  dre*," *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Bud  * 46 (1987): 272-3. The moral responsibility lies with the one who puts either the one or the other into practice, an aspect which is dealt with in a later stage of the dialogue.

in a great solemn silence. And in the same way the logoi also [do not answer]. Although you might think that they are talking intelligently, the minute you question them, wishing to learn something of the logoi, they are always signifying the same one thing. And whenever it is written even once, every logos is wandering indifferently among both the experts and among those who have nothing to do with it at all; moreover, it does not know whom to address and whom to avoid. And that is not all, since when it is treated without justice, it always needs its father's defense, for it is not capable of either helping or defending itself. (275d4-e5)

One of the most important aspects of the above discussion is that in it writing is revealed as a kind of speech. The expression "written arguments," λόγους γεγραμμένους, which appears in the former of the two passages, hints at this kind of connection. In the second passage, the process is illustrated explicitly: "every logos, whenever it is written." The origin of writing is in the logos. True, the former is a derivative of the latter, as Derrida repeatedly stresses; but, in contrast with the claims of deconstruction, writing cannot abandon speech. Γραφή is always a λόγος γεγραμμένος, that is, a species of speech; it is a written speech, at least as far as Plato is concerned.¹⁷ Writing is not a sign of a discontinuity between the *gramma* and the logos, as Derrida tries to claim, but rather a sign of the gap between the logos and the speaker.¹⁸ The Derridian

¹⁷ Friedländer, *Plato*, 110.

¹⁸ Derrida does not overlook the importance of the speaker in the dialogue. On the contrary, he pays careful attention to the problem of the father-son relationship and its correlation with the speech-writing connection. The father is afraid of his own, not his logos's castration and murder. The difficulty in the deconstructive interpretation is elsewhere; it lies in the father-logos *identity*. For Derrida, the father and the logos are one, and thus they stand together in opposition to writing. Writing, he claims, is disconnected from the father, from the logos, and as such it begins to act independently. Actually, the disconnection of the logos from the father happens at a much earlier stage, when the logos comes into being. The moment the logos is pronounced, the moment it is uttered, it is disconnected from the living and speaking subject-father. Death, therefore, is already on the stage, and its immediate bond with being is not surprising. Thus, the difference between speech and writing is not between the internal and the external (with all the consequent Derridian meanings), but between the near and the distant. It is this difference that finds its expression in the ability to give aid. The logos, which is near its father, can have the benefit of the father's help, while writing, which is distant, has to wander around. Thus, the text again creates a hierarchy (of distances) and not an opposition between inside and outside. The merit of the logos in comparison with writing is, therefore, in the former's close

"writing in general," that which is defined as being disconnected from any *logos*, is impossible in the Platonic context, where writing is always dependent on and connected with speech.¹⁹

It is not surprising, therefore, that the distinction between the two kinds of writing is based on the assumption that writing is always derived from speech. Socrates says, "So, let us have a look at a different speech [*ἄλλον λόγον*], the legitimate brother of the former, in what way is it born, on the one hand, and how much it is better and more capable by nature than the former, on the other hand" (276a1-3). The second kind of writing, "writing in the soul," is also a *logos* like the first one. The internal difference, that within writing, is on two levels. One level is that of the contribution to learning; the first type of writing, the illegitimate son of the *logos*, cannot contribute to learning (275d7-9), while the second, legitimate son can do so. The other level is that of the capability of self-defense. Unlike the weakness of the wandering orphan, the *λόγος γεγραμμένος*, the *logos* written in the pupil's soul, is "written with knowledge [*μετ' ἐπιστήμης*]. On the one hand, it is capable of defending itself, and, on the other hand, it has the knowledge [*ἐπιστήμων*] of both speaking and keeping in silence as the situation demands" (276a5-7). The Derridian fascination with the status of the orphan (87; 77) thus needs to be reconsidered. This independence of the orphan, this freedom and liberty, this breaking of the limits is, more than anything else, a painful state of loneliness. Without a father, helpless, scorned, and humiliated, the illegitimate *logos* is pushed and pulled by those who pass by. Deprived forever of its origin, it is neither understood nor wanted, and, almost forgotten by everyone, it keeps repeating its unintelligible words. It is a sorry sight.

relationship with the father. On this same aspect in Plato's *Seventh Letter*, see Thomas Alexander Szlezak, "The Acquiring of Philosophical Knowledge According to Plato's *Seventh Letter*," in *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies*, 358.

¹⁹ Even in the passage where writing seems to be explicitly condemned, the connection between the speaker and the written arguments is stressed: "If, however, the one who knows the truth composes these things, and he is able to defend them directing himself towards a thorough investigation of what he wrote, and while he speaks, he himself is able to prove that the written arguments [*τὰ γεγραμμένα*] do not deserve serious consideration, there is no need that he will be called after the latter, but rather after his serious occupations" (278c4-d1). Dealing with nonserious occupations is thus legitimate so long as the writer is able to limit them to the region of unimportant phenomena. This limitation is done by means of speech.

Let us go back to the dialogue. According to Socrates, the speech which is written in the soul has knowledge, μετ' ἐπιστήμης, an epithet echoed in the participle ἐπιστήμων which appears somewhat later. Thus ἐπιστήμη, which is connected with the good writing, contrasts with δόξα, mere opinion, which is a characteristic of the written speech described in the king's answer to Theuth: "For it will cause forgetfulness in the souls of the learners . . . , that which has the effigy of wisdom . . . , and they will believe that they know a lot without learning . . . , and they will be seemingly wise (δοξόσοφοι) instead of being really wise" (275a2-b2). The opposition of δόξα and ἐπιστήμη is a recurring theme in the Platonic dialogues. In the *Phaedrus* it characterizes the separation of physics from metaphysics. The region above the sky, the ὑπερουράνιον, is portrayed as the location of the essence of being (οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα; 247c7), in accordance with which every kind of real knowledge is defined (περί ἧν τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιστήμη; 247c8). There, the soul's governor inspects knowledge (καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμην), while the soul itself is nourished by knowledge (247e3). By contrast, the broken-winged souls that will be incarnated in human bodies are those which are nourished by mere opinion (δοξαστῇ χρώνται; 248b5).

Still, although the writing in the soul is able to act independently, can defend itself, has ἐπιστήμη; and is installed in the learner's soul, it is always a kind of a logos; thus, writing in the soul is a kind of logos written in the soul. For Plato, this internal distinction (good and bad) within writing is analogous to the internal distinction (good and bad) within speech.²⁰ In other words, both logos and writing are ethically split.²¹ As a consequence, the central

²⁰ This distinction between the two kinds of writing being kinds of speech reappears in 277e5-278b4: "And there is no doubt that the one who deems that, on the one hand, in the written speech [ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ] great frivolity is a rule of necessity, and that no written speech [λόγον γραφῆναι] . . . deserves great seriousness, and that on the other hand . . . only in the arguments which are really written in the soul [καὶ τῷ ὄντι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ] about the things which are just and beautiful and good exists that which deserves . . . seriousness; and, moreover, who thinks that these kinds of speech should be called the legitimate sons of their speaker . . . , [this man,] it seems to me, *Phaedrus*, both you and I should aspire to be like." Again, writing is not of itself illegitimate. Moreover, the possession of the legitimate writing is one of the characteristics of the man whose personality is an object of desire for Socrates.

²¹ This criterion has different reflections in the dialogue. Thus, the difference between Plato, who creates a speech imitating Lysias's style,

opposition of the dialogue is not that of writing and speech, as Derrida tries to claim, but that of the shameful (*αἰσχρόν*) and the beautiful (*καλόν*) regarding both writing and speech.²² Socrates: "And what about both the speaking and the writing of arguments [*λόγους λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν*], is it beautiful or shameful [*καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν*]? . . . ; isn't it clear from what we've just said?" (277d1-3). To sharpen the above argument, I shall now proceed to the position of the writer of speeches, the logographer.

The logographer's first appearance on the dialogue's stage comes after the end of Socrates' second speech:

For, my dear friend, only recently one of the politicians railed at him [Lysias], and reproached him calling him through his whole speech logographer. And he, fearing for his reputation, might very soon stop writing speeches at all. (257c4-7)

For Derrida, this passage has a clear interpretation:

The logographer, in the strict sense, composes speeches for litigants; speeches which he himself does not pronounce, which he does not attend, so to speak, in person, and which produce their effects in his absence. In writing what he does not speak, what he would never say and would never think in truth, the author of the written speech is already entrenched in the posture of the sophist; the man of non-presence and non-truth (76; 68).

The explicit boundary separating the writer from the written speech seems obvious at first sight. The logographer is the symbol of the gap between the man who writes and the man who speaks,²³ yet an

and Lysias, who creates a speech imitating his client's style, is the monetary motivation of Lysias versus the educational motivation of Plato; see Ronna Burger, *Plato's Phaedrus: A Defence of a Philosophic Art of Writing* (Tuscaloosa: Alabama University Press, 1980), 21. Lysias's speech is disapproved of because it presents an attitude which is ethically defective; see Alfred Edward Taylor, *Plato: The Man and his Work*, 4th ed. (London: Methuen, 1937), 302. Cf. Giovanni, R. F. Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 91. Ferrari's arguments are not convincing. On myth as a medium of an ethical message see Paul Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), 7; and Leon Robin, *Platon* (Paris: Alcan, 1935), 192, 196. On the ethical context of the dialogue as a whole see Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Work*, 30.

²² Zaslavsky, *Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing*, 59.

²³ Already in the scholia: "for *λογογράφοι* was the name given by the ancients to those who wrote speeches [*λόγους*] for money, and sold them to those who needed them in the law-courts, and the rhetoricians were those who spoke [*λέγουσι*]." The translation is based on *Scholia Platonica*, ed. Gviliem Chase Greene, (Haverford: American Philological Association, 1938).

inspection of Demosthenes' speech dealing with the activity of the logographer Ktesikles reveals a different picture: "There is also a fourth law according to which Theocrines, the one who is now prosecuted, must pay 500 drachmae . . . , yet he arranged the things with Ktesikles the logographer, who acted in the matter for his opponents, so that he would not have to pay and would not be brought to the Acropolis."²⁴ The whole affair, therefore, was arranged by the logographer.²⁵ True, he did not pronounce it with his own mouth (*il ne prononçait pas lui-même*), but one cannot therefore deduce that he was either absent or did not assist (*il n'assistait pas*) (76; 68).²⁶ On the contrary, in this case the presence and the help of the logographer were so great that the logos was not transformed into a λόγος γεγραμμένος. The problem was solved outside the law court, not with a written speech learned by heart, but with the help of the man who is considered by Derrida to be the one who prevents his help from the logos. It is therefore impossible to treat the logographer as one who formulates his client's opinion (*rédigeait des discours*) (76; 68); he is, rather, a counselor in matters of law.²⁷

These facts would not have received so much attention if the logographer were not such an important link in Derrida's deconstructive chain. The lack of connection between the written speech and the writing subject represents for Derrida all the following phenomena: the sophist's position, (*l'homme de la non-présence et la*

²⁴ The translation is based on Demosthenes, *Orationes*, ed. William Rennie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), vol. 3, 1327.19

²⁵ See *Demosthenes: Selected Private Speeches*, ed. C. Carey and R. A. Reid, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15.

²⁶ The expression *il n'assistait pas* is a very interesting example of the absent *a*. Like the *a* of the *différance* which is present in writing though absent from speech, here the *a* of the expression *assister à*, which means "to be present," is absent from writing, although present in meaning. The strong connection between presence and help is not new in either the Platonic or the Derridian contexts. On the wide range of assistance the logographer gives to his client see Stephen Usher, "Lysias and his Client," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 17 (1976): 36. Regarding Usher's criticism, Kenneth D. Dover's suggestion (in his *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968], 151) that the logographer did not write his speech at all seems to me an exaggeration.

²⁷ "L'auteur [Demosthenes] imputa insi au logographe le rôle de mandataire de son client et s'il croit devoir critiquer ses agissements, il paraît cependant trouver naturel que l'avocat, le conseiller, agisse bien au de la rédaction du discours"; M. Lavency, *Aspects de la logographie judiciaire Attique* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1964), 103.

non-vérité), the presence of the absence, and, later, the disconnection from the father. This associative chain not only originates in a highly problematic linkage (as can be understood from the above discussion of the logographer), but is also very difficult to verify, considering the position of both the written speech and Lysias in the dialogue. The written speech is not always presented as hopeless, disconnected, and wandering around. Thus, Lysias's speech (named "logos") can do without Socrates' help because of the author's presence: "Although I do love you alot, yet, since Lysias is actually here [*παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου*] I do not have even the slightest intention of offering my help to you" (228d8-e2).²⁸ The stress on the fact that Lysias is actually present signifies the impossibility of choosing the solution of simple irony.²⁹ Lysias's presence is not that of the Derridian absolute absence. Despite the fact that Lysias is not able to aid the written speech by his own living one, he is present enough to hinder Socrates from speaking against it. The weakness of the speech (logos) will be revealed as an internal one, stemming from its ethical character and not from its formal aspect as a *λόγος γεγραμμένος*. In this context, writing is irrelevant to the discussion, and not inferior to speech. Even if Lysias had pronounced his speech with his own mouth it would have been impossible to help the argumentation, as Socrates later states explicitly:

No doubt, then, he would not seriously write these things with ink upon the water and would not sow them by means of his pen with arguments (*μετὰ λόγων*) which are not capable of defending themselves by means of speech (*λόγῳ*) on the one hand, and are not capable of teaching the truth adequately on the other hand. (276c7-9).

²⁸ On the problematics of *καὶ* in this passage see de Vriès, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus*, 43. On translating *καὶ* as "actually," see William Jacob Verdenius, "Notes on Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Mnemosyne* 8 (1955): 266; and Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, 12.

²⁹ It is, rather, a case of complex irony. Gregory Vlastos defines complex irony as an expression in which "what is said both is and isn't what is meant"; Gregory Vlastos, "Platonic Irony," *The Classical Quarterly* 37 (1987): 86. That is, on one level of meaning there is a gap between what is said and what is meant, while on a different level such a gap does not exist. Thus, on the literal level regarding Lysias's physical presence, there is a gap between words and meaning, while on the level regarding the relationship between the logos and his father this gap is cancelled. The notion of complex irony is further developed in Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 32, 236-42.

The impossibility of teaching adequately is not an inevitable outcome of the use of writing instead of speech, although writing is more conducive to inadequate teaching. It is, rather, a reflection of the defective nature of the logos before it was ever written.³⁰ If the logoi have knowledge (μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους) and are able to defend both themselves and the one who has planted them in the pupil's soul, if they are not barren but fertile and signify continuity and immortality (276e7-277a3), then writing, which is a derivative of these logoi, also preserves the same qualities. Thus, again, the logoi are revealed in this passage as either ontologically good or bad independent of their written or spoken form. From an ethical point of view, *both* forms are predisposed to the shameful and the beautiful to the same degree (258d1-5). This leads us to the question of the φάρμακον.

In my previous discussion of the φάρμακον, I tried to reveal the hidden contradiction between the Derridian φάρμακον and the Platonic one so as to explain the strategy of deconstructive reading. The concealment of this contradiction has another purpose, however, which is to cut the Platonic thread connecting the φάρμακον and the physician. The central position of the φάρμακον in the deconstructive interpretation is nourished by its independence; the φάρμακον, as a dominant link in the Derridian chain, cannot have an origin. The role of the φάρμακον is to pose a dangerous question about the legitimacy of the origin while being immune from that same question. Moreover, its power stems exactly from that immunity. According to the rules of the deconstructive game, each link must be free, since subordination to something, or even worse, to somebody, means the immediate loss of the ability to ask, that is, the ability to play the central role in the game. Since the latter notion is a necessary condition in the deconstructive strategy, the exposition of the φάρμακον's dependence due to its connection to the physician

³⁰ This opinion contrasts with the opinions of most of the critics, who regard the deprecation of writing in the *Phaedrus*, itself a written text, as a paradox. See de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus*, 145; Burger, *Plato's Phaedrus*, 2; Mary Margaret Mackenzie, "Paradox in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 28 (1982): 65; Kenneth M. Sayre, "Plato's Dialogues in the Light of the *Seventh Letter*," in *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings*, ed. Charles L. Griswold, Jr., (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1988), 97; and Rosemary Desjardins, "Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play," in *Platonic Writings*, 110ff.

would show the existence of an aspect within the Platonic text alien to Derrida's regulations.³¹ This attitude does not dispute the legitimacy of the deconstructive assumptions in the case of the *φάρμακον*, but merely focuses on the impossibility that they may be realized within the Platonic weave.

Let us go back, then, to the dialogue, to illuminate somewhat the *φάρμακον*'s hidden dependence. The conversation begins with the questions, "Wherefrom and whereto?" the answers being, "From Lysias . . . and I intend to walk outside the walls." This declaration is followed by its motivation: "Because I was persuaded by our mutual friend, Acumenus." It is only the fifth line of the text—the *φάρμακον* will not appear for a considerable time—and yet the im-

³¹ Jasper P. Neel, who devotes an entire book to Derrida's reading of Plato, has completely missed the deconstructive concept of textuality; see Jasper P. Neel, *Plato, Derrida, and Writing* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988). The starting point does seem to be deconstructive: "The way to neutralize an old, strong text . . . is to attack it directly on its own grounds, then show the most obvious way to rehabilitate it, and finally expose the deceptiveness of that rehabilitation" (p. xi). The following page, however, reveals a basic misunderstanding: "Derrida repeatedly argues that writing is the truth of the West" (p. xii). The unequivocal use of the word "truth" in a Derridian context completely ignores Derrida's main aim: the exposure of the fictive nature of that "truth." Moreover, such argumentation hints at the existence of an original, deconstructive binaric opposition within the truthful poles of which lies writing. This implicit notion stands in contrast to the conception that Derrida regards the text as an ahierarchical weave. Neel's statement that "Plato is wrong and Derrida is right" (p. xii) is an explicit manifestation of his binaric attitude. The Derridian reading aims at unravelling the hidden threads of the textual net and not at presenting a dialectical position toward them. The whole strategy is planned so as to make impossible the placing of any deconstructive reading in opposition with its object of reference. Thus, the innocent binaric opposition of right and wrong is alien to Derrida's intentions.

Although I have focused on Neel's Introduction, the same criticisms hold for the book as a whole. One example will suffice to make the point. Neel says he thinks that "we'd rather be ill than suffer Plato's cure" (p. 65). In his discussion of the *Phaedrus* Derrida continuously plays with the ambivalence of the *φάρμακον* as both remedy and poison, avoiding reference to the *φάρμακον* as merely "medicine," because it is also a poison. Neel's declaration, in addition to its complete incompatibility with a Derridian reading, also avoids the importance of that play of meanings. What is more, the claim that writing for Plato is a "trivial play" (p. xi) stands in contrast to the serious position of Platonic play in Derrida's argumentation. This emphasis, however, follows a long tradition of reading; see W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) vol. 2, pp. 56–65.

portance of the physician is already hinted at.³² Acumenus the physician is a friend of Socrates and Phaedrus; his son, Eryximachus, himself a physician and a close friend of Phaedrus, "meets" both Socrates and Phaedrus in another Platonic dialogue, the *Symposium*.³³ As the discussion develops, it is clear that there is another physician besides Acumenus and Eryximachus and that he is *the* physician, Hippocrates,³⁴ according to whose instructions Socrates

³² The association between medicine and the physicians creates a central axis in the dialogue, and exceeds the pharmaceutic links. According to Werner Jaeger, medicine is the model for Plato's ethics; Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, trans. Gilbert Highet, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), 3. The appearance of medical literature symbolizes in ancient Greece the transition to the age of professionalization (p. 11). Plato stresses the difference between the slave-doctor and the professional doctor in *Laws*, a difference which is highly connected with the logos (p. 12). In addition, toward the end of the dialogue, medicine is associated with Egypt, the land of the myth of Theuth, by means of Isocrates; see Hans Herter, "The Problematic Mention of Hippocrates in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Illinois Classical Studies* 1 (1976): 39-40. On the connection between medicine and philosophy see also Pierre-Maxime Schuhl, "Platon et la médecine," *Revue des études Grecques* 62 (1960): 73-9; and Michel Frede, "Philosophy and Medicine in Antiquity," *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 225 (on the ethical relationship of medicine to philosophy see p. 231).

³³ See de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus*, 33; and Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, 25.

³⁴ At the beginning of *On Airs, Waters, Places*, Hippocrates gives the following advice: "The one who wants to learn well the art of medicine must do the following. . . . And to test the warm winds and the cold ones . . . one should test the characteristics of the water . . . and the kinds of water the inhabitants apply . . . and the soil also, whether it is not fertile and dry or whether it is full of trees and water . . . and the inhabitants' way of life"; translation based on Hippocrates, *On Airs, Waters, Places*, in *Opera*, ed. and trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1923). The analogy between this and Socrates' actions when he arrives at Ilisos is quite prominent, as Ferrari shows very clearly: "He [Socrates] examines the soil and finds it well watered [the spring] and thickly covered with vegetation [the lush grass, the plane—and agnus—trees]; he checks the characteristics of the water supply [sweet and cool; and notice here the pedantically scientific 'as you can confirm with your toes', ὥστε γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι, 230b7]; he considers the winds [the pleasant breeze]; and he concerns himself with the inhabitants of the place, detecting the presence of Achelous and the Nymphs and commenting on the musical activity of the cicadas—whose habits of spare eating and drinking and fondness for work he reserves, however, for later scrutiny"; Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas*, 17. See also Jaap Mansfeld, "Plato and the Method of Hippocrates," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 21 (1980): 356; and Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy*

implicitly acts. Thus, it is possible to infer from the context of activities done according to the instructions of the physicians (going outside the walls according to Acumenus,³⁵ checking the place according to Hippocrates) that there exists a certain bond between the *φάρμακον* and the physician, an inference which is affirmed by the following:

Socrates: No doubt, it seems to me as if it were you who found the *φάρμακον* of getting me out, like those who hold out and shake a green twig or some kind of fruit before the cattle and lead them, so you, carrying in front of me logoi in books, seem to be able to lead me through Attica and to whatever other place you'd like. (230d5-e1)

In the Greek language, the complete dependence of the *φάρμακον* on its user is overemphasized. The sentence opens with a double emphasis on the agent of the action, Phaedrus; both the usage of the personal pronoun "you" (συ, which is not necessary in Greek) and the particle *μέντοι* strongly signify a human context.³⁶ The green twig and the fruit, which are not able to act autonomously, indicate the same dependence, as their movement is the outcome of a human decision. Despite what Derrida says (79-80; 71), the comparison underlined by Socrates is not between the *φάρμακον* and the logoi in books, but rather between those who lead the cattle and Phaedrus. In other words, it is not between different objects but between different men. The *φάρμακον* which leads Socrates out of the walls is not an inner-directed entity; although potentially powerful, a human being must put it into practice.³⁷ Phaedrus takes it with him, places it under his cloak, makes it peep out, conceals it, exposes it, and attracts Socrates with it (230e3).

and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 124. On the connection between Hippocrates and Plato, see Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas*, 248, n. 19; and Mansfeld, "Plato and the Method of Hippocrates," 354. On the importance of medicine in the dialogue see Annie Lebeck, "The Central Myth of Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 13 (1972): 21, n. 21; and Schuhl, "Platon et la médecine," 75, 77.

³⁵ The mere act of walking creates a bond between the physicians and the logos, a bond which is stronger than that of the one between the physicians and the *φάρμακον*. See Lebeck, "The Central Myth of Plato's *Phaedrus*," 284, n. 32; 285, n. 34.

³⁶ All the textual corrections suggested by de Vries (*A Commentary on the Phaedrus*, 57) strengthen this accentuation by means of the Greek γέ.

³⁷ On the emphasis given to the human factor in the dialogue see Stanley Rosen, "The Non-Lover in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Man and World* 2 (1969): 425.

This complexity of connections which exist between the *φάρμακον*, the physician, and the books is also seen when Socrates explains, using a fictitious dialogue, some of his ideas concerning the importance of the expert:

Socrates: Well, then, tell me; if someone coming to your friend Eryximachus or to his father, Acumenus, would say "I am an expert [*ἐπίσταμαι*] in applying [*προσφέρειν*] the following things to the bodies so that they would be warmed whenever I want . . . , and many other things of this kind; and because of my knowledge [*ἐπιστάμενος*] of them I consider myself a physician, and I also believe I am able to make [a physician] every other man to whom I would give the knowledge [*ἐπιστήμην*] about these things . . ." (268a8-b4)³⁸

The fictitious speaker claims to be a physician on the basis of certain knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), which enables him both to heal and to transmit the ability to heal to others. The importance of such a claim cannot be overemphasized, since *ἐπιστήμη*, which is depicted in a different context as the opposite of *δόξα*, seems to be in this context identical with *δόξα*, as there is no doubt that the speaker cannot have the *ἐπιστήμη* of medicine merely on the basis of knowing the effects of the *φάρμακα*. He can, however, have a plausible assumption as to the meaning of medicine, that is, the *δόξα* of medicine. Thus, while using the word *ἐπιστήμη*, the speaker in fact refers to *δόξα*. In this light, one might wonder whether this is another hint at a Derridian thread. If the signifier *ἐπιστήμη* constitutes both knowledge and opinion, then it is fundamentally similar to the *φάρμακον*, which constitutes both medicine and poison. Such a conclusion, however, ignores the delicate construction of the Platonic text. The speaker's declaration that he has this certain kind of knowledge (applying *φάρμακα* in order to get a certain result) means that he feels he has also acquired the art of medicine. From his point of view, this is not *δόξα* but *ἐπιστήμη*. From Socrates' point of view, however, the mere claim that one has a certain kind of knowledge is far from being sufficient proof of its possession. Although the existence of knowledge can be reflected by such kinds of utterance, the latter in itself cannot create knowledge. This contrast is vividly expressed in Socrates' presentation of the

³⁸ On the verb *προσφέρειν*, applying drugs to the sick body, see de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus*, 227. This is the same verb used in connection with the *φάρμακον* of the head in *Charmides* 157c5.

claim. On the one hand, the dialogue form, which gives a different voice to each opinion, preserves a variety of perspectives. On the other hand, this same technique restricts the confused ideas concerning the nature of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη-δόξα*) to the limited domain of the speaker, the arrogant layman. By contrast, the vast field of the expert remains free from that kind of ambiguity.

Still, one might argue that the above is but another example of a binaric opposition, expert-layman, which can easily be resolved through deconstruction. Such a movement might have been possible if Plato's careful choice of words in the physician's answer had not already prevented it: "Does he know in addition [*προσέπισσεται*] what kind of actions one has to do and when and in what manner they should be done?" (268b6-8). The difference, therefore, is not of quality but of quantity; both laymen and experts know how to apply certain *φάρμακα* to achieve certain effects, but only the expert has the additional knowledge concerning specific actions and timing. It is again clear why deconstruction is impossible. What seemed at first to be another case of a binaric opposition is revealed to be a difference on the same level. In other words, instead of polarity, which is the starting point of any deconstructive maneuver, one finds a sequence which prevents any activation of the Derridian strategy.

The layman's position begins to be problematic only when he tries to deny the existence of the gap which separates him from the expert. This clearly indicates that Plato's main concern is not with the presence or absence of knowledge but with the proper use or abuse of words expressing that knowledge. In itself, the different amounts of knowledge are neither good nor bad. They are morally neutral. What is morally wrong is the oral concealment of the real situation. This brings us back to the *φάρμακον*: "And because he heard once from a book [*ἐκ βιβλίου*] or he was acquainted with drugs [*φάρμακίσις*], he believes himself to be a physician, while he is not an expert [*ἐπαίων*] at all" (268c2-4).

Again, both books and *φάρμακα* appear in a deprecating context,³⁹ yet it is not their essence which is condemned, but their action. Medicine clearly cannot exist as a science, as *ἐπιστήμη*, without a knowledge, *ἐπιστήμη*, of *φάρμακα*. To be a physician, however, one

³⁹ Plato uses here the word *φαρμακίον* and not the word *φάρμακον*, a diminutive which hints at humiliation. See de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus*, 228.

must in addition know the right application of each *φάρμακον* to each patient. The distinction is not one between different objects but between different kinds of users of these objects. The difference is between the man who is an expert (*ἐπαῖων*) and the man who is not an expert. It is the nonexpert's lack of knowledge which makes books and *φάρμακα* harmful, not their mere existence. It is this same expert-nonexpert distinction which is the focus of a passage already cited in connection with the deprecation of written speech:

And whenever it is written even once, every *logos* is wandering around in the same manner both among the experts and among those who have nothing to do with it at all. Moreover, it does not know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not. (275d9–e3)⁴⁰

The problem is not, therefore, with the wrong objects but with the wrong hands. Socrates repeats this notion regarding poetry (268c5–d2) and harmony (268d6–e6, with *ἐπαῖειν* in 268e5) as well. Again, knowledge itself is not at fault.⁴¹

There is one more point to be discussed, and that is the consequences of using the *φάρμακον*. The duality of the *φάρμακον*, (poison-medicine) becomes more serious when the poison is not merely metaphorical (as in the king's answer to Theuth), but is a means of consciously causing harm. The Athenian in the *Laws* dedicates a separate section to the laws concerning poisoning where, again, the difference is between two sorts who use the *φάρμακον*, and not be-

⁴⁰ On the epistemological deprecation associated with the verb "to wander around" (*κυλινδείται*) see de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus*, 252.

⁴¹ Moreover, on the subject of harmony, the learning (*μαθήματα*) to be condemned in the context of a deceitful *ἐπιστήμη* is a necessary (*ἀναγκαῖα*) precondition for harmony (268e1) as much as the *φάρμακα* are necessary for the physician (270b6). At this point I would direct the reader's attention to Michel Foucault's criticism of Derrida in the afterword to his *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 583–603. Although his criticism deals with a Derridian reading of Descartes' notions about madness, Foucault's attitude toward the deconstructive text is very similar to my own criticism of Derrida. As with the internal division within writing, Foucault indicates the internal division within madness (p. 591); like the claim that the main opposition in the Platonic text is not speech-writing but ethical-nonethical, Foucault states that Descartes' main opposition is not insanity-sanity but *demens-dormiens*. What is more, Foucault proves that the Derridian both-and phenomenon is impossible, while impossibility in general is an important criterion for Derrida's critical discussion (p. 596).

tween different consequences of its use, that is, between different responsibilities:

This is the law concerning poisoning [*περὶ φαρμακείας*]; the man who poisons [*φαρμακεύη*] someone in order to incite damage without a fatal consequence either to himself or to the other, or in order to have a fatal consequence for the latter or otherwise to his cattle or bees, would, if on the one hand [*μέν*] he is a physician and would be convicted of poisoning, suffer death; and if, on the other hand [*δέ*], he is a layman [*ιδιώτης*], the court will decide what he shall suffer or pay. And if there would be a suspicion that someone is causing harm by means of spells, charms, or some kind of incantations or other such kinds of witchcrafts [*τῶν τοιούτων φαρμακειῶν*], if, on the one hand [*μέν*], he is a prophet or a diviner, let him die, and if, on the other hand [*δέ*], he would be convicted of witchcraft [*περὶ φαρμακείας*] without any help of prophetic art, he shall be dealt with as in the former case; the court will decide about him what he shall suffer or pay.⁴²

The text is unambiguous; the legislator distinguishes between the expert and the layman, whether in medicine or in witchcraft. The expert's fate is uniform; the penalty is always death, regardless of the seriousness of the outcome. With the exception of murder, where the penalty is humiliation in addition to death,⁴³ all damage to property and person is considered by the enforcers of the law to be the same; there is no place for mercy. The reason for the severity is clear: the abuse of knowledge—an abuse based on the power given by society to the expert so that he will put it to good use—is considered to be a kind of treason. This twofold aspect of the law, which allows different penalties for the layman, but only one for the expert, applies even though in both cases *φάρμακα* were consciously used to cause harm. Although the layman's intentions were no better than those of the expert, it is only in the latter case that the court has no leeway. Thus, unlike Derrida, who disconnects his deconstructive agents from any subject and therefore from any responsibility, Plato emphasizes again and again the responsibility of the human being for his actions and their outcomes.

In conclusion, the above discussion illuminates the problematics of a deconstructive interpretation in accordance with its own regulations. The hierarchical construction of the Platonic text cannot be deconstructed unless the textual weave goes through a drastic

⁴² *Laws* 933d1–e5.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 871d4–5.

change, which is impossible in the context of a subtle Derridian reading. In addition, the *φάρμακον*'s autonomy, which is an essential characteristic of Derrida's commentary on Plato, was disputed here, and as a result the question of the validity of the deconstructive exegetical process is reopened. As for the last issue to be dealt with, namely, the notion of responsibility within the Derridian frame of reference, this must be developed another time.

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Appendix: *ψυχὴ πᾶσα*

The expression "the soul as a whole," which is my translation for the Greek *ψυχὴ πᾶσα*, was first suggested by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.⁴⁴ Even Wilamowitz himself, however, found it problematic and left some of the difficulties unresolved. Moreover, Wilamowitz is an exception, since the dispute among most interpreters since Hermias Alexandrinus⁴⁵ concentrates on the question whether the meaning of *ψυχὴ πᾶσα* is "all soul" or "every soul."⁴⁶ The latter problem cannot be resolved by means of textual criticism,⁴⁷ and therefore my suggestion is based on the context. In 246b6 and following, *ψυχὴ πᾶσα* appears as a complete being (*τελέα μὲν οὖν οὖν οὔσα*) having wings, which stands in contrast to the soul which has lost its wings (*πτερορρηήσασα*). In 246d6 and following, the wings' power to carry the heavy part of the soul to the gods' place of habitation is mentioned; Zeus himself, driving a winged chariot (*πτηνὸν ἄρμα*), directs the gods toward the summit of the sky, from which it is possible to have a look at the metaphysical region. Moreover, falling to earth is a direct outcome of the falling off of the wings (248c7-8). The opposition is quite clear; the divine, the

⁴⁴ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1920) vol. 2, p. 364.

⁴⁵ Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, ed. Paul Couvreur (Paris: Librairie mile Bouillon, 1901), 102.

⁴⁶ Thompson, *The Phaedrus of Plato*, 44; Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, 63.

⁴⁷ Perceval Frutiger, *Les mythes de Platon. Étude philosophique et littéraire* (Paris: Alcan, 1930), 34.

origin, and the presence stand in contrast to the human, the derivative, and the absence, while the insurmountable gap between the two poles is realized by the actual breaking off of the wings. It is according to this opposition that the insufficiency of both translations becomes manifest. The use of a collective signifier ("all" or "every"), which tends to give an impression of identity and closeness, is a misreading of an expression which appears in the context of difference and separation. By contrast, the translation "the soul as a whole" both emphasizes the existence of the difference and preserves the notion of completeness which is one of the characteristics of the Platonic primeval situation.

The above two options raise another problem. At 247b6 the dialogue presents the souls which are named immortal (αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι), while at 248a1, the other souls are presented (αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί). The Greek combination of μὲν and δέ represents a binary opposition.⁴⁸ The souls of the second group, which belong to those which are not gods, are not named immortal. In the light of this contrast, both "all soul" and "every soul" are misinterpretations of the Greek ψυχῇ πᾶσα, since they ignore the difference between the mortal and the immortal. It is the context again which hints at the accuracy of my translation. In 246c7-d2, the connection between the living being (ζῶον) and the immortal is depicted. The immortal has both a body and a soul which exist forever as a complete phenomenon (συμπεφυκότα).⁴⁹ By contrast, the living being, which is an outcome of an arbitrary connection between body and soul, has only a *temporal* completeness, which merely serves as a means for the new growth of the wings. Translating ψυχῇ πᾶσα as "the soul as a whole" stresses the difference between the complete immortal and the incomplete mortal in a dialogue where difference is a main theme.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus*, 134.

⁴⁹ Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 239.

⁵⁰ See Raphael Demos, "Plato's Doctrine of the Psyche as a Self-Moving Motion," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6 (1968): 134; Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 419, n. 4; and Griswold, *Self Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*, 259, n. 13.

PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS: EMANATION OR CREATION?

LLOYD P. GERSON

ONE FREQUENTLY READS CASUAL REFERENCES to Neo-Platonic metaphysics as emanationist. It is somewhat less common to find analyses of the term "emanation" so used. In this paper I shall be concerned solely with Plotinus. I hereby set aside all questions regarding any common denominator one might suppose between Plotinus and, say, Proclus.

There are several texts in the *Enneads* which employ noun and verb forms of $\rho\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ to describe the activity of the One in relation to complex entities. For example,

For the soul now knows that these things must be, but longs to answer the question repeatedly discussed also by the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multiplicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed [$\acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\rho\rho\acute{\upsilon}\eta$] from it as that which is seen to exist in beings, but which we think it right to refer back to the One. (5.1.6.2-8)¹

This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows [$\acute{\upsilon}\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\rho\rho\acute{\upsilon}\eta$], as it were, and its superabundance makes something other than itself. (5.2.1.5-10)

The first remark I wish to make about these passages is the obvious one that to think of emanating or flowing in contrast to creating is to make a sort of category mistake. For metaphors are not properly contrasted with technical terminology.² If one wants convincing on this point, we need only recall that Aquinas sometimes

¹ All translations are by A. H. Armstrong in the eight volume Loeb edition of the works of Plotinus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966-88).

² A similar point is made by Fernand Brunner, "Création et émanation: fragment de philosophie comparée," *Studia Philosophia* 33 (1973): 33-63.

uses the same metaphor in behalf of an explanation of creation, not in contrast to it.³ Conceding this, there is still the reasonable suspicion that *some* fundamental difference remains between Plotinus' metaphysics and a creation metaphysics such as that of Aquinas. I conjecture that the reason for this suspicion is that Plotinus is supposed to be the faithful inheritor of the Parmenidean legacy which lays down the axiom that *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Aquinas, however, understands creation as *ex nihilo*. So it would seem just incorrect to construe the metaphors of emanation in a manner which would make Plotinus contradict that axiom.

This reasoning seems less cogent when we begin to explicate the term *ex nihilo*; for one thing Aquinas does not mean by *creatio ex nihilo* is temporal origin. That God is the creator of all Aquinas believes he can demonstrate; that the world did not always exist is held by faith alone.⁴ Thus, the philosophical core of the notion of creation is causal dependence of being: *Deus est causa universalis totius esse*. The proper effect of God's causal activity is the being of everything.⁵ Let us compare this with a text of Plotinus:

But how is that One the principle of all things? Is it because as principle it keeps them in being, making each one of them to be? Yes, and because it caused them to be. (5.3.15.28-30)⁶

A good question for proponents of emanationism in Plotinus to ask themselves at this point is how this passage and similar ones express a noncreationist metaphysics.

One proposal sometimes made in order to differentiate a non-creationist from a creationist metaphysics is that in the former creatures exist of necessity whereas in the latter they do not.

³ See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 1: "Sicut igitur generatio hominis est ex non ente quod est non homo, ita creatio, quae est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil." Heinrich Dörrie provides a useful survey of the literary uses of the language of emanation in his "Emanation. Ein unphilosophisches Wort im spätantiken Denken," in *Parusia*, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1960), 211-28.

⁴ See *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. 2.

⁵ "Illud autem quod est proprius effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis, scilicet esse absolute"; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. 5.

⁶ "ὅπως δὲ ἐκείνο ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων, ἀρα, ὅτι αὐτὰ σώζει ἐν ἑκάστων αὐτῶν ποιήσασα εἶναι; ἢ καὶ ὅτι ὑπέστησεν αὐτά." Cf. *Enneads* 3.8.10.1-2, 4.8.6.1-6, 5.3.17.11-14, 5.5.5.5-7, 6.7.42.11, 6.9.1.1-2.

Indeed, Plotinus does say that what exists does so necessarily and not as a result of the discursive reasoning (λογισμός) of the ἀρχή of all.⁷ By contrast, Aquinas says in many places that *Deus produxit creaturas, non ex necessitate, sed per intellectum et voluntatem*.⁸ Of course, Aquinas also says that God's knowledge is not discursive, and one of the reasons for this is that discursive knowing implies imperfection.⁹ But Plotinus, too, says that the One is perfect and that it acts according to its will (βούλησις).¹⁰ So, whereas Aquinas contrasts the alternatives of acting by necessity and acting by will (and intellect), Plotinus contrasts acting by necessity and acting on the basis of discursive reasoning. This should lead us to conclude that the "necessity" as attributed to creation by Plotinus and "necessity" as denied of God's acting by Aquinas do not mean the same thing.

In fact, there are at least two reasons why the necessary existence of things does not entail that the One acts by necessity. First, the term ἀνάγκη in Plotinus implies constraint from outside. But there is nothing outside the One and it is constrained by nothing. Second, the putative necessity by which the One acts cannot be really distinct from the One or indeed from its will, for this would negate its simplicity. So to say that the One acts by necessity could mean nothing else but that it acts according to its will. Another, albeit esoteric, facet of this second reason is that if the One acted by a necessity really distinct from it, then this would set up, counter to Plotinus's express argument, a real relation between the One and what it produces.¹¹ This would be so because if there is something really distinct from the One, then the One is limited in relation to it; and what prevents the One from being really related to anything, is that it is unqualifiedly unlimited. Thus, it seems that if "necessity" is understood as constraint *ab extra*, then the One does not act of necessity. Since Aquinas's God does not act by this kind of necessity either, we can hardly use it to contrast Plotinus's metaphysics with Thomistic creation metaphysics.

⁷ Cf. *Enneads* 3.2.3.1-5.

⁸ Cf. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 4; q. 25, a. 5; q. 28, a. 1, ad 3.

⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* 1.57.

¹⁰ *Enneads* 6.8.13.7-8, 53

¹¹ "δεῖ δὲ ὅλως πρὸς οὐδὲν αὐτὸν λέγειν ἔστι γὰρ ὅπερ ἔστι καὶ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ἀφαιρούμεν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα ὁπωσοῦν. . ."; *Enneads* 6.8.8.13-15.

It is sometimes supposed that what distinguishes an emanationist metaphysics is an account of production by the first principle whereby this principle is emptied of all that is in it.¹² Alternatively, one may think of Russian dolls or a telescoped antenna where what is somehow contained within the whole is separated out from it. There are certainly many texts in which Plotinus says that everything is contained within the One.¹³ But none of these texts, or indeed no other that I know of, claims that anything is ever "outside" of the One or separated off from it. Thus, the relation between the One and everything else cannot be construed according to the above metaphors, where what is suggested is a two-phase process: first, everything is in the One, and second, everything is not in the One, but emptied out of or unfolded from it.¹⁴

A somewhat more serious and complex suggestion for characterizing an emanationist metaphysics is to construe its account of causal dependence according to the model of a *per accidens* series. In a *per accidens* causal series, as opposed to a *per se* causal series, *A* is the cause of *B*, *B* is the cause of *C*, and so on. In a *per se* causal series, *A* would be the cause of *C*, and *B* would be an instrument of *A*'s causal activity. For example, the tree of Jesse is a *per accidens* causal series: Jesse begat David who begat Solomon and so on. A man causing a traffic accident with his car is an example of a *per se* causally ordered series. Applying this distinction to Plotinus's claims about the causal activity of the One, we might interpret him to mean that the causality is according to a *per accidens* ordered series. Thus, the One would cause *vous* to be, *vous* would cause soul to be, and soul would presumably cause nature to be.¹⁵

¹² Cf. C. P. Gorman, "Freedom in the God of Plotinus," *New Scholasticism* 14 (1940): 379-405. Gorman uses the phrase "progressive unfolding of reality" to characterize the One's relation to its products (p. 404).

¹³ For example, see *Enneads* 5.5.9, 6.4.2, 6.5.1.26.

¹⁴ Cf. H. F. Müller, "Ist die Metaphysik des Plotins ein Emanations-system?" *Hermes* 48 (1914): esp. 416-22, where this interpretation is decisively refuted. More recently, in the same vein, see G. Reale, "I fondamenti della metafisica di Plotino e la struttura della processione," in *Graceful Reason*, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983), esp. 153-8.

¹⁵ "Just as the One overflows into Mind and Mind into Soul and Soul into the world, so the latent powers of Soul in their final exhaustion pass over into blank nothingness, or, in other words, beget or produce it"; B. A. G. Fuller, *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912), 306.

We need to distinguish two different questions here. The first question is whether Plotinus's account of metaphysical causality is *per accidens* or *per se*, assuming that these alternatives are exhaustive. The second question is whether the selected alternative does indeed distinguish an emanationist from a creationist metaphysics. Regarding this question, Aquinas is clear that God's creative activity does not operate instrumentally.¹⁶ So, were we to opt for a *per accidens* causal series, we should not therefore conclude that a *per se* ordered series is a differentia of a creation metaphysics. Let us turn now to the evidence pertaining to an answer to the first question.

The main text supporting the interpretation of metaphysical causality as a *per accidens* ordered series is a continuation of the text cited above in which the term "emanating" appears:

This [*voûs*], when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces in the same way, pouring forth a multiple power—this is a likeness of it—just as that which was before it poured it forth. This activity springing from the substance of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while that which is before it abides unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and so brings forth an image. (5.2.1.10-19)¹⁷

If we employ the concept of a *per accidens* ordered causal series to interpret this passage, the causal activity of the One is limited to the production of *voûs*. We could still say that without this first production nothing else would be produced, but the existence of the One would no longer be a necessary condition for the production of soul anymore than the existence of the grandfather is a necessary condition for the production of the grandson. Even if we insist that the One exists necessarily, this existence is irrelevant to the causality of the being of soul, which, in the putative *per accidens* series, is attributed solely to *voûs*.

¹⁶ "Unde non potest aliquid operari dispositive et instrumentaliter ad hunc effectum, cum creatio non sit ex aliquo praesupposito quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis agentis"; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 5.

¹⁷ Cf. *Enneads* 4.8.6, 6.7.42.17-20.

The obvious impediments to the endorsement of this interpretation are the many texts where Plotinus says that the One preserves all things in being. It might be thought that the interpretation can be retained if this preservation is construed as a counterfactual.¹⁸ Thus, the One preserves everything in being means that if *per impossibile* the One were to cease existing, then everything else would cease existing as well. We can imagine if we like an Atlas holding the earth aloft, an Atlas who is no part of earthly production, but who could not simply disappear without his burden crashing down. The problem with this construal is that it imports an unacceptable complexity into the One's causal activity. It presumes that the One is the cause of the being of *νοῦς* and then operates differently in conserving the being of *νοῦς* and everything else. However the activity of the One may be understood, we cannot accept an interpretation which has it do two different *kinds* of things. How could we make a distinction within the One to account for this? So, either the One is the cause of the being of *νοῦς* and everything else or it is the cause of neither. But the latter alternative is excluded by the texts.

Perhaps this line of argument will seem problematic. There is, however, another argument against the *per accidens* interpretation which removes the possibility of construing preserving in being differently from causing being. The ἀρχή of *νοῦς* is the ultimate explanation or cause of thinking, life, and οὐσία.¹⁹ It is sufficient at this point to note that it is obviously not the ἀρχή of that which it receives from the One, the ἀρχή above it. Now if the One is the ἀρχή of the being or existence of *νοῦς*, then in no case is *νοῦς* the ἀρχή of the being or existence of anything else. If soul, for example, receives not only life, thinking, and οὐσία from *νοῦς* but existence as well, then *νοῦς* performs for soul the identical function that the One performs for *νοῦς*. Then the uniqueness of the ἀρχή of being, to say nothing of its primacy, would be destroyed. I take

¹⁸ There is some textual support provided for this in the conditional clause at *Enneads* 3.8.10.1-2: ἥς μὴ οὐσης οὐδ' ἂν τὰ πάντα.

¹⁹ For example, see *Enneads* 6.7.13.28-42. See also Pierre Hadot, "Être, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin," in *Les sources de Plotin* (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1960), 107-41. Hadot richly documents his conclusion that "la triade être-vie-pensée révèle la structure de l'Intelligence."

it that any interpretation that leads to this result is to be firmly rejected.²⁰

If, owing to these objections against an interpretation of the metaphysical causality in Plotinus in terms of a *per accidens* series, we opt for a *per se* ordered series, then the One is the sole cause of the being of everything else and the role of the other principles is at most instrumental. One of the central texts relevant to assessing this proposal is also perhaps one of the texts most frequently thought of as somehow expressing emanation:

All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances [οὐσίας], in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality [ὑπόστασιν] directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced: fire produces the heat which comes from it; snow does not only keep its cold inside itself. Perfumed things show this particularly clearly. As long as they exist, something is diffused from themselves around them, and what is near them enjoys their existence. And all things when they come to perfection produce [γεννᾶ]; the One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly; and that which it produces is less than itself. (5.1.6.31–8)²¹

There are many, many important features in this passage. Of particular interest to us is just what it is that the One produces. From the above arguments, we can infer that the answer is not simply νοῦς. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that νοῦς is indeed a product of the One. It is in fact the “first” product, that which

²⁰ At *Enneads* 5.2.1.14–15 Plotinus says that νοῦς “makes likenesses [τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ]” as does the One. Armstrong is wrong to translate this as “produces in the same way.” As the text goes on to make clear, the point is that the relation of νοῦς to what is below it is *analogous* to the relation of the One to νοῦς. The specific feature of the analogue is imagery or copying. That is, the image of νοῦς is analogous to the image of the One. This does not make νοῦς the cause of existence of anything.

²¹ Cf. *Enneads* 4.8.6.8–12, 5.4.1.27–34, 6.8.18.51. I doubt that 5.3.12.20ff, which seems to hold that the πρώτη ἐνέργεια is νοῦς, should be taken to indicate that the distinction between first and second ἐνέργεια does not apply to the One. Rather, νοῦς is where the concept of ἐνέργεια can be applied without the qualification οἶον. The ἀρχή νοῦς is the πρώτη ἐνέργεια of οὐσία. Against Hans Büchner (*Plotins Möglichkeitslehre* [Munich: Anton Pustet, 1970], 99), *Enneads* 1.7.1.17–20 does not imply that there is no ἐνέργεια in the One. Rather, it implies that the ἐνέργεια in the One, though producing a secondary ἐνέργεια, does not thereby erect a real relation between the One and everything else.

is eternally in closest proximity to the source of all.²² All we are told in the present passage is that what is produced by the One is inferior (ἐλαττον) to it.

In order to proceed further we need to adduce another text which will guide us toward the goal:

In each and every thing there is an activity of the substance [ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας] and there is an activity from the substance [ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας]; and that which is of the substance is each thing itself, while the activity from the substance derives from the first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself: as in fire there is a heat which is the content of its substance, and another which comes into being from that primary heat when fire exercises the activity which is native [σύμφυτον] to its substance in abiding unchanged as fire. So it is also in the higher world; and much more so there, while it [the One] abides in its own proper way of life, the activity generated from the perfection in it and its coexistent activity [συνούσης ἐνεργείας] acquires existence [ὑπόστασιν], since it comes from a great power, the greatest indeed of all, and arrives at being and substance [τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν], for that [the One] is beyond being. That is the productive power [δύναμις] of all, and its product is already all things [τὰ πάντα]. (5.4.2.27-39)²³

As will I hope become clear, there is no doctrine in Plotinus which better illustrates his original use of his Platonic and Aristotelian sources than the distinction between ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας and ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. To begin with, the word ἐνέργεια is apparently of Aristotelian origin. There is no occurrence of the word form in Plato. I would add, though this is perhaps a bit more contentious, that the concept pair ἐνέργεια-δύναμις is not clearly to be found in Plato at all, though δύναμις does of course appear in the sense of "power" rather than "potency."²⁴ Nevertheless, the use to which Plotinus puts the concept of ἐνέργεια, particularly in reference to the One, is most un-Aristotelian.

For Aristotle, the most perfect ἐνέργεια in the universe is the noetic activity of the unmoved mover.²⁵ This activity of self-contemplation is the antithesis of an activity "in another"; and it is precisely because the unmoved mover is perfect that its activity is

²² On the texts indicating gradation in the One's products, cf. Dominic O'Meara, *Structures hiérarchiques dans la pensée de Plotin* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), esp. 120-4.

²³ Cf. *Enneads* 2.6.9.14-23, 2.9.8.22-5, 4.5.7.51-5, 5.1.6.34, 5.3.7.23, 5.9.8.13, 6.2.22.24-9.

²⁴ For example, *Republic* 509b9, in reference to the Form of the Good.

²⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1071b19-20, 1072b26-7.

unqualifiedly immanent. To have an actuality outside of itself would mean that it had a potency in relation to that actuality and hence that it is imperfect in some respect. Thus, insofar as the actuality of an agent is in the movable, the agent is in potency to that actuality even if it is itself the movable.²⁶ Aristotle does in fact make a distinction between something like an "internal" and an "external" *ἐνέργεια*, as in the case of sight, on the one hand, and building a house on the other.²⁷ But these are different species of *ἐνέργεια*, and there is no suggestion at all that an internal *ἐνέργεια* has connected with it an external one necessarily. For example, what would be the external *ἐνέργεια* following necessarily upon seeing? So when Plotinus makes the distinction between *ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας* and *ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας* he may reasonably be thought to be quite consciously diverging from Aristotle's use of the concept of *ἐνέργεια*.

For a concept of external actualization we naturally look back to Plato. There are at least three relevant passages. First, there is the famous text regarding the Form of the Good which produces knowability, existence, and being in the other Forms.²⁸ Though this text does not clearly distinguish between what the Form of the Good is or does in itself and what it produces outside itself, the analogical representation of it by the sun and the unique attributes it possesses, such as being *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*, make it reasonable to conclude at least that some such distinction is in harmony with Plato's intention.

The second relevant text is the description of the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*. The Demiurge is good and so without grudgingness (*φθόρον*).²⁹ He desires that the world should be as much like himself as possible. So he creates order out of chaos. Notice that in the Demiurge benevolent desire cannot be capricious or transitory. He is permanently well-disposed. But here one hesitates—well-disposed to what? Not to a nonexistent creation, nor to the inchoate heaps of disordered quasi-elements which represent the necessity the Demiurge must *overcome*. Reflecting on an answer to this question, it is natural enough for Plotinus and indeed for an entire tradition to surmise that the Demiurge or *ἀρχή* of all or God or the gods are essentially benevolent in the sense that their goodness is always

²⁶ Cf. *Physics* 202a13–21.

²⁷ *Metaphysics* 1050a23–9.

²⁸ *Republic* 509b6–10.

²⁹ *Timaeus* 29e.

overflowing. Whether the result of this overflowing goodness is an adjunct to a product or the product itself, the idea that *bonum est diffusivum sui* can be traced back to this text.

The last text that should be mentioned is from the *Symposium*, where Diotima declares that the ἔργον of love is birth in beauty.³⁰ More precisely, all men love to possess the good everlastingly and in their possession of it they produce beauty, particularly, as the passage goes on to say, the beauty that is true virtue.³¹ So here, though it is not goodness that is itself diffusive, it is association with goodness that spontaneously, or better, naturally, produces.³²

As suggestive as these three texts undoubtedly are, they do not quite amount to the distinction between ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας and ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας as this is applied to the One. The Form of the Good works exclusively on the other Forms; these other Forms are, if anything, the causes of the being of their participants. This would reflect the *per accidens* series we have already rejected. The Demiurge, which in neither Plato nor Plotinus is equivalent to the Good or One, quite explicitly works on a preexistent chaos, whereas for Plotinus there is no room for an independent ἀρχή "from below." So, the pressing question is not merely why Plotinus endorses the axiom of the diffusiveness of goodness but why he reinterprets this, using or perhaps misusing an Aristotelian concept.

I answer this question as follows. When Plotinus rejected the primacy of νοῦς as postulated by Aristotle, he thereby rejected the primacy of οὐσία. Since οὐσία represents limitedness or distinctness in nature, the immediate consequence is that the ἀρχή of all is going to be beyond οὐσία and so beyond limit.³³ This much could be inferred alone from a reaffirmation of Plato's account of the Form of the Good in opposition to *Metaphysics* 12. It is Aristotle who identified primary οὐσία with ἐνέργεια; it is Plotinus who reasoned that if the ἀρχή of all is beyond οὐσία, then it is beyond the kind of

³⁰ *Symposium* 206b.

³¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, 212a.

³² For the documentation of the use of this principle in ancient Greek philosophy in and before Plotinus see Klaus Kremer, "*Bonum est diffusivum sui*. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum," in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, ed. Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini, teil 2, bd. 36.2 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 994-1032, esp. 1002-11.

³³ Cf. *Enneads* 5.5.6.4, 5.5.11.2-3, 6.7.32.9.

ἐνέργεια that is οὐσία, not beyond ἐνέργεια *tout court*. For, of course, that the One is beyond οὐσία does not mean that it is beyond existence or being altogether. Suggestions to the contrary are just misunderstandings of Plotinus's so-called negative theology. What Plotinus rejects in reference to the One is language that implies limitedness or complexity.

We must suppose that at this point in the reasoning Plotinus had to ask himself whether or not ἐνέργεια was so tied to οὐσία that to attribute it to the One was wrong. There is a text which clearly indicates his answer.

Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first activity [ἐνέργεια] is without substance [οὐσία], but posit this very fact as his, so to speak, existence [ὑπόστασις]. But if one posited an existence without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfect. And if one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then the activity is more perfect than the substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. (6.8.20.9-16)³⁴

It is not too difficult to see why this must be so. The reasoning leading to the positing of an ἀρχή of all in the first place is reasoning from effect to cause.³⁵ The first cause is not an essential cause, for that role devolves upon οὐσία, which does not explain the datum that the One is needed to explain. The only kind of cause that the first cause can be is an efficient cause. Thus, for the One to be the ἀρχή of all it cannot be deprived of ἐνέργεια. To deny ἐνέργεια of it would be to deny causal efficacy to it. For being an efficient cause means acting as an efficient cause.

Arguing in this way, we reach a primary ἐνέργεια, but we do not yet have the premise that distinguishes its causal activity according to a *per accidens* or a *per se* ordered series. One might suppose, that is, that the ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας of the One is just νοῦς alone. This, however, would imply a kind of limitedness in the One: its causal activity operates so far and no further. Yet there is nothing in the One to account for this limitedness; indeed, everything said of the One speaks against it. Another way, albeit rhetorical, of making the same point is to ask, Why should the One stop *here*, or *here*? Must not it operate

³⁴ Cf. *Enneads* 6.8.7.47-8, 6.8.13.7-8.

³⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, 5.3.17.11-14; 5.3.15.12-13, 28; 6.4.10.1-31; 6.7.23.22-4; 6.8.18.7.

up to the limit of logical possibility?³⁶ An unlimited or infinite ἐνέργεια cannot, it seems, produce its proper effect restrictedly.

If this is so, then the ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας of the One is neither νοῦς alone nor just that which νοῦς receives from the One. It is not the former because νοῦς or οὐσία does not as such have an ἀρχή. That is, essence does not have an essential cause. It is not the latter because that would imply a limitation in the One. The ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας is rather the being of everything that can possess being, from νοῦς down to and including matter.

If this were the whole story, we could simply conclude that Plotinus's metaphysics is creationist in the sense that the proper effect of the first principle of all is the being of everything else. But this would be an oversimplification. In rejecting a *per accidens* ordered series for metaphysical causality, we still have before us the alternative of a *per se* ordered series. As we have seen, according to Aquinas at least, if a *per se* series involves instrumentality, then it is not creationist. Surely the fact that νοῦς and ψυχή are ἀρχαί in themselves should give us pause. In fact, I have hitherto suppressed an important distinction in this matter: that between being and existence. To this I now turn.

I shall not now recount the philological evidence, which is in any case ambiguous, though not as ambiguous as some would suppose. Several texts are, however, most revealing.

. . . because it [the One] is not enslaved to itself, but is only itself and really itself, while every other thing is itself and something else. (6.8.21.32-3)

But where absolute substance [αὐτοουσία] [the One] is completely what it is, and it is not one thing and its substance [οὐσία] another, what it is it is also master of, and is no longer to be referred to another insofar as it is and insofar as it is substance. (6.8.12.14-7)

But if it [the One] is needed for the existence of each and every substance [εἰς οὐσίας ἐκάστης ὑπόστασιν]—for there is nothing which is which is not one—it would also exist before substance and as generating substance. For this reason also it is one-being [ἐν ὄν], but not first being and then one; for in that which was being and also one there would be many. . . . (6.6.13.49-53)³⁷

³⁶ Cf. *Enneads* 5.5.12.44-50, where Plotinus bases the plenitude of creation on the ungrudging nature of the One.

³⁷ Cf. *Enneads* 5.5.3.25, 6.9.1.1-2.

Note that in the last text it is said that the One is needed for the existence of every *οὐσία*, and that the reason for this is that there is nothing which is not one. Since the One is unqualifiedly simple, the immediate inference is that the oneness and the existence received from the One are the same thing. Thus, it is false to suppose as some have that if the existence of things other than the One is to be accounted for at all, then that is to be done otherwise than by the One, for the One is simply and solely the cause of oneness. Perhaps a salutary reminder in this regard is that "One" is no more of a correct description of the *ἀρχή* of all than is any other description, including, I must add, "*ἀρχή* of all." So, the One is the cause of the existence of *οὐσία*. As is seen in the second text, there is no distinction within the One between what it is and that it is, between its essence and existence, if you will. By contrast, in everything other than the One, such a distinction needs to be made. The distinction will be a real, minor one in Scholastic terminology, but that is not my main point here. Rather, I am concerned to show that in these texts what is presumed is a distinction between that which is the proper effect of the One's causal activity, namely, existence, and the recipient of this endowment, which is strictly and literally *οὐσία*. But *οὐσία* apart from existence has no reality for Plotinus; it is eternally in possession of its endowment. By "being" I mean whatever it is that is in possession of existence, an existence really distinct from "what" it is.

With the distinction between existence and being, we can see the problem facing Plotinus. On the one hand, *οὐσία* or *νοῦς* must be an *ἀρχή* distinct from the One, for the *ἀρχή* of essence must be sufficiently complex to serve as the guarantor of all eternal truths. On the other hand, if the One is to be the *ἀρχή* of all, *οὐσία* must be subordinated to it. Indeed, it is, but only by having its existence caused by the One. *Οὐσία* itself is a distinct *ἀρχή*. If the One were understood as the cause of being as opposed to the cause of existence, it would assume an illicit complexity. In one place he does actually say that the One has all forms in itself "indistinctly" (*μὴ διακεκριμένον*).³⁸ In fact, the reason given for the One's having the ability to give existence to everything is just that it has everything in it "beforehand." It must have everything indistinctly, however, because otherwise this would compromise its simplicity.

³⁸ *Enneads* 5.3.15.31. Cf. 5.2.1.1, 5.4.2.17, 6.7.32.12, 6.8.18.3, 6.8.21.24-5.

Such language encourages the view that the Forms are eminently as well as virtually in the One. This view obscures the specific causality that the One exercises: for it suggests that the One give essence as well as existence to *voûs*. If this were so, one might then suppose that *voûs* does the same for what is below it. Against such a view are the texts in which Plotinus says that "there is no necessity for something to have what it gives," and "the form is in that which is shaped (that is, *voûs*), but the shaper was shapeless."³⁹ How then can we reconcile the indistinct existence of Forms in the One with the claim that it does not have them?

Let us recall that *voûs* eternally achieves its good by contemplating the Forms with which it is identical. The indistinct existence of Forms in the One cannot be a superior mode of existence for these Forms for several reasons. First, *voûs* is the ἀρχή of Forms. Second, the Forms in *voûs* are not an image of Forms in the One. If they were, then *voûs* would not have knowledge of Forms, but only of images. Finally, indistinct Forms are not Forms at all, for the entire point of positing Forms in the first place is to explain distinct intelligible contents in the sensible world. If then *voûs* achieves its good by contemplating Forms, can we give any meaning to that good achieved over and above *voûs* itself? Yes, it is nothing but perfect noncomposite being, that is, existence. Forms are not an image of the One; the divided existence of *voûs* is such an image. The perfect simplicity of the One prevents it from having the Forms eminently. But the fact that the goodness in the life of *voûs* is identified with imperfect oneness makes the Good or the One over and above it a necessary superordinate principle.

The problem of the equal versus subordinate status of *voûs* in relation to the One comes plainly to the fore when we ask about the cause of the being of everything else, especially everything else below *ψυχή*, which is of course another ἀρχή and the source of an analogous problem. When Plotinus analyzes the being of things in the world he will analyze them into essence or image of essence and existence, positing the ἀρχή of each as *voûs* and One, respectively. That is, the One's proper effect here is evident solely as the existence of things, not their οὐσία, which derives from the second ἀρχή. The One, then, is represented as primary cause of existence, but οὐσία is the

³⁹ *Enneads* 6.7.17.3-4, 17-18.

instrumental cause of being. Since there is no being without existence, the One's causal activity is completely instrumental, including even *οὐσία* itself, which as such does not require a cause outside itself. In the being of *οὐσία*, the One uses *οὐσία* as an instrument. So also with everything else.

An objection may occur to some. Does not the instrumental activity of *οὐσία* or *νοῦς* place some constraint or limitation on the One, counter to its purported unlimitedness as explained above? This is an important objection, one which strikes a vital nerve. It is precisely owing to a suspected denial of omnipotence in Christian creation metaphysics, coming out of the Plotinian tradition, that Aquinas refuses to join instrumentality with creation. I think that the correct answer to this objection is to admit that it does place a constraint upon the One, but to deny that it is the sort of constraint that Plotinus means to deny in saying that the One is unlimited.

In endowing things with existence, the One is unlimited. It does not run out of power or goodness. There is nothing that could exist that does not. Yet *what* could exist is not the One's business. That birds and bees can and do exist, that griffins could exist, but do not, and that square circles cannot exist, are owing to facts about *οὐσία*, to put it crudely. When the One produces existence, it uses the template of *οὐσία*. Its causal power is a pure stream, flowing out and over whatever it is that can receive it according to its own nature.

No doubt Plotinus saw a certain advantage in instrumentalism. For example, he did not see it so much as a limitation but as a way to divest the One of responsibility for evil. The ultimate explanation of evil is to be found in *what* things are, and for this the One is not the *ἀρχή*. Ironically perhaps, Plato would have found it easier to assimilate *οὐσία* to the Good, but only at the cost of making matter a separate *ἀρχή*, independent of *οὐσία*. Yet Plotinus does come tantalizingly close to undercutting the separateness of the *ἀρχή* of *οὐσία* when he says that all the Forms exist in the One indistinctly. One may perhaps usefully compare this with Anaximander's *ἄπειρον*, which at least on Aristotle's testimony appears to be a unique *ἀρχή* in which all things are contained indistinctly and from which all things come.⁴⁰ Although Plotinus's One is obviously a more sophisticated metaphysical principle that is the *ἄπειρον* of

⁴⁰ Cf. *Physics* 187a20-1.



Anaximander, there must be something in the nature of *οὐσία* or in the nature of the One which prevents Plotinus from collapsing the former into the latter.

It is well to be clear about the alternatives facing the philosopher who has arrived at this point. Either *οὐσία*, shorthand for the locus of eternal truths, is a really distinct albeit subordinate *ἀρχή*, or it is merely a conceptually distinct description of the One. I think we should resist concluding that Plotinus neatly accommodates both alternatives when he calls the One *οἶον οὐσία*. For this would be to undervalue his unqualified insistence that *οὐσία* is an *ἀρχή*. To reject the first, Plotinian, alternative is either to introduce real complexity into the One or to reduce all eternal truth to a single truth, perhaps least misleadingly represented as "the One exists." I have of course left aside the theological adaptation of the first alternative wherein *οὐσία* becomes identified with the second person of the Christian Trinity.

Returning to the question with which I began this paper, Is Plotinus's metaphysics creationist or emanationist? if it is allowed that instrumental creationism is a legitimate species of creationism, then I think the answer is the former. If, on the other hand, one insists that there is no common genus for a metaphysics that holds that the existence of everything depends on the first principle and a metaphysics that holds that the being of everything depends on the first principle, then Plotinus's metaphysics is not accurately called creationist. But it is not emanationist either. I do not have a convenient label to offer for this alternative.

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HOW ARE SOULS RELATED TO BODIES? A STUDY OF JOHN BURIDAN

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MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS HAD NO SINGLE RESPONSE to the difficult question of how souls are related to the bodies they animate. In this respect, the theory of psychological inherence advanced by the noted Parisian philosopher John Buridan is a case in point. Buridan offers different accounts of the soul-body relation, depending upon which of two main varieties of natural, animate substance he is explaining. In the case of human beings, he defends a version of immanent dualism: the thesis that the soul is an immaterial, everlasting, and created (as opposed to naturally generated) entity, actually inhering in each and every body it animates, and thus numerically many.¹ But when his *explanandum* is the relation between nonhuman animal or plant souls and their bodies, Buridan is a materialist; that is, he regards the sensitive and vegetative souls of such creatures as no more than collections of material, extended powers exhaustively defined by their biological functions, and hence as corruptible as the particular arrangements of matter they happen to animate.

In the larger context of medieval Aristotelianism, the fact that Buridan has a hybrid approach to the question of psychological

¹ The last of these features distinguishes Buridan's view from that of Averroes, who defends the transcendent dualist view that the immaterial and everlasting part of the human soul (which he calls the possible intellect) is a singular entity existing separately from individual human beings, but in such a way that it is simultaneously present to each of them. Much of Buridan's own account of psychological inherence is developed in counterpoint to Averroes' *Long Commentary on De anima*, a work with which he was intimately familiar. See John Alexander Zupko, "John Buridan's Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of his *Questions on Aristotle's De anima* (Third Redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1989), 457–505.

inherence is neither remarkable nor especially interesting. Obviously, some combination of materialism and dualism seems called for if the soul-body relation is to be explained in a way that is both naturalistic and consistent with the possibility of personal immortality for some class(es) of corporeal, animate things. What is both remarkable and interesting, however, is the way in which Buridan manages the details of his hybrid account, that is, the particular explanations he gives under its materialistic and dualistic aspects.

My aim in this paper is to examine Buridan's answer to the very basic question of what it means for the soul to inhere in the body. This question is discussed at several junctures in the third and final version of his *Questions on Aristotle's De anima* (hereafter "QDA"),² though as we shall see below, his explanation of how non-human souls inhere in their bodies is of a piece with the more general theory of inherence presented in his other writings.

I

Nonhuman Souls. The question of how the soul inheres in the body is first addressed as such in QDA 2.7. Like virtually all of the questions in this work, QDA 2.7 is based on a lemma from Aristotle's *De anima*: in this instance, the observation in *De anima* 2.2 that it is possible for some plants and animals to survive physical division, from which we are to conclude that before division, their souls are actually one but potentially many.³ For Buridan, this claim raises the question of how we are to understand the presence of the soul's nutritive and sensitive powers in corporeal bodies: in what sense does the whole soul of an organism inhere in its body if a single division of the quantitative parts of that body gives rise to two new whole souls? Since QDA 2, like *De anima* 2, addresses the nature

² Specifically, in QDA 2.4–2.7 (see Peter Gordon Sobol, "John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation: An Edition of Book II of His Commentary on Aristotle's Book of the Soul, with an Introduction and a Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species" [Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1984], 42–105) and QDA 3.3–3.6, 3.17 (see Zupko, "Buridan's Philosophy of Mind," 20–56, 189–98). In the text, citations of QDA 2 and QDA 3 will be followed by page numbers from the editions of Sobol and Zupko respectively. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this paper are my own.

³ See *De anima* 413b16–24.

and function of the sensitive part of the soul, Buridan gives his answer in the context of the psychology of brute or nonhuman animals, creatures whose souls are paradigmatically sensitive.

In the main part of *QDA* 2.7, Buridan introduces four metaphysical principles which he takes to govern the inherence of nonhuman animal souls, and thus also to explain how the sensitive and vegetative souls of such creatures can be in each part of their bodies. I shall discuss each of these principles in turn, and then examine Buridan's dualistic account of the relation between human souls and their bodies in *QDA* 3.

A. *The Extensionality Principle.* The first principle governing the inherence of nonhuman souls in their bodies is attributed to Aristotle and defined as follows: "The vegetative soul, sensitive soul, and so forth in a horse are not distinct in different parts of the body, but the vegetative, sensitive, and appetitive [souls] are extended throughout the whole body of the animal [*per totum corpus animalis extensa est*]" (*QDA* 2.7, p. 89). The vegetative and sensitive souls of brute animals, together with their characteristic powers of nutrition, growth, and desire (sometimes called "souls" in their own right, as in "nutritive soul," "appetitive soul," and so on), are said to be "extended throughout the whole body" because they are derived from its matter. The extensionality principle contends that when an animating power has been derived from an extended subject, it must commensurably inhere in that subject.

Buridan elsewhere draws a distinction between two different modes of inherence which helps to clarify how one thing can be said to inhere commensurably in another. A power or capacity, he says, inheres in a subject (1) as a proximate potentiality (*potentia propinqua*), just in case it can act or be acted upon immediately, without the assistance of a mediating quality disposing it to act or be acted upon; or (2) as a remote potentiality (*potentia remota*), just in case it can only act or be acted upon with the assistance of a mediating quality so disposing it. In this way, some powers of the soul are said to be proximate, others remote:

Although the soul can exercise some of its operations immediately, it cannot [so exercise] all of them. For example, if we suppose that there is only one substantial form in a human being, namely, the intellectual soul, a human body would be informed by each. Nevertheless, it [the intellectual soul] has been so abstracted that it is not derived from a subjective potentiality, nor extended by its extension, which is also why it does not need to use a corporeal organ for its

principal operations, that is, willing and understanding. And yet it does need a corporeal organ, and certain qualitative dispositions of a [corporeal] organ, to exercise its other operations, for it needs an eye to see, an ear to hear, and so forth.⁴

Thus, the intellective soul is proximately potential to its definitive or essential operations of willing and understanding, since it is possible for intellectual creatures to engage in those activities without needing any specific arrangement of matter in the form of an organ.⁵ But the powers characteristic of the vegetative or sensitive souls—such as nutrition, growth, sensation, and desire—are, considered by themselves, only remote potentialities. They become proximate potentialities only when considered together with their determining qualitative dispositions. Thus, we say that the sensitive power together with the eye, an arrangement of matter disposed to register light and color, is immediately capable of seeing; the sensitive power together with the ear, an arrangement of matter disposed to register vibrations in the air, is immediately capable of hearing, and so on.

The distinction between proximate and remote potentialities is important for understanding the precise sense in which Buridan understands the powers of the vegetative or sensitive soul to be extended throughout the body. The extensionality principle is false if those powers are conceived as proximate potentialities, since the sensitive soul is proximately *x*-ing not throughout the whole body but only locally, that is, where it inheres in physical organs disposed

⁴ *Quaestiones Ioannis Buridani super decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum* (Paris: 1513; reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968), 6.3.118vb. Hereafter this work will be cited as "QNE."

⁵ Buridan later concedes that the intellective soul does in fact use corporeal organs "ministratively" (*ministrative*) in carrying out its principal operations (QNE 6.3.119ra). This is based on his view that the intellect of the wayfarer cannot (1) think without phantasms or images provided by the faculty of sense, and specifically by the imagination, a cognitive power realized in physical organs, namely, in the heart and the brain (see also QDA 2.23, pp. 383–4; 2.24, pp. 401–2; 3.15, p. 383; cf. *De anima* 431a16–17); or (2) exercise its power of volition without objects presented to it *sub ratione boni vel mali*, that is, appearances that are ultimately founded upon sensory images (see also QDA 3.15, pp. 167–8; 3.18, pp. 199–205; QNE 3.1–3.5). The profound dependence of thinking and willing upon the operations of corporeal organs is not expressed more strongly here because Buridan elsewhere maintains the conceivability of the intellective soul operating without corporeal organs. In such a disembodied state, it is said to understand "by God's power and arrangement [*ex dei potentia et ordinatione*]"; QDA 3.6, p. 54.

to *x*-ing. Thus, it is proximately seeing only in the eye, proximately hearing only in the ear, and so on. But the principle is true if those powers are conceived as remote potentialities, since each and every part of the body of a plant or animal is potentially *x*-ing but for the mediating qualitative disposition required for *x*-ing. Buridan explains his understanding of this distinction in response to what looks to have been a student query:

But it is reasonable for you to ask whether in the foot of a horse, the soul is capable of seeing. And I say that it is, speaking of a principal and remote potentiality, since taken by itself it is naturally suited to see, and it would see in the foot if God and nature were to form an eye in the foot for it. But it is not in the foot as a proximate potentiality for seeing, because by "proximate potentiality" we must understand either the required dispositions together with the principal agent, or the principal potentiality itself in possession of the dispositions it needs to operate. And when it is without them, it is called a "remote potentiality." Nor is that [remote] potentiality [posited] pointlessly in the foot, since it exercises other operations [besides seeing] there. (QDA 2.5, pp. 66-7)

So even if the sensitive soul's powers are manifested only locally, there remains a sense in which they are present throughout the whole body:

If an eye were in the foot in the same way that it is in the head, [that is,] as far as qualitative dispositions are concerned, we would undoubtedly see with an eye belonging to the foot just as we do with an eye belonging to the head. For the substance of the soul, which is naturally suited to exercise its every operation where the organic dispositions required for this have been present, is everywhere throughout the whole body. (QNE 6.3.119ra; cf. QDA 2.19, pp. 326-7)

Buridan's extensionality principle as applied to the soul, then, is a claim about capacities of the soul conceived as remote potentialities.

B. The Subject Identity Principle. The second principle advanced by Buridan states that in nonhuman animals, "the sensitive soul is not separate in subject from the vegetative soul," but part of the same identical subject of which the vegetative soul is also a part (QDA 2.7, p. 91). In defense of this principle, Buridan notes only that it raises the question of whether there is a plurality of souls in any living thing; he claims to have answered this question in the negative in a previous discussion. This is a reference to QDA 2.4, where Buridan presents five arguments against the view that the same animal is possessed of vegetative and sensitive souls distinct not only in definition, but also in reality. The first three of

these arguments are aimed at reducing the pluralist position to absurdity. If the vegetative and sensitive souls are really distinct, Buridan argues, then:

(1) In a horse, God could separate one soul from the other, making the horse into either an animal or a plant. But then the horse would be composed of both animal and plant, which is absurd.

(2) The vegetative soul of a horse would be more noble than its sensitive soul, since the former acts on a substance through nutrition and generation, whereas the latter is merely the passive recipient of external sensible species. But this is absurd.⁶

(3) Since the sensitive souls of a dog and a horse would have the same substantial nature, they must differ in some specific, substantial form added to them. Proof: This added form will be either a soul or else some other kind of form. If the latter, then it would be less noble than the sensitive soul, which is absurd since souls are the most noble natural forms, and specific form is related to general form as act to potentiality, from which it follows that a specific form must be more noble than the general form it perfects. If the former, then that added soul would be either capable or incapable of cognition. If incapable, it would be less noble than the sensitive soul, which is absurd. But if it is capable of cognition, it will cognize as either a sensitive or intellective power. Since a horse or dog cannot understand, however, it must be sensitive—but then it would not be distinct from the sensitive soul it supposedly differentiates, which is absurd.

Buridan's fourth argument proceeds to attack the pluralist claim that though really distinct, the vegetative or sensitive souls found in different creatures are specifically the same:

(4) If the vegetative soul had the same nature in human beings, horses, and fish, then it would nourish in the same way,

⁶ The nobility of agency over passivity is likewise invoked in an argument on the negative side of *QDA* 3.1, which asks, Is the human intellect a passive power as regards what is intelligible? "Again, it follows that the vegetative power would be more noble than the intellect, which is false. The consequence is obvious, because (1) it is active in relation to its object; (2) acting is more noble than being acted upon; and (3) that action must be judged more noble whose act is more noble"; *QDA* 3.1.

and produce similar flesh and similar limbs in those creatures possessing it, which is plainly false.

In his final argument, Buridan points to what he regards as the main problem with the pluralist position. Although we must argue to the specific diversity of substantial forms on the basis of a diversity in operations, he says, "one does not argue to a diversity of substantial forms on the basis of any specific diversity in operations at all" (*QDA* 2.4, p. 54). That is so for this reason:

(5) Not every operational diversity is attributable to specific difference. Thus, we do not argue from diverse operations in the intellect (for example understanding, willing, apprehending), in the vegetative souls of plants (for example, nourishment, growth, foliation, bearing fruit), or even from diversity in the natural dispositions of elements (for example, the cooling and moistening capacities of water), to diversity of substantial forms.

On Buridan's view, the pluralists' mistake lies in always inferring substantial from operational diversity, when not every operational diversity is attributable to specific difference. Buridan himself regards operational diversity as an *indicator* of substantial diversity, but his inferences are constrained by the more fundamental metaphysical principle that forms of a superior degree and greater actuality subsume, in their more noble operations, the operations of lesser forms—in the way that a mixture is said to retain the qualities and capacities of its predominant elements (*QDA* 2.4, pp. 54–5).⁷ The soul-body inherence relation is thus not many-one but one-one, since one soul can have a variety of operations, some of which are more noble than others.

Although Buridan is surely following Aristotle on the question of how many relata are on the soul side of each soul-body relation,⁸ he is also motivated by considerations of parsimony. In the corresponding question in his *QDA* 3 treatment of the intellective soul,⁹

⁷ Cf. *QDA* 3.3, p. 24; *Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo*, ed. Ernest Addison Moody (Cambridge: Medieval Academy of America, 1942), 1.7, pp. 31–5.

⁸ See *De anima* 414b24–415a14; cf. *De anima* 3.12–13.

⁹ *QDA* 3.17 asks, Is there a single intellective soul in a human being distinct from the sensitive soul? (p. 189). Buridan's arguments in *QDA* 3.17 are heavily dependent upon *QDA* 2.4, referring to the latter question on at least five different occasions.

he reasserts the subject identity principle on the grounds that "it would be pointless to posit more than one soul if everything could be explained by just one" (*QDA* 3.17, p. 192).¹⁰ One consequence of this is that language improperly implying the existence of a plurality of souls needs to be reformulated so that "the soul is said to be intellective to the extent that it is naturally suited to understand [*anima dicitur intellectiva secundum quod innata est intelligere*], sensitive to the extent that it is naturally suited to sense, vegetative to the extent that it is naturally suited to nourish, and locally motive to the extent that it is naturally suited to move a body locally" (*QDA* 3.17; pp. 192-3). Likewise, Buridan finds that language used to refer to animate capacities must be carefully interpreted so as to avoid falling into the pluralist trap of assuming that distinct capacities inhere in really distinct essences or natures. Thus,

we say that Brunellus is Brunellus and horse and animal and living thing and body through his same essence and nature. And when we say that sensitive being [*esse sensitivum*] is in Brunellus through his nature as an animal and not as a living thing, we understand by this that "An animal is sensitive" is true *per se* and in the first instance, and not "A living thing is sensitive." So that an essential or first predication of terms is understood by "being in something in itself" [*in esse secundum quod ipsum*], either immediately or of this kind, just as "multiplication" is expounded in many ways. So that [that is, the latter] expression was not about real inherence [*non erat de reali inherencia*]. (*QDA* 2.4, p. 56)

Buridan accordingly concedes that there is an order of predication between the various natural capacities of the soul and the soul itself conceived as sensitive, moving, living, and so on, but denies that such distinctions are ontologically significant in the sense that they entitle us to posit distinct entities. This is for the straightforwardly nominalistic reason that merely predicational distinctions do not make real distinctions.

What is the basis, though, for this definitional or predicational sense in which the various powers of a single soul may be said to

¹⁰ "Frustra ponerentur plures animae si omnes possent salvari per unicum." Cf. *QNE* VI.3.118va: "And if this kind of predication [that is, of absolute terms] can be preserved of him [God] without anything added to him, it could also be preserved in other things, because it will be otiose to posit a relation in matter, in the soul, or in any other principle at all, other than a soul added to its foundation."

be distinct from each other? The final two principles advanced in QDA 2.7 are intended to answer this question.

C. *The Definitional Distinction Principle.* Founded upon Aristotle's assertion that the various parts of the soul, though incapable of existing separately, remain distinct in definition,¹¹ Buridan's third principle is presented as a claim about how we are to understand the terms "vegetative," "sensitive," and so on: "Aristotle's second conclusion is that the names 'sensitive' and 'vegetative' attributed to a horse are not synonymous, but differ in definition, because there is one definition according to which we understand the soul to be the principle of sensation and according to which it is called sensitive, and another according to which we understand the soul to be the principle of nutrition, and according to which it is called nutritive, and so on for the other [definitions]" (QDA 2.7, p. 91). Buridan argues that although the powers of the soul are not really distinct,¹² we do impose different names (for example, "sense," "intellect," "vegetative soul") to signify them as diverse operations, in accordance with the principle that active and passive potentialities take their proper denomination from their operations (QDA 2.5, pp. 64, 66).¹³ Such powers are said to be distinct in reason or distinct

¹¹ See *De anima* 413b29.

¹² Notice, however, that the mediating qualitative dispositions or instrumental potentialities through which the soul exercises its operations (discussed in connection with the extensionality thesis above) are really distinct from each other. The reason is that dispositions of this sort inhere in physical organs, from which it follows that, for example, an animal's eyes must be really and not merely conceptually distinct from its ears or nose (as is obvious). See QDA 2.5, pp. 64-7; QNE 6.3.118vb.

¹³ Buridan employs a parallel concept, "denomination by the much more principal part" (*denominatio a parte valde principaliori*), for substance terms. Thus, he argues that despite the change in Socrates' bodily parts over time, Socrates remains the same in the sense that his most principal part, namely, his soul, persists without material or substantial change; *Ioannis Buridani subtilissime quaestiones super octo physicorum libros Aristotelis* (Paris: 1509; reprinted as *Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik* [Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1964]), 1.10.13vb; QDA 2.7, pp. 100-1. Cf. QDA 3.11, p. 125; 3.20, p. 217.

For the imposition of different names to correspond to the different ways of understanding a thing, cf. *Sophismata* 4, in T. K. Scott, Jr., *Sophisms on Meaning and Truth* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), 126 (the Latin text is in *Ioannis Buridani Sophismata*, ed. T. K. Scott, Jr. [Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog, 1977], 73-4): "For since I can understand the same thing in many different ways [*secundum multas diversas rationes*], and, corresponding to these diverse ways, impose different names on it to

in definition, since their names signify the same thing "according to different natures [*secundum diversas rationes*]" (QDA 2.5, pp. 63-4).¹⁴

A definition, says Buridan, "must explicate the concept of the defined term" (QNE 6.3.118vb). Still, the concepts of defined terms may differ while still suppositing for, or referring to, the same thing:

I say that the same thing is conceived by exceedingly different concepts, either because of the different properties found in it, or because of [their] diverse connotation (whether extrinsic or inhering in it). For this reason, the same thing is properly signified by names belonging to the ten categories. And so it appears that concepts still possess an original distinction on the part of the things signified, though not always on the part of the things which they signify, or for which they supposit, but more often on the part of [their] connotation.¹⁵

The possibility of terms such as "vegetative soul" and "sensitive soul" having different supposits or referents is ruled out by the subject identity principle. As Buridan states, "I believe . . . that the soul in a horse is singular, and that there is no vegetative soul in it distinct [that is, really distinct] from the sensitive soul, nor sensitive soul distinct from the vegetative" (QDA 2.4, p. 48). The expressions "vegetative soul" and "sensitive soul" are therefore connotative terms having the same referent (for example, horse), but making that referent known in different ways.¹⁶ Buridan's theory of connotation (often called "appellation" in propositional contexts) is an important device from an ontological standpoint. As L. M. de Rijk has suggested, it functions "to make our different modes of thinking the same thing explicit," while avoiding the danger of Platonism

signify it, therefore, such verbs cause the terms with which they occur to connote the reasons [*appellare rationes*] for which their names are imposed to signify them, and not only the external things known [*res cognitae ad extra*], as happens with other verbs." Hereafter, the Latin and English texts will be cited together.

¹⁴ Cf. QNE 6.3.118vb-199ra.

¹⁵ In *Metaphysicam Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae magistri Joannis Buridani* (Paris: 1518; reprinted as *Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik* [Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1964]); 4.1.13ra-rb.

¹⁶ Cf. William of Ockham, for whom connotative terms primarily signify what they are truly predicable of, but secondarily signify or connote, for example, the abstract concept contained in their nominal definitions. See William of Ockham, *Summa logicae* 1.10, in his *Opera Philosophica* 1, ed. P. Boehner, G. Gál, and S. Brown (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1974), 35-8.

which lies in "hypostasizing accidental features" of substances.¹⁷ In the case of the single-substance soul, the features Buridan wishes to avoid hypostasizing are not accidental but essential, namely, the definitive operations of the soul variously conceived as sensitive, living, and so on. To this end, the theory of connotation grounds the language he uses to refer to different psychological operations without committing him to the view that those operations must inhere in different things. What Buridan avoids multiplying by means of the definitional distinction principle are souls.

D. The Homogeneity Principle The final principle introduced by Buridan in *QDA* 2.7 concerns the manner rather than the mode of inherence. The homogeneity principle states that the sensitive and vegetative souls of nonhuman animals are composed of quantitative parts having the same nature [*composita ex partibus eiusdem rationis*], like the form of air. This Buridan offers as the metaphysical basis for claiming that the parts of the soul "receive the predications of the whole to the extent that they are quidditative predicates" (*QDA* 2.7, p. 93; cf. *QDA* 3.17, pp. 192–3): it is because substantial predicates apply to each quantitative part of homogenous entities that we can say that each part of air is air, each part of water is water, each part of an animal is an animal, and each part of a horse is a horse.

But in the case of the sensitive and vegetative souls, what is it, exactly, that is homogenous? The answer may be found in Buridan's discussion of the extensionality principle. The animate capacities of plants and nonhuman animals conceived as remote potentialities must be homogeneously extended throughout their entire bodies, since, as we saw above, even the foot of a horse would see but for the mediating qualitative disposition necessary for seeing. Notice,

¹⁷ L. M. de Rijk, "On Buridan's Doctrine of Connotation," in *The Logic of John Buridan: Acts of the Third European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics*, ed. Jan Pinborg (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1976), 98–9. De Rijk adds that for Buridan, connotation and appellation differ in the sense that the former (like signification) is a semantic property of terms, whereas the latter (like supposition) occurs only in propositions.

Buridan's primary discussions of connotation and appellation can be found in parts of two treatises of his *Summulae de dialectica: Tractatus de suppositionibus*, in Maria Elena Reina, "Giovanni Buridano: *Tractatus de suppositionibus*," *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 12 (1957): 343–8; and in *Sophismata* 4, in Scott, *Sophisms on Meaning and Truth*, 109–44; and *Iohannis Buridani Sophismata*, 59–89.

however, that the homogeneity thesis would be false if "animal" or "horse" were taken as signifying those dispositions or physical organs through which the soul happens to operate, since these organs are composed of heterogenous and dissimilar quantitative parts. Thus, Buridan argues that if we say that an animal "is substantially constituted by prime matter and a single substantial form not having parts substantially dissimilar and belonging to diverse natures," then the term "animal" is truly a substance term which does not signify or connote arrangements of organic matter such as we find in the eyes and ears of living things (*QDA* 2.7, p. 94).

Buridan offers two arguments on behalf of the view that the terms "animal" and "horse" are nonconnotative substantial terms by which we conceive of an animal or a horse as a composite of matter together with a single soul having homogenous parts. First, if God were to separate, *per potentiam divinam*, a matter-soul composite from the organic dispositions through which it happens to operate, and preserve it separately, only on the substantial term view could "animal" be truly predicated of the remaining composite; whereas if it were a term connotative of the qualitative dispositions through which the soul happens to operate, or of the soul conceived as an entirety, it would not be true to say of the remaining composite that it is an animal (*QDA* 2.7, p. 95). Second, in an argument originating from Aristotle's remarks about animals that can survive physical division,¹⁸ it might look as if such animals are really two or more animals: for (1) once divided, the names used to signify their parts will stand for something living, sensing, and subsisting *per se*—and everything of that sort is an animal; and (2) if the parts of an animal will be animals tomorrow, surely they are animals now (*QDA* 2.7, p. 96).¹⁹ But Buridan observes that construing "animal" as a substantial term provides an innocuous way of conceding the truth of the second consequence; for "animal" may be truly predicated both of distinct substances and distinct quantitative parts of the same substance in the primary sense that each is a body-soul composite, though not in the secondary and connotative sense that

¹⁸ See *De anima* 413b20; and note 3 above.

¹⁹ Cf. Buridan's resolution of the sophism, "You ate raw meat today," in *Sophismata* 4, in Scott, *Sophisms on Meaning and Truth*, 118–20; *Iohannis Buridani Sophismata*, 67–8.

each is a whole substance having distinct quantitative parts (*QDA* 2.7, pp. 96–7).

By way of contrast, Buridan also discusses how the terms “animal,” “horse,” and so forth function when construed as connotative rather than substantial terms. Here the homogeneity principle no longer applies, because if “animal” is connotative of the animal taken as a whole, it cannot be predicated of each of its quantitative parts prior to their actual physical division: by “whole being” Buridan understands “that which is a being and not part of another being,” and by “whole substance,” “that which is a substance and not part of another substance” (*QDA* 2.7, pp. 97–8). On this view, says Buridan, if we call the foot of a horse *A* and the rest *B*, “it is obvious that *B* is not a horse,” although it immediately becomes a horse once *A* has been cut off (*QDA* 2.7, p. 98).²⁰ The reason is that being “whole” or “part” signifies not only some thing, but also that thing’s being somehow related to something else. Thus, if the term “animal” connotes totality, Buridan concludes that one would be committing the fallacy of figure of speech by arguing, “Whatever *B* is now, it was that before,” or “*B* is now an animal; therefore, it was an animal before.” This is because *B* has changed not in what it is, but in how it is related to another thing, in this case to (what was) another integral part of the whole animal (*QDA* 2.7, pp. 98–9).

The change in truth-value of the proposition, *B* is now an animal, is rooted in an important feature of Buridan’s ontology. What kind of change would make that proposition false at one time, but true at another? There is no change in the supposition or reference of its constituent terms, since on both occasions of its utterance, the subject *B* refers to the horse minus a foot (the latter being designated as *A*), and the predicate “animal” to mobile, animate things. But there does appear to be change in what is signified secondarily or connoted by the term “animal” (recall Buridan’s assumption that

²⁰ The example presented here may have been inspired by the traditional sophism sentence, *Animal est pars animalis*, which usually introduced the same problem in terms of the relation between Socrates and Socrates’ foot. Neither this sophisma, however, nor the closely related *Totus Socrates est minor Socrate*, is discussed in Buridan’s own *Sophismata*. See Norman Kretzmann, “Syncategoremata, exponibilia, sophismata,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 231, n. 79.

"animal" is being used here as a connotative and nonsubstantial term). This is because "animal" connotes a mobile, animate thing taken as a whole, and that connotation fails in the first instance, that is, when *A* is still joined to *B*. One must be careful, though, since no *thing* either comes into or passes out of existence as a result of this change: "*B* is now an animal" is true in the second instance only because of a change in the way *B* is related to something external to it. The question this raises for nominalists such as Buridan is how to explain changes in truth value that do not arise from the generation or corruption of anything, but merely from relational changes. If we assume that the world is austere furnished to begin with, how are we best to describe subsequent rearrangements of the furniture?

As Calvin Normore has argued, Buridan resolves this problem by embracing realism about modes, which are qualities or accidents that define not what a thing is, but how it is.²¹ Such relational changes are regarded as sufficient to ground changes in connotation. Buridan notes, for example, that relational terms may connote "another thing" either inherent in, or extrinsic to, the things for which they supposit:

Sometimes it happens that a relative concrete term not only signifies or connotes the thing for which it supposits, and the thing to which the comparison is being made, but also connotes another thing either inhering in some [one] of them, or perhaps sometimes extrinsic to them. For example, if I say, "Socrates is similar to Plato," the term "similar" not only signifies and connotes Socrates and Plato, but also connotes the quality according to which he is similar to him. And so if I say, "Socrates is equal to Plato," the term "equal" connotes, besides Socrates and Plato, their magnitude. And if I say, "Whiteness inheres in a stone" or "Form inheres in matter," then the word "inheres" connotes the disposition added apart from the form and the matter, namely, the inseparability [of this disposition], as was stated in another [that is, the immediately previous] question. Likewise, if I say, "Socrates is at a distance from Plato," the term "is at a distance" connotes another thing apart from Socrates and Plato and extrinsic to Socrates and Plato, namely, the intermediate dimension by which Socrates is at a distance from Plato.²²

²¹ Calvin Normore, "Buridan's Ontology," in *How Things Are: Studies in Predication and the History and Philosophy of Science*, ed. James Bogen and James E. McGuire (Boston: Reidel, 1985), 198–9.

²² In *Metaphysicam Aristotelis* 5.9.32va. Cf. 5.8.31rb–33ra (actually 32ra).

Although the proposition "*B* is now an animal" contains no relational terms, Buridan's assumption that "animal" functions in it connotatively suggests that we have in the above discussion the right model for understanding its change in truth-value. Thus, the term "animal" may be said to signify an animate, mobile thing, but also to connote it *in some way*, namely, as a whole. What it connotes is the spatial continuity of its integral parts, something which Buridan, oddly enough, takes to be extrinsic to the thing possessing it.

Buridan's unusual conception of spatial continuity is best explained, I think, by another passage in which he says that there are three ways in which "something, while remaining the same, is able to be differently disposed, such that contradictory predicates are verified at different times of it, that is, of the term suppositing for it, or such that the same predicate would be affirmed and denied at different times of that term."²³ Only one of these three ways could apply to "*B* is now an animal," however, and that is the first, which Buridan describes as follows:

The first way is, if the predicate is connotative of something extrinsic to it [*sit connotativum alicuius extrinseci*], then it is possible for that to happen on account of the existence or nonexistence, or on account of another change, of the extrinsic thing. For example, a man is a father if his son exists, and without him existing, he is not a father. And a man is rich if riches are joined to him [*si sunt divitiae sibi applicatae*], and poor if they are lost or joined to another. And body *A* is next to body *B* if there is no other body or space between them, and it is remote or more remote if there is a lesser or greater body between them. And to be differently disposed on account of another in this way does not require any change in it or in its parts.²⁴

²³ *Super octo physicorum libros* 2.1.31ra. The proposition "*B* is now an animal" obviously fits into the latter category, since the predicate "is now an animal" is first denied and later affirmed of *B*, a subject that is itself unchanging.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.1.31ra-rb. Neither of the two other ways mentioned by Buridan could apply to the case of "*B* is now a horse." The second way is intended to cover predicates connoting "the situation [*situm*] of the parts of the thing in relation to each other," and specifically the differing dispositions which result from the internal local motion of the parts of a thing, such that "there is nothing else afterwards which was not there before, and also nothing before which was not afterwards." But none of the examples Buridan gives in this connection—Socrates first sitting and then standing, a spherical object becoming cubical—involves any gain or loss of integral parts. Likewise, the third way applies to predicates connoting qualities which are actually generated or corrupted at different times in a thing, such as whiteness in Socrates. For further discussion of these ways or modes, see Normore, "Buridan's Ontology."

The spatial continuity of the integral parts of an animal, that is, the fact that there is no other body between them, is the extrinsic how or mode connoted by the term "animal." That connotation fails for "*B* is now an animal" as long as *B* remains spatially continuous with *A*, because the term "animal" connotes the spatial continuity of the integral parts of its referent. Once *A* has been physically separated from *B*, however—that is, once there is some "body or space between them"—the connotation holds, since *A* is no longer one of the spatially continuous parts of the animal. The conclusion Buridan reaches in *QDA* 2.7 is that although *B* "is not different than it was before, it is differently disposed, for being 'whole' or 'partial' not only signifies being something, but also being disposed or not disposed in some way to another thing" (*QDA* 2.7, p. 98).

E. Summary. Buridan's account of how nonhuman souls inhere in their bodies is given in terms of four metaphysical principles: (1) the extensionality principle, which states that material souls, be they vegetative, sensitive, or appetitive, are extended throughout the entire body of animals and plants; (2) the subject identity principle, which states that the various 'souls' we attribute to the same animal are actually just different powers belonging to a single soul inhering in a single body; (3) the definitional distinction principle, which contends that the terms which are supposed to reflect such differences in psychological operations (for example, "sensitive soul," "living thing") must be understood connotatively, that is, as making the same referent known in different ways; and (4) the homogeneity principle, which states that material souls are composed of quantitative parts having the same nature and existing continuously with the body, though not identical with its particular material arrangements. We may call the conjunction of (1)–(4) Buridan's *materialist* theory of psychological inherence.²⁵

²⁵ If we were to put a contemporary label on it, we might say that Buridan's materialism has more in common with functionalism than, say, with mind-brain identity theory. For as we saw in his discussion of the extensionality principle, Buridan identifies the souls of plants and non-human animals with the conjunction of their animate powers, rather than with the particular organs or material dispositions through which those powers happen to operate.

II

Human Souls. In *QDA* 3.17, Buridan likens the metaphysical proximity of human souls to their bodies to the way in which God is said to be present to the world:

I imagine that just as God is present to the whole world [*assistit toti mundo*] and to each of its parts principally and immediately, so in a certain way is the human soul immediately present to the whole human body. And yet there would be a difference, since God is not a form inhering in the world, but the human soul informs the human body and inheres in it. (*QDA* 3.17, p. 192)²⁶

At the risk of explaining the obscure by the more obscure, Buridan does make the point here that the human soul-body relation presents a special problem. Besides being "immediately present" to it, how is it that an immaterial and indivisible whole actually inheres in a material and divisible whole?

Buridan's broad strategy for solving this problem is to appeal to the medieval distinction between being definitively in a place and circumscriptively in a place.²⁷ According to this distinction, the intellective soul of a human being would be said to inhere definitively but not circumscriptively in its body, that is, such that it is present to its body whole in whole and whole in part, rather than whole in whole and part in part.²⁸ The latter is the mode of inherence exhibited by material forms such as the sensitive souls of nonhuman animals and the vegetative souls of plants.

But positing a distinct mode of being in a place offers only a starting point for Buridan's dualist account of psychological

²⁶ There is an uncanny similarity between this passage and another, much earlier passage in which Buridan is reporting the opinion of Averroes. In fact, the only real difference between them is that Buridan asserts, whereas Averroes denies, the actual inherence of the human soul in the human body: "He [Averroes] imagines that just as God is present without distance to the entire world and to each part of it, and yet not inherent in the world or in any part of it, so the intellect is related to human beings, namely, [in such a way] that it inheres in none of them, but is present without distance to each [*cuiuslibet indistanter assistit*], even though it is indivisible"; *QDA* 3.3, p. 22.

²⁷ The distinction is also used by both Duns Scotus and Ockham to explain the doctrine of transubstantiation. For discussion of this, see Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 186–201.

²⁸ "Our soul is something that exists indivisibly in the entire body and in each part of it"; *QNE* 6.6.143rb.

inherence, because he also wishes to assert the subject identity and definitional distinction principles with respect to the intellectual soul, and he obviously cannot do this by presenting them in a package along with the extensionality and homogeneity principles.²⁹ The more specific aim of his dualist theory is therefore to explain how it is possible for a single immaterial substance possessing different powers to inhere in a single physical body.

Buridan outlines his view in reply to Averroes' argument that it is impossible for indivisibles, such as the human intellect, to inhere in divisible subjects, such as the human body. This argument "can be set out deductively," he says, in three steps:³⁰ (1) If an indivisible existing intellect inheres in a divisible body, then it must inhere either (a) in each part of that body, or (b) in some part of that body and not another. (2) It cannot inhere in one part and not in another, because then "it could not be consistently attributed to each part and quantity" of that body (not [1b]). (3) Likewise, it cannot inhere in each part of that body, since as an indivisible, it will have to be taken as a whole (not [1a]). Because it is inconsistent with the requirement that the intellective soul be predicable of each part of its material subject, (1b) is rejected.³¹ Buridan is more interested in (1a), however, since it was the rejection of that premise that led Averroes to conclude that the immaterial part of the intellect is transcendent.

Why does Averroes resist the idea that an immaterial soul could inhere as a whole in each part of its body? Buridan suggests that the immanent dualist conception of inherence gives rise to a number of seeming absurdities:³²

(A1) The same thing would as a whole be moved and at rest simultaneously. Proof: if your foot is at rest and your hand is

²⁹ The subject identity and definitional distinction principles are asserted with respect to the human intellect in *QDA* 3.17, pp. 191-6.

³⁰ See *QDA* 3.4, p. 30.

³¹ For Buridan, this follows from the assumption that indivisible animate forms such as the intellective soul are definitively rather than circumscriptively present in the bodies in which they inhere. The sensitive and vegetative souls are also predicable of each part of their material subjects, but for a different reason: the homogeneity principle guarantees the equal attribution of divisible animate forms to each part of the bodies in which they inhere, so that the integral parts of material things also "receive the predications of the whole to the extent that they are quidditative predicates"; *QDA* 2.7, p. 93. Cf. *QDA* 3.17, pp. 192-3.

³² See *QDA* 3.4, pp. 30-1.

moving, your soul would be moved as a whole with the motion of your hand, and at rest as a whole with your resting foot.

(A2) The same thing would as an entirety be moved by contrary motions simultaneously. Proof: if you move one hand to the left and the other to the right, your soul would be at a distance from itself, which is impossible.

(A3) Your foot would understand, because the intellect would be present in it as a whole. Proof: the principal operation of the intellect is to understand, and your intellect as a whole is present in your foot.

(A4) Your foot would be a human being, because the human substantial form would be present in it as a whole. Proof: the intellect is the substantial form of the whole human being, and your intellect as a whole is present in your foot.

(A5) Substantial forms would travel from subject to subject as the parts of a body change. Proof: the intellect as substantial form is present in each part of the body, but some of these parts can come to be or pass away without the corruption of their original subject.

Buridan rejects, however, Averroes' conclusion that the human intellective soul can only be a transcendent substance, firmly asserting the contrary thesis that "your intellect, by which you understand, inheres in your body or your matter" (*QDA* 3.4, p. 31). This obligates him to reply to (A1)–(A5).³³

In response to (A1), Buridan points out that although the intellect is moved in the hand and at rest in the foot simultaneously, "this is not a contradiction," because "those motions do not inhere in it, nor are they commensurably related to it" (*QDA* 3.4, pp. 35–6). As a model for the way in which human intellects are related to their bodies, Buridan appeals to the doctrine of real presence in the Eucharist:

³³ Buridan actually begins by offering four "naturalistic" *reductio* arguments against Averroes, but these tend to gainsay rather than directly refute the Commentator's position (*QDA* 3.4, pp. 32–4). Briefly, Buridan argues that a transcendent intellect would exist extrinsically to the substance it supposedly informs, and could not be numerically many (contrary to the evidence of experience). Hence he argues that it must be unique (likewise contrary to experience), and finally that it would exist before you do, even though it is in a sense your transcendent intellect.

When it is said that it [the intellect] is moved by contrary motions, we can speak of this just as we speak of the body of Christ in the consecrated host when one priest carries the body of Christ to the right and another to the left. For the body of Christ is neither moved in itself, nor by a motion inhering in it, just as the size of the host does not inhere in it. (QDA 3.4, p. 35)

Buridan assumes here that there are two kinds of inherence relation: "real" inherence or inherence proper, the relata of which are commensurably related to each other;³⁴ and definitive inherence, the relata of which are noncommensurably related. The commensurability of properly inherent relata follows from their mutual, finite extension: one thing commensurably inheres in another just in case both are extended; otherwise, their mode of inherence is noncommensurable. Immaterial substances such as the intellectual soul would therefore be present in extended bodies in accordance with the second, noncommensurable, mode of inherence.

The notion of noncommensurable or definitive inherence is further discussed in Buridan's reply to (A2). The Real Presence again provides the explanatory model, this time for understanding how a noncommensurably inherent substance could be in two places at once:

To the second counter-instance, it is said that [the intellect] is not at a distance from itself [*non distat a se*] because it is not in the hand or foot commensurably [*commensurabiliter*], since it is not extended by the extension of the hand or foot. And it is not absurd for the same thing to be noncommensurably and wholly in different places at a distance from each other, although this would be by supernatural means, as the body of Christ is simultaneously in paradise and on the altar (for the body of Christ in the host on the altar is not commensurate with the magnitude of the host, but [as a whole] in each part of the host, even if the parts are at a distance from each other—and it is not on that account at a distance from itself). And so in the same way, the intellect is somehow in the hand and foot, and in neither commensurably, since it is not extended in any of those members. (QDA 3.4, p. 36)

Following his reply to (A1), Buridan's reply to (A2) makes use of the fact that noncommensurably inherent forms cannot be moved in conjunction with the motions of any commensurable part(s) of their material subjects. Inherent forms can be moved only if they are part in part present in their subjects.

³⁴ For the term "real inherence," see QDA 2.4, p. 28, quoted in section I above.

Buridan replies to the worries in (A3) about a foot becoming an understanding thing, or even becoming a human being (in [A4]), by examining the logic of the terms "total" (*totale*) and "partial" (*partiale*). If the phrase, "total understanding" (*totale intelligens*), is properly expounded as "that which is not part of another understanding," he says, a foot cannot be called a total understanding because it is part of another whole understanding, namely, the human being (*QDA* 3.4, p. 36). Likewise, nothing is called a human being "in familiar and ordinary speech except the whole substance, that is, that which is not part of another substance" (*QDA* 3.4, p. 36). The Averroists' mistake in (A3)–(A4) is to multiply substances by the (infinite) number of divisible parts belonging to their material subjects, rather than by each of those subjects taken as a whole. But it does not follow from the assumption that the intellect is whole in each part of the human body that each part of the human body is a whole intellect. That would be the fallacy of division.

The final Averroist argument, (A5), claims that substantial forms wholly present in each part of their material subjects would migrate from subject to subject as the extended parts of their bodies change (the souls of blood donors, for example, would come to exist in the bodies of their recipients). Buridan replies by pursuing the suggestion in his reply to (A2) that noncommensurable inherence has a supernatural cause:

It will be said that the way in which the intellect inheres in the human body is not natural but supernatural. And it is certain that God could supernaturally not only form something not derived from a material potentiality, but also separate what has been so derived from its matter, conserve it separately, and place it in some other matter. Why, then, would this not be possible as regards the human intellect? (*QDA* 3.4, p. 37)

In other words, because supernaturally inherent forms such as the human intellect are not subject to material change, they are not themselves divided when the extended parts of their bodies are divided. Rhetorical questions aside (Why *wouldn't* this be possible as regards the human intellect?), it is puzzling to find Buridan pinning such a crucial metaphysical doctrine on divine omnipotence.³⁵ But the picture is more complex than first appears.

³⁵ Buridan also appeals to supernatural causes to explain the numerical diversity of human intellects in *QDA* 3.5, p. 44.

Buridan's reply to (A5) actually contains two claims: first, non-commensurable inherence is not a natural state of affairs, meaning that it cannot be explained by appealing to the same principles which govern the inherence of material forms; and second, there is nothing contradictory in supposing that God could create an indivisible, unextended substance and put it in matter. Buridan is making the subtle but important point here that although no naturalistic model can explain how human souls inhere in their bodies, we have no *a priori* reason for supposing that only naturalistic models need apply. This is really a claim about where a theory of noncommensurable or definitive inherence should begin, rather than some *ad hoc* appeal to the miraculous. In the case of human souls and their bodies, Buridan is very clear about the *explanandum*:

[There is] the truth of our faith, which we must firmly believe: namely, that the human intellect is the substantial form of a body inhering in the human body, but not derived from a material potentiality, nor materially extended, and so not naturally produced or corrupted; and yet it is not absolutely everlasting, since it was created in time. Nevertheless, it is sempiternal hereafter [*sempiterna a parte post*] in such a way that it will never be corrupted or annihilated, although God could annihilate it by his absolute power. (QDA 3.3, pp. 22-3)

Again, since the human soul is not an extended or material thing, neither the extensionality principle nor the homogeneity principle can explain its mode of inherence in the human body. Some other principle or principles must be found to support the view that the various powers of the human soul are one in subject and yet distinct in definition.

Now that we know where to begin, what about the *explanans* of noncommensurable inherence? Here Buridan is less forthcoming, for two, not unrelated, reasons. First, he is generally wary of encroaching on territory outside the traditional domain of an Arts Master, often mentioning his reluctance to treat a question because it would be more properly addressed by theologians.³⁶ Given

³⁶ One cannot avoid being struck by the number of times Buridan makes this concession in his writings. In psychology, it figures in his discussions of both the sense in which the human intellect is everlasting; and the possibility of cognition after death and in a disembodied state; QDA 3.6, pp. 53-4; 3.15, p. 173. Still, Buridan's expressions of deference to theologians more often than not accompany, rather than replace, his own treatments of so-called matters of faith. See *In Metaphysicam Ar-*

Buridan's belief that noncommensurable inherence should be understood on the model of real presence in the Eucharist, it is not easy to see how any philosophical discussion of the former could avoid becoming embroiled in the theological controversy surrounding the latter.³⁷ Second, perhaps also because he was an Arts Master, Buridan sees natural philosophy (including psychology) as committed to naturalistic explanation, which for him requires the construction of demonstrative arguments based on evident premises. Where such arguments are lacking, he is inclined to indicate their absence and leave it at that, rather than to engage in a priori metaphysical speculation.

He takes a similar approach to the question of the human soul's status as an immaterial form:

Although this thesis [that the human intellect is not a material form] is absolutely true, and must be firmly maintained by faith, and although the arguments adduced for it are readily believable [*probabiles*], nevertheless, it is not apparent to me that they are demonstrative, [drawn] from principles having evidentness [*evidentiam habentibus*] (leaving the faith aside), unless God with a grace that is special and outside the usual course of nature could make it evident to us, just as he could make evident to anyone the article of the Trinity or the Incarnation. (*QDA* 3.4, pp. 25–6)

Buridan's point here is that since the immateriality of the human intellect is not evident to us, or apparent to our senses, we are in no position to construct empirical arguments about it. God could, of course, make such truths evident to us directly and nonempirically, but then our *scientia* would not be natural, but revealed.³⁸

All of this leaves Buridan with little to say when it comes to explaining how the various powers of the human soul are

istotelis 6.5.37ra (on divine foreknowledge); *Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo* 1.20, p. 93 (on the existence of a body beyond the heavens); *Super octo physicorum libros* 4.8.73vb–74ra (on the possibility of a vacuum); and *Super octo physicorum libros* 8.12.121ra (on the thesis that God sets each of the celestial bodies in motion directly, with an impressed force or impetus): "I state this not as an assertion [*assertive*], but in order to seek from divine theologians what they would teach me about these matters [and] how they can occur."

³⁷ For an illuminating discussion of the theological controversy in relation to Ockham, see Adams, *William Ockham*, 186–201.

³⁸ Buridan elsewhere allows that there are theological arguments concerning the nature of the soul (for example, that Christ assumed a "complete and entire humanity," including a sensitive soul), but he says that these produce a "great faith" in him, rather than knowledge; *QDA* 3.17, p. 192.

attributable to a single, unitary subject. Though he argues for this thesis, he does so, as we saw above, on the grounds that it would be pointless to imagine a plurality of souls inhering in a human being when operations such as nutrition, sensation, and understanding can all be attributed to just one.³⁹ Thus, one and the same human soul may be called "sensitive to the extent that it has been naturally suited to sense," although unlike the sensitive souls of nonhuman animals, the human sensitive power is neither extended nor naturally generated. Rather, it is said to "inform" corporeal and extended matter through an act that "coexists" with the material dispositions of sense organs. The human sensitive soul can thereby remain incorruptible, even if "the corporeal dispositions required for sensing naturally are corrupted" (*QDA* 3.17, p. 193).

If the human sensitive soul cannot be both incorruptible and extended, however, it also follows from Buridan's account that, except for purely material similarities in the organs through which humans and nonhuman animals operate, sensation in human beings will differ specifically from sensation in nonhuman animals. This will give rise to a certain discontinuity between the two accounts, since our understanding of the internal causes of, say, equine vision will not apply to human vision. Buridan acknowledges this problem and reflects on it:

It is certainly true that there is a great difficulty if we posit just one soul in a human being, for it must be intellectual and indivisible, not extended in any way by the extension of matter or subject. And then that unextended soul is [also] a sensitive and vegetative soul. How, then—since sensation is supposed to be materially extended in organs—could it be inherent in an indivisible subject and, as it were, derived from its potentiality? This seems to be miraculous [*hoc videtur mirabile*], since the only extension form has is extension in its subject. And how could a divisible and extended thing inhere in an indivisible and unextended thing? This seems to be miraculous. And I reply with certainty that it is miraculous, because the human soul inheres in the human body in a miraculous and supernatural way, neither extended nor derived from the potentiality of the subject in which it inheres. And yet it also inheres in the whole body and in each part of it. This is truly miraculous and supernatural. (*QDA* 2.9, p. 138)

To modern ears, this passage has an unfortunate ring. It strikes us as a capitulation: a philosopher giving up the game because he

³⁹ See note 10 above.

believes that his subject matter is beyond rational comprehension. Seen in the context of his other remarks about psychological inherence, however, Buridan's claim in the above passage is in fact much more limited. Recall his suggestion above that God could, if He wished, make the immateriality of the human intellect evident to us outside the common course of nature. Buridan is not suggesting here that the inherence of the human soul is utterly inexplicable, but only that it cannot be explained naturalistically; that is, with demonstrative arguments based on premises whose truth is apparent to our senses.⁴⁰ He is making only a negative claim about the failure of empirical knowledge in a certain field of inquiry. His remarks do not entail that some a priori mode of knowing might not reveal to us the principle governing the human soul's inherence in its body, though, again, he does not speculate about this. His conception of the miraculous is likewise not absolute, but relative to the epistemic situation of human beings. Thus, when he calls the inherence of the human soul in its body miraculous, he has in mind nothing like the Humean conception according to which miracles are violations or transgressions of the laws of nature, but something more in the spirit of Augustine's remark that a miraculous event "does not occur contrary to nature, but contrary to what is known of nature."⁴¹ I suggest that substituting "outside the common course of nature" for each occurrence of "supernatural," and "not empirically evident" for "miraculous" would provide a reading of the above passage which, though a bit awkward, better reflects Buridan's thinking on the question.

⁴⁰ Cf. *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis* 12.9, where Buridan explores possible relationships between the number of celestial motions and the number of the intelligences: "And another conclusion is posited: that there are many more separate substances than celestial spheres or celestial motions, namely, great legions of angels. But those [legions] cannot be proved with demonstrative arguments arising from what has been sensed [*ista probari non possunt rationibus demonstrativis habentibus ortum ex sensatis*]"; 12.9.73ra.

⁴¹ See David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 10.1; and Augustine, *City of God*, 21.8. A useful overview of medieval strategies for explaining *mirabilia* is provided by Bert Hansen, *Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature* (Toronto: PIMS, 1985), 50–73. For discussion of the epistemic consequences of Buridan's conception of the miraculous, see my "Buridan and Skepticism," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 31 (April 1993): 21–50.

III

Conclusion. Buridan's hybrid solution to the problem of psychological inherence consists, on the one hand, of a materialist explanation of the relation between nonhuman animal or plant souls and their bodies, and, on the other, of an immanent dualist explanation of the human soul-body relation. In both cases he contends that the various animate functions of a living thing belong to one and the same subject (the subject identity principle), and that such functions are distinct from each other not really but only in definition (the definitional distinction principle). The main difference between his two accounts consists in his assertions that nonhuman souls are extended throughout their bodies (the extensionality principle), and have the same physical nature in each part (the homogeneity principle). The latter two principles do not apply to human intellective souls, which lack extension and hence also integral parts. The human soul is, on the contrary, noncommensurably or definitively present in the body in which it inheres.

Buridan sees psychology as a naturalistic endeavor, concerned with the construction of arguments based on empirically evident premises. This approach has its shortcomings, however, as a means of defending the immanent dualist side of his theory. Buridan appeals to the notion of noncommensurable or definitive inherence in order to avoid Averroes' conclusion that indivisible human souls cannot actually inhere in divisible human bodies. But no naturalistic explanation seems possible for a mode of inherence that is, by his own admission, caused outside the common or usual course of nature. The result is that while Buridan is able to block the Averroist *reductio* argument that an inherent soul would be moved as an entirety by simultaneous contrary motions, he does so at the significant cost of moving part of his theory beyond the scope of his own explanatory methodology. Understanding the precise relation between the human soul and its body turns out to be a matter best left to theologians, who use the notion of noncommensurable inherence to explain the Real Presence of Christ in the consecrated bread and wine of the Eucharist.

Buridan is well aware of the lack of empirical evidence for dualism, though he does not reach what seems to be the consensus view in contemporary philosophy of mind that dualism is empirically false. Rather, he treats what little evidence is available to him

concerning the human soul-body relation as insufficient to establish the truth about that relation's nature. His own conclusion about the nature of this relation is hardly agnostic, of course, but he openly admits that it is not founded upon anything observable in the common course of nature. In that sense, at least, Buridan was a naturalist who understood the limits of naturalistic explanation.⁴²

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⁴² An abridged version of this paper was read at a session on cognitive science in the fourteenth century at the Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, May 1992. I would like to thank Marilyn Adams, Jenny Ashworth, and Calvin Normore for their helpful comments and suggestions.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

MATTHEW CUDDEBACK AND STAFF

BLONDEL, Eric. *Nietzsche: The Body and Culture*. Translated by Seán Hand. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991. 353 pp. Cloth, 39.50; paper, 14.95—Friedrich Nietzsche is generally received as a clever critic of metaphysics who nevertheless remained hopelessly entangled in the metaphysical tradition he sought to challenge. As a consequence perhaps of Heidegger's influential designation of Nietzsche as the "last metaphysician of the West," scholars have for the most part treated Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics as provocative and entertaining, but ultimately unsuccessful. In his important study of 1987, Eric Blondel attempts to recuperate and defend Nietzsche's immanent critique of metaphysics. The key to Blondel's interpretation is his attention to the body as the central focus of Nietzsche's philosophy. For Blondel as for Nietzsche, the body stands for the "other" of metaphysics: flux, appearance, becoming, excess, incontinence, and difference. Any attempt to fix or define or stabilize the body necessarily involves its relapse into the procrustean bed of metaphysics. The central question of Nietzsche's philosophy thus becomes, How can we speak of the body without thereby violating it? According to Blondel, Nietzsche realized that a discursive account of the body is both necessary—lest philosophy degenerate into an idle exercise—and yet impossible to articulate without recourse to the suffocating categories of metaphysics.

Blondel proposes an ingenious solution to this dilemma: Nietzsche deploys a metaphorical "para-discourse" that enables him to "unsay or retract what he says" (p. 248), thus allowing him to speak within metaphysics about the body. Blondel thus presents a Nietzsche who self-consciously labored within a metaphysical tradition he knew he could neither escape nor overcome. Nietzsche consequently limits his critique of metaphysics to a proliferating series of carefully executed experiments; he is content "merely" to orchestrate this immanent challenge rather than to pursue it to some dialectical conclusion. Blondel thus locates the affirmative moment of Nietzsche's philosophy

* Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

in the text itself, which, via metaphor, both "produces and sub-verts its signifieds" (p. 29).

Blondel concentrates on the cluster of physiological metaphors whereby Nietzsche figures as texts both the body and, by extension, culture. Blondel thus presents Nietzschean genealogy as a symptomatological attempt to interpret culture as a "bodily economy," that is, in terms of its health or decay. Because Nietzsche relies so heavily on metaphor to convey his genealogies, he minimizes the risk that they might reify the body and culture as metaphysical entities. Of course, this metaphor-intensive "para-discourse" also compromises the validity and explanatory power of Nietzsche's genealogy of culture. But this is a price that Blondel believes Nietzsche was willing to pay in order to raise the question of the body.

Blondel's command of Nietzsche's writings is indeed impressive; he supplies a wealth of textual evidence in support of virtually every interpretative point he makes. At times, however, I found the excessive citation of texts a distraction from the argument of the book as a whole. For example, it is not unusual for Blondel to devote entire pages to the documentation of textual evidence; chapter 8 alone contains four hundred forty-six footnotes. While Blondel's book would have benefitted immensely from the guidance of a stronger editorial hand, it is nevertheless an important and insightful contribution to the growing secondary literature on Nietzsche's philosophical methods and styles.—Daniel W. Conway, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

BERNSTEIN, Richard J. *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. Cloth, \$35.00; paper, \$15.95—This book consists of ten chapters, an Introduction, and an Appendix. Of these twelve sections, eight have appeared previously. Although in the Acknowledgments he writes that "the essays have been revised for publication in this volume," the Introduction is more honest when it admits the failure of his "original plan . . . to rewrite essays in order to relate a coherent narrative" (p. 12). The disdain for coherence and narrative unity is of course part of what Bernstein calls the "'modern/postmodern' *Stimmung*" (p. 11; cf. pp. 57, 199, 225–6), and the title's use of composite terms, as well as the (paratactic) guiding concepts of "constellation" and "force-field" borrowed from the Frankfurt School via Martin Jay (explained on pp. 8–9, 41–2, 201, 225) demonstrate the author's attempts at a sympathetic engagement with a direction of thought that is obviously at odds with his deepest philosophical impulses (cf. pp. 1–4). Viewed as a whole, the book bears a strong resemblance to the *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1987) of Habermas, a philosopher with whose work Bernstein has long been identified and who is prominently mentioned in the Acknowledgments. Three introductory chapters precede a chapter on Heidegger in which a lengthy and sym-

pathetic textual discussion is followed by a shorter, harsh judgment of Heidegger's silence concerning the criminality of the National Socialist regime, and of the connection of this ethical failure with his philosophy. Bernstein follows, as does Habermas, with chapters on Foucault and Derrida, in addition to one on the Derrida-Habermas controversy itself which arose from the publication of Habermas's book. Rather than treating Bataille, Bernstein devotes two chapters to the political implications of Richard Rorty's recent writings, and Bernstein also concludes with two chapters on his own position ("Reconciliation/Rupture" and the Appendix), the first proposing a rehabilitation of (Hegelian) determinate negation (pp. 309ff.), and the second outlining his pragmatic "engaged fallibilistic pluralism" based on a (Gadamerian and Habermasian) "model of dialogical encounter" (pp. 336ff.). Nietzsche, for Habermas the "turning point" of modernity, is thematically absent from Bernstein's book. This is emblematic of the collection as a whole, robbing postmodernism of its philosophical point and encouraging treatment of it as a "pervasive, amorphous mood" (p. 57). The thrust of Bernstein's analysis is less theoretical than Habermas's though often dependent on Habermas's conclusions. Replacing his previous focus on *praxis* with one on *ethos*, Bernstein is especially concerned with ethical and political implications of the positions he examines. The level of Bernstein's ethical-political "analysis," however, is concrete in what often seems to be an arbitrary way. He is indulgent of Foucault (p. 164) and Derrida (p. 187), but Rorty is warned about his similarity to "neo-conservatives" (whose views are never analyzed [p. 257, n. 28]) and "[Daniel] Bell and his fellow travelers" (p. 249). Nothing is said about Derrida's ambiguous apologies for Heidegger and Paul de Man as exercises in the ethics of deconstruction. Bernstein notes similarities between Rorty's irony and Mussolini's cynicism (pp. 282-3), but is silent about Foucault's advocacy of Khomeini's Islamic revolution. Perhaps most bizarrely, Bernstein notes at the beginning of chapter 4 that "throughout his writings, Heidegger typically uses masculine forms of speech. To avoid artificiality, I have followed his usage" (p. 79). Needless to say, this "usage" is not "typical" only of Heidegger. The question of the ethical and political implications of postmodernism is certainly a deeply significant one. But this is philosophy that is "political" in a way that many will find repugnant as well as unedifying. Despite all talk of a "new constellation" and "openness to the Other," many—not only those who are familiar with Bernstein's previous publications—who sit down with this book will find themselves faced with the same old thing.—Robert Rethy, *Xavier University*.

DANCY, R. M. *Two Studies in the Early Academy*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. xii + 219 pp. \$14.95—Here is a welcome reminder that not all members of the Academy were Platonists; that the Academy must have been a lively place, full of

discussion and disagreement; and that Platonism itself is not monolithic. The focus is, as the title promises, doctrines maintained by two associates of the early Academy: the immanentism of Eudoxus and Speusippus's view that although The One is the first principle, it is not an existent.

The major difficulty in dealing with these issues is the paucity of evidence; the task is made more complex by the problem of reconstructing philosophical positions, and using those philosophical views to evaluate the evidence. Dancy recognizes the pitfalls of such a method and, while not minimizing the difficulties, succeeds in staking out and arguing for positions. He is concerned not only to attribute positions to Eudoxus and to Speusippus, but to show how these views grow reasonably out of a concern with specific problems generated by "High Platonism." This philosophical context makes their sometimes seemingly paradoxical views less odd.

Study 1 is concerned with Eudoxus's theory of immanence. Dancy sets it in the context of the theories of Anaxagoras and of Plato's early and middle period, and contrasts it with Aristotle's "partly immanentist" theory of the *Categories*. Dancy argues that Aristotle takes care in *Categories* 2 to separate his own account of "in a subject" from Eudoxus's view. Insisting that what is in a subject cannot exist apart (*Categories* 1a24-25), Aristotle stresses that his immanentism does not suffer from the difficulties generated by Eudoxus's treatment of Forms as separable physical ingredients. Dancy considers Aristotle's criticisms of Eudoxus in *Metaphysics* 1.9, and Alexander's commentary (together with some arguments about what might have been anti-Eudoxian in the *Peri Ideon*).

Study 2 treats Speusippus's claim that the One is both first principle and nonexistent. The notion that "some of the things we can talk about are not existent things" (p. 63) is dubbed by Dancy "Ancient Meinongianism." Study 2 explains both how Speusippus might have come to hold such a view and why it is not an absurd view to hold. Dancy canvasses other occurrences of Ancient Meinongianism, but his primary purpose here is to motivate Speusippus's view and set it in its context. The crux of the theory is the claim that while the One is responsible for the being of everything else, it is not itself a being. Dancy's Speusippus, perhaps convinced by such arguments as the Third Man, rejects the assumption that a cause of something's being *F* must itself be *F* (the Transmission Theory), and replaces it with a "Principle of Alien Causality," which maintains that "a principle of *F*'s is not yet *F*" (p. 91). This principle not only rescues Speusippus's theory from any Third Man-type attack, but begins to explain why there are beings at all. Any account of *that* cannot begin with something that is. The price to be paid is Meinongianism.

In the course of his two studies Dancy ranges over important issues interesting even to those not primarily concerned with Eudoxus or Speusippus, and many will find this a useful study. It is not, however, an easy book to read. In one hundred nineteen pages of text there are five hundred thirteen notes, gathered at the back of the book rather than at the foot of the page. When sentences contain as many as

four notes the necessary flipping back and forth distracts from the flow of argument and discussion. The full references and full quotations of Greek texts, with literal translations are a boon. A text and English translation of Iamblichus, *Universal Math* 4 is an added bonus.—Patricia Kenig Curd, *Purdue University*.

DUMMETT, Michael. *Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. xii + 331 pp. \$34.95—Frege is considered by many to be the founder of analytic philosophy, but his importance for the philosophy of mathematics is unrecognized. Despite his inability to deal with the paradoxes pointed out by Russell, personal blind spots (fierce opposition to non-Euclidean geometry, and failure to recognize the merit of the work of Hilbert, Cantor, and Dedekind), and various serious philosophical shortcomings, he is, says Dummett, “the greatest philosopher of mathematics yet to have written” (p. 321). Not everything of interest on this topic is given here; rather, Dummett means to go “to the heart of Frege’s philosophy of mathematics, setting aside everything not of central importance for that purpose” (p. xi).

The initial focus is on *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, “Frege’s masterpiece” (p. 1), written as a prolegomenon to Frege’s intended magnum opus, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. For *Grundlagen*—itself continuous with the work of the still earlier *Begriffsschrift*—presents the philosophical underpinnings of *Grundgesetze*, and so expresses Frege’s mature philosophy of arithmetic. Frege’s aim in *Grundlagen* is to show that the truths of arithmetic are analytic, and this requires identifying the principles and concepts basic to number theory; much of this work is taken up with analyzing numerical and arithmetical concepts. Frege’s notion of “sense” has a prominent role here, for example, in his struggles with Husserl’s psychologism. Interesting is Frege’s view on analytic propositions, that they “encapsulate an inferential subroutine” (p. 36). Thus, dissection of a proposition reveals something new and is a process of concept formation; deductive reasoning requires the apprehension of such patterns and thus is creative. So Frege offers a solution to the problem of why deductive reasoning can reveal new knowledge—a problem rarely addressed.

A recurring theme is the status of numbers as objects. Dedekind and others hold that mathematical objects are “free creations of the human mind” (p. 49, quoting Dedekind). The resulting conceptions are not solipsistic because each creator will have performed analogous operations—a view rejected by Frege on the grounds that there is no means of comparing private mental contents. For him, judgeable mathematical contents are objective and communicable, the same for everyone. Dedekind believes that natural numbers have only the properties resulting from their positions in the order generated by the act of thought creating them. But Frege holds that natural numbers are intimately connected with their applications and thus not

solely identified by position: one gives a natural number in answer to the question, How many objects are there which satisfy a certain condition? Nevertheless, Frege is a staunch realist about numbers: given any domain of mathematical objects, statements resulting from quantification over it will be either true or false. Dummett objects to this; the paradoxes have revealed that some concepts are "indefinitely extensible" (p. 317) in not defining a definite totality. Thus we are forced to adopt a constructivist view of mathematical practice, a suggestion with which Dummett concludes his book.

There is much in this densely written but moderately sized volume: Frege's definition of a cardinal number and his claim that substantival uses of numerical expressions have primacy over adjectival ones; his adoption (in what is "arguably the most philosophically pregnant paragraph ever written" [p. 111][*Grundlagen*, sec. 62]) of the linguistic turn in which numbers are defined contextually; the reason numbers have to be objects (because their domain must be infinite); Frege on the paradox and direction of analysis; and Frege's views on Kant, Mill, Dedekind, Hilbert, Cantor, Husserl, and Russell, and Whitehead. Dummett brings the discussion down to the present with comments on philosophers such as Waismann, Wittgenstein, Benacerraf, Quine, and Crispin Wright. Those wondering whether mathematics really needs the kind of foundation Frege attempts to provide will not be satisfied with Dummett's brief remarks here, but there is no doubt that he has provided an important exposition of the more distinctively mathematical side of Frege's thought.—Charles Crittenden, *California State University, Northridge*.

FEREJOHN, Michael. *The Origins of Aristotelian Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. xii + 174 pp. \$24.50—Modern readers who have wrestled with the difficulties of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* can sympathize with the twelfth-century lament of John of Salisbury that there are "as many obstacles to understanding this work as there are chapters in it—and you are lucky if there are not more obstacles than chapters" (*Metalogicon* 4.6). One recent reader who has met with some success in overcoming these difficulties is Michael Ferejohn, whose book attempts to set out systematically the elements of the Aristotelian theory of scientific explanation. Rather than add to the eminent tradition of commentary on the text, Ferejohn provides a reconstruction of the theory and so a comprehensive interpretation of demonstrative knowledge.

Ferejohn presents Aristotle's theory as an attempt, first, to set out those general requirements which any adequate theory of knowledge would have to satisfy, and second, to construct a theory of scientific explanation based on his theory of the syllogism. Crucial to this project is the task of showing that Aristotle's notion of scientific knowledge is foundationalist but not, at the same time, axiomatic. This latter view, which Ferejohn calls syllogisticism, seems to fit those

passages of the *Posterior Analytics* which closely connect the theory of the syllogism with scientific demonstration. It runs aground, however, on those passages where Aristotle speaks of definitions and principles in ways which do not easily lend themselves to syllogistic reasoning. Ferejohn claims that this is because the text contains a complex method of demonstration which is only partly syllogistic and not at all axiomatic. What the strict syllogisticist overlooks is the fact that Aristotelian scientific explanation is a two-stage process. The nonsyllogistic stage is based on the Platonic method of division in which the concepts relevant to the explanation of a particular phenomenon are framed and the necessary definitions are set out. This procedure provides the raw material, that is, the propositions, from which demonstrative syllogisms are constructed. The actual construction of these syllogisms in a way that shows how a causal middle term links properties set out in the framing stage, constitutes the second stage of explanation. Thus, Ferejohn argues against the strict syllogisticist that the definitions and first principles of a science are not axioms of a strictly deductive system, but basic assumptions which are organized and selected through division as a preparation for demonstrating syllogistically.

This two-stage method of explanation is outlined, in a general way, in the first part of the book. In the second part, Ferejohn provides a close study of the various kinds of immediate connections Aristotle allows between terms of a definition. Making these connections constitutes a major part of the first stage and is accomplished through an application of Platonic division in strictly limited ways. In this way Aristotle is able, Ferejohn argues, to provide the diverse kinds of assumptions syllogistic reasoning requires.

Clearly written and well organized, Ferejohn's book offers a novel approach to interpreting the *Posterior Analytics*. By attempting to reconstruct Aristotle's theory rather than by giving a textual exegesis, this book is able to approach issues without following Aristotle's sometimes confusing order of treatment. More importantly, this book has the great merit of providing a viable alternative to the various other interpretations which have dominated Aristotle studies in this century. These include not only the strict syllogisticist interpretation, but also those interpretations which, in one way or another, attempt to drive a wedge between Aristotle's conception of explanation in the *Posterior Analytics* and his actual practice in his works on specific natural sciences. This reason alone would make Ferejohn's work an important contribution to current Aristotle studies.—Michael W. Tkacz, *Gonzaga University*.

FURLEY, David, and WILDBERG, Christian, trans. *Place, Void, and Eternity*. Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. 153 pp. \$44.50—This volume in the continuing series of translations of the ancient commentators on Aristotle contains

three treatises related to Aristotle's *Physics*: the "Corollary on Place" and the "Corollary on Void" from John Philoponus's commentary on the *Physics* (translated by David Furley), and a section from Simplicius's commentary on the *Physics* which critiques another (lost) work by Philoponus on the eternity of the world (translated by Christian Wildberg). Each of these involves the sixth-century controversies surrounding the Christian commentator, John Philoponus, who is unique for his time in trying to turn Aristotle's own arguments against themselves (often in support of Christian beliefs).

All three of these translations maintain the high quality witnessed in previous volumes of the series. While none of these is an entire work, each focuses on a theme in the philosophy of science that is strikingly modern. Most notable in this regard is the "Corollary on Place," for here is found one of the most innovative and controversial of Philoponus's positions. Throughout much of Greek philosophy there was dissatisfaction with Aristotle's claim that place (or space—the Greek *topos* can be rendered either way) is the two-dimensional boundary that surrounds a body. Philoponus seeks to rebut Aristotle's analysis in *Physics* 4.4 where that philosopher considers four candidates for place: the form, the matter, the extension, and the boundary of a body. While Aristotle opted for the third of these, Philoponus rejects this and argues that place must be construed as three-dimensional extension. (Philoponus both attacks Aristotle's rejection of extension as well as presents positive arguments in favor of this position.) Philoponus claims that this three-dimensional reading of place is a necessary condition for the possibility of motion.

The "Corollary on Void" returns to an old chestnut of Aristotelian philosophy: motion within a void. Philoponus does agree that that void cannot exist, but he seeks to show *per impossibile* that motion within a void is nonetheless a coherent notion; contra Aristotle (*Physics* 4.8), motion within a void would not need to be instantaneous. Here Philoponus truly seeks to turn Aristotle against himself, for he draws upon Aristotle's analysis that takes the speed of an object to be a function of both the density of the medium and the weight of the body in motion. Aristotle's arguments against motion in a void, Philoponus notes, presume that speed is solely determined by the density of the medium, for only then would speed increase to infinity if the density dropped to zero. Philoponus claims instead that each body has an internal impulse to move and that, while the medium is an obstacle to the force of the impulse, the body's motion in a void would still take time since the body would move at a speed determined by its impulse.

The final section comes from Simplicius's commentary on the *Physics*, but it is a self-contained unit. Here Simplicius digresses to consider a work of Philoponus in which the latter argues that the physical world must (on Aristotelian principles) be both created and perish. The thrust of Philoponus's attack utilizes the Aristotelian principle that a finite body cannot have infinite power; the physical world is finite and therefore cannot have the capacity to exist for an infinite time. Simplicius's response draws upon the distinction between the

capacity for infinite motion and the capacity to be moved for an infinite time; he argues that the finitude of a body need only deny the first not the second of these.

The volume is well crafted and provides multiple indexes and glossaries that will permit it to be of service to both scholars and students of ancient philosophy.—Lawrence P. Schrenk, *The Catholic University of America*.

FLATHMAN, Richard E. *Willful Liberalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. xi + 232 pp. Cloth, \$31.50; paper, \$13.95—The author argues for a refined understanding of the proper roles of voluntarism, individuality, and plurality in liberal political theory. Animated by the conviction that contemporary debates between liberals and communitarians are truncated artificially, Flathman aspires to transcend the false polarities of atomism versus holism.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the author addresses issues related to individuality and plurality: "Let us take plurality to mean an abundant diversity of sub- or extrastate groups and associations, and let us call pluralism the doctrine that there is and/or should be such a multiplicity" (p. 7). Here he interprets a host of Western thinkers, not all of whom are typically linked together in political theory: Hobbes, William James, Wittgenstein, and Michael Oakeshott. The commonality of such thinkers, in Flathman's view, does not lie in the similarity of their substantive normative conclusions, but instead in their importance for explicating notions essential to liberalism such as the meaning of individuality and self-enactment, and the possibility of mutual intelligibility among humans.

In the second part Flathman concentrates on voluntarism ("the [human] capability of developing desires and interests, objectives and purposes that are in some meaningful sense their own, of forming beliefs and intentions that are partially distinctive to themselves, and of making personal choices and taking actions on the basis of these" [p. 124]) and the will. Here he interprets and associates an even more offbeat coterie of thinkers: Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Brian O'Shaughnessy, Hanna Arendt, and Augustine.

The author's general theme is that liberalism requires refinement to secure the paramount value of plurality and yet retain a strong notion of voluntarism. In explicating this theme, Flathman confronts and exposes numerous dichotomies which plague contemporary political debates among liberals, and between liberals and their communitarian critics. As evidenced by his choice of thinkers, the author fearlessly appropriates supporting ideas where he believes they will serve his purposes, without regard to traditional classifications and juxtapositions.

In several ways this book is unique. I find the book most interesting when Flathman is grappling with complex metaphysical and

epistemological problems and when he is unraveling his sometimes novel interpretations of well-known philosophers. Surprisingly, this book may prove of greater interest to mainstream philosophers than to political theorists. The latter may tire of the author's lengthy discussions of voluntarism, will, and mutual intelligibility, and instead yearn for a clearer exposition of the practical implications of Flathman's refined liberalism.

This is a fine book whose author recognizes the impasses to which most contemporary political debates have led and the false polarities that often cripple theoretical insight. Although I am not convinced that the book will meet the (understandably) optimistic celebrations on its jacket ("to revive liberalism as the dominant public philosophy of our culture, setting it on a new and better course"), *Willful Liberalism* is indeed refreshing and instructive.—Raymond A. Belliotti, *State University of New York at Fredonia*.

GADAMER, Hans-Georg. *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus*. Translated, with an Introduction by Robert M. Wallace. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. xxx + 240 pp. \$27.50—Sixty years after its first publication in 1931, Robert Wallace presents us with the first English translation of Hans-Georg Gadamer's habilitation, a work that has appeared in several German editions. In 1968 it was first republished "unaltered" (according to Gadamer in the Preface to this edition), under the same title, with four appended essays (all of which have appeared in English translation: *Dialogue and Dialectic* [1980]). This expanded edition was reprinted in 1982. The habilitation appears again in volume 5 of Gadamer's *Gesammelte Werke: Griechische Philosophie I* (1985). Wallace's English translation follows this most recent published version, which differs from the earlier versions only in a few additional footnotes or added remarks in the footnotes, most of which refer us to later work by Gadamer relevant to the material. It follows the *Collected Works* as well in providing the Preface to the first edition and excerpts from prefaces to the second edition (1968) and its reprinting (1982).

The book consists of only two chapters. The first chapter treats Platonic dialectic; the second chapter provides an interpretation of the *Philebus*. In a recent (1989) short essay entitled "Platos dialektische Ethik"—beim Wort genommen" (English translation in *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, ed. H. Silverman [New York: Routledge, 1991]), Gadamer tells us that he had originally planned for his habilitation a work on the Good in Plato and Aristotle, but that he cut it back in size and scope so as to finish it before Heidegger left Marburg in 1928 to return to Freiburg to assume Husserl's chair. This 1989 essay appears as a sort of preface to the reprinting of *The Idea of the Good in Plato and Aristotle* in volume 7 of his collected works (1991). Gadamer points out that he has remained true to his original intention

but that it has taken a lifetime to sort through this complex question. Nonetheless, the direction and the philosophical motives for Gadamer's lifelong reading of Plato are apparent in this early work.

In the Preface to the second edition of the habilitation Gadamer presents the work as that of a beginner and as inadequate. As such, it "could not be revised" (p. xxix). Wallace justifies the translation on two counts, both of which go back to the simple fact that it is a work by Gadamer. He argues that this volume is useful generally for understanding the course of German thought since the 1920s and, more specifically, that it allows us to see how "Gadamer establishes . . . the 'effective unity' between Socratic dialogue and the conception of knowledge he had constructed under the influence of Heidegger" (p. xx). *Plato's Dialectical Ethics* appeared at about the time that Heidegger was presenting his lecture, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," which formulates his strong critique of Platonism and metaphysics. This lecture on Plato and its companion piece, "On the Essence of Truth," mark Heidegger's turn away from phenomenology (in the subtitle of Gadamer's habilitation) and the project of *Being and Time*. Though Gadamer had heard Heidegger lecture on Plato, Heidegger's attention in his Marburg years was directed more to Aristotle. In the 1989 essay referred to above Gadamer sets the context for his habilitation in this way: "What was imparted to me by Heidegger's introduction to Aristotle's thought in ethics, rhetoric, physics, and metaphysics had to be put to a special kind of test in the Platonic dialogue. For here the language of concepts does not predominate." Gadamer suggests here that the Heideggerian critique of the tradition of theory and metaphysics (which Heidegger is happy to call Platonism) does not pertain without qualification to Plato. In the introduction to the habilitation Gadamer writes, "All scientific philosophy is Aristotelianism insofar as it is conceptual work, and thus if one wants to interpret Plato's philosophy philosophically, one must necessarily interpret it via Aristotle. . . . The first hand discovery that Plato is more than what Aristotelian conceptual analysis can extract from him cannot, itself, be conveyed secondhand" (p. 8).

The first chapter sets out to show how Plato's dialectic leads to Aristotelian *episteme* (and not Aristotelian dialectic). Gadamer briefly discusses dialectic as it shows itself in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Parmenides*. Dialectic is presented as a specific form of Socratic conversation, that is, dialectic is the way station between dialogue and *episteme*. Many of the important concepts of Heidegger's account of *Dasein* play an important role in the analysis, for example, care, idle chatter, circumspection, inauthentic speech (Sophism). Beyond conversation and dialogue, at least three important notions for Gadamer's own later development are evident in the analysis: play (*Spiel*), tarrying (*Verweilen*), and "concern for the facts of the matter" (*Sachlichkeit*). The Socratic conversation is, according to Gadamer, concerned with coming to a shared understanding about "the unity and sameness of the thing that is under discussion" (p. 64), the matter at hand, *die Sache selbst*.

The second chapter provides a reading of the *Philebus* that stays close to the text. This dialogue has particular significance for

Gadamer for at least two reasons. First, dialectic is explicitly discussed and becomes aware of itself in the dialogue. Second, the discussion of the good opens the way to Aristotle's ethics. This is particularly so, according to Gadamer, because the good under consideration is the human good and not a divine one. Gadamer comments on the Platonic way to Aristotle's ethics only in the last two concluding pages, but this concern clearly guides his reading—much as the concern for Aristotelian *episteme* guides his account of dialectic.

Wallace's translation is faithful and readable. For the most part he follows Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of Heideggerian concepts. Inevitably the translation of *Sache* (facts of the matter, thing, reality), *sachlich* (substantive), and *Sachlichkeit* (concern for the facts of the matter) are awkward and inexact. This edition provides at the end an analytical table of contents (from the 1931 edition), a short translation key, and an index of names and subjects.—Robert J. Dostal, *Bryn Mawr College*.

GOODMAN, L. E. *On Justice: An Essay in Jewish Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. xvi + 288. \$37.50—Citing Alasdair MacIntyre, Goodman acknowledges that all rational enquiry is embodied in a tradition. The author makes explicit the tradition in which he chooses to work. It is a tradition grounded in the Torah and developed through the ages by the Spinozas and Mendelssohns of every period. Yet Goodman is a philosopher, and though he may speak with a distinctive accent, his outlook is one that can be embraced by anyone who is convinced that justice is not a matter of convention but is grounded in the very nature of things. Divided into six chapters, the book offers first a general theory of objective justice and then chapter-length reflections on punishment, recompense, natural justice, messianism, and immortality.

In his preface, Goodman advances two theses: that justice considered as a virtue cannot be understood apart from the requirements of objective equity, and that justice is not simply the execution of formal obligation. Equity does not create but rests upon desert. He writes, "The deserts of human subjecthood underlie . . . (the more fundamental relations among persons) and provide the necessary groundings which theories of contract and consent alone cannot provide" (p. xi).

Yet the life of the law is through community. Morals are not simply a matter of personal conscience but are reflective of a larger social ethos. Making a distinction between desert and earned desert, he suggests that legitimate rights are "claims founded in the deserts of every being in relation to the interests of all others" (p. 32).

In an insightful chapter on the moral foundations of punishment, Goodman finds that punishment responds to an affront against civil trust: "Utilitarian theories of deterrence and idealistic programs of reform lack the restraints and recognition of desert that a properly retributive account of punishment affords." Retribution is not ven-

geance. "The premise of retribution is that crime involves a violation of the norms, dignity, and composure of society, quite apart from the harm to particular interests" (p. 47).

In discussing the rationale for a given course of action, Goodman steers between what he takes to be deontological and teleological justifications, although he acknowledges that "both claim a warrant of rationality: teleology in the adjustment of means to ends; deontology, in the seeming omni-sufficiency of rightness" (p. 77). Critical not only of Mill but also of Kant, Goodman maintains that goodness does not require but already contains its reward. There are meaningful and worthwhile actions quite apart from any external recompense. Virtue is intrinsically rewarding and of its nature is conducive to further acts of self-achievement. Although a single act may not attain its just desert, in a certain sense, even martyrs conquer death. "Every act of purity and goodness endures forever *sub specie aeternitatis*."

Chapter 5, entitled "The Messianic Age," introduces a distinctively Jewish theme. According to Goodman the messianic idea must be understood as primarily a vision of the Torah as realized in history. All prophecies of Israel's hegemony have to be interpreted as pointing to a particular manifestation of a universal truth, that is, "through the idea of God justice will be kept alive and imparted not only from generation to generation but from nation to nation" (p. 179). From that vantage point Israel's spiritual mission may be regarded as that of a light unto the world.

In a concluding chapter, Goodman defends the rational necessity of leading a moral life although "the grave be the end of man." The claim that morality requires immortality is mistaken, and is foreign to the Mosaic outlook. "The Hebrew Bible is manifestly a life-oriented rather than a death-oriented canon" (p. 196). He continues, "The demand for an afterlife is a rejection of the intrinsic worth of the life we have. It flies in the face of biblical theology, morals and cosmology because it clashes with the recognition of the goodness of being, which is the basis of that cosmology" (p. 202). When the Torah instructs us to harken to the word of God, it is calling us to perfect our humanity, to become as God-like as possible. Virtue is its own reward; "divine justice" is to be found in the natural order. A life led in accord with time-transcending moral principles is an expression of eternity. So, too, is the creativity of the artist, the work of the scientist and the physical accomplishments of the athlete. "We attain to immortality . . . when we transcend the facticity of the given: in procreation, in education, in creative work, in overcoming any of the limits that bind and confine the fullness of our being as moral actors, spiritual and intellectual beholders of the universe, ourselves and one another" (p. 234).

On Justice is clearly written, comprehensive, coherent, and at times almost poetic. While it appropriates a language characteristic of classical and medieval philosophy, it never deviates from a naturalistic interpretation of the Hebrew scriptures, which Goodman presents as an important, although literary, source of insight into human nature and its fulfillment.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

GRAHAM, Daniel W. *Aristotle's Two Systems*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. xv + 359 pp. Cloth \$66.00; paper \$24.95—A central exegetical problem in Aristotelian studies is deciding how best to deal with apparent inconsistencies in his writings. Early this century, Werner Jaeger (*Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*, 1923), challenging unitarian approaches of the previous century, argued that conflicting views could be reconciled by relegating them to different stages of Aristotle's philosophical career. Although scholars have questioned some of Jaeger's specific proposals, genetic explanations of inconsistencies are still widely adopted.

Daniel Graham offers a provocative thesis within this tradition. He thinks that at different times Aristotle held two distinct philosophical systems, each of which provides its own set of doctrines in ontology, logic, and philosophy of science. The two systems are incommensurable with each other. The first system (S_1) includes the works in the *Organon* (and *Rhetoric*). The second (S_2) includes the rest of the corpus. Graham characterizes S_1 as beginning with an atomistic perception of reality and building a conception of the world that is static and constructive; S_2 is dynamic and analytic in outlook, aiming to explain the constitution of concrete substances and their generation and development. Graham locates the shift from S_1 to S_2 in Aristotle's account of substantial generation in *Physics* 1. Because S_1 is committed to "substantial atomism," the idea that "primary substances are ontologically indivisible particulars" (p. 35), Aristotle cannot account for substantial generation within this system. By introducing hylomorphic analysis in *Physics* 1.7—the analysis of concrete substances into matter and form—he can answer Parmenides' objection to change. Aristotle agrees with Parmenides that something cannot emerge from nothing. When a new substance is generated, it emerges from something else, and part of the preexisting object (the matter) survives in the product, and part (the form) is replaced. Graham thinks that Aristotle's hylomorphism revolutionizes his philosophical theory. Comparing Aristotle's hylomorphic turn to a Kuhnian paradigm switch, Graham contends that this single move alters Aristotle's entire world-view, demanding revisions in his logic and philosophy of science, as well as in his ontology.

Graham believes that *Metaphysics* 7 confirms his thesis. Aristotle was unaware that S_1 was incommensurable with S_2 , and this text, which scholars have long struggled to understand, is testimony of Aristotle's confusion. *Metaphysics* 7 is logically incoherent, because the principles of the earlier system contaminate the later, resulting in inconsistencies.

If Graham is right, his thesis renders pointless not only further probing of *Metaphysics* 7, but current research in other vital areas as well, such as the application of Aristotle's philosophy of science in the *Analytics* to his biological investigations. This research is futile because Aristotle cannot consistently apply the methods of science from S_1 to his scientific enterprise in S_2 . Yet the exciting advances in this area indicate, *pace* Graham, that the *Analytics* and biology are consistent (see, for example, *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*,

ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox, 1987). This research calls Graham's thesis into serious question.

Graham's project is well carried out, but it does not live up to the ambitious project it sets for itself. The argument for two incommensurable systems rests on an equivocation. The central principle of S_1 is substantial atomism, the principle that primary substances are indivisible particulars. This principle conflicts with hylomorphism, the central principle of S_2 . Graham contends that S_1 cannot be enriched by adding hylomorphism, because the system would then include an inconsistent set of propositions (p. 91). But is S_1 committed to substantial atomism? If so, Graham has failed to show us. He points out that the *Categories* specifies primary substance—the individual man or individual horse—as *ἄτομον* (indivisible) and one in number. In addition, he correctly says that individuals are indivisible because they cannot be divided into a plurality of instances, as species are divided into individuals or genera into species and individuals (p. 25). In Aristotle's terminology, the individuals are not "said of" anything further. (According to Michael Frede—whose paper, "Individuen bei Aristoteles," *Antike und Abendland* 24 [1978], Graham cites—individuals in the *Categories* are indivisible in the sense that they have no *subjective* parts, that is, nothing is a subject for them as they are for their species). This meaning of "indivisible," however, is not the one Graham then invokes in his statement of substantial atomism (p. 35). The indivisibility required is one that says individuals cannot be analyzed into metaphysical components. Graham provides no evidence that Aristotle rejects such divisibility in the *Organon*. To be sure, no such analysis occurs in these treatises, but S_1 need not be saddled with a principle antithetical to it. Without this principle Graham has no argument (pp. 90–3) that S_1 and S_2 are incompatible systems. S_2 may simply be an extension of S_1 .

Graham's proposal should be rejected. Even so, the book has considerable merit and deserves to be read. The thesis, though mistaken, is an interesting one, and his arguments for it are learned and well articulated. While the interpretations of individual texts are not particularly novel, the juxtaposition of those interpretations, which generate contradictions, is illuminating. By highlighting inconsistencies rather than minimizing them, Graham invites scholars to reexamine the set of beliefs they attribute to Aristotle. Such reassessment could prove highly constructive.—Mary Louise Gill, *University of Pittsburgh*.

GUYER, Paul, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. xii + 482 pp. Cloth, \$59.95; paper, \$17.95—This is the third in a projected series of companion volumes to major philosophers. According to a prefatory note, the series is intended both for students and nonspecialists as well as for advanced students and specialists, serving the former as a reference work and

the latter as a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of the philosopher. Since the essays comprising the volumes are specially commissioned for them, they can reinforce one another and present an internally coherent interpretation of the philosopher's thought as a whole. Such a collection should have the merit of a comprehensive introduction to the philosopher's work, while providing a detailed treatment of particular topics by authors with special expertise.

The format of this volume is well conceived. A general introduction to Kant's philosophy is followed by an essay on the development of his thought through the precritical works and, to the extent that it is possible, through the "silent decade" of the 1770s. As for the essays dealing with the critical philosophy, it is to be expected that Kant's theory of knowledge would claim the biggest share. Seven essays deal either with the main divisions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* or with themes arising in it. Two of the latter consider the relevance of the first *Critique* to the empirical content of natural science, one of them discussing the methodological import of regulative ideas of reason, the other tracing the development of Kant's treatment of causality in his later works. An essay on Kant's conception of reason is intended as a transition from the first *Critique* to his practical philosophy. The remainder of the volume consists of essays on Kant's moral philosophy as a whole, his theory of right and political philosophy, his aesthetics, and his philosophy of religion. The volume concludes with an essay on the initial reception of the critical philosophy and the subsequent dissatisfaction with its dualisms that led to the development of nineteenth-century German idealism. A highly selective bibliography is supplemented by an editorial note regarding more extensive bibliographical sources.

To what extent the volume fulfills the dual intent of the companion series is rather difficult to estimate. Of the essays on the divisions of the first *Critique*, some would seem to be more successful than others in balancing exposition with interpretation and criticism. It is, perhaps, in the nature of the undertaking that the essays comprising the remainder of the volume should be more accessible to students. Each presents an overview that could serve admirably as an introduction to the subject. A more advanced student or a specialist would test the framework against the text and determine the extent to which the former reflects the author's interests and assumptions. This category of reader might well complain about one or another assertion, or about matters of emphasis and omission, while yet regarding the essay as a good—in some cases, excellent—survey of the area. The concluding essay, which treats the historical Lessing-Jacobi-Mendelssohn affair as a questioning of the legitimacy of philosophy itself, throws new light on the emergence of German idealism.—Mary Gregor, *San Diego State University*.

HARRIS, Errol E. *Spinoza's Philosophy: An Outline*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1992. x + 125 pp. Cloth, \$35.00;

paper, \$12.50—This book is the author's second book-length exposition of Spinoza's thought. Like the earlier commentary, *Salvation from Despair: A Reappraisal of Spinoza's Philosophy* (1973), it presents Spinoza's philosophy sympathetically and compellingly, for Harris has been much influenced by the master. But unlike *Salvation from Despair*, which was aimed at specialists, this book is geared to readers unfamiliar with Spinoza's work. Basing his analyses on the full range of Spinoza's writing, Harris devotes seven chapters to discussion of topics in Spinoza's metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and epistemology; six chapters to explanation of issues in Spinoza's psychology, ethics, political theory, and critique of religion; and one chapter, the first, to description of Spinoza's current appeal. The appeal, Harris claims, derives from Spinoza's conception of the moral agent both as self-determined and as expressing and realizing divine causation through universal and objective law (p. 9). According to Harris, contemporary philosophy misses this profound truth because of its relativist pre-suppositions (pp. 9-10).

Harris states in his preface that the purpose of the book is to help beginning students understand Spinoza's philosophy by explaining in plain language Spinoza's main ideas and line of reasoning (p. vii). In the endeavor to provide lucid and instructive explanation of Spinoza's tenets, Harris succeeds wonderfully. An example can be found in his account of Spinoza's identification of the human mind with the idea of the human body:

Our consciousness is thus primarily the awareness of our bodies in sensation. It is through this and only through this that we can become aware of the world around us. . . . All our consciousness is an elaboration of this primary feeling of the body and none is independent of it entirely, not even abstract thinking, which not only involves feelings of strain and effort but which is operative upon objects derivative from those of which we are conscious through bodily sensations. (p. 36)

Frequently, Harris clarifies obscurities in Spinoza's thought with illustrations or metaphors drawn from twentieth-century science. How is it that modes of thought and modes of extension are the same in substance but not in attribute? Harris tells us to think of the way in which the basic entities of quantum physics manifest themselves differently and incommensurably as waves and as particles (p. 39).

As can be gleaned from the passage cited above, Harris's exposition is interpretive: Spinoza's text does not really say that the relationship of the human mind to the human body consists in the awareness by the one of the other. This is, however, a likely construction of Spinoza's meaning. Most of Harris's interpretations are similarly smooth and plausible, and, also like this one, can be supported by the text. (In this book, Harris does not usually defend his interpretations at length, textually or otherwise.) Cognoscenti will notice that, in contrast with more typical American commentators, Harris draws links between Spinoza and Hegel (pp. 15, 22, 113), and sees Spinoza's system as dialectical (p. 73). This perspective on Spinozistic reality

plays an important part in Harris's original reading of Spinoza's views on teleology and determinism (pp. 67-73). The description of Spinoza as a moral absolutist who recognizes some truth in relativism (pp. 75-80) is fairly standard.

Harris states that he wants to avoid overburdening or distracting the reader with footnotes and references (p. vii), and he offers little in the way of citations. This course seems ill-considered: what if a beginner wants to consult Spinoza's text or commentaries other than this one concerning a specific point Harris raises? Another weakness of the work is that its social criticism is out of date (see p. 2), as are its lists of recommended translations and secondary sources (pp. ix-x, 119). Despite these shortcomings, this is a welcome contribution to Spinoza scholarship. Its emphasis on the spirituality of Spinoza's thought makes it an interesting corrective to drier commentary, and experts as well as novices will appreciate Harris's clear prose.—Amy Robinson, *New York, N.Y.*

INEICHEN, Hans. *Philosophische Hermeneutik*. Handbuch Philosophie. München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1991. 293 pp. DM62—Handbuch Philosophie is a series edited by Elisabeth Ströker and Wolfgang Wieland, the purpose of which is to present various fields and themes in contemporary thought. The author of the present work, who teaches philosophy in Erlangen and Heidelberg, has previously published two books in the history and theory of interpretation. The study is divided into two parts: the first adopts a systematic approach to its theme; the second develops a historical perspective. Using the Gadamerian term "philosophical hermeneutics," the author wishes to summarize three different fields or levels of questioning: the interpretation of texts, the understanding of human deeds and actions in general, and the idea of understanding as an ontological determination of man. The first level relates to the traditional art of hermeneutics as developed within theology and jurisprudence and, eventually, philology; the second refers primarily to the work of Dilthey and to different modern theories of human action and behavior; the third, finally, concerns the ontological turn that hermeneutics undergoes in Heidegger and Gadamer. Thus, "philosophical hermeneutics" is not the designation of a clearly delimited discipline, but the rather arbitrary name for a conglomerate of thinkers, questions, and disciplines which could be said to converge around the problem of human understanding. Ineichen's study is a handbook intended to serve as an introduction to this amorphous field. Despite its basically pedagogical intention, however, it is guided throughout by a highly critical spirit.

The first thematic section of the book is divided into ten short chapters dealing with various general aspects of human understanding. Undoubtedly, the most fundamental concept in this context is that of "sense" or "meaning" (*Sinn*). The starting point and condition for any hermeneutic endeavor is that there is such a phenomenon as sense.

which the interpreter can eventually extrapolate from whatever material configuration is at hand (texts, actions, artifacts, and so forth). As every philosopher of language knows, sense is a very elusive concept. Ineichen elegantly avoids the deeper complications connected to this notion by stating, simply, that sense is something objective (or intersubjective), that its primary seat is language (which is said to convey sense in virtue of being a rule-governed practice), and that sense, in the context of actions and artifacts, is generally synonymous with the intention (explicit or implicit) of the doer or maker. The objectivity of sense, for which he argues with reference to both Husserl and Frege, is the key to his subsequent exposition. If sense were subjective or tied to individual events or intentions, understanding would simply not be possible, or understanding would at least remain essentially uncertain. Instead, the fact that there is a distinct, objective, and repeatable sense makes it possible to perform interpretation in a scientific mode, with a claim to truth that can be rationally assessed.

In the historical section, which covers the larger second portion of the book, the author tells the story of hermeneutical thinking from Ast, Wolf, and Schleiermacher to Gadamer and Ricoeur in brief but concise sketches. In a separate chapter he also discusses a number of thinkers from the school of analytic philosophy, such as Popper, Dray, and von Wright, who have contributed in various ways to the theory of understanding and of human action. The historical presentation follows the standard account, focusing on the work of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Heidegger. In an original contribution to this historical development, however, Ineichen also stresses the importance of one of Schleiermacher's students, A. Boeck. The most generous treatment in this critical overview is granted to Paul Ricoeur. In Ricoeur Ineichen sees a thinker not only able to bridge the gap between various schools of thought, but also attentive to the multifacetedness of the hermeneutical enterprise—attentiveness demonstrated not the least in Ricoeur's theory of the symbol.

The most admirable trait of Ineichen's book is the broadness of its scope. Despite its limited size the work manages to incorporate presentations not only of all the leading theorists of interpretation and understanding in the Continental tradition up to Ricoeur, but also of a number of related Anglo-American thinkers. In addition, the critical approach of the book could have been advantageous had it not been for the brevity of the critical presentations. With its short summaries of vast theoretical explorations, followed by often sweeping critiques of the particular philosophers under discussion, the book betrays a lack of sensitivity that contradicts its hermeneutic intentions. This is true of its treatment of Heidegger, and even more so of Gadamer, to whom it is indebted for large parts of its account (which Ineichen also initially acknowledges). Ineichen criticizes Gadamer on points which Gadamer himself has repeatedly treated of, notably concerning the accusation that his hermeneutics somehow undermine the possibility of a critique. Gadamer (as well as Heidegger) is guided in his thinking by an evaluation of Western

philosophical thought, whose critical potential should be obvious. The most important question, then, is not whether his theory of truth and understanding gives due credit to the critical function of reason, but whether one approves of the critical consequences implied by this theory. Ineichen obviously does not approve.—Hans Ruin, *University of Stockholm*.

KEMAL, Salim. *The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna*. Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science: Texts and Studies, vol. 9. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991. viii + 283 pp. \$83.00—The Arabic philosophical tradition followed the Alexandrian school in including both the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* among the logical texts. Such inclusion raised the question of the nature of poetic validity and its role in forming a community. This question was of great importance for Arabic culture since poetry was not only the main art form but also the basis of education before the rise of Islam. Therefore, Arabic philosophers developed sophisticated studies of poetry and had to contend with the views of the literary critiques.

Kemal is fully aware that Alfarabi and Avicenna consider the *Poetics* to be a part of Aristotle's logical works, but his desire to vindicate the eminence of Arabic poetry against the views of Western Arabists such as von Grunebaum, Goldziher, and Heinrichs leads him to emphasize literary criticism over philosophy. Therefore, Kemal does not spend much time locating Alfarabi's and Avicenna's conception of poetry in their more encompassing view of logic but rather delineates and assesses the validity of their conception of poetry. This leads him to deal with issues important to contemporary literary criticism but fairly neglected by or even alien to Alfarabi and Avicenna. These issues are rather fascinating and Kemal presents them intelligently, but at times one may wonder whether they do not provide a slightly tangential approach to Alfarabi and Avicenna. Kemal acknowledges the seminal importance of Alfarabi's work but finds it much more problematic than Avicenna's account, which he greatly favors.

To present Alfarabi's and Avicenna's views Kemal picks up some basic texts. His criteria of selection are somewhat obscure. For instance, the main text for Alfarabi is the *Canons of Poetry*, whereas the *Short Commentary on the Poetics* remains much neglected, and there is little use of the many references to poetics in other logical texts. As for the use of secondary literature, it is rather parsimonious and tilted more to literature than to philosophy. This may prove a useful challenge to the scholar in philosophy, but the conspicuous absence of a bibliography and of an index of the texts quoted renders it frustrating.

Any reader truly interested in the *Poetics* in Arabic philosophy will find it useful and stimulating to contrast Kemal's approach to Deborah L. Black's approach in her *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics*

in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (1990). There is no doubt that Alfarabi's and Avicenna's conception of poetry are well worth reflecting upon.—Thérèse-Anne Druart, *The Catholic University of America*.

LANG, Berel. *The Anatomy of Philosophical Style: Literary Philosophy and the Philosophy of Literature*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. 266 pp. Cloth, \$44.95; paper, \$16.95—What are the relations, if any, between philosophy and literary style? Lang asserts "that the 'literariness' of philosophical writing is not accidental or ornamental but unavoidable—imbedded in that discourse and so also in its substantive questions and proposed solutions" (p. 3). Lang attempts to clarify and support his thesis in discussions of philosophy as literature (Part 1) and philosophy of literature (Part 2).

Part 1, "Philosophical Discourse and Literary Form," suggests that philosophy is a form of writing occurring in a particular setting, to which the various types of literary genera are applicable. Lang attacks the "Neutralist" model in which "the form or structure of philosophical discourse is denied any intrinsic connection to its substance as philosophy; the relation is viewed as at most ornamental, at its least as accidental and irrelevant, even as a hindrance or occasion of philosophical obfuscation" (p. 12). Furthermore, such a view assumes a "context-free or neutral medium of philosophical discourse as an ideal" (p. 14).

This model allows neither the reader to interpret the text nor the writer to speak from within the text placed in a particular historical period. Rather, there is only the reader discovering the "neutral" language in the text—a language often hidden under "the several historically distinct languages in which [the] authors respectively wrote" (p. 13). Lang develops his own view more clearly in chapter 2, "The Plots and Acts of Philosophical Genre," and applies his position, in chapter 3, to an understanding of Descartes.

Not only is the Neutralist model ineffective in helping us understand philosophical writing—Lang argues in chapter 6, "Rorty Scrivener"—but the model also leads to its own collapse. Concluding Part 1 with a chapter entitled "Nostalgia for the Future, Waiting for the Past: Postmodernism in Philosophy," Lang presents a critical analysis of postmodernism, culminating in the assertion that philosophy begins not in suspicion but in wonder (p. 152), and that this wonder is a function of the context of the here-and-now of philosophizing.

Part 2, "Literary Form and Non-Literary Fact," sets forth Lang's philosophy of literature in five chapters. Lang begins with "Hamlet's Grandmother(s)." Did Hamlet have a grandmother? Lang amplifies the significance of this question in terms of the essential importance of the background in which a literary piece is placed and the restrictions that background puts on writer and reader. The Neutralist model, however, derides the importance of background. Lang argues that such an attitude is ill-founded. For example, if there is nothing

but the text, then questions of referential truth and existence vanish. One only has to think of Derrida. Thus Part 2 clarifies the discussion of the content and style of a literary work, necessarily set within a context, in terms of the dimensions of truth and ontological commitment.

Reading Lang's book is difficult for several reasons. First, there is the demand that the reader be familiar with both philosophical literature and literary criticism. Second, Lang's sentence structure often becomes overly complicated (see, for example, p. 46). Third, there are moments when one wonders just how a topic is related to the overall development of the book. Even so, the rewards of reading Lang can be worth the struggle, for he not only reminds us of, but gives reasons to support, the view that what we say is limited by how we say it, that how we say something is as revealing as what we say, and that philosophizing cannot be done within a neutralist vacuum.—Frank R. Harrison III, *University of Georgia*.

LEWIS, Frank A. *Substance and Prediction in Aristotle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xvii + 370 pp. \$44.50—In this ambitious and challenging book, Frank Lewis aims to make clear the relation between the early metaphysical theory of Aristotle's *Categories* and the later theory of the central books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; to show, with each theory, how Aristotle positions himself in relation to Plato's theory of Forms; and to locate Aristotle's treatment of purely accidental entities within a more general Aristotelian theory of compounds.

Ontogenetically, it is Lewis's treatment of accidental entities that constitutes the first layer of this book. Lewis is already well known for arguing that Aristotle counts, say, Socrates and seated Socrates as genuinely distinct *onta* within his ontology. Part 2 of the book elaborates somewhat on the case Lewis had already made for this conclusion in his pioneering article, "Accidental Sameness in Aristotle" (*Philosophical Studies* 42 [1982]: 1–36). But the surrounding three parts of the book develop an imaginative and challenging answer to the question of what interest it might be to us that Aristotle should display in his ontology such an alarmingly high tolerance for pure ephemera.

One might expect a contemporary defense of the importance of Aristotle's views on accidental entities to focus on "referential opacity." We think we have to restrict the intersubstitutivity of the coreferential terms, "the one approaching" and "Coriscus" in, for example, "Socrates knows that Coriscus is Coriscus," since Socrates is not thereby guaranteed to know that the one approaching is Coriscus. By contrast, Aristotle simply denies that "Coriscus" and "the one approaching" are coreferential terms. The ramifications of Aristotle's way of understanding this situation versus our own more Fregean

way of thinking about it is worth careful exploration. Lewis does some of that exploration in this book. His overarching project, however, is to develop a more general theory of compounds, which, he argues, applies as much to Socrates, conceived now as a form-matter compound, as to the weirdly ephemeral object, seated Socrates.


In Part 1 Lewis offers an account of the early metaphysical views of Aristotle, with special emphasis on the *Categories*. Making use of the distinction between "Izzing" and "Having" developed by Paul Grice and Alan Code, Lewis interprets the early Aristotle as a response to Plato, and particularly to Plato's problem of the Third Man. But Lewis finds Compound Theory relevant to this part too, since he finds the idea of an accidental entity already present in Aristotle's notion of a paronym (for example, the brave one) at the beginning of the *Categories*.

In Part 3 Lewis shows how the more generalized Compound Theory applies to concrete individuals. Here Lewis defends the claim that such compounds are also, in their own way, accidental entities, though the substantial form of Socrates gives him a unity that pallor cannot give to the entity, pale Socrates.

In Part 4 Lewis argues that Aristotle's requirements for primary substances in his *Categories* (subjects for everything else and themselves predicated of nothing) become altered in the *Metaphysics*. In the latter work, he says, a primary substance is something that is the substance of itself—and in a reduced sense, the substance of a form-matter compound—but is universally predicated only of matter. Unlike Daniel Graham, who in his *Aristotle's Two Systems* portrays Aristotle as presenting two, logically incompatible, metaphysical systems, Lewis presents the late Aristotle as only modifying, even if rather drastically, the conception of primary substance that underlies the *Categories*.

Lewis's book is a major contribution to Aristotelian scholarship. The fact that it tackles some of the most contentious issues in Aristotelian metaphysics and does so not only with imagination and fresh insight, but also with encyclopedically detailed reference to the writings of other scholars, should assure it a central place in contemporary efforts to understand the metaphysics of "the Philosopher."—Gareth B. Matthews, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*.

- LOUX, Michael J. *Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. xii + 285 pp. \$39.95—Loux sets the stage with a discussion of *ousia* in the *Categories*. There, he claims, Aristotle maintained that (1) "basic subjects" are ontologically fundamental, and (2) the essence of each such subject is its species (Aristotle's essentialism). Loux thinks that Aristotle was tacitly committed to the "intersection" of these two, which he terms the "unanalyzability principle": An *ousia*'s falling under its species is a "primitive . . . fact about it . . . not susceptible of further ontological analysis" (p. 4).



By the time he came to write *Metaphysics* 7 and 8, Aristotle had rejected this principle. He came to see that because the basic subjects of the *Categories* are subject to change they are composites of form and matter, and that form is predicated of matter. This latter predication differs in logic and depth of grammar from the predication of the species of a composite. Most importantly, a form's being predicated of a matter accounts for the composite's falling under its species. Thus, a human being is an instance of the species animal because the form of human being is predicated of some "pack of flesh and bones." Loux distinguishes between form and species (the Greek for both is *eidos*): a form is an essence that is fundamental in that it depends on no other essence—it is its own essence; a species consists of a certain form and a certain matter taken universally. The species is predicated of the individual composite; the form is not.

Loux uses these distinctions—culled from analysis of *Metaphysics* 7.3–7.12—to tackle the main problem of *Metaphysics* 7 and 8, that is, how to understand Aristotle's seemingly contrary requirements for *ousia*. Loux maintains that form is *ousia* and that form is a universal. His case rests on the contention that Aristotle's arguments in 7.13 show not that no universal is *ousia*—this would exclude form—but that no universal is the *ousia* of that of which it is predicated (p. 208). Form is the *ousia* of the composite, but it is not predicated of the composite. Though form is predicated of matter, it does not express the essence of the matter; it belongs to matter accidentally, as a such rather than a this. Hence, form does not fall under the arguments of 7.13. Moreover, the key premise in some of those arguments is, "things whose *ousia* and essence are one are themselves one." But Aristotle denies that the *ousia* and essence of a composite are the same: its *ousia* is its form; its essence is its species. Hence, there is no reason that all the composites whose *ousia* is form need be one.

This account raises problems about the status of matter, and Loux's final chapter addresses them. If matter has some nature of its own, then the primacy of form is in question; if matter has no nature, then, contrary to Aristotle's essentialism, there is a something with no nature (p. 246). Loux maintains that Aristotle does not resolve this problem: the existence of an "ultimate subject" for substance "does not square" with essentialism (p. 252). On the other hand, Loux thinks Aristotle did solve the problem of the unity of the composite in *Metaphysics* 8.6, but the solution is apparently simply to recognize that the form-matter predication is primitive.

Loux leaves a great deal unexplained. It is unclear just how a form predication explains a species predication. Loux thinks that the former represents an analysis of the primary subject of the *Categories* into form and matter, but the formal character is just what Aristotle identifies as the species in *Metaphysics* 7.12 and, as Loux notices, throughout the logical works. Furthermore, Loux has Aristotle explaining one supposedly primitive predication with another supposedly primitive predication; but the form predication is, if anything, less intelligible because form is predicated accidentally of matter. Loux explains how to skirt textual obstacles to form's being universal, but

he does not explain how to understand such a form: how can form be a universal if it is not a common character shared by the matter of which it is predicated? Finally, identifying the composite's unity with its being an instance of a genus, Loux does not address the real issue of *Metaphysics* 8.6: why the bits of matter and the form constitute a single entity. It is hard to see how any of these issues could be clarified by relying only on predication, as Loux does. Indeed, the insistence on predication actually generates a conflict with essentialism, Loux argues; is this a problem for Aristotle or, rather, an artifact of Loux's analysis? Loux's account of Aristotle's development is rendered implausible by Plato's dialogues and undermined by his own insistence that despite the incompatibility between *Metaphysics* 7-8 and the *Categories*, the former delineates a theoretical framework that explains, but also preserves, the common sense framework of the *Categories* (pp. 259-60).

Nevertheless, Loux provides much worthwhile discussion of the implications of Aristotle's essentialism, and he effectively criticizes the individual forms interpretation. Analytic scholars will particularly appreciate his linguistic formulations of Aristotelian doctrines, and his treatment of secondary literature.—Edward C. Halper, *University of Georgia*.

MARION, Jean-Luc. *God Without Being: Hors Texte*. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson, with a Foreword by David Tracy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. xxv + 258 pp. \$38.00—For biblical or more precisely Christian theology the way up and the way down are not one and the same. Christian theology could attempt to avoid this potentially embarrassing impasse and, refusing to speak to the philosophers, retreat to a comfortable interiority were it not for the fact that the founder of Christianity and indeed the theologians' own humanity demand otherwise. Philosophy in turn might have chosen to disregard the claims of a theology emboldened by reason and Revelation were it not for its own desire to be comprehensive. Accordingly, no major philosopher of the last millennium has passed over the Bible in silence. Admittedly, the theologians have been reticent of late, yet it is by no means clear that the philosophers have succeeded in restoring thought to its former state of Greek "innocence." It is no surprise, then, that the crisis it is the fashion to call "postmodernism" should have reawakened the old question, *Quid sit deus?* Marion's short, demanding, and at times repetitive book, written "at the border between philosophy and theology," meets this question in a provocative way. This careful translation will surely win him both theologically and philosophically minded readers, as did the French original. His formation points to his currency: among his "teachers" we may mention Derrida; Levinas and Balthasar number among his "masters"; and as he himself admits, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger form his "horizon" (cf. p. xix).

The opening chapter introduces the ruling distinction of the book, that between idol and icon. Through a description one might term phenomenological Marion presents idols as artifacts invested with the searching power of the idolater's own gaze. That gaze is the human desire to look through or beyond everything immediate, to "aim," as he puts it, toward the divine. The idol commands reverence by mirroring in a displaced and therefore unreflective embodiment the divine human look. Icons, in contrast, do not mirror, but measure, our looking. They visibly initiate an invisible encounter with the divine. In this way their "look" precedes ours. Marion may be faulted here for an excessively formal account of idolatry. In particular his silence about the human and extrahuman necessities which plainly figure in natural piety is disappointing, especially since a rational assessment of such "powers" has traditionally been a task common to philosophy and theology. Similarly, his iconography would have been more accessible had he made more evident his debt to the theology of the Eastern Church. Nonetheless his comparison of idol and icon is informative and at times elegant.

The second and third chapters trace the history of "conceptual idolatry," which would be a worship of our own inadequate attempts to think God. Marion suggests that the atheistic denial of such conceptions is no less idolatrous because it too is still under the sway of human efforts to limit the divine. The argument is familiar, although his extension of it is somewhat less so; for he claims that metaphysics always brings us in the end to the same conceptual idolatry it professes to abhor. Hence the title of the book: inspired by Heidegger he supposes that the "onto-theological" turn to "being" entails a "blasphemous" confinement of the biblical God. In the "Preface to the English Edition" Marion cautiously exempts the Thomistic metaphysics of *esse* from this critique, but his disclaimer is unconvincing, for the body of the work nowhere essays an extended consideration of Thomas's contribution. Given the utter impossibility of reducing *ipsum esse per se subsistens* to anything remotely conceptual or "ontic," such a deficit signals a serious shortcoming.

Heidegger himself seems to have toyed with pursuing properly theological investigations, but his resolute engagement with the *Seinsfrage* never waned. Marion attempts to outflank Heidegger's spoken and unspoken teaching by appealing beyond all thought of being to self-revelatory charity which, precisely as a "gift," cannot be reduced to what is seized conceptually. The category of the gift is, Marion would have us see, more fundamental than ontological difference (here again he might profitably have consulted Thomistic *esse*). He hazards two strategies for making the notion of the giftedness of being more salient, one negative and one positive. The first is a meditation on vanity, principally as set forth in *Ecclesiastes*: according to Marion only the experience of the unpredictable excess of love could show us that vanity does not have the last human word. In the second Marion sets forth "in a dogmatic way . . . two emblematic figures of the gift," the Christian doctrine of the Eucharist, and the act of confessing the Christian faith. His treatment of the former is

particularly helpful insofar as he demonstrates that the Real Presence is in no respect a repetition of the much maligned metaphysics of presence.

Books such as this risk incurring the wrath of both the philosophers and the theologians, with the former appealing to the justice of their objections, the latter to the justice of their replies. It is likely that Marion's dependence upon Heidegger and his destruction of all "metaphysics" has prevented Marion from rendering to each his own. Still, the author's willingness to court odium affords reason enough to applaud his work. After all, we were warned long ago that the truth about such matters could be known rationally only "by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors."—John C. McCarthy, *The Catholic University of America*.

McGINN, Colin. *The Problem of Consciousness*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991. viii + 216 pp. \$47.95—Unconsciousness might seem to most people a more genuinely problematic state than consciousness, but McGinn's title alludes to a problem posed to Descartes, and thereby bequeathed to philosophy, by Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. She wondered how a thinking substance, the soul of a man, could determine his bodily spirits to perform voluntary actions. McGinn is concerned with some more contemporary, less obviously Cartesian variants of this mind-body problem—for example, "How is it possible for conscious states to depend on brain states?" and "How could the aggregation of millions of insentient neurons generate subjective awareness?" (p. 1). He suggests that such queries about "the psychophysical link" are in fact what Chomsky calls mysteries, that they are fated to elude our understanding. Using an idea of "cognitive closure" derived more from the notion of a closed mind than from that of a closed system or set, McGinn contends that our cognitive equipment is unequal to the task of apprehending a mysterious property, *P*, that would, if grasped, render the mental-physical link intelligible to us. His confidence that there is such a property seems inspired by a naturalistic belief that there are no miracles which could be presumed to account for consciousness as a magically emergent entity discontinuous with physical reality.

McGinn characterizes his position as a sort of (Kantian) noumenalism (p. 82). This seems reasonable insofar as he rejects the possibility of any phenomenal awareness of *P*, but it seems implausible to the extent that he insists that some (in principle inaccessible) science affords a "natural and prosaic" theory that explains the psychophysical connection (p. 17). McGinn's hypothetical conception of a science beyond our ken, a science of things-in-themselves, is a way of trying to make sense of what he regards as the unintelligible intelligibility of the connection. No mean feat, to be sure. But is (even nontranscendent) science ever really in the business of fathoming rationally intelligible connections? McGinn here seems to presuppose an almost pre-Humean conception of causal relations.

P, that which "makes consciousness an intelligible product of brain activity" and which "constitutes embodiment or emergence," is said to be a property of some hidden structure of consciousness. Overlooking what the classical pragmatists had to say about the mediating role of habits in consciousness, McGinn says that the idea of any hidden structure in consciousness is absent from the intellectual landscape. According to him, consciousness is not so fully revealed to inner sense as we think, and it is the incapacity of introspection to discern the structure of consciousness that makes us unable to solve the mind-body problem.

Readers who doubt that meanings are wholly "in the head" may be disinclined to accept McGinn's comparison between the hidden structure of consciousness and the underlying logical form of propositions; for while logical analysis may in some sense clarify what one believes when one believes that *p*, this is more a matter of reformulating *p* in a way that indicates what follows from *p*—what is true if *p* is—than it is some sort of (introspective?) assay of *p*'s inner nature within the mind of the believer. McGinn suggests that unless propositions actually have logical form they cannot stand in logical relations to one another. This way of thinking may explain why he thinks that consciousness must have some sort of intelligible structure if it is to be related to the brain. (Yet if I am someone's brother, must I be possessed of some sort of abstract brotherness?)

For empirical support of hidden structure McGinn appeals to cases of blindsight, in which, for example, a cortically damaged subject claims not to "see in a certain portion of her visual field," and yet, on the basis of alleged guessing, "can reliably tell you what kind of thing lies in the 'blind' part" (p. 110). But whether blindsight is evidence for some sort of hidden structure seems irrelevant to whether there also exists some *other* sort of hidden structure capable of rendering the mind-body link intelligible to better minds than ours. By what effects is this sort of structure known (or even suspected) to exist?

The second set of four papers in this collection was published before the first four and is said to involve "thinking along different lines." In these final chapters, anomalous monism is defended on non-Davidsonian grounds; functionalism is adjudged to be no more plausible than phenomenalism, which is said to be analogous to but incompatible with functionalism; and machine consciousness is said to require the selfsame unknown property that makes the brain—itself a machine—conscious. McGinn's later thinking, recorded earlier in the book, has it that this unknown is an unknowable property of consciousness, an enigma in which the mystery of consciousness remains shrouded.—Dennis M. Senchuk, *Indiana University*.

McHENRY, Leemon B. *Whitehead and Bradley: A Comparative Analysis*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. 226 pp. Cloth, \$44.50; paper, \$14.95—Whitehead and Bradley both constructed

philosophies of experience based upon feeling, in opposition to theories of scientific materialism (particularly in Whitehead's case). For Bradley reality is ultimately timeless, while for Whitehead reality is process. In the end Whitehead thought his philosophy could be understood as a transformation of absolute idealism in terms of the realities of process. He did not start out thinking this, although the affinities between idealism and process is greatest in the original version of *Science and the Modern World* (1925). The underlying substantial activity, particularly as characterized by its modes, the definite events of the world, could be considered as a dynamic, temporalized conception of the all-inclusive Absolute. Bradley's Wolf-eating-Lamb as a qualification of the Absolute could be seen as a particular event constituting one mode of the substantial activity, despite Whitehead's later emphatic objections (see *Process and Reality* [Free Press, 1978], 43).

Yet Whitehead never accorded the underlying substantial activity a preeminent reality which denigrated the reality of the modes. He embraced monism at this time only because he could not find any adequate individuating principle for events short of the whole. All this changed when he adopted temporal atomicity. Now the individual occasions were the fundamental actualities, and the underlying substantial activity faded into the background as the abstract formative element of creativity. His thought became concretely pluralistic as he sought to understand the nature of passage for these actual occasions.

Even when Whitehead found it necessary to introduce God in the form of a nontemporal actuality, it was not identified with the underlying substantial activity, which alone could be considered all inclusive. At first he was even obligated to think of God as the third attribute of that activity. This timeless actuality was originally conceived as an exceedingly abstract principle limiting eternal objects to those capable of actualization, and later conceived as their timeless synthesis. Thus it is safe to say that during most of the composition of *Process and Reality* Whitehead would have rejected the Absolute out of hand, for the effort to conceive of a single inclusive Reality appears to undercut the reality of passage and time.

What neither he nor any one else seems to have anticipated is the possibility of transforming the concept of an all-inclusive Absolute along temporalistic lines, in terms of the consequent nature. This concept does not appear to have been based so much on a renewed appropriation of Bradley as on internal issues concerning Whitehead's own systematic. He seems to have asked himself, What would happen if God as the concrescence of all conceptual feelings were conceived to have physical feelings of all actualities as well? This concept worked well, for Whitehead could now appropriate Bradley's Absolute by transforming it temporally.

Leemon McHenry's book is a careful, responsible study setting out to do precisely what is required by its title. The two thinkers are compared on such topics as experience (and consciousness), internal and external relations, extension (whole-part relations), time, and God.

While Whitehead may have adopted "feeling" from Bradley to express a more inclusive subjective category than thought or emotion or sensation, he fit it into a framework determined by prehensive relationships. Bradley, on the other hand, seems to have adopted feeling from Hegel as "the vague continuum below relations" (p. 12). Whitehead may be here offering a pluralistic version of this monism of feeling, since connections among the many need to be conceived as relations, and these relations would be feelings.

Bradley's strict monism ultimately precludes any relations at all, but this can be understood as the intensification of internal relations. Certainly it is quite distant from any theory of external relations. Whitehead's theory of prehension is a pluralistic version of internal relations, the many being held apart in that some of the terms are held apart by external relations.

There is really only one point in the analysis of Whitehead's theory that requires further comment, and that concerns the tricky issue of "perishing." McHenry presents T. L. S. Sprigge's objections to Whitehead's theory of time, from Sprigge's *The Vindication of Absolute Idealism* (1983). If, in Sprigge's words, the occasion has "suffered a kind of sea-change" by losing subjective immediacy, how is it identical with itself? (p. 145). McHenry takes this to be the problem of how diverse perspectives can be identical with the one reality experienced; for the being perishes insofar as its impact upon successors is fragmentary and partial. This is clearly one of Whitehead's meanings (*Process and Reality*, 340), for it is this perishing of being that is overcome by its inclusion within the consequent nature.

Yet this is a general problem for all realistic epistemologies. I suspect Sprigge was asking a different question, one closer to Whitehead's particular theory: How can a being be identical with its former self, now that it has lost subjective immediacy? In one sense, it cannot, because now it is a being, whereas formerly it was becoming. But that is precisely the nature of self-creation. Then the question becomes, How can an objective being be identical with its subjective becoming? For the elaborate metaphor of subjective perishing in the attainment of objective immortality is designed to explain how the shift from subject to object is not a shift from one kind of being to another, but from one temporal aspect to another.

Note, however, that this is not the perishing of being Whitehead talks about in the context of the consequent nature. For it is by the perishing of (subjective) becoming that being is attained. A fortiori it is not the complete perishing of being, for it is only by the perishing of becoming that any being can come to be.

In McHenry's final assessment, Bradley's theory is judged to be consistent but, on senses, inadequate; Whitehead's account is more adequate, but inconsistent, largely because God does not exemplify all the metaphysical principles (pp. 164-5). Yet it is enough that God be an actual entity; this need not mean that God is an exception because the consequent concrescence cannot reach final unity. On the other hand, there are real problems concerning God's interaction with the world. McHenry proposes to overcome this difficulty by having

smaller internal satisfactions within the overarching consequent concrescence (pp. 167ff). This would make good sense were it fundamentally a part-whole problem. But becoming is an all-inclusive undertaking, whether in actual occasions or God: no being is attained until there is final unity, which for the divine becoming will never come.—Lewis S. Ford, *Old Dominion University*.

MONDIN, Battista. *Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di san Tommaso d'Aquino*. Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 1991. 687 pp. n.p.—In his encyclopedic dictionary, Battista Mondin proposes to explain the meaning of the more important philosophical and theological concepts occurring in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. In fact, his explanations often become short treatises so that the book is almost the equivalent of a summary, in alphabetical order, of the main themes of Aquinas's philosophy and theology. Mondin provides the historical background of the doctrinal content expressed by certain terms. The book has a total of five hundred thirty-eight entries, most of which concern doctrinal terms. Some entries are about important philosophers quoted by Aquinas, for example, Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, Avicbron, Boethius, Dionysius, and Maimonides; others are entries such as *Aeterni Patris*, Augustinianism, *analogia fidei*, axiology; and modern terms such as contraception, ecology, ecumenism, euthanasia, reincarnation, sport. The texts are written by a specialist who has a very good knowledge of the theological and philosophical works of Aquinas. The wording of the articles is precise, succinct, and clear, and the explanations provided are generally reliable and complete. To those who read Italian, Mondin's book will be a valuable instrument: it will help them to find rapidly the essential points of Aquinas's views on a great number of theological and philosophical subjects. One can only marvel at the degree of completeness attained by the author.—Leo Elders, *Kerkrade, Netherlands*.

MOONEY, Edward F. *Knights of Faith and Resignation: Reading Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. xv + 187 pp. \$12.95—Mooney, in his particularly well-written commentary on Søren Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*, attempts to fill a conspicuous void which exists in Kierkegaard scholarship in the English-speaking world. This void is attested to by the fact that there is no book-length commentary in English on *Fear and Trembling*, which was viewed by Kierkegaard as one of his greatest works, and which has a certain claim to literary renown. Mooney attributes the lack of specific consideration given to this "dialectical lyric" to its provocative and easily misunderstood content.

The Genesis account of Abraham's trial of faith, in which Abraham is instructed by God to offer in sacrifice the same Isaac who was the fulfillment of God's covenantal promise, serves as the literary context for Kierkegaard's portrayal of the relationship between the universally applicable claims of the "ethical" and the claims which are specifically addressed to the individual *qua* individual. It is Mooney's main thesis that Kierkegaard's employment of this pathos-filled account of God's demand and Abraham's obedient response to this demand is not meant to "propose an overthrow of ethics, or embrace a wild irrationalism" (p. ix). Rather, Kierkegaard uses this particular dramatic situation to "raise doubts about his countrymen's understanding of ethics and faith, to awaken them from spiritual complacency, to probe the possibilities for individual life in an age that threatens to level all to a collective mediocrity" (p. 2).

Mooney begins his discussion of Abraham's ordeal of resignation and trust by considering the character of the pseudonymous author of this work, Johannes de silentio. Johannes speaks of, but does not occupy, "the religious sphere of life" of which Abraham is a paragon (p. 5). Mooney suggests that it is this external perspective on the actions and motivations of Abraham which is the cause of Johannes's understanding the "knight of faith" as having acquired faith "on the strength of the absurd." Such is the view of the "poet-narrator [who] lacks the conceptual-experiential repertoire available to the marvelous figure he venerates" (p. 56).

It is Mooney's argument that Abraham's inability to justify his actions by an appeal to a universally valid ethical claim, or to articulate a demonstrative justification for his action, does not render the action completely irrational and groundless. Rather, Abraham's ethical and religious dilemma reveals that "we can undergo a terrible clash of irreconcilable requirements, leaving ethics impotent to point the way" (p. 15). In this ordeal "Abraham is faced with inescapable demands to love and protect his son, and to love and obey his God. To fulfill one is to deny the other; yet to deny either will be unimaginable" (p. 67).

Mooney's interpretation of Kierkegaard's message in *Fear and Trembling* is definitely unique. Rather than pursue the more common interpretation in which Abraham's actions point to the existence of a religious *telos* which transcends and encompasses the ethical *telos* on account of the existence of an absolute duty to God, Mooney asserts that this drama suggests that "strong, nonmoral reasons can sometimes override weak moral ones" (p. 77). These personal reasons or "absolutes" can be motives and commitments which are required for "the ongoing task of reflective self-articulation" (p. 71). According to Mooney, the reasons which can outweigh the universal claims of the ethical "derive from a personal and intuitive conviction . . . [which] need not rest on articulated theoretical foundations" (p. 69). Such an interpretation, however, along with the attempt to relate *Fear and Trembling* to the analytic tradition, side steps the Christian religious motivation which dominates and informs the entire Kierkegaardian corpus.—Peter E. Hojnowski, *Southington, Ct.*

MOSÈS, Stéphane. *System and Revelation: The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig*. Translated by Catherine Tihanyi. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992. 318 pp. \$39.95—Jewish destiny works itself out in the nexus between two poles: between temporal, finite human experience and the eternity of divine governance and orientation. At times the two poles seem close; an intimacy with God seems accessible and worthy of human aspiration. At other times, however, the poles diverge, and God seems remote, human affairs seem a vale of tears, the domain of human responsibility alone. Like human existence, Judaism is embedded in history and yet cleaves to transcendence, and no one has understood the depths of this polarity for human existence in general and for Judaism in particular better than Franz Rosenzweig.

The Star of Redemption, written by Rosenzweig during World War I and published in 1921, overcomes the impersonal and detached perspective of traditional philosophy, grounds philosophical thought in the return to human experience and the personal point of view, and articulates the character of Judaism and Christianity in terms of their complementary relationships to history and eternity. Yet Rosenzweig, in this great work, speaks to us from a distance. For *The Star's* world, the world of German Jewry, has been destroyed, and its fascination with eternity and transcendence, after Nazism and the death camps, may seem to lie in ruins (p. 27).

To see why this is so one must first understand Rosenzweig's system in *The Star*; this task is an exceedingly demanding one. The book, for all its significance and influence, has not been well understood or even widely read. This is especially true in the English-speaking world, where the work is poorly translated and where helpful guidance is rare. Rosenzweig's thinking and writing are technical, complex, allusive, and obscure. It is hardly surprising that many speak about his work and thought without immersing themselves in it. The present book, a translation of a work first published in French in 1982, aims to guide the reader through such a reading. As he points out, the author intends neither an intellectual biography nor a study of Rosenzweig's work as a whole. Rather, his goal is narrower: "To analyze . . . Rosenzweig's philosophical system as elaborated in his central work, *The Star of Redemption*" (p. 28).

The book begins with a brief but helpful chapter on Rosenzweig's intellectual sources—from Hegel and Schelling to Friedrich Meinecke and Hermann Cohen—and the way in which *The Star* emerged from Rosenzweig's own struggles concerning Judaism, Christianity, and the nature of philosophy. Mosès makes some very important points along the way. For example, he notes how World War I and its violence stimulated in Rosenzweig a critique of nationalism and the State which came to be "generalized into his radical refusal of history" (p. 33). Mosès also points out that Rosenzweig's respect for Goethe should be viewed as a feature of his affinity for objectivity and his opposition to the threats of relativism. Later, religion and especially revelation provide the vehicle for such objectivity; revelation is the means for "orienting" the individual in space and time, for locating human existence vis-à-vis history and its goal, truth or eternity. Mosès' central

insight in this chapter is a very important one: Rosenzweig saw his challenge to be the uniting of the systematic character of a structured, totalizing philosophy with the requirements of a personal thinking grounded in revelation (pp. 36–42). In a sense, Rosenzweig's work is his alternative to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a systematic resolution of historical experience and an eternal totality, but without succumbing to either relativism or idealism. The reader will find this chapter an extremely valuable and accessible introduction to Rosenzweig's thought.

The remainder of the book is more demanding. *The Star* contains three parts. The first exhibits the failures of traditional Western philosophy as it has attempted to reduce the objects of experience and knowledge to God or humanity or nature. It sets out these three—God, man, and world—as being together the preconditions of situated, first-person experience but as needing yet to be properly understood. The second part carries out this task by following the experiencing subject as he first grasps nature as contingent, then experiences the world as permeated by divine disclosure and love, and finally turns to the other, the neighbor, in love and community. In the third part, Rosenzweig describes Judaism and Christianity as the two modes of historical existence that stretch out between Creation and the end of history. The details of this threefold account are often obscure, allusive, and complicated. Only the third part makes much sense at first reading, and even it is difficult to follow in detail. Mosès' chapter on the first part nicely raises and answers the important question of the *status* of the results (pp. 56–68). But its own arcane vocabulary makes it opaque and often as mystifying as the original. His three chapters on part two—on Creation, Revelation, and Redemption—are rich but fail to provide much perspective or background on Rosenzweig's text. Clearest and doubtless most helpful is Mosès' treatment of Judaism—with a focus on Judaism's specificity, its relation to history, its focus on ritual and the cycle of sacred time, and its critique of politics and Zionism—and his account of Christianity, its worldliness, and of the relation between Christian existence and sacred art.

Overall, Mosès' study of *The Star* is a serious, deep, and important contribution to the field. *The Star* is severely architectonic, overly intricate, and excessively structured. Mosès follows Rosenzweig almost too closely; when he steps back to provide background or give a framework for interpreting what Rosenzweig is doing, he is insightful and interesting; but he does this too rarely. At times his commentary is as obscure as the work that it seeks to clarify. Often it is not, however, and for this we should be grateful. Rosenzweig is one of a few great Jewish thinkers of this century; he is also the most impenetrable. We have only a few really helpful guides to his work in English. Mosès' book may not be easy to read, but it is surely one of this small number.—Michael L. Morgan, *Indiana University*.

NICHOLSON, Graeme. *Illustrations of Being: Drawing Upon Heidegger and Upon Metaphysics*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1992.

xiii + 293 pp. \$49.95—"The thesis of the present book is that we all possess, a priori, an awareness, or even understanding, of being (and other subjects) that guides our daily practice as well as any subsequent philosophical interpretations" (p. 167). The awareness is preontological, and this "pre-ontological awareness [of being] is what does the philosophizing" (p. 95) in each historical epoch. It has yielded a series of interpretations of being as substance, reality, the Trinity, the principles of symbolic logic, dialectical reason, consciousness—to name the most important—which we recognize as the various major grounding concepts of metaphysics. But the interpretations are merely "illustrations of being." None is fundamental and others are possible.

Inspired by Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* as well as by his later works, the present work is an ambitious ontological study of yet another illustration of being: existence. But while knowledge of Heidegger's work is essential to appreciate Nicholson's inspiration for his work, the present work is not an esoteric text written in the Heideggerian idiom. The first part of the book is a discussion of Heidegger's thought as the culmination, "for our times at least" (p. 29), of the long history of being's self-revealing (presence) and self-hiding (absence). Here Nicholson reviews the basic concepts of Heidegger's thought and begins his own illustration of being in a study of what he calls the exister, "a being like ourselves for whom the one and only matter at issue is to be" (p. 45). The term "exister" is Nicholson's candidate for a translation of Heidegger's early central term for the being of human existence, *Dasein*. The term is Walter Lowrie's rendering of *den Existerende* in Søren Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. A human being philosophizes because he or she is an exister and therefore a discloser of possible experiences (p. 65).

Part 2 explicates the most important illustrations of being in Western philosophy: the metaphysics of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, the dialectical materialists, and the symbolic logicians. The author discovers behind each metaphysical doctrine an experience of time that has been eclipsed by the very illustration of being for which it is determinative. The epochal experience of time in each instance determines the mode of existence of the exister and, in turn, the character of the exister's fundamental metaphysical figure.

Clearly, Nicholson sees in Heidegger's thought a means of understanding both the history of philosophy and the crisis of the present age. The book begins with a plea for philosophy in an age of disheartening and confusing doubt among many professional philosophers. The author argues against several contemporary trends in the "literary criticism" of philosophical texts, including Jacques Derrida's deconstructions, and against what he calls "Unphilosophy," which claims to have found in writing about being throughout the Western tradition a source of doctrines that can and have been used to control and exploit people (pp. xi-xii).

In the concluding chapter Nicholson advocates what he terms "Green Philosophy." He does not tell us very much, however, about how this is related to the thinking and writing about being that he

has undertaken in his book. Whatever the nature of his political engagement may be, his delight in philosophy is as reassuring as his certainty of its value is encouraging.—Miles Groth, *New York, N.Y.*

RANKIN, Kenneth. *The Recovery of the Soul: An Aristotelian Essay on Self-Fulfillment*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991. xxii + 298 pp. \$44.95—This work is a hybrid: part analysis and critique of Aristotle's philosophical system and part independent philosophical theorizing. Rankin presents his text as an effort to recuperate a fading interest in the Stagirite within the contemporary philosophic community. His approach is decidedly Analytical and it adverts to many of the central philosophical problems discussed by that school, for example, Wittgenstein's view of language, Moore's naturalistic fallacy, McTaggart's paradox, and so forth. The style is somewhat turgid and considerably overworked.

Rankin distinguishes six separate Aristotelian themes; of these, he rejects the first two (and arguably three) entirely and significantly modifies the other four according to his own philosophic perspective. A review of these themes will serve as an overview of the work. The first is that Aristotle's philosophy constitutes a process of enlightenment in which the knower moves from what is more known to us to what is more knowable in itself. This ascension ultimately ends in an awareness of the self-reflective knowing of the Prime Mover. The view assumes an identification of substance (or as Rankin prefers to call it, "non-arbitrary thinghood") with form conceived as psychological entity. This identity is acceptable to Rankin, but Aristotle conceives substance too narrowly as intellectual. "Then, to compound the mischief, he conceived it as immaterial" (p. 124). Thus Rankin rejects outright the transcendent and nonmaterial Prime Mover.

Second, Aristotle's defense of a first philosophy that studies the Prime Mover is an anthropomorphism, Rankin holds. "Presumably it is by an extrapolation from their own intellectual activity that first philosophers become aware of the divine nature as the eternal self-engrossed activity of contemplation" (p. 97). The projection of teleological purposiveness into the world extends to both the dynamic and geometric realm of physics and to the biological realm of plant and animal life.

For Aristotle, thirdly, substances are instantiations of form in matter; but for Rankin "there are no such things as unique individual essences whereby actual and possible particulars are all individuated from each other" (p. 228). The rejection of these first three themes makes it clear that Rankin intends to discard Aristotelian metaphysics.

Rankin agrees with Aristotle that the soul is a potentiality, and he makes use of this tenet in his discussion of the moral order in chapter 9. He argues that the self is motivated by its desire for an unqualified good, and ultimately for that good which is essentially self-

desiderative. This desire constitutes the distinctive potentiality of the human being. Moral standards, however, are not laws derived from individually intuited and objectively existing goods, but are prescriptive utterances derived from each moral agent who lives (playing on Kant's "kingdom of ends") in a "republic of means."

Rankin believes that for Aristotle the soul or mind confers being upon other natural substances in a manner similar to that in which the skill of the hand confers utility on the tools it handles. The soul exemplifies freedom in this activity and so possesses an "indeterministic" power of choice; this freedom accounts for our grasp of the structure of reality as intrinsically temporal. Nevertheless, the soul is physical in character and possesses no properly spiritual dimension.

Finally, according to Rankin, the highest good is the ultimate reifying factor for substance; but because Rankin rejects the transcendent Prime Mover, he must locate this highest good in the universal and self-desiderative desire of the physical human being. It is a core task of this book to "detranscendentalize" the Prime Mover and to transpose its powers to ordinary human souls.

Rankin has obviously expended a great deal of effort on this project; it represents many years of solid work and reflection. The reader will be impressed with his keen sense for subtle distinctions and his unrelenting demand for precise terminology. Nonetheless, as an Aristotelian essay, it is more a measure of how different our own age is from that of ancient Greece than a philosophic effort in the Aristotelian spirit. As an attempt to readjust Aristotle's outlook to a world that has vastly changed since ancient times, the work is highly thought-provoking and original. There is no doubt, however, that Aristotle would have much to say in his own defense were he with us today.—E. J. Furton, *St. Charles Borromeo Seminary*.

ROUSSEAU, Mary. *Community: The Tie That Binds*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991. xiv + 173 pp. Cloth, \$39.75; paper, \$21.75—Mary Rousseau has written an important work on community. In this text she considers the contrasting foundations and effects of communitarian society versus contractual society. Citing several examples of concrete choices she relentlessly seeks to demonstrate that community is the only real choice that faces people who want fulfillment in their lives.

Rousseau considers the roots of the meaning of community within language, in the ancient philosophical problem of the one and the many, and in Enlightenment philosophers such as Hobbes. Citing her own orientation as coming from Aristotle, St. Thomas, and existentialist philosophy, she then lays a foundation for the claim that altruistic love is the indispensable basis for community.

Developing Aristotle's third kind of friendship as based on the concern for the good of the other more than the good of the self, Rousseau describes the way in which acts of friendship enable an individual to

overcome an ontological and psychological loneliness. A decentering of the self allows a person to want what is good for the other's sake rather than for one's own sake.

After having established her fundamental concept of community, Rousseau then elaborates a contrast between communities and contracts. Contractual bonds are described as primarily egotistical associations, in which people seek their own fulfillment and use others as an end to their own utility or pleasure. The radical individuality of social contract theory, which had its roots in Enlightenment thought, views human associations as power struggles amid conflicts of rights. In this situation what is useful is some aspect or quality of the other self. So contract society depersonalizes the other by turning him or her "into an object rather than a subject, into a means rather than an end, and into a thing rather than a person" (p. 55).

Rousseau next considers what binds people together in communities. She offers two different suggestions: first, that individual, separately existing human beings have a common source or Creator, common goal, and common exemplar; and second, that sincere persons, who may not have a faith in a transcendent God, may nonetheless share a common goal of the search for truth. Rousseau calls these religious or humanist beliefs the "tie that binds" persons together in communities. She concludes that "any basis for genuine community must consist in some prior link of its potential members to a common transcendent reality" (p. 98).

In subsequent chapters the basic argument of the text shifts from a focus on ontological and psychological dynamics of community to ethical and legal duties, obligations, and norms. Placing an emphasis on the importance of an interior attitude which is either "altruistically or egocentrically motivated," Rousseau concludes that all acts either promote community or destroy community. Consequently, community is not simply one option among others, but it becomes an obligation of all human beings. She concludes: "Community is our basic moral absolute, not a matter of preference or a value that is relative to time, place, or circumstances" (p. 115). Law, when properly understood, becomes a guide to find the way toward altruistic love, toward building up specific communities of persons. Her work concludes with the attempt to demonstrate in practical examples ways in which decisions do or do not express this understanding of community.

The book is written in a very readable style. It flows easily from one point to the next, and would serve very well in an undergraduate university course as a text. There is a considerable amount of repetition of the basic lines of thought, so that the reader can follow the argument of the author. At times the nuances or specific details of qualifications of arguments are left out. Nonetheless, this is an excellent and well-written book which gives very much needed sharpness to the debate about contract societies and communal societies, and about our own obligation to make particular kinds of moral choices.—Prudence Allen, *Concordia University*.

SCHAEFER, David Lewis. *The Political Philosophy of Montaigne*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. xv + 407 pp. n.p.—The author re-

gards Montaigne as one of the architects of modern political thought, a precursor of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and the American Founding Fathers. The *Essais*, for Schaefer, are notable primarily on account of their formulation of a primitive version of bourgeois liberalism: the doctrine that society functions best when individuals pursue their own self-interest with a minimum of governmental interference. Montaigne, in other words, was an early Modern apostle of the gospel preached in our own time by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.

The image which Montaigne presents of himself as a humane and quirkily original commentator on classical texts and contemporary mores has beguiled readers for centuries. In Schaefer's view, however, this charming self-portrait was part of a cunning rhetorical strategy, which allowed Montaigne to put forward revolutionary ideas without antagonizing the ecclesiastical and political authorities of his day or arousing the suspicions of his more orthodox readers. By making this claim, Schaefer gives himself carte blanche to dismiss whatever he finds inconvenient in the surface level of the *Essais*, that is, what Montaigne actually says he thinks and believes. Again and again we are told to look beyond the ostensible, purported, or putative sense of the text in order to discover a deeper level of meaning. Not surprisingly, this meaning has eluded all previous interpreters of the work; for Schaefer can only discover these secret doctrines by means of a complicated procedure in which apparently unconnected passages in different (but, according to him, numerically significant) chapters are placed against one another in such a way as to subvert a straightforward reading of the text.

Schaefer's belief that Montaigne resorted to this twofold method of exposition, in which overt statements aimed at the censors and common run of people concealed covert messages, decipherable only by the philosophical elite, is not based on analysis of sixteenth-century political and religious treatises, very few of which he seems to know first hand. Rather, it is founded on the ideas of his mentor, Leo Strauss. While Schaefer calls on Strauss, Strauss's disciple Allan Bloom, and even the economist Milton Friedman to corroborate his arguments, he almost entirely neglects Renaissance thinkers, except for Machiavelli, whom he sees entirely in Straussian terms. Pierre Charron, the most important popularizer of Montaigne's ideas, is either unknown to him or has been omitted because his writings demonstrate that even the most sensitive and intelligent contemporary readers accepted Montaigne (as Schaefer is unwilling to do) at face value.

Montaigne always claimed to be a loyal son of the Catholic Church and professed himself willing to accept its authority in all things spiritual. The skepticism he so brilliantly deploys in his "Apology for Raymond Sebond" is classified by many scholars as a form of fideism, a doctrine which contrasts the unreliability of entirely rationally acquired knowledge with the absolute certainty of the revealed truths of faith. Schaefer, who devotes three chapters to the "Apology," rejects this view, maintaining that religion, above all

Christianity, far from being exempt from Montaigne's skeptical critique, was its main target. Here, as elsewhere, his case is undermined by a lack of familiarity with sixteenth-century thought. He states, for instance, that "the chief source of the supposed fideism of the Renaissance was the teaching of Pietro Pompanozzi [*sic*]" (p. 50n), apparently unaware that it was Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's *Examen vanitatis gentium doctrinae* (1520) which put fideism on the scholarly map. Had he consulted this fundamental work, Schaefer would have seen that fideism was a perfectly respectable intellectual stance in the context of the late Renaissance. It was not until the seventeenth century that the weapons of skepticism, formerly used to defend the faith, began to be turned against it.

Schaefer argues that by placing man firmly within the animal kingdom, Montaigne is attempting to convince us "to forsake the concern with the divine and the transcendent, things of which we can have no true knowledge" (p. 170), and to focus instead on the practical and achievable goal of satisfying our corporeal needs. Montaigne is presented as a pre-Baconian promoter of the scientific revolution, aiming to convince philosophers to turn their attention away from the futility of metaphysics and toward the utilitarian goal of providing earthly goods for the benefit of the people. The people, on the other hand, were meant to learn from their superficial reading of the *Essais* to stop worrying about salvation in the next life, an obsession which had led to the horrors of the religious wars, and to treat the Earth as their exclusive home, giving themselves up to a selfish but harmless hedonism. As usual, Schaefer looks at the *Essais* from the distorting perspective of later developments, which leads him to transform Montaigne's sixteenth-century Christian Epicureanism into a wholehearted endorsement of the consumer society.—Jill Kraye, *Warburg Institute, University of London*.

SENUCHUK, Dennis M. *Against Instinct: From Biology to Philosophical Psychology*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. xxii + 277 pp. \$44.95—If, as is now commonly believed, there are no impenetrable fences separating science from philosophy, there seems no good reason why scientists and philosophers should not cultivate each other's gardens. It is in this spirit, and not as a mere servant, that Senuchuk works to bring down the theory of the instinctive in its various guises and replace it with his own account of conscious flexibility. His primary concern is, I think, with the explanation of human behavior (towards the end of the book his angry impatience with Edward O. Wilson's entomology of the human breaks out), but frogs, geese, and other beasts are also given their day. The result is a very good book which is densely packed with argument relieved by (usually good) humor.

In the first of two parts Senuchuk makes use of "a Pyrrhonian sceptical critique" (p. xv) whereby possible, plausible nonnativist

explanations are given of behavioral facts that ethologists such as Lorenz and Tinbergen have presented as requiring the postulation of instincts. Besides giving a notably imaginative "phenomenological" description of the tribulations of an intelligent mother greyleg goose, Senchuk undertakes the critical investigation of several important theoretical issues, including the interpretation of deprivation experiments (in which animals are supposedly denied opportunities for learning) and of Lorenz's notion of innate informational content resident in the nervous system. By the end of this section, only readers whose nativism is hard-wire imprinted will remain unmoved.

In the second part Senchuk develops his account of what it is to be an animal possessed of a prehensile consciousness, an awareness initially barely informed but grasping. In fact, he shifts the focus of the debate from the traditional controversy over the relative contributions of nature and nurture to the issue of flexibility. There is something mechanically set about instincts, if any such exist, whereas consciousness, even when settled into habits, is, paradoxically, inherently flexible. Here we are fairly clearly in the philosophical rather than the scientific garden, even though the gate between the two stays open. For Senchuk, flexibility cannot be given a deterministic explanation in terms of feedback mechanisms and such, and so flexibility is not to be confused with the mere plasticity of some machines. Nor is the consciousness which is thus flexible in any way reducible to the physical, even though he thinks complex macroscopic objects such as brains also show indeterminacy. Senchuk tries to answer the obvious metaphysical questions arising from all this by espousing emergentism and a double-aspect theory of the mental and the physical. There are, I think, problems with both these positions that need to be taken up in more detail than he attempts. For example, just how do we distinguish the double-aspect theory from, on the one hand, the epiphenomenalism into which it seems about to degenerate or, on the other, the dualistic interactionism into which it appears poised to expand? How do we answer the "How lucky!" response to the theory of the emergence of the mental? It may be that Senchuk has such questions in mind for answering in future publications.

Whether or not one accepts Senchuk's conclusions, his way to them contains many valuable discussions—of teleology, the "mindedness" of computers, and so on—that should prove independently interesting to students of philosophical psychology and the philosophy of biology. His book might encourage some peering over garden fences.—Alan Olding, *Macquarie University, Australia*.

SKULSKY, Harold. *Language Recreated: Seventeenth-Century Metaphorists and the Act of Metaphor*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992. 233 pp. \$45.00—Skulsky examines how figurative language acts in seventeenth-century English poetry. Though a working knowledge of these poets would be helpful to the reader, particularly with respect

to the work of John Donne, George Herbert, and Henry Vaughan, it is not absolutely necessary. Furthermore, though Skulsky's book may be of primary interest to the student of poetry, much of what he says in respect to the way in which language operates will be of concern to the philosopher.

Skulsky points out that metaphorical language cannot be truly understood if it is read on a literal level where it will usually turn out to be nothing more than false. Skulsky espouses the classical view that a particular reading of a text is either correct or incorrect, and he rejects the idea that any interpretation provided cleverly enough can be correct. In order for metaphorical language to be properly understood one must first know what kind of talk is going on and who is doing the talking. Such language is set in its own historical time and this must be considered if it is to be properly understood. In short, meaning must be discovered and not invented.

Skulsky then goes on to give an extensive account of the various types of figurative language one might encounter in seventeenth-century English poetry. He provides the reader with a number of examples of these types and explains how they are to be interpreted. For Skulsky the use of metaphor creates a new language. Hence it cannot be seen as a vain attempt to decorate ordinary language, but as an effort to express something which ordinary language is incapable of expressing. Because of this the reader cannot take a text at face value, but he must also be careful that he does not impose his own illusions upon a text which he is supposed to be interpreting. Metaphors must always be read in context and the words cannot be made to mean something they did not mean when they were articulated. Their true meaning cannot be discovered by treating them as if they had been articulated under different circumstances. In short, *ex post facto* meaningfulness is simply false. According to Skulsky, metaphors may be best understood as a move in the game of dialogue. Even in ordinary conversation we do not take the speaker's words at face value: "We let him build up his own idiom, and we do the best we can to learn it as he and we go along" (p. 222). Reading is a kind of one-way conversation where one negotiates with the text, and this is particularly the case when one is reading metaphorical language. For Skulsky, poems—and metaphorical language in general—must be read as mini-conversations within the wider conversation of culture.

Skulsky's book also includes two interesting appendixes. The first examines Donald Davidson's argument that there is no difference between figurative and literal meaning. Skulsky rejects Davidson's position by pointing out that the definition of language which Davidson adopts is so narrow and transient that what he is speaking of can in no way be properly called a language. In the second appendix Skulsky gives an account of how his theory accords with the psychological discovery that figurative understanding takes no longer than literal understanding provided the reader has been alerted to the relevant talk postulates.—David J. De Leonadis, *Jersey City, N.J.*

URVOY, Dominique. *Ibn Rushd, Averroes*. Translated by O. Stewart. Arab Thought and Culture. New York: Routledge, 1991. 156 pp. \$18.95—This book purposes to study Ibn Rushd in his historic context. The introduction depicts the doctrinal and cultural background of the Muslim world of southern Spain in the time of Averroes to consider next the philosopher's life. It was Averroes' intention to construct a coherent system and to determine how far reason can take us in the analysis of reality (p. 29). His disgrace resulted from the desire of the Almohad rulers to win over the masses by a political gesture.

The *Short, Middle, and Long Commentaries* witness to different periods in the life of the great Arab philosopher. Urvoy distinguishes a phase of scientific preparation, a period during which Averroes formulated his religious thought, and a third phase dedicated to the study of the entire field of knowledge (p. 90). In his medical work Averroes tries to give a summary of the medical knowledge of the East as well as of the West. Averroes is essentially a philosopher of nature (p. 58), although his works on law are very scholarly. In fact, he is a many-sided genius whose interest embraces the whole of reality.

Urvoy devotes ample space to what has been considered the most typical doctrine of Averroes (the unity of the possible intellect of all men, as well as the uniqueness of the agent intellect). With J. Jolivet he explains this theory by the presence of Neo-Platonic elements (p. 102) as well as by Averroes' desire to construct an overall coherence where Aristotle was satisfied with observation in each field of scientific studies. According to Averroes, it is man's function to take forms back to their origin by thinking them (p. 103). Wisdom transcends the human individual.

In the Muslim world Averroes has remained a marginal figure whose greatness was rediscovered toward the end of the nineteenth century. He found a much better audience with the Jews, who were instrumental in handing over his work to the Christians. Jewish scholars in southern France took over much of Averroes' criticism of Avicenna. In the Latin West, Ibn Rushd's influence increased after 1220 (Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant). Ramon Marti extensively quoted him and may have provided Thomas with texts. Ramon Lull, on the other hand, was involved in a polemic.

This book is a reliable and scholarly guide. Its usefulness would have been greater if Urvoy would have given more information on the Muslim rulers in southern Spain, and added a glossary of some Arab terms as well as a number of extra pages on the philosophy of Averroes. The translation by Stewart is correct, although occasionally somewhat stiff.—Leo J. Elders, *Kerkrade, Netherlands*.

WEISS, Paul. *Creative Ventures*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992. xvi + 341 pp. \$45.00—Weiss seeks to clarify the distinctive nature of creativity and created work through an examination of five creative ventures: art, mathematics, a noble character,

leadership, and statesmanship (p. 31). Creativity, strictly interpreted, means "the production of splendors which, when well read, open one up to final conditions as pertinent to whatever there is" (p. 162). Weiss's examination differs from previous efforts in seeking to uncover "what creators presuppose and utilize, how they proceed . . . [and] the nature of that with which they end" through knowing "what all the ultimate factors are and how they are and could be joined" (p. 3). The ultimate factors are identified as conditions and the Dunamis. Conditions (finalities, modes of being), which are static, structural, and knowable, are the source of fixities. The Dunamis is a "primary pulsating ground."

"Creative activity begins with an attempt to produce an excellent work" (p. 32) and "turns a prospective excellence into a single unification of a plurality of separately produced parts" (p. 1). One creative venture differs from another "primarily in its concern with a particular kind of excellence, other ways of employing ultimate factors, the production of other kinds of units, and a successful, technical mastery of special materials" (p. 43). Particular excellences begin as bare, indeterminate prospects that "become more and more determinate by being realized as factors used in a distinctive venture" (p. 194). Creators, using distinct epitomizations of their privacy and embedding the results in special materials, repeatedly merge conditions and the Dunamis so that the unification of these ultimates achieves the prospective excellence focused upon. Human creators differ from other humans not in kind but in activity, by realizing "prospective excellences beyond any preassignable degree" (p. 249).

Beauty is the prospective excellence of art, the truth of mathematics, the good of a noble character, the glory of leadership, and the justice of statesmanship. The Dunamis turns the creator toward the prospective excellence, grounds the root-relatedness of all factors involved, gives vibrancy to, and carries the reader toward, what is made available by a created work. The condition most pertinent to art is the voluminous, which is "dealt with as being primarily spatial, temporal, or transformative" (p. 5). Mathematics utilizes the rational, which is "sheer intelligibility or form." Forging a noble character employs the stratifier, which is "an assessing, ordering power." Leadership makes use of the affiliator, which "enables items to be inter-involved with one another as more or less compatible and supportive." Statesmanship implements the coordinator.

A good reading of the created work discerns the effective condition operative in a creative venture. A good reading of a created work begins with the identification of an excellent work and follows the lead of the feeling in it, which results in "the reader being opened up to depths intrusive on what is daily confronted" (p. 44). Weiss notes that if what he maintains about creative activity is correct, "a good reading of all kinds of creation will make evident the nature of all the conditions that operate everywhere, and which the cosmos, nature, the humanized world, and men specialize in diverse ways" (p. 308).

Creative Ventures extends in important ways, and helpfully applies to creativity, previously developed Weissian insights into human pri-

vacy, conditions, and the Dunamis. Of particular importance are the appendix that further clarifies the nature and character of the Dunamis and where it is encountered, and the chart that details the relationships between the various elements pertaining to creative ventures. There are noteworthy treatments of work and creativity, of various views of mathematics and set theory as the foundation of mathematics, of the nature and development of character, of the nature of genuine leadership, and of the nature of statesmanship and justice. The volume is an important addition both to Weissian scholarship and to reflection on the nature of creativity.—Thomas Kretté, *Creighton University*.

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS*

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 66, No. 2, Spring 1993

Husserl on Eidetic Intuition and Historical Interpretation,
RICHARD COBB-STEVENSON

Husserl's early works describe eidetic intuition as a process of discernment guided by imagined limit cases and sophisticated sorting procedures, rather than as a straightforward and unmediated seeing. Moreover, his examples highlight the role of intellectual prudence in deciding when the process should come to an end. Like Aristotle, he recognizes that discernment of essences requires both method and judgment. A sense of the mean between extremes is as necessary in intellectual inquiry as it is in practical affairs. The later Husserl's method of historical interpretation proceeds by a narrative mode of argument that calls for imaginative excursions backward and forward in history. Fully aware of the hermeneutic circle entailed by this zigzag method of imaginative reconstruction, Husserl acknowledges the incomplete and tentative character of historical truths. This article emphasizes the continuity between the Aristotelian prudence of Husserl's early works and the more explicitly hermeneutic stance of his later works.

Edmund Husserl's Reformation of Philosophy: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern? JOHN J. DRUMMOND

This paper reveals central features of Husserl's conception of the nature of philosophy by reflecting upon pivotal aspects of a Husserlian history of philosophy: (1) the notion, common to the Greek and modern enlightenments, of an autonomous critical reason; (2) the Greek development of a theoretical attitude; (3) modern philosophy's incipient transcendental

* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

turn; (4) Husserl's full-fledged development of the phenomenological reduction; and (5) the unifying telos of philosophy, namely, the disclosure of the conditions and categories underlying intelligibility. In the course of this discussion, the paper also briefly discusses Husserl's relation to that history of philosophy.

Phenomenology of Religion: Limits and Possibilities,
LOUIS DUPRÉ

A phenomenology of religion that is more than a mere description faces unique problems of interpretation. As in all other acts, the ego constitutes the meaning of the religious act. Yet the religious believer considers both the object of his faith and the symbols in which it is expressed essentially given or revealed. Does this imply, as Scheler concluded, that phenomenology requires a sharing of that faith? Henry Duméry argues that the religious act does indeed "project" meaning, but that the projecting act itself is intrinsically given. A problem remains, however, concerning the specific nature and function of what the believer considers revealed. Are they characterized by a merely human response to specific cultural conditions? If so, the religious expression contains no transcendent message, but only a transcendent impulse. To avoid that conclusion, further reflection on the phenomenological concept of truth as disclosure is needed. In it, truth is at once active and passive.

Entelechy in Transcendental Phenomenology: A Sketch of the Foundations of Husserlian Metaphysics, JAMES HART

Husserl's metaphysics and his philosophical theology have to do properly, as Iso Kern has pointed out, with the conditions of reason. This essay continues earlier efforts to work out Husserl's metaphysics and philosophical theology. To get clear on the notion of entelechy as it appears in Husserl, Hans Driesch's position (which probably had some influence) and its critique by Hedwig Conrad-Martius are reviewed. For Husserl, entelechy works in tandem with *Idee*, which is his appropriation of the Kantian regulative ideal to account for the teleology which is evident both at the higher-order levels of constituted being (intersubjectivity, nature, culture, social ethics, politics, and so forth), and at the constituting levels of intentionality and the elemental primal presencing.

Some Husserlian Comments on Depiction and Art,
JOHN B. BROUGH

The article examines Husserl's sketch of a phenomenology of depiction—which he linked to the nature and consciousness of the work of art—as it appears in *Husserliana* 23 (1980). While perception involves a single object, depiction becomes constituted in the interplay of three objects: the physical image (the canvas and pigment belonging to a portrait, for ex-

ample), the image-object (the image that actually appears when one looks at the portrait), and the image-subject (the person depicted). The image-object is present with the force and vivacity of perception, but is not intended as actually existing. Husserl therefore calls it a "perceptual illusion" or "perceptual fiction," insisting, however, on its difference from the object of ordinary sensory deception. Works of art can but do not have to be depictive; they must, however, possess a physical basis and an image-object or perceptual fiction that can be contemplated aesthetically.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. 29, No. 4, October 1992

Who or What Has Moral Standing? MARTIN SCHÖNFELD

Given that the domain of moral patients ought to be well founded and well demarcated, and given that an environmental ethics ought to account for the undesirability of classic cases of environmental degradation, the standard views currently discussed in environmental ethics (such as anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism, or holism) are not satisfactory. It is argued that the maximum set of entities possessing moral standing consists of all and only living beings, as the proper and nonmetaphorical objects of benefits and harms. Set-internal differences in the significance of moral standing imply a demarcation between paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic moral patients (humans and higher evolved animals versus less developed organisms and plants), and suggest a hierarchy of overriding circumstances preparing the way for a feasible normative system. Inanimate objects and collections (species, ecosystems, the land) cannot be said to possess moral standing and are outside the realm of immediate moral relevance.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. 30, No. 1, January 1993

Friendship, Morality, and Special Obligation,
JAMES O. GRUNEBAUM

This article examines arguments which try to demonstrate that people ought to treat their friends with preference as compared to nonfriends, or that people have special duties to their friends. Two different strategies are examined. The first tries to deduce the obligation to treat friends preferentially from the morality inherent in friendship. This deduction faces the dilemma that either the values of friendship are fundamental to morality, in which case special treatment of friends is not morally justified;

or special treatment of friends is morally justified, so that the values inherent in friendship are not moral values.

The second strategy consists in deducing the obligation of special treatment from different moral principles. The article concludes that moral principles which are based upon a strong premise of human equality, such as Kant's categorical imperative, are less able to justify special treatment of or special duties to friends than are moral principles which are not grounded on assumptions of human equality, such as Hare's rule utilitarianism.

Coercion and the Hiddenness of God,

MICHAEL J. MURRAY

Atheists often challenge the theist by asking why God would fail to make His existence more evident to us if, as theists contend, belief in God is a necessary condition of ultimate human fulfillment. This article argues that creaturely freedom is a significant good and that preserving such freedom requires that certain conditions obtain. One of these conditions is the absence of coercion by means of a threat. It is further argued that if the Christian God were to make His existence evident to too great an extent, our beliefs and actions would be originating in the context of a threat sufficient to preclude the exercise of morally significant freedom. Consequently, God must veil His existence to a certain extent in order to preserve the important good of creaturely freedom.

Contractualist Impartiality and Personal Commitments,

MADISON POWERS

Several contemporary moral philosophers, including Bernard Williams, Susan Wolf, Michael Stocker, and Lawrence Blum, have argued that Kantian moral theory, and perhaps any impartial moral theory, rests upon an implausible account of human motivation. A commitment to acting only as one's impartial moral theory permits or requires is said to be objectionable in several respects: it is too demanding; it is incompatible with the motivations essential to friendship and love; it crowds out nonmoral virtues needed for well-being; and it presents a distorted account of the relation between moral justification and personal motivation. The argument of this article is that a contractualist theory of impartial morality can defeat each of these objections.

Conceptual Analysis and the Essence of Knowledge,

JAMES E. TAYLOR

Although many epistemologists have attempted to discern the nature of knowledge, few lately have discussed the best method for this task. The received view is that knowing the correct analysis of the concept of knowledge is necessary and sufficient for determining what knowledge is. The

thesis of this paper is that conceptual analysis is not sufficient as a method for grasping the essence of knowledge. Potential supplementary methods include scientific investigation and global metaphysical theorizing. A tentative assessment of the former brings encouragement for epistemologists interested in naturalizing epistemology. A preliminary evaluation of the latter engenders skepticism about knowing the complete essence of knowledge—a skepticism that is the reasonable response of those who do not believe that knowing is a naturalistic property.

*The Metaphysics and Metapsychology of Personal Identity:
Why Thought Experiments Matter in Deciding Who We Are,*
DANIEL KOLAK

Personal identity is metaphysical and metapsychological individuation and identification: the giving rise to, and the sustaining of, the signification of some physical and psychological borders over and above others so as to dissolve the significance of the latter while heightening the significance of the former into boundaries along which the identity of a particular (complex) numerically distinct entity—a person—is drawn. This signification occurs over and above the physiological and psychological borders themselves. The boundaries of personal identity are therefore not drawn in empirical facts inferred from such borders; rather, personal identity is a rendering of these borders highlighted by whatever metaphysical and metapsychological significance we accord to them. This metaphysical significance is not readily apparent and may vary from person to person and culture to culture, and so we must necessarily turn to conceptual analysis via thought experiments.

Fiction and The Emotions, ALEX NEILL

This article addresses the issue of what sorts of state we are moved to when we are moved by fiction. It argues that at least some emotions, such as pity, may be founded on an agent's beliefs about what is fictionally the case, and thus may have objects that are known by the agent to be fictional. Other emotions, including fear for oneself and jealousy, cannot be so founded, and hence cannot have objects that the agent knows to be fictional. We can pity fictional characters, but we cannot fear them or be jealous of them.

Natural Autonomy and Alternative Possibilities,
BRUCE N. WALLER

Due to the difficulties in developing a natural, nonmiraculous account of choosing among alternatives, contemporary compatibilists have turned to autonomy-as-authenticity. The ability to choose otherwise has been abandoned to libertarians. Through examination of the exploratory behavior humans share with other species, autonomy-as-alternatives can be

given a plausible, naturalistic, nonmysterious interpretation. This interpretation exhibits the natural roots of autonomy-as-alternatives, explains both the similarities and differences between the exploratory alternative-seeking behavior of humans and other animals, shows how genuine choices among alternatives can exist in the natural world, and explains why autonomy-as-authenticity is a poor substitute for autonomy-as-alternatives.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 32, No. 3, September 1992

Wittgenstein on Voluntary Actions, JORGE V. ARREGUI

Following the thought of Wittgenstein, the paper criticizes the idea that a voluntary action is an action caused by an "act of the will," and puts forwards an Aristotelian interpretation of Wittgenstein's insights. It is maintained that: willing is not a basic action; a voluntary action is not an action nomologically caused by an act of the will; the will is not a mental experience or a psychological event; and a voluntary action is an action originated by *me*. The arguments developed in the paper lead to the thesis that the will is not a faculty or operative principle of the soul parallel to the intellect.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Trying to Become Real: A Buddhist Critique of Some Secular Heresies, DAVID LOY

The Buddhist denial of self suggests that our fundamental repression is not sex or death but the quite valid intuition that "I am not real." In this case the "return of the repressed" manifests itself as a sense of lack, and we compensate for this feeling by trying to make ourselves real. If we are not blinded by the usual sacred-secular distinction, we can see that fame, money, and romance are means by which we symbolically try to fill up our sense of lack. Why are these historically conditioned preoccupations so important to us today? They might be called "secular religions," because in pursuing them a basically religious urge for transcendence returns in distorted form. Since we cannot overcome our sense of unreality in this fashion, our pursuits of fame, money and romance tend to become "demonic": we keep concluding that we need more.

Intentionality and Madness in Hegel's Psychology of Action,
DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND

The aim of this article is to show how Hegel's theory of action relies on an anatomy of "unintentional," or unconscious motives. The article

looks at the way this theme comes to light in Hegel's critique of purely intentional (nonconsequentialist) ethical positions, in his ontology of alienation, in his philosophy of language, and in his theory of madness (*Verrücktheit*). Various comparisons are made to the views of Nietzsche and Freud on the importance of the unconscious.

Plotinus and the Platonic Parmenides, GARY M. GURTNER, S.J.

Plotinus has often been accused of the excesses of his Neo-Platonic successors in interpreting Plato's *Parmenides*. Most commentators based their cases on allusions to the *Parmenides* scattered throughout the *Enneads*, avoiding *Enneads* 6.4-5, a sustained analysis of the dialogue. Instead of a mystical interpretation, Plotinus focuses on the point at issue: the relation of the form and particulars, and the dilemma of participation. He uses Aristotle's distinction of substance and accident to fix the extent of the Forms, questioned at *Parmenides* 130a-e. Accidents are treated in terms of Aristotle's hylomorphism, with substances related to Plato's transcendent Forms. In explicating substance, Plotinus attacks the confusion of the *Parmenides*, and attacks Aristotle concerning Plato's identification of substance with number. He shows that number is subordinate to being, counting what is already existent. He further accounts for the causal relationship between forms and sensible particulars by transforming Aristotle's doctrine of act and potency. In short, he deftly uses Aristotelian theories to disarm the dilemma of participation and to ground Platonic realism.

On Being Wrong: Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference,
JOHN POWERS

The focus of the article is a critical reexamination of Saul Kripke's causal theory of reference, which holds that reference derives from a chain of communication that begins with the original referent and is passed on by members of a language-speaking group. This theory works well with respect to simple declarative statements where the referent is relatively unambiguous. As language is actually used, however, the situation is often complicated by ambiguity and error. Speakers commonly say things that they do not mean, and mean more than they say. More importantly, it is possible to refer successfully while using language in a mistaken manner. The article provides several examples of successful reference that appear to meet Kripke's conditions but cannot intelligibly be said to be encompassed by his causal theory of reference. The article follows Grice in arguing that an adequate theory of reference must take account of the cognitive element that is always present in communication.

Three Zeros: A Comparative Philosophy of Voids,
ARCHIE J. BAHM

"Three Zeros" refers to three kinds of ontological negation in Western, Indian, and Chinese civilizations. These are absence of being, absence of

difference, and absence of exclusion. The Western conception is absence of being, not absence of distinction or absence of exclusion. The Indian conception is absence of difference, including absence of exclusion, but not absence of being. The Chinese conception is absence of exclusion, not absence of being or absence of difference. Implied are three conceptions of logical negation: exclusive negation, negation of all negation, and negation of exclusion.

Dawkins in Biomorph Land, KENNETH T. GALLAGHER

Richard Dawkins, in *The Blind Watchmaker*, argues in defense of the Darwinian claim that natural selection can account for the order in living beings without the need to appeal to a designer. Although his arguments have attracted wide attention, close examination seems to reveal serious defects. His models do not seem to be genuine simulacra of organisms. A recurring difficulty is the failure to incorporate the issue of the relation between form and function. Since this is a central question, models that do not take it into account will be multifariously misleading. The paper attempts to trace some instances of this in Dawkins.

Self as a Problem in African Philosophy,
CHUKWUDUM B. OKOLO

A Defense of Folk Psychology, PAUL K. BLUNT

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 31, No. 1, January 1993

Aristotle on Lying, JANE S. ZEMBATY

This paper examines some of Aristotle's statements regarding the truthful individual, the boaster, the self-deprecator, and the magnanimous individual in order to bring out Aristotle's views on lying. Part 1 begins a characterization of those lies which belong to the class of unjust acts. This characterization is relevant to Part 2, which deals with the boaster's lies and Aristotle's grounds for distinguishing between lies which are more and less reprehensible. Part 3 brings out additional reasons for the initial negative weight Aristotle assigns to lies, as well as some of the special considerations that make some lies nonreprehensible. Part 4 compares Aristotle's views on lies with some contemporary views on lying in general and benevolent lies in particular.

Occasionalism and General Will in Malebranche,
STEVEN NADLER

This article examines the nature of divine volitions and God's causal role in Malebranche's occasionalism. It argues that a recent and prevalent interpretation of Malebranche, according to which God wills only general laws, is mistaken. In the occasionalist system, God's causal activity is constant, and directed at particular states of substances and events. When Malebranche calls God's volitions "general volitions," he is simply calling attention to their accordance with law, and not describing their content as general.

The Last Temptation of Zarathustra, DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT

This article analyzes the significance of Zarathustra's "last sin," his pity for the higher men, in Part 4 of Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. It also explains why Zarathustra's overcoming of pity is the basis for an existential reorientation toward life that prepares the way for his "work," his striving for *Übermenschlichkeit*. To do this, the article details Schopenhauer's morality of pity and its connection to his theory of salvation as denial of the will; the problem of pity within Nietzsche's life and writings; and the function of pity in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as an expression of a bad love of self, others, and life. The article concludes that by highlighting pity as Zarathustra's last temptation, Nietzsche dramatically illustrates the life-denying dimensions of traditional altruistic morality, the seductive power of this tradition, and the strengths needed to transcend this tradition.

Russell's Theory of Meaning and Denotation and "On Denoting,"
RUSSELL WAHL

THE MONIST

Vol. 75, No. 4, October 1992

*Feminism and Pragmatism: On the Arrival of a "Ministry
of Disturbance, a Regulated Source of Annoyance; a Destroyer
of Routine; an Underminer of Complacency,"*
MARJORIE C. MILLER

Rediscovery of a philosophic tradition may be recognized by the emergence of vocabulary, categories, particular distinctions and connections, problems and themes which were previously articulated in a powerful philosophic tradition. This emergence may be viewed as rediscovery, even if those articulating the new positions are unaware of direct or indirect debt to the earlier tradition. Just such a rediscovery of the American

tradition is apparent in the work of contemporary feminists. This claim is defended with regard to the following: the problematizing of experience, the privileging of reason, and the conception of philosophy. The way particular feminists have raised, addressed, and developed each issue is explored in terms of the way their approaches may be viewed as a rediscovery of the "classic tradition." Examination of these issues, important to both feminists and classic American philosophers, suggests the value of extending the reconstruction.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 43, No. 170, January 1993

Quantum Mechanics and Determinism, NIAL SHANKS

This paper examines a number of arguments based on Bell's Theorem which purport to establish that quantum mechanics has ontological implications which exclude the possibility that determinism, viewed as an ontological thesis, is true. It is argued that while the arguments against determinism based on Bell's Theorem are valid—indeed, conspicuously so—they fail to do the required work because they rest on assumptions which beg the question against their intended determinist victims. An attempt is made to tie the results of this highly specific philosophical critique to broader epistemological concerns about skepticism and the very endeavor of providing empirical refutations of metaphysical theses.

Necessary Conditions and Explaining How-Possibly,
RICHARD REINER

William Dray has argued that historical explanations may take the form of answers to the question, How could the event E possibly have occurred? and that such explanations are not reducible to the covering-law form. In this article it is argued that a how-possibly explanation of an event must involve the assertion that some known, necessary condition for the event has been satisfied, and that in the examples Dray uses to support his argument only a single member of some hypothetical, and possibly infinite, jointly necessary set of conditions has been satisfied. It is further argued that Dray's examples seem convincing only because the condition satisfied suggests a particular causal account of the event, that is, a covering-law explanation. Finally, it is argued that explanation by necessary conditions is methodologically hazardous, because statements of the form " E_1 is a necessary condition for E_2 " are unfalsifiable.

Species, Essences and the Names of Natural Kinds,
T. E. WILKERSON

Exclusion and Abstraction in Descartes' Metaphysics,
D. R. MURDOCH

PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 68, No. 263, January 1993

The Subjection of John Stuart Mill, DAVID STOVE

This article concerns J. S. Mill's *The Subjection of Women*, and more specifically its treatment of the question whether the intellectual capacity of women is equal to that of men. Mill believed that it is. His treatment of this question, however, is evasive and superficial, and yet manages even so to be self-contradictory.

Self, Reference and Self-Reference, E. J. LOWE

An analysis of selfhood is presented which ties this notion to the possession of certain kinds of first-person knowledge, in particular *de re* knowledge of the identity of one's own conscious thoughts and experiences. This leads to an exploration of the nature of demonstrative reference to one's own conscious thoughts and experiences. Such reference, it is argued, is typically "direct," in contrast to demonstrative reference to all physical objects, apart from those objects that are parts of one's own body or which are directly subject to one's will. The implication is that the semantic distinction between "direct" and "indirect" demonstrative reference helps to delineate the metaphysical boundary between oneself and the rest of the world. It is not contended, however, that one is to be identified with one's body: indeed, it is argued that one can know *a priori* that no such identity can obtain.

Future Generations: Present Harms, JOHN O'NEILL

The protagonists in the philosophical debate about our obligations to future generations share a common assumption: there is a special problem about obligations to future generations, that is, we can benefit or harm them but they cannot benefit or harm us. This paper rejects that assumption. It shows that the actions of generations that follow us can harm us, just as we can benefit and harm those who have lived before us. It criticizes the subjectivist account of well-being that is presupposed by those who hold a temporally local perspective on the goods and harms that can befall us. Finally, it argues that this perspective reflects a peculiarly modern attitude toward our relation with the past and future which is at the center of our environmental problems, and it explores the social conditions responsible for the prevalence of that attitude.

Deconstruction and Aerodynamics, JENNY TEICHMAN

This paper begins by pointing out that deconstruction is among other things a theory of meaning derived from the work of Saussure. Two of

Derrida's technical terms, namely, "logocentrism" and *differance*, are explained with examples. The attempt to deconstruct deconstruction is examined and found to be an attempt to immunize deconstruction from more traditional forms of refutation such as proofs that it is false and proofs that it is self-contradictory. A deconstructive thesis, namely, that meaning undergoes constant slippage and is therefore impossible, is compared to the theory in aerodynamics which proves, supposedly, that bumblebees cannot fly. The deconstructive thesis is thereby shown to be false. The paper ends with an examination of the concept of philosophical insincerity.

Love's Constancy, MIKE W. MARTIN

At its best, marital love is a durable attitude and relationship defined in part by the virtues of caring, honesty, fairness, and faithfulness. Marital faithfulness, which is distinct from the much narrower idea of foregoing adultery, is grounded in a commitment to love. That commitment has unjustifiably been criticized as unintelligible, unreasonable, inhumane, unnecessary, nonbinding, and even incompatible with love. Rejecting these criticisms, however, leaves open the question of why faithfulness is a virtue. One part of the answer concerns the moral goods involved in love, and the way faithfulness provides a framework for ongoing and reciprocal caring, support, fulfillment, and joy. Another part concerns the way faithfulness is a context-dependent, limited, and flexible virtue which (alongside luck) makes a significant contribution to desirable forms of love.

Philosophical Prose and Practice, RICHARD C. MCCLEARY

Richard Rorty argues that philosophy must abandon its traditional attempt to establish suprahistorical bases for understanding, action, and community. Alisdair MacIntyre argues that philosophy must free itself from the narrow confines of professional philosophy and recognize that philosophy's proper context of inquiry is the conceptual analyses of all academic professionals. This paper argues that the philosophizing of all professionals is distorted by their involvement in history's classification, group, and class struggles; that these struggles are the concrete context of philosophical inquiry; that in this context the important distinction is not between professionals and nonprofessionals but between those who do and do not philosophize critically in terms of a concrete historical understanding of the social and epistemological foundations and functions of their thought and action; and that only critical philosophizing as public dialogue can produce relatively undistorted answers to the question of how we must live together to live well.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
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The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory,
STEPHEN ENGSTROM

Kant claims that the concept of the highest good—the idea of a state or condition in which happiness is proportioned to virtue—is grounded in the moral law. This claim, however, has often been challenged, and many have denied that the concept of the highest good has a legitimate place within his moral theory. This paper argues that when the moral law is interpreted as a criterion of validity for the application of the concept of the good, the concept of the highest good can indeed be derived from the moral law. It is also argued that despite an initial appearance to the contrary, the duty to promote the highest good does not conflict with other duties. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the highest good is to be promoted, and how the concept of the highest good relates to the rest of Kant's moral theory.

Where's the Good in Teleology? MARK BEDAU

Contemporary analyses of teleological explanation generally attempt to cast it in some descriptive, efficient causal form. This trend is misguided, because value plays an essential role in teleological explanation. This paper defends a causal analysis of teleological explanation that gives value an essential explanatory role. After surveying alternative accounts, three grades of evaluative involvement in teleology are distinguished. Instances of the grade-one three analysis are developed for teleology involving mental agents, artifacts, and biological organisms and their parts. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for the controversy concerning teleology in biology.

Criteria of Identity and the Individuation of Natural-Kind Events,
ELIAS E. SAVELLOS

How are events individuated? The standard response to this question has involved the formulation of criteria of identity for events. This, in turn, has been the result of viewing the problem of individuation as one of individual differentiation. Yet the genuine problem of individuation, some philosophers have argued, calls for an account as to what structures individuality, what it is that makes a single individual an individual nonetheless. This paper proposes that in viewing events as Aristotelian "this-suches" we have the means to respond to the concerns of those who view the problem of individuation as one of individuality, as well as to structure an answer that satisfies the standard view. This proposal is limited in

scope. It applies only to natural-kind events such as earthquakes, tornadoes, eruptions, and the like.

In Defense of Global Supervenience, R. CRANSTON PAULL and
THEODORE SIDER

Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind. The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties. But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psycho-physical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on the physical, and that global supervenience is too weak to be an interesting dependence relation. It is argued in this article that these arguments are unsound. Along the way, the authors clarify the relationship between global and strong supervenience, and show clearly what sort of dependence global supervenience provides.

Deontology and the Arbitrary, ANTHONY ELLIS

Nonabsolutist deontology holds that certain acts are morally prohibited (or required) unless the consequences of not performing them are sufficiently bad (or good). This paper argues that it is not possible to give an account of what "sufficiently" means in this formulation, and that this destroys such a theory. The problem, obviously, is that of specifying cutoff points. This paper argues that for the type of theory under discussion it must be impossible to specify such cutoff points without arbitrariness. Nor will it solve the problem to hold that there is no cutoff point, since the notion of sufficiency here is acceptably vague. Though such a finding would be consistent with some theories, it is not consistent with the type of theory under discussion, for it leaves a deep and damaging inconsistency at its center. A gesture is then made toward one moral theory which responds to at least some of the motivations behind nonabsolutist deontology, but which does not encounter this problem. A short appendix on the structure of deontology is included.

Demonstrating with Descriptions, MARGA REIMER

Kaplan's "directing intention" theory of perceptual demonstratives, together with his demonstrative analysis of referentially used descriptions, is shown to cohere with the fact that a slightly off-target demonstration—whether effected by ostension or description—is not going to prevent the intended demonstratum from emerging as the actual demonstratum. The analyses are then criticized on the grounds that they fail to account for what happens when the demonstration—whether effected by ostension or description—is very wide of the mark. Two alternative analyses of perceptual demonstratives, together with alternative analyses of referentially

used descriptions, are proposed. The analyses are recommended on the grounds that they account for the phenomena which support, as well as the phenomena which undermine, Kaplan's proposed analyses. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of how the proposed treatments of referentially used descriptions fare when compared with other popular treatments of such expressions.

The Laws of Thought, HILARY KORNBLITH

A good deal of experimental work in psychology done in the last two decades seems to converge on a common conclusion: human beings reason very badly. Some have urged that there are very general reasons for rejecting this conclusion: Elliot Sober, John Pollack, and L. J. Cohen, for example, argue that the data do not look nearly so bad once we draw a competence-performance distinction. Sober and Pollack both argue that the mere fact that we are capable of detecting our reasoning errors shows that we do not reason as badly as has frequently been claimed. These arguments in defense of our ability to reason well are examined and found wanting. By the same token, however, attempts to show that the data do indeed demonstrate human irrationality or native bad reasoning are also found wanting. A modestly optimistic account of the experimental data is presented and defended.

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, KEITH DEROSE

This paper is an exposition, clarification, and defense of contextualism: the view that there is a contextually determined variance in the epistemic standards a subject *S* must live up to in order for a sentence attributing knowledge to *S* to be true. The first part introduces and motivates the discussion of contextualism by means of a pair of cases which displays such a variation of epistemic standards. The second part distinguishes contextualism from what has been called the Relevant Alternatives theory of knowledge (*RA*). It is argued that of the two types of factors which are plausibly thought on *RA* to affect what the range of relevant alternatives is, only one type affects the meaning or content of a knowledge attribution; that one can accept *RA* without being a contextualist; and that *RA* theorists have attempted to tie the meaning or content of a knowledge attribution too closely to the range of relevant alternatives. The third part defends contextualism from objections which initially appear to be very powerful: the objection that the issue of whether a subject knows something or not seems to be independent of the contextual interests of those who happen to be talking about the subject at a given time; and the related charge that, after a knowledge claim is made and the standards for knowledge then go up, contextualism would countenance such an absurd utterance as, "Well, I did know before, but now that the standards have been raised, I no longer know."

Pleasure, Passion and Truth, J. E. TILES

Hume's claim that there cannot be a conflict between passion and reason is shown to rest on two questionable principles, one about the nature

of representation and the other about the objects of the passions. It is argued that each of these principles should be rejected. With these two principles set aside it is possible, drawing on resources found in Plato's *Philebus*, to show how passions can be true or false, and thus how reason, even if confined to the office of determining truth and falsehood, is competent to condemn a passion as irrational.

PHRONESIS
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Do Plato's Philosopher-Rulers Sacrifice Self-Interest To Justice?
TIMOTHY A. MAHONEY

Virtually all interpreters of the *Republic* agree that the conclusion of the main argument of Books 2-4 is that psychic justice is the foundation of one's happiness, and thus psychic justice is also an integral part of one's self-interest. Many interpreters believe, however, that philosophers sacrifice their self-interest by governing the model *polis* in accordance with the demands of social justice. This paper elucidates the conception of self-interest at work in the *Republic* and demonstrates that being just is essential to one's own self-interest, whether one conceives of justice as a psychic virtue—that is, each part of the soul fulfilling its proper function for the good of the soul as a whole—or as a social virtue, that is, each person in a society fulfilling his proper function for the good of society as a whole.

Appearances and Impressions, RACHEL BARNEY

A central problem in the interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism is how to understand the skeptic's readiness to say how things "appear" to him in a way compatible with his disavowal of dogmatism. The paper argues, against most recent interpretations, that there is no need to attribute to the skeptic a conception of appearance that says what appears to one is unrelated to one's beliefs about the world. An examination of appearance (and the related concept of "impression") in Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Epictetus confirms that the idea of an experience of "being appeared to" unrelated to belief is itself a dogmatic construct unsuited to the skeptic. Instead, the skeptic uses the language of appearance to express a profound lack of confidence in his own processes of belief formation—a natural response to the irresolvable epistemological conflicts he encounters.

*A Theophrastean Excursus on God and Nature and its Aftermath
in Hellenistic Thought*, JAAP MANSFELD

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Metaphysical Society of America announces a call for papers to be presented at its March 1994 meeting entitled "Becoming." There will be four sessions, each focusing on a different aspect of reality from the perspective of the general theme: "Becoming and Time," "Becoming and Person," "Becoming and Society," and "Becoming and Nature." Some papers will be invited; the majority will be selected by the Program Committee. A prospectus of at least two pages, outlining the theme and general arguments, or a draft paper of no more than twenty-five pages, should be sent by May 1, 1993, to George Allan, Dean, Dickinson College, P.O. Box 1773, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. Papers that are selected must have a reading time of no more than thirty minutes.

The Scots Philosophical Club, in association with Trinity College, Dublin, invites papers for a conference to be held in the spring of 1994 commemorating the three-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Francis Hutcheson. Papers may be on the interpretation of Hutcheson and on present day debates in the topics with which he is associated, notably moral theory, utilitarianism, and aesthetics. Abstracts of two hundred to four hundred words, together with a biographical note, should be sent by September 1, 1993, to L. G. Graham, Secretary of the Scots Philosophical Club, Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland KY16 9AL.

The *European Journal of Philosophy* announces the April 1993 publication of its first issue. The *Journal* aims to foster a greater exchange of ideas among European philosophers and to publish articles reflecting the range of philosophical activity in Europe. The *Journal* will also organize workshops, publish reviews of new titles, and provide professional information of interest to philosophers. Information concerning submissions may be obtained from Mark Sacks, Editor, The European Journal of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom. Subscription information may be obtained by writing to Journal Marketing, The European Journal of Philosophy, Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142.

Work has begun on *The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia*, which is scheduled to be published in June 1997. The volume will contain entries on all aspects of its subject, and is intended to provide an overview of current scholarship for students and researchers. Inquiries should be addressed to Christopher Berry Gray, Editor, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University, 7141 Sherbrooke Street West, Montréal, Quebec, Canada H4B 1R6.

As of the beginning of 1993, the *Journal of Philosophical Research* (formerly *Philosophy Research Archives*) will be edited by Panayot Butchvarov of the University of Iowa. He succeeds Robert Audi of the University of Nebraska.